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Karin Zachmann
AN INTRODUCTION
“Where were you when the lights went out?” With this short, pointed 
question, David Nye opened his book on the history of electricity blackouts 
in America.1 These few words sufficed to set his program, namely to explore 
blackouts not as technical failures but social constructions. Thus, he used 
sudden darkness to illuminate the political, technological and cultural 
dynamics of high-energy societies. 
In the studies that follow, we are pursuing a similar aim but with 
a different angle. To investigate how energy concatenates politics, 
technologies and cultures, we invited researchers from different fields 
in the humanities and social sciences to discuss energy as a resource, a 
symbol and a consumer good.2 We focussed attention on a variety of sites 
in Europe and the United States and travelled not just through space but 
also through time – from the 19th to the 21st century – in order to understand 
how energy was perceived, appropriated and put to use for a broad variety 
1 | David E. Nye: When the Lights Went Out. A History of Blackouts in America. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2010, 1.
2 | The contributions in this volume are based on papers given at the interna-
tional workshop “Deified – Damned – Depleted: Energy as Symbol, Resource 
and Consumer Good”, organized by the research project “Objects of Energy Con-
sumption” at the Deutsches Museum, January 20-22, 2011. We thank the Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) for the generous funding of the 
research project, the workshop and this publication.
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of purposes. Presenting here the findings from these studies, we hope to 
contribute new perspectives on past and present energy societies. 
At the outset, however, such an undertaking encounters a major 
difficulty. This is the problem of finding a comprehensive and definitive 
concept of energy, not just in the sciences but in technology and culture. In 
science, the physicist and Nobel laureate Richard Feynman once stated in 
one of his famous lectures in the 1960s: “It is important to realize that in 
physics today, we have no knowledge of what energy is. We do not have a 
picture that energy comes in little blobs of a definite amount.”3 There are, of 
course, formulas to calculate a numerical quantity that is always constant. 
But according to Feynman, this numerical quantity is an abstract thing 
that tells us nothing about the mechanisms and reasons for the different 
formulas.4 Other scholars from a broad spectrum of fields – including 
more Nobel laureates – advanced the idea of energy as an all-encompassing 
concept. This becomes obvious in the introduction of physicist R. Bruce 
Lindsay’s history on the concept of energy: “No other concept [than the idea 
of energy, K.C.Z.] has so unified our understanding of experience. Without 
exaggeration we can say that every single aspect of human experience, 
whether it be what we observe in the external world, or what we do or what 
is done to us, can be adequately described either as a transfer of energy in 
one form from one place to another or the transformation of energy from 
one form to another.”5 But also Lindsay ends up asking: “But what is the 
thing that is transferred and transformed?” He consulted encyclopaedias 
and dictionaries but to no result. Fighting resignation, he asked: “Must you 
then pursue a whole course of university physics with its awful array of 
mathematical symbolism in order to understand what energy means, how 
it is measured, and the reason for its overwhelmingly important role in 
human life?”6 Lindsay suggests instead trying another approach, namely 
to detect the key idea in energy. Thus, from a philosophical perspective he 
3 | Richard P. Feynman, Robert B. Leighton, Matthew Sands: Feynman Lectures 
on Physics: Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat. 3 vols. Reading, MA: Addi-
son-Wesley, 1966, 59.
4 | Feynman: Feynman Lectures on Physics, 59.
5 | R. Bruce Lindsay: Energy. Historical Development of the Concept. Strouds-
burg, PA: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, 1975, 2.
6 | Lindsay: Energy, 5.
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characterized energy as “constancy in the midst of change.”7 This short 
assertion effectively translates the first law of thermodynamics (that energy 
is ‘conserved’) into a philosophical statement that is broad enough to guide 
Lindsay’s exploration on how energy emerged as a concept in history. 
Scholars and intellectuals in the social sciences, however, differ from 
physicists because they are not so much interested in exploring what 
is constant but rather in seeking explanations of change. In doing so, 
well-known academics contributed to what has become known as the 
‘energy-civilization equation’, i.e. a train of thought that deduced societal 
achievements (civilization) from increases in energy consumption.8 
“Because we use a hundred and ten times as much coal as our ancestors, 
we believe ourselves a hundred and ten times better, intellectually, morally, 
and spiritually.”9 This is how Aldous Huxley, author of the dystopian novel 
Brave New World (1932), satirically presented the energy-civilization equation 
that many other writers and thinkers assumed was a valid construct. 
Radical innovations, such as the steam engine, the internal combustion 
engine, and the dynamoelectric machine, fundamentally changed existing 
energy regimes and led to the development of thermodynamics, the basic 
formulation of the relationship between work and energy in Newtonian 
physics, and the establishment of the first and second laws. Together, they 
also inspired scholars to define energy as the driving force throughout 
human history that is responsible for all changes. 
That energy might fundamentally drive history is the central premise 
of this introduction. As a first step, it will outline, albeit briefly, how the 
deterministic tradition of a societal energetics emerged and changed 
against the background of energy transitions and societal evolutions. 
Contextualizing and historically grounding the developing energy-
civilization equation will, it is hoped, provide us with the means to 
understand that the challenges of the pending energy transitions of the 
21st century require a more reflective picture on the complex relationship 
between energy and society. This introduction then goes on to introduce 
7 | Lindsay: Energy, 5.
8 | For an overview see George Basalla: “Energy and Civilization”, in: Chauncey 
Starr/Philip C. Ritterbush, eds. Science, Technology, and the Human Prospect: 
Proceedings of the Edison Centennial Symposium. New York: Pergamon Press, 
1980, 39-52.
9 | Aldous Huxley: “Progress”, in: Vanity Fair 29 (1928), 69.
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the anthology’s chapters and to show how the authors approach past and 
present energy societies and thus contribute new perspectives on the 
linkages between energy, politics, technologies and cultures.
RE VISITING THE ENERGY-CIVILIZ ATION EQUATION
Many writers in 19th century Great Britain attributed the country’s becoming 
‘the workshop of the world’ and the then wealthiest nation to the advent 
and expansion of steam power.10 The technical and popular literature on 
the European continent replicated this deterministic energy-civilization 
view in many versions. But early on we can also find a critical stance 
against this formulation. Although his statement, “The hand-mill gives 
you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial 
capitalist,” is often interpreted as proof for the assumption that Karl Marx 
(1818-1883) subscribed to the energy-civilization equation11, Marx explicitly 
contradicted this view in the chapter on machinery and big industry in the 
first volume of Capital.12 Here he maintained that not the steam engine 
bore the responsibility for the industrial revolution but rather the machine 
tool. “The machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set 
in motion, performs with its tools the same operations that were formerly 
done by the workman with similar tools. Whether the motive power is 
derived from man, or from some other machine, makes no difference in 
this respect.”13 Others, however, were more impressed by the power of 
steam and subsequent heat engines. 
10 | For details cf. Basalla: “Energy and Civilization”, 42-43.
11 | Karl Marx: The Poverty of Philosophy. Chapter 2, Second Observation, 
http://www.mar xists.org/archive/mar x/works/1847/pover ty-philosophy/ch02.
htm, Accessed 28.12.2011.
12 | In the online edition, the chapter on “Machinery and Modern Industry” is 
chapter 15. Cf. Karl Marx: Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One. 
Chapter 15: Machinery and Modern Industry. Section 1 – The Development of Ma-
chinery. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch15.htm, Ac-
cessed 28.12.2011.
13 | Shortly thereafter Marx stated again: “The machine, which is the star ting-
point of the industrial revolution, supersedes the workman, who handles a single 
tool, by a mechanism operating with a number of similar tools, and set in motion 
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The British philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) 
subscribed to the energy-civilization equation when he reasoned that energy 
is largely responsible for material differences between societies.14 The 
more energy a society could harness from its resources, the better it fared 
relative to others. Based on his notion of physical power, Spencer conceived 
society as an energetic system. He interchangeably used metaphors of 
power, energy and force for developing his concept of societal evolution. 
Surprisingly, however, Spencer did not deal with the social use of non-
human energy forms.15 That remained for Sir Patrick Geddes (1854-1932) 
who built on Spencer but advanced the use of non-human energy to become 
a main argument for explaining societal evolution. A Scottish biologist, 
sociologist, and city planner who co-founded the British Sociological 
Society in 1902 and strove to develop a concrete and applied sociology of 
cities that he called “civics”, Geddes subdivided the industrial era into a 
‘paleotechnic’ and a ‘neotechnic’ phase. He distinguished ‘paleotechnics’, 
“a comparatively crude and wasteful technic age, characterised by coal, 
steam, and cheap machine products, and a corresponding quantitative 
ideal of ‘progress of wealth and population’” from ‘neotechnics’, “a finer 
civilisation, characterised by the wider command, yet greater economy 
of natural energies, by the predominance of electricity, and by increasing 
victory of an ideal of qualitative progress, expressed in terms of skill and 
art, of hygiene and education, of social polity, etc.”16 Geddes shared his 
admiration of electricity as an agent of societal betterment with many 
others. But his specific, energy-based framework of societal as civic 
evolution would find just one important intellectual heir, whom I will 
introduce later.
by a single motive power, whatever the form of that power may be.” Marx: Capital, 
Section 1 – The Development of Machinery.
14 | Herbert Spencer: First Principles. New York: A. L. Burt, 1880.
15 | Cf. Andrew M. McKinnon: “Energy and Society: Herbert Spencer’s ‘Energetic 
Sociology’ of Social Evolution and Beyond”, in: Journal of Classical Sociology 
10:4 (2010), 439-55.
16 | Patrick Geddes: “Civics: As Concrete and Applied Sociology, Part II”, in: 
Sociological Papers 2 (1906), 58-119, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/13205/13205-h/13205-h.htm, Accessed 28.12.2011. See also Patrick 
Geddes: Cities in Evolution: An Introduction to the Town Planning Movement and 
the Study of Civics. London: Williams & Norgate, 1915, Chaper IV. 
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Similar to Geddes but framed in terms of a cultural theory, his German 
contemporary, the chemist and Nobel laureate Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-
1932) established energy as the core concept of his world view. Ostwald 
argued that the transformation of crude energy (rohe Energie) into useful 
energy (Nutzenergie) was at the base of all social change.17 According to 
Ostwald, the efficiency of this transformation (Güteverhältnis) determines 
the amount of free energy that societies can put to use for cultural work. 
This then would be the second principle of energetics. While the first 
principle is the first law of thermodynamics (i.e. conservation of energy), the 
second principle serves as a guideline of cultural development.18 Ostwald 
concluded his energy-deterministic worldview with the firm appeal, “Do 
not waste energy!” which he ambitiously called the energetic imperative.19 
Ostwald’s reasoning on the role of energy in society provoked criticism 
from, among others, Max Weber, who accused Ostwald of deriving value 
judgements from hard science and thus adhering to a naturalism that 
does not foster but prohibit a fruitful discussion between the hard and the 
cultural sciences.20 
But Ostwald inspired other thinkers to expand on his ideas of 
energetics. One of them was the U.S. American historian and writer Henry 
Adams (1838-1918), who expanded his notion of energy beyond the concept 
of physics. In his famous 1900 essay “The Dynamo and the Virgin”, Adams 
developed a multi-stage theory of Western civilization that was based on 
energy. He differentiated four stages of increasingly shorter length, what 
he saw as proof of a historical process of acceleration. The first stage was 
driven by religious energy embodied in the Virgin Mary. This stage lasted 
until around 1600. The next stage was marked by the coming of the steam 
engine and led into the age of mechanical energy that lasted for the next 
300 years. In 1900, symbolized by the spectacle of the dynamoelectric 
machine, the age of electricity supplanted the mechanical stage, but 
it lasted only 17 and a half years. By 1917, the ether that filled the whole 
17 | Wilhelm Ostwald: Energetische Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft. Leipzig: 
Klinkhardt, 1909, 24.
18 | Ostwald: Energetische Grundlagen, 39.
19 | Wilhelm Ostwald: Der energetische Imperativ. Leipzig: Akademische Ver-
lags-Gesellschaft, 1912.
20 | Max Weber: “Energetische Kultur theorien”, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur 
Wissenschaftslehre. Tübingen: Mohr, 1968, 400-26.
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universe would emerge as the only still available source of energy, but the 
emergent ethereal civilization was doomed to perish by 1921. Assuming 
that the universe relied on a fixed supply of energy, Adams expected an 
apocalyptical end of history due to the law of entropy.21 
At the same time as Adams published his dystopian visions, other 
scholars also warned of the limited availability of usable energy stemming 
from the second law of thermodynamics. The British chemist and Nobel 
laureate Frederick Soddy (1877-1956) was among them. In his 1912 book 
Matter and Energy, Soddy stated that the “laws expressing the relations 
between energy and matter are not solely of importance in pure science, 
[but] they [also] necessarily come first in order […] in the whole record of 
human experience, and they control, in the last resort, the rise and fall 
of political systems, the freedom or bondage of nations, the movements 
of commerce and industry, the origin of wealth and poverty, and the 
general physical welfare of the race.”22 As a pioneer in the study of the 
atom, however, Soddy turned from pessimist into an anxious protagonist 
of atomic energy. Releasing the energy in the heart of the atom would allow 
humankind to escape the danger inherent in the scarcity of coal (and oil) 
and instead bring about an affluent paradise of the atomic future.23 Thus, 
roughly three decades prior to the euphoric though sometimes ambivalent 
assessment of the atom during the Cold War, Soddy preached on the promise 
of abundance that would be based on atomic energy. He also pondered the 
possibility of producing atomic weapons. Similarly, science fiction writer 
H. G. Wells foresaw the danger of atomic warfare and developed the vision 
that humankind would be able to use the atom peacefully only after having 
gone through a devastating atomic war. Wells dedicated his novel, written 
21 | Henry Adams: The Education of Henry Adams. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1961, chapters 25 and 33, quoted in David Nye: Electrifying America. Social 
Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997, 
143.
22 | Frederick Soddy: Matter and Energy. London: Williams and Norgate, 1912, 
10-11, quoted by Leslie A. White: The Evolution of Culture: The Development of 
Civilization to the Fall of Rome. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959, 39.
23 | Frederick Soddy: Science and Life. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1920, 22-24; Fre-
derick Soddy: Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt. London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1926, 49-68.
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before the beginning of World War I, to none other than Frederick Soddy.24 
The chemist Soddy saw a second impediment to the arrival of his atomic 
‘Garden Eden’. This was the prevailing economic system. Therefore, he 
turned to economics and called for a major change in the economic system 
that would be based on the laws of thermodynamics.25 
While Soddy derived his optimism for the future of humankind from 
his faith in the still-to-be-tapped mighty atom, many of his contemporaries 
in the first third of the 20th century focussed their hopes for a better future 
on electricity as a clean form of energy. Scientists, engineers, intellectuals, 
entrepreneurs, feminists, politicians – in short, representatives of all 
strata of society from many countries – expected to better society via 
electrification.26 One of them was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, leader of the 
communist revolution in Russia, who pushed electrification because he 
believed that the power of Soviets plus electrification would lead toward 
true communism.27 British feminists cherished quite comparable hopes 
when they formed an Electrical Association for Women as a step toward 
their emancipation.28 In the United States during the Great Depression, 
leaders of the New Deal and their followers championed the electrification 
of the Tennessee Valley as a means to bring the backward South into the 20th 
century.29 Even before the turn of the century in Germany, representatives 
of the conservative as well as the socialist political camp connected their 
societal visions to the availability of electricity, not just as a power source 
but as a source for empowerment of their respective clienteles. Socio-
conservative economists as well as engineers hoped to secure the survival 
24 | Basalla: “Energy and Civilization”, 47.
25 | Soddy: Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt, 49-68.
26 | For an early review of this literature, see James W. Carey and John J. Quirck: 
“The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution”, in: The American Scholar, Parts I and 
II, 39 (1970), 219-41, 395-424.
27 | On Lenin and Soviet electrification, see Jonathan Coopersmith: The Electri-
fication of Russia, 1880-1926. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.
28 | Carroll W. Pursell, Jr.: “Domesticating Modernity: The Electrical Associa-
tion for Women, 1924-1986”, in: British Journal for the History of Science 32:1 
(1999), 47-67.
29 | Thomas P. Hughes: American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Techno-
logical Enthusiasm. New York: Viking, 1989, 353-81; Nye: Electrifying America, 
304-35.
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of small-scale industries and traditional crafts against the competition 
of big industry by introducing small-scale electrical engines as power 
source.30 At the same time, the socialist leader August Bebel (1840-1913) 
extended and republished his socialist utopia under the title, The Woman 
and Socialism, in several editions. Therein, he envisioned the electrification 
of the household as the precondition for the emancipation of women, and 
he described his socialist utopia in terms of an electrified paradise.31 
German engineers also felt empowered as innovators in the field of 
electric power generation, its transmission, and its use to minimize the 
effects of entropy, thus following Ostwald’s energetic imperative.32 The 
engineers called for superseding the principle of profitability by the 
principle of efficiency, as the latter was the most important regulator of the 
30 | Ulrich Wengenroth: “Motoren für den Kleinbetrieb. Soziale Utopien, techni-
sche Entwicklung und Absatzstrategien bei der Motorisierung des Kleingewer-
bes im Kaiserreich”, in: Ulrich Wengenroth, ed. Prekäre Selbstbestimmung. Zur 
Standortbestimmung von Handwerk, Hausindustrie und Kleingewerbe im Indu-
strialisierungsprozess. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989, 177-205. In the U.S., ironically, 
Henry Ford became a champion of decentralized “village industries” even though 
his company’s Highland Park and River Rouge factories epitomized the very es-
sence of mass production. See Howard Segal: Recasting the Machine Age: Henry 
Ford’s Village Industries. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005. 
The German inventor Rudolph Diesel strongly believed that his new engine pos-
sessed all the right characteristics to decentralize factory motive power, thereby 
mitigating many of the negative aspects of the factory system, which he believed 
could be attributed to the steam engine and its centralized power distribution 
system (belts, pulleys, and line shafting that conveyed power to manufacturing 
processes, machine tools, textile machinery, and the like from a central source). 
See Diesel’s discussion in his Diesel’s Rational Heat Motor: A Lecture. New York: 
Progressive Publishing Company, 1897, 18.
31 | August Bebel: Die Frau und der Sozialismus. 37th ed. Stuttgart: Dietz, 1904.
32 | Hans Dieter Hellige: “Wir tschafts-, Energie- und Stoffkreisläufe in säkularer 
Perspektive: Von der thermodynamischen Entzauberung der Welt zur recycling-
orientier ten Wachstumsgesellschaft”, in: Gangolf Hübinger/Ernst Schulin, eds. 
Universalgeschichte und Nationalgeschichten. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 
1994, 291-315.
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economy.33 In comparison to the economist, the engineer would act as the 
superior housekeeper as he calculated efficiencies based on the inputs and 
outputs of energy in his works.34 This would entitle engineers to be the 
leaders of society because only they knew best how to govern the economy 
and society in the most efficient way.35 
Similar ideas also sprang up in the United States. In 1921, social 
scientist Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) proposed a Soviet of Technicians, 
which would be more competent in managing the country’s industrial 
system than what he termed Vested Interests and their absentee owners.36 
Rather than the wasteful, highly inefficient management of industry by 
the financial agents of absentee owners, the Soviet of Technicians would 
responsibly govern the allocation of energy sources, equipment, materials, 
and manpower. Led by the self-trained and self-styled ‘Bohemian engineer’ 
Howard Scott, subscribers to Veblen’s Engineers and the Price System 
soon envisaged a new currency to replace money, a currency based on 
energy instead of gold. Although the Veblen-inspired movement flowered 
only briefly as “Technocracy, Incorporated”, energy-based technocratic 
thought endured in many forms, including the ideas implicit in one-
time Technocracy, Inc. member M. King Hubbert (of ‘Hubbert’s Peak’ or 
33 | The most explicit conclusion drew Rathenau and Moellendorff when they re-
quired reforming the post WWI economy according to the principles of the war-
fare state into a social economy where the market was replaced by organization 
for the sake of efficiency. Cf. Karin Zachmann: “Wirkungsgrad contra Wertgrad: 
Zur Entstehung des Konflikts zwischen der technischen und der ökonomischen 
Auffassung vom Wir tschaften”, in: Technikgeschichte 62:2 (1995): 103-31.
34 | Julius Schenk: Die Begrif fe Wirtschaft und Technik und ihre Bedeutung für 
die Ingenieurausbildung. Breslau: Preuss & Jünger, 1913. 
35 | On the engineers’ claim to societal leadership after WWI see Charles Mai-
er: “Zwischen Taylorismus und Technokratie: Gesellschaftspolitik im Zeichen in-
dustrieller Rationalität in den zwanziger Jahren in Europa”, in: Michael Stürmer, 
ed. Die Weimarer Republik. Belagerte Civitas. Königstein: Athenäum, 1985, 188-
213; Karin Zachmann: Mobilisierung der Frauen. Technik, Geschlecht und Kalter 
Krieg in der DDR. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2004, 136-49. 
36 | Thorstein Veblen: The Engineers and the Price System. Kitchener, ON: Ba-
toche Books, 2001 [1921], available at http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/
ugcm/3ll3/veblen/Engineers.pdf, Accessed 28.12.2011. 
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‘peak oil’ fame) and the historical framework put forward in 1934 by the 
American ‘public intellectual’ Lewis Mumford (1895-1990).37
In the early 1930s, Mumford subscribed to Veblen’s diagnosis and 
critique of an increasing “dissociation between capitalism and technics.”38 
In his widely-read fundamental work Technics and Civilization, published 
in 1934, Mumford explored the development of the technology-driven 
Western civilization. By expanding the framework of Geddes, whom he 
praised as his master, Mumford differentiated three historical epochs that 
had formed technologically distinct complexes. A determining factor for 
each epoch was energy. The ecotechnic phase was dominated by water 
power and wood energy sources. The paleotechnic phase was characterized 
by a coal-based energy system. The neotechnic phase, eventually, rested 
upon the modern electricity-based energy complex. Mumford analyzed the 
social effects of new power sources and technologies in great detail and he 
shared his contemporaries’ overly enthusiastic vision of the social effects 
of electricity.39 
The advent of atomic power and its ambivalent perception as both 
cornucopia and sword of Damocles in the fiercely contested Cold War 
37 | On the technocracy movement, see Daniel Bell: The End of Ideology. New 
York: The Free Press, 1960; Edwin T. Layton, Jr.: Revolt of the Engineers. Cleve-
land, OH: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1971; Henry Elsner, Jr.: The 
Technocrats: Prophets of Automation. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1967; William E. Akin: Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat 
Movement, 1900-1941. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977; and 
Howard Scott’s own, infamous “Hotel Pierre” address of January 1933, “Tech-
nocracy,” available online at http://www.technocracy.org/technical-alliancetn/
howard-scott/208-societyscott, Accessed 28.12.2011. On Hubbert, see Ronald 
Doel’s biographical sketch in the Handbook of Texas Online, http://www.oilcrisis.
com/hubbert/bio_doel.htm, Accessed 28.12.2011. On the American and the 
German technocracy movement in comparison see Stefan Willeke: Die Technokra-
tiebewegung in Nordamerika und Deutschland zwischen den Weltkriegen. Frankfurt/
Main: Lang, 1995.
38 | Lewis Mumford: Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt, 1934, 366.
39 | Near the end of Technics and Civilization, albeit briefly, Mumford even pro-
jected a future “biotechnic” phase that some analysts have seen as Mumford’s 
vision of a more sustainable socio-technic energy regime. Mumford: Technics 
and Civilization, 353.
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nourished new thinking about the energy-civilization equation. The 
American anthropologist Leslie A. White (1900-1975) initiated this 
renewed discussion in the midst of World War II with the publication of his 
influential article “Energy and the Evolution of Culture” in The American 
Anthropologist. Leslie asserted that anthropology was a “branch of natural 
science which deals with matter-and-motion, i.e. energy, phenomena 
in cultural form, as biology deals with them in cellular, and physics in 
atomic form.”40 White established himself as an evolutionist against the 
anthropological school of Franz Boas by tying cultural evolution to human 
control of energy. Cultural evolution was to be measured by the amount 
of energy the culture in question was able to harness. As White explicitly 
stated: “The key to the future, in any event, lies in the energy situation. 
[…] Should […] the amount of energy that we are able to harness diminish 
materially, then culture would cease to advance or even recede.”41 That the 
great civilizations of China, India, Egypt, the Near East, Central America, 
and Peru had failed to advance after a phase of rapid development, White 
attributed to their limitations in the availability of energy. With respect to 
the future, he was optimistic, as he counted on tapping of new sources 
of energy, including atomic energy, which he saw as the most intriguing 
possibility.42 If the technology of nuclear fission succeeded, the energy 
resources would be multiplied a thousand fold. Even if nuclear energy were 
to fail, White’s optimism remained steadfast because, he underscored, 
“there is always the sun.” He expected that the sun could become the direct 
and thus chief source of power in the future.43 In 1959, with civilian nuclear 
energy – i.e. ‘the Peaceful Atom’ – well on its way toward realization, 
White extended his 1943 cultural energetics framework into a book-length 
exploration of the evolution of culture to the fall of Rome. He meant the 
book to be the first of a three-volume project examining the evolution of 
cultures over all historical epochs. That energy was the main variable in 
his explanatory framework becomes especially clear from the announced 
40 | Leslie A. White: “Energy and the Evolution of Culture”, in: American Anthro-
pologist 43:3 (1943), 335.
41 | White: “Energy and the Evolution of Culture”, 350.
42 | White: “Energy and the Evolution of Culture”, 350. 
43 | White: “Energy and the Evolution of Culture”, 351.
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content of his planned second book, tentatively titled “The Fuel Revolution 
and Its Institutional Concomitants.”44 
Four years before Leslie White published The Evolution of Culture, the 
American sociologist Frederick W. Cottrell (1903-1979) put another version 
of the energy-civilization equation on the book market, Energy and Society. 
The Relation between Energy, Social Change, and Economic Development (1955). 
In the midst of the intense competition between two political, economic, and 
social systems that constituted the Cold War, Cottrell aimed at discovering 
“the relations between the energy converters and fuel men use and the 
kinds of society they build.”45 This could help to evaluate the competing 
systems’ claims on the betterment of humankind, as the possibilities of 
change would not only rest on human beings’ values but also on knowledge 
of their physical potentialities. Cottrell stated that energy was the key to 
determine – or unlock – these potentialities: “It is that the energy available 
to man limits what he can do and influences what he will do.”46 Departing 
from this thesis, he differentiated ‘low-energy societies’ from ‘high-energy 
societies’ and explored in great detail societal changes that followed from 
the transition to high-energy converters. His book, however, was not well 
received and was unfavourably reviewed by anthropologists, especially the 
followers of Leslie A. White. Marshall Sahlins, a former student and then 
colleague of White, accused Cottrell of an inadequate theory of cultural 
change, as Cottrell put values at the centre of his explanation of cultural 
change but at the same time let cultural change determine values. This 
not only prevented energy determinism but also prohibited “a satisfactory 
explanation of the origins of energy-based changes.”47 Cottrell himself 
came to the same conclusion, as he wrote, “perhaps the contribution of 
this essay lies chiefly in the fact that it suggests whole areas of ignorance 
whose exploration might increase the accuracy of thinking about the 
future development of human society.”48 However, Cottrell’s framework of 
44 | White: The Evolution of Culture, x.
45 | Frederick W. Cottrell: Energy and Society: The Relation between Energy, So-
cial Changes, and Economic Development. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955, 3.
46 | Cottrell: Energy and Society, 2.
47 | Marshall D. Sahlins: “Energy and Society: The Relation between Energy, So-
cial Change, and Economic Development. W. Frederick Cottrell”, in: American An-
thropologist 58:6 (1956), 1143.
48 | Cottrell: Energy and Society, 311.
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thinking in terms of a low-energy and a high-energy society based on the 
energy converters and the fuels that had been used proved to be a useful 
concept to several engineer-historians in the United States and was taken 
up by subsequent researchers such as Vaclav Smil. 
The energy crisis of the 1970s brought to the fore a more critical 
perspective on the energy-civilization equation. The Romanian-born U.S. 
economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1906-1994) published The Entropy 
Law and Economic Process in 1971 where he criticized the mainstream 
economists for not recognizing the entropy law with its consequences for 
economic growth.49 In his book, Georgescu-Roegen laid the groundwork 
for the concept of a steady-state-economy that was further developed by 
his student Herman Daly. The latter defined such an economy as “an 
economy with constant stocks of people and artefacts, maintained at some 
desired, sufficient levels by low rates of maintenance ‘throughput’, that is, 
by the lowest feasible flows of matter and energy from the first stage of 
production to the last stage of consumption.”50 The idea of a steady state 
can be traced further back in history. Daly referred extensively to the 19th 
century British economist John Stuart Mill to gain credit for Georgescu-
Roegen’s and his concept. Its prominence in the late 1970s, however, 
emerged from the coincidence of the environmental movement with the 
energy crisis.51 
49 | Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen: The Entropy Law and Economic Process. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
50 | Herman E. Daly: Steady-State Economics. San Francisco: Freeman, 1977, 
17.
51 | Not only would the work of Herman Daly build on and advance Georgescu-
Roegen’s fundamental ideas, but so would the scholarship of Kozo Mayumi. See 
Kozo Mayumi: The Origins of Ecological Economics: The Bioeconomics of Geor-
gescu-Roegen. London: Routledge, 2001. To a large extent, the more vocal, non-
scholarly publications of Jeremy Rifkin rely on Georgescu-Roegen’s work. Cf. e.g. 
Jeremy Rifkin: Entropy. A New World View. New York: The Viking Press, 1980 or 
more recently Jeremy Rifkin: The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power 
is Transforming Energy, the Economy, and the World. London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2011. On the history of the energy crisis of the 1970s, see Karen R. Merrill: 
The Oil Crisis of 1973-1974: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/
St. Martin’s, 2007 and Jens Hohensee: Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973/74. Stutt-
gart: Steiner, 1996. On the history of the ecological movement of the 1960s and 
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The no-growth concept gave the energy-civilization equation new 
meaning as it questioned the hitherto commonly held assumption 
that societal progress is bound to energy-fuelled economic growth. By 
contrast, anti-growth scenarios called for human-scaled and decentralized 
technological cultures that would reduce the dependency on high-energy 
converters. The American physicist Amory B. Lovins took the growth-
critical ideas as point of departure for his program of “soft energy paths” 
that were to supersede the hitherto prevalent – and unsustainable – 
“hard energy path”. As a passionate opponent of nuclear power, Lovins 
ardently criticized the “hard path” conclusion that the political and energy 
establishment had drawn from the crisis. Instead of pushing nuclear power 
and readily available fossil fuels – especially coal – to secure fuel supplies, 
Lovins called for an end-use-orientation that would determine “how much 
of what kind of energy is needed to do the task for which the energy is 
desired, and then supplying exactly that kind.”52 This reorientation from 
a source- and production-based toward an end-use based determination 
of energy needs was to work as a precondition for a direction change from 
the hard to the soft path of energy policy. The latter implied “a prompt 
and serious commitment to efficient use of energy, rapid development of 
renewable energy sources matched in scale and energy quality to end use 
needs, and special transition fossil fuel technologies.”53 
Lovins’ program attracted enormous attention. While the physicist 
Lovins did not elaborate the social consequences of his soft-path proposition, 
1970s, see Samuel Hayes: Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Poli-
tics in the United States, 1955-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987; Karl Ditt: “Ursprünge und Anfänge der Umweltpolitik in der Bundesrepublik 
während der 1960er und frühen 1970er Jahre”, in: Matthias Frese/Julia Paulus/
Karl Teppe, eds. Demokratisierung und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch. Die 1960er 
Jahre als Wendezeit der Bundesrepublik. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schönigh, 2003, 
305-47; Jens Ivo Engels: Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik. Ideenwelt und poli-
tische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung 1950-1980. Pader-
born: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006.
52 | Amory B. Lovins: Soft Energy Paths. Cambridge, MA: Friends of the Earth and 
Ballinger Publishing Co, 1977, 8. 
53 | Lovins: Soft Energy Paths, 25.
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sociologists dealt with its implications for societal changes.54 Thus, the 
soft-path-concept remained bound to the energy-civilization equation, 
as it expected to change society in fundamental ways by restructuring 
its energy provision and needs. While the energy establishment fiercely 
contested this vision, protagonists of the internationally strengthening 
environmental movement expanded it and developed new arguments for 
the urgency of the transition.55 As early as 1981, the challenge of climate 
change was introduced as an additional argument for the transition to 
soft energy paths. The urgency and international character of soft-path 
proponents are evident in the 1981 book Least-Cost Energy – Solving the CO2-
Problem that Amory Lovins and his wife L. Hunter Lovins co-authored with 
their German colleagues Florentin Krause and Wilfrid Bach.56 Krause was 
a co-founder of the German Eco-Institute in Freiburg and a co-author of 
an energy study that was published under the title Energiewende (energy 
turn) in 1980. This study argued that economic growth would not require 
more energy and that especially nuclear energy should be abandoned and 
the use of fossil fuels could be significantly curtailed.57 Bach had headed 
the research center of applied climatology and environmental studies at the 
University of Münster since the mid-1970s and published widely on the 
relationship between energy use and climate change.58 
The no-growth scenario that was developed by alternative economists 
and the soft-path concept that stemmed from scientists fuelled the energy 
debate in the decade of the energy crisis and set the course for a rethinking 
of the energy-civilization equation. The anti-growth attitudes, however, 
54 | Denton E. Morrison/Dora G. Lodwick: “The Social Impacts of Soft and Hard 
Energy Systems: The Lovins’ Claims as a Social Science Challenge”, in: Annual 
Review of Energy 6 (1981), 357-78.
55 | Martin V. Melosi: Coping with Abundance.Energy and Environment in Indus-
trial America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985, 316-19.
56 | Amory Lovins/L. Hunter Lovins/Florentin Krause/Wilfrid Bach: Least-Cost 
Energy – Solving the CO
2
-Problem. Andover, MA: Brickhouse Publication Co., 1981. 
57 | Florentin Krause/Hartmut Bossel/Karl-Friedrich Müller-Reissmann: Ener-
giewende. Wachstum und Wohlstand ohne Erdöl und Uran. Frankfurt/Main: Fi-
scher, 1980.
58 | One of his early publications to this topic is Wilfrid Bach: “Impact of Increas-
ing Atmospheric CO
2
 Concentration on Global Climate: Potential Consequences 
and Corrective Measures”, in: Environment International 2 (1979), 215-28.
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got increasingly marginalised by a new consensus on ready-to-implement 
technical means for garnering more energy and using it more efficiently. 
Thus, for example, the Union of Concerned Scientists stated in its report 
on Energy Strategies: Toward a Solar Future: 
“The United States can provide a high level of economic prosperity for all its 
citizens without the wastefully high levels of gross energy use characteristic 
of conventional government and industry projections. By increasing energy 
productivity and thereby deriving greater benefit from the energy we use, 
economic growth can be sustained with lit tle or no growth in overall energy 
use.”59 
The widespread consensus on the importance of a rise in energy efficiency 
put two very different groups of actors centre stage at the arena of energy 
policy. One were engineers serving as efficiency experts whereas the other 
group were consumers who were supposed to make the right choices about 
energy-consuming goods and services. In any case, the efficiency paradigm 
began to shift attention from the hitherto prevalent emphasis on energy 
production to energy use.60 In contrast to this emerging and still widely 
held consensus on energy efficiency as valuable conservation strategy61, 
59 | Henry W. Kendall, Steven J. Nadis, eds.: Energy Strategies: Toward a Solar 
Future. A Report of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 
1980, 58.
60 | Despite broad acceptance, however, the efficiency paradigm was also met 
with scepticism as it was questioned with reference to rebound effects. On re-
bound effects refer to a growing body of literature, e.g. Sheetal Gavankar, Roland 
Geyer: The Rebound Effect: State of the Debate and Implications for Energy Efficien-
cy Research. Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of 
California, Santa Barbara, 2010. http://iee.ucsb.edu/files/pdf/Rebound%20Re 
port%20for%20IEE-UCSB_0.pdf, accessed 28.12.2011.
61 | Energy efficiency is the core element of the EU’s Europe 2020 Strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and of the transition to a resource ef-
ficient economy. The European Union has set itself the target for 2020 of saving 
20 percent of its primary energy consumption compared to projections. On the 
EU energy efficiency strategy cf. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/index_
en.htm, Accessed 28.12.2011.
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attitudes on what sources of energy ought to be preferred differed widely.62 
Here, the spectrum of proposed strategies reached from a substantial 
increase of nuclear power and a rapid return to coal to a strong preference 
for renewable energies, while suggestions for a proper energy mix with a 
rising percentage of natural gas stood as a middling position.63
The fact that the energy debate focussed ever more on energy transitions 
since the decade of the oil crisis caused social scientists and historians to 
revisit the energy-civilization equation. Since the early 1980s, the book 
market has offered an increasing array of publications dealing in one way 
or another with past and present energy societies. But while many books 
published prior to the energy crises of the 1970s had developed the energy-
civilization equation in terms of grand stage theories or clear evolutionary 
progress, post-energy-crises scholars provided more in-depth studies of 
specific energy systems and sources on the regional or the national level64, as 
well as detailed studies of various aspects of energy production and use.65 For 
the most part, however, these studies have been concerned with problems of 
62 | Langdon Winner: “Energy Regimes and the Ideology of Efficiency”, in: 
George H. Daniels, Mark H. Rose, eds. Energy and Transport. Historical Perspec-
tives on Policy Issues. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982, 261-77.
63 | More detailed is Vaclav Smil: Energy Transitions. History, Requirements, 
Prospects. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010.
64 | Cf. among others the survey on the new German speaking electricity history 
by Bernhard Stier: “Die neue Elektrizitätsgeschichte zwischen kulturhistorischer 
Erweiterung und kommunikationspolitischer Instrumentalisierung”, in: Vierteljah-
resschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 87:4 (2000): 477-87.
65 | So far, only few scholars have aimed at exploring the societal and environ-
mental implications of energy regimes from the perspective of global history. Cf. 
Vaclav Smil: Energy in World History. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994; Smil: 
Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertainties. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2003; Smil: Energy Transitions; Rolf Peter Sieferle: Rückblick auf 
die Natur. Eine Geschichte des Menschen und seiner Umwelt. München: Luchterhand, 
1997; Rolf Peter Sieferle: Der unterirdische Wald: Energiekrise und Industrielle 
Revolution. München: Beck, 1982. For a recent, quite innovative but also debat-
able suggestion on using power as a synthesizing concept in history cf. Edmund 
Russell/James Allison/Thomas Finger/John K. Brown/Brian Balogh/W. Bernard 
Carlson: “The Nature of Power. Synthesizing the History of Technology and Envi-
ronmental History”, in: Technology and Culture 52:2 (2011), 246-59.
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energy production, transition and provision while the (re)presentation and 
consumption of energy as well as the cultural perception of energy sources 
and its use has not yet found the attention it deserves.66 Approaching energy 
from the user and mediator perspective, however, is a promising way to get 
to a more detailed understanding of past and present energy societies and 
thus to avoid an uncritical replication of the energy-civilization premise that 
has been and partly still is quite influential in current energy discourses. 
CONTRIBUTING ESSAYS
The aim of this anthology is to contribute to the current scholarly energy 
debate by shedding light on the political, technological and cultural 
premises of the high-energy society and its capacities of transitions. In Part 
One of this collection, the authors deal with cultural representations of 
energy and how these representations have shaped various high-energy 
societies of the 20th century. Nina Möllers opens with an investigation of 
(re)presentations of energy at world’s fairs from the late 19th to the late 
20th century in the U.S. and Europe. As sites where host countries and 
cities, exhibitors, and visitors staged their dreams of how the world ought 
to be and how to get there with the help of new technologies, world’s 
fairs provide excellent windows through which to view the historically 
changing meanings of electricity. Following designers and visitors 
through the exhibitions and tracing their communications via written and 
visual documentation, Nina Möllers shows how electricity was cast in a 
narrative of abundance that dominated the societal discourse on energy, 
in the U.S. and in Western Europe for most of the 20th century. Only at 
the last fair examined – Knoxville, Tennessee, 1982 – was the narrative of 
abundance modified. Reworking through the preceding oil crises of the 
1970s, the fair staged a two-part drama. Scene One told the story of artificial 
scarcity as imposed by foreign hands, whereas Scene Two demonstrated 
that American ingenuity mastered the challenge and ensured a return to 
66 | At the time still exceptional was David E. Nye: Consuming Power. A Social 
History of American Energies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. For a most re-
cent user-centred energy history see Christopher Jones: “The Carbon-Consuming 
Home: Residential Markets and Energy Transitions”, in: Enterprise and Society 
12:4 (2011), 790-823. 
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U.S. energy abundance and national security. In making the rich sources 
of energy display accessible via careful interpretation, Möllers discloses 
two related discourses – the promotional discourse of utility companies 
and consumer goods manufacturers and the societal discourse of energy 
abundance that was deeply engrained in all world’s fairs displays no matter 
whether they dealt with energy explicitly or not. Both discourses worked 
together in shaping and communicating a careless energy consumption 
mentality that spread from the U.S. and became a role model for many 
societies. Whether they presented electricity as did the fairs in Chicago 
(1893 and 1933) and New York (1939) or atomic energy that was the big 
attraction in Brussels (1958) or renewable energies staged in Knoxville 
(1982), all world’s expositions developed and perpetuated an energy 
narrative promising abundance. By exploring the efforts put into these 
constructions, Möllers shows that electricity is more than what flows out 
of wall sockets; it is energetic fluid of 20th and 21st century high-energy 
societies that must be produced, consumed, and understood on a material 
and a cultural level.
World’s fairs were a prominent but by no means the only place for 
featuring cultural representations of electricity. At national, regional, 
and even local levels, utilities became most bustling actors in charging 
electricity with cultural meanings. Utilities managed to sell electricity only 
when they were able to convince consumers that it ensured a modern, 
superior lifestyle in contrast to old-fashioned cooking or heating with 
coal or gas. The volume’s next two contributions take us to Germany and 
France, exploring how marketers of power companies designed electricity 
as an everyday life-enchanting icon of modernity. 
Sophie Gerber delved deeply into the archives of Berlin’s local 
electricity supplier Bewag, in order to disclose how the company charged 
electricity with meanings in their efforts to market electricity both before 
and after World War II. Because electricity is different from most other 
goods and services as it must be produced at the moment it is consumed, 
utilities recognized and sought to foster a tight bond between themselves 
and their customers. That bond was the electricity-consuming appliance. 
Therefore, utilities closely collaborated with the appliance industry in 
their marketing strategies. Bewag developed a broad variety of methods 
and means for advertising electricity. Not just through publications on 
electricity and appliances that appeared in newspapers, expert journals, 
customer magazines, and cookbooks and advertising; on buses, subways 
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and in many other public spaces, but also via public advice centers, training 
kitchens, installment systems, and stove rental schemes. Utilities and their 
agents thereby sought to convey the message of progress and modernity 
through electricity. The narratives deployed throughout Bewag’s marketing 
activities were closely connected to the immediate political context in 
(West) Germany. During the Weimar Republic, when people experienced 
hyperinflation and ongoing economic instability, Bewag constructed a 
narrative of the superiority of electricity through price and safety advantages. 
In the early years of the Nazi period, electric cooking became a new topic 
in the marketing efforts. Promoting kitchen ranges promised to increase 
the efficiency of the utility and at the same time it fit nicely into the Nazi 
images of ‘Aryan’ domesticity. With the advent of Germany’s post-WWII 
economic ‘miracle’, increasing electricity sales became part and parcel of 
the new social contract based on mass consumption and promised to foster 
a German nation. Values such as modernity, freedom, leisure and progress 
provided subtexts within a broad array of electricity advertisements. 
These positive connotations of electricity, however, were challenged in the 
decade of the oil crises. Bewag adapted to the new situation as it developed 
fresh marketing methods in order to charge electricity with green – i.e. 
ecologically responsible – meanings. Bewag’s marketing department 
developed a broadly accepted narrative on the meaning of electricity as is 
revealed in its steadily rising power sales, and thus, together with its tightly 
coupled customers, Bewag decisively contributed to the rapid development 
of the high-energy society and mentality that has proven to be so hard to 
reverse.
The third contribution in Part One is also concerned with the marketing 
strategies of an energy supplier, but this time in France. It covers more 
than half a century from the end of World War II until the turn to the 
21st century. Yves Bouvier has investigated promotional films produced on 
behalf of the French national electric company, Électricité de France (EDF). 
He aims to explore how these films worked as cultural representations of 
electricity and served the business strategy of the public company. The 
films stage – and therefore shape – the relationship between consumers 
and energy. Bouvier takes the French sociologists and semioticians Jean 
Baudrillard and Roland Barthes as points of departure as their approaches 
to deciphering the world of objects as myths and vehicles of meaning guide 
his analysis of his material. EDF’s films represent energy in a narrative 
of abundance that developed in various, subsequent steps. In the mid-
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1950s, abundance was showcased as a system of electrical objects within 
the house that EDF had integrated into the modern world via its electricity. 
In the early 1960s, after consumerism had become more important as the 
cement of the social order in France, abundance was featured as a rapid 
accumulation of appliances in households, which were supported by EDF 
via the installation of new meters. While the appliances in the 1950s stood 
for concepts of comfort that implied a lessening of laborious housework, 
the message changed in the 1960s. Now appliances became lifestyle objects 
and this imbued the narrative of abundance with an unmistakeable flavour 
of hedonism. The decade of the oil crises severely challenged the hitherto 
prevalent cultural representation of energy. The French response to the 
oil crises was twofold: The state extended and accelerated the transition to 
nuclear power and forbade energy advertising. Thus, EDF had to change 
the way it communicated with its consumers. It did so by producing 
films on how to save energy. In these films, not appliances but energy-
saving users with their consumption practices figured prominently. With 
these user projections, EDF was able to adhere to the original narrative of 
abundance, as the films advised the customers how to maintain an affluent 
lifestyle by saving energy. In the 1990s, finally, appliances reappeared in 
the promotional films, now more numerous than ever before. Hedonism 
had returned in a “hyper-consumer-society,” and its architect was EDF. 
Thus, the cultural representations of energy in EDF’s promotional films 
worked as important, constructed narratives for France’s high-energy 
society; narratives that resonate with the marketing strategies of the 
German Bewag.
High-energy societies have not only been shaped by cultural 
representations of energy but also by actual consumption practices. 
Therefore, Part Two presents three case studies that deal with such energy 
consumption practices. Of course, energy is not consumed directly but 
through devices, materials, and processes – as warm water, artificial light, 
or a pleasantly warm room on a cold day. The authors of the three case 
studies explore, respectively, how the Bewag as an energy supplier, the 
German states in the era of the Cold War, and the Austrian social system 
cast consumption practices and thus contributed to the development of 
high-energy societies. 
Nina Lorkowski probes consumers’ warm water usage behind Berlin’s 
bathroom and kitchen doors as a critical factor within Bewag’s electricity 
supply strategy. Driven by the desire to improve the efficiency of power 
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production by stimulating electricity demand during off-peak-hours, 
Bewag introduced a marketing and sales program for electric storage water 
heaters in the 1920s. These had been designed not just to increase the 
overall electricity demand but to store energy in the form of warm water 
because they used electric power for heating up water during off-peak hours 
during the night while their service, warm water, was to be used during 
the day and therefore without using power in peak-hours. The designers 
of Bewag’s storage water heaters inscribed this usage pattern into the 
appliances via a time switch and an extra meter. Thus, Bewag controlled 
the heating-up period via the timer which the users could not manipulate. 
They could adjust the usage of the appliance to their own needs only by 
switching it off completely when the water heater was not needed over 
longer periods of time. This, however, contradicted the strategy of Bewag 
to use private households as energy storage for balancing load curves. 
With the economic downturn in the wake of the big crisis from 1929 to 
1933, Bewag was confronted with an even larger problem. Because of the 
drastically decreasing industrial electricity demand, the company now 
sought to increase its power supply to households not only for balancing 
load curves but above all to utilize its power plant capacities through any and 
all possible means. Preventing users from switching off their water heaters 
and extending heating-up times during the day appeared as an appropriate 
strategy to increase households’ electricity demand. For generating a 
more steady need for warm water, Bewag rented out water heaters with 
two or three outlets, one of which supplied the kitchen. The restrictions of 
charging time to night hours were abandoned. The consumption practice 
that Bewag had sought to inscribe in the appliance design, however, was 
adopted by consumers only partly, as they stuck to old hygiene and bathing 
customs with a weekly bathing day instead of showering daily. But once 
the appliance had found its way into the household, it at least opened the 
possibility for an increased residential energy use. This possibility began to 
materialize in the 1950s when the state’s promotion of energy-consuming 
household appliances as part of the implementation strategy of the West 
German social market economy proved to be a tremendous success. Within 
this framework, however, the meaning of consumption and energy use 
changed according to consumers’ growing expectations about convenience 
and hygiene. In this context, no longer could the utility company prescribe 
to the consumer which appliances should be used and how and when to 
guarantee a more balanced capacity utilization. Instead, surging residential 
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energy demand now became a reason to generally extend power plant 
capacities. The case study by Lorkowski is revealing in two respects. It 
clearly shows how utilities conceived of households as elements of their 
production strategy and how they used appliances to shape consumer 
practices. But Lorkowski also points us to the actual consumers who 
rewrote the inscribed user scenario by using the appliances subversively. 
Thus, she makes us aware that imposed technical means for manipulating 
energy use are rather questionable strategies because energy consumption 
practices are the outcome of societal contracts and cultural traditions and 
not an unchangeably materialized script within technologies.
Not just appliances but also the organization of time has been 
mobilized to manipulate energy consumption practices. In the second case 
study, Matthias Mutz documents the introduction of Daylight Saving Time 
(DST) in order to understand its meaning within and beyond the energy 
discourse for both German states in the energy crises of the 1970s. The 
debate on DST began immediately in the wake of the first oil crisis in West 
Germany. Thus, DST was cast in the frame of an emergency measure, 
bearing resemblance to earlier DST introductions as wartime actions in 
the First and the Second World War. But the West German debates after 
the first oil shock (that had not hit East Germany because of oil contracts 
with the USSR) did not result in DST-introduction. In contrast to most 
European states that did advance their clocks for an hour in the mid-1970s, 
the political actors in Bonn and, with a time lag, the political players in 
East Berlin opted against changing clocks. Both governments used similar 
arguments as justifications. DST would provide only marginal energy 
savings, but it could, if not introduced in both German states at the same 
time, erect a time border and thus endanger the delicate balance in inter-
German relations. The introduction of DST by European neighbour states 
was said to be a lifestyle choice and thus irrelevant for the two German 
states. Only after the second oil crisis did German attitudes change, and in 
October 1979, first in East Berlin and 13 days later in Bonn, the Germans 
decided to implement DST the following year. Mutz carefully outlines how 
energy policy contributed to this decision. In West Germany, DST increased 
the acceptance of energy saving that was now cast more in terms of energy 
efficiency and allowed everybody to participate in the saving ‘hype’ without 
changing individual consumption practices. In East Germany, DST worked 
as a substitute for an earnest energy policy with more effective energy 
saving measures. Energy consumption practices in private households 
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remained untouched by the East German state, as it stuck to a constant low 
price for a kilowatt hour of electricity of 8 (nominal) Pfennig since 1946. 
In the end, both German states introduced DST not least because of its 
positive ‘side effects’ of leisure and recreation. Thus, DST contributed to 
the transformation of the energy discourse from a narrative of crisis and 
scarcity to a narrative of abundance and well-being, respectively. In this 
way, DST helped to maintain established energy consumption practices 
in the decades after the “golden years,” as Hobsbawm described the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
The last case study of Part Two takes us to contemporary Austria. 
Karl-Michael Brunner, Anja Christanell and Markus Spitzer investigate 
energy consumption practices in Austrian low-income households. While 
most studies on differences of energy consumption conceive of these 
inequalities in terms of their global dimension, this case study points 
to the fact that even within industrialised countries, residential energy 
consumption is far from being equally distributed throughout society. 
Analysing these differences, however, is crucial for governing the way 
toward a ‘low-carbon-society,’ as different lifestyles have different impacts 
on the environment while at the same time they vary in their vulnerability 
to climate change. The latter will have especially discriminative effects on 
low-income households as they have less means to make provisions for 
negative climate effects. Therefore, by exploring the phenomenon of fuel-
poverty in the Austrian capital, Vienna, the authors shed light on the social 
dimension of energy consumption practices in order to address problems 
of environmental justice. As they look at housing and living conditions 
as well as heating and lighting practices, the contributors reveal how 
social inequalities become manifest in energy consumption practices. 
They show that fuel-poor households develop a specific energy culture via 
sacrifices in comfort and living standard. At the same time, low-income 
households encounter major difficulties in tapping their households’ full 
efficiency potential due to factors beyond their reach, such as inefficient 
construction features of buildings, heating technologies, and larger, less 
efficient pre-installed household appliances in low-priced flats. Although 
fuel-poor households are forced to pioneer in energy saving strategies, they 
are disadvantaged in reaping the benefits. Therefore, the authors conclude, 
governing the transition to a socially just ‘low-carbon society’ requires 
societal interventions against fuel poverty. 
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Part Three of this volume is concerned with cultural perceptions of 
and national discourses on energy resources. As the last and the ongoing 
centuries were and are marked by continual energy transitions due to 
various short-term emergency and longer-term structural forces such as 
imbalances in the world economy, wartime scarcity and global ecological 
policy, to name but a few, energy resources became a prominent subject of 
public debates. Three case studies trace these debates in Sweden, Norway 
and West Siberia in order to reveal what determined perceptions of both 
energy resources and the feasibility of energy transitions. The final chapter 
investigates the relationship between patterns of energy transitions and 
economic growth in Europe during the last two centuries.
Helena Ekerholm reconstructs the story of wood gas in Sweden, which 
was pursued as a national means of transitioning from petrol to domestic 
fuel alternatives between 1930 and 1945. But the planned fuel transition 
failed. Wood gas provides an interesting case in several respects: first, it is a 
renewable fuel; second, it played a partial role in the emerging automobile 
culture; third, it promised to boost the struggling forestry industry; and 
finally, wood gas was included in wartime emergency plans. Wood 
gasification technology was a 19th century British invention that attracted 
interest as an alternative means of automobile propulsion in several 
countries across the globe early in the automobile era. Sweden began to 
consider wood gas as it looked for ways out of the crisis in the nationally 
important forestry industry in the early 1930s. By 1932, the Swedish 
government had established a wood gasifier loan fund intended to push 
the new technology, which experienced a fiasco after a short-lived boom. 
The gasifiers had not met user expectations for manifold reasons, which 
Ekerholm explores in detail. The loan failure resulted in new evaluations 
that established a more specific user profile. But not until the outbreak of 
World War II did wood gas receive a second chance, this time as a wartime 
surrogate. Optimists, however, expected an enduring breakthrough for 
wood gas and hoped that it would find its place in peacetime economy. But 
this did not come to pass for several reasons such as hazards connected to 
wood gas use and troublesome maintenance problems. These and other 
reasons contributed to the perception that wood gas usage was contradictory 
to the highly esteemed ideals of a modern automotive culture. Because 
wood gas could not overcome its connotations of wartime surrogate and 
outdated fuel, it did not endure. Thus, Ekerholm’s story is a case study on 
a failed transition from fossil to renewable fuels. 
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The next case study leads the readers to West Siberia and covers the four 
decades from the 1970s to the present. In the decade when the oil crises hit 
the Western bloc, the Soviet state rapidly increased the exploitation of West 
Siberia’s oil deposits. Since that time, the Soviet Union and then the Russian 
state has become increasingly dependent on the oil resources of this region, 
while in Western Europe efforts were taken to decrease carbon emissions 
from hydrocarbons by way of a transition to lower-carbon non-renewable 
and renewable sources of energy. By contrast, the rapid exploitation of the 
oil deposits in West Siberia not only prevented the Soviet and the Russian 
governments, respectively, from pondering an energy transition toward 
a more sustainable path, but it also caused tremendous environmental 
problems in West Siberia. Valentina Roxo analyses the public debates 
on West Siberian oil production in order to understand how, despite the 
coincidence of the West Siberian oil boom with the international boost of 
environmentalism, the latter did not have any impact on the former. Roxo 
shows that until the mid-1980s environmental data had been kept secret in 
the USSR and no public discussion could emerge. Only as a result of the 
glasnost reforms and especially following the Chernobyl catastrophe did 
environmental institutions spring up, decrees were issued, and ecological 
problems began to be discussed openly. But the most critical problems in 
the oil sector were left out of the public debate. Instead, in the wake of the 
Chernobyl disaster, oil was perceived as a secure source to meet the energy 
needs. This positive attitude toward oil took the form of a socialist version 
of a Promethean discourse, as the conquest of nature for the extraction 
of oil was celebrated as a human achievement. The depletion of natural 
resources and environmental destruction from oil extraction was denied by 
Soviet leaders. The finiteness of resources was to be overcome by science 
and technology and communism would lead to a state of abundance. 
Also, the narrative of the development of the West Siberian region from a 
backward place into a modern industrial landscape was cast as Promethean 
discourse. That living conditions of the indigenous West Siberian people 
had changed completely was glorified as tremendous progress. Only 
when the Soviet Union collapsed, did a more critical discourse begin to 
emerge. The lot of the indigenous population, conflicts between them 
and the oil industry, the poor state of the new cities in the region, and the 
environmentally disastrous practice of gas flaring – all these problems now 
came to the fore. But after the turn of the new millennia, the just-emerging 
environmental discourse began to be superseded again, this time by the 
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debates on dangerous symptoms of the so-called Dutch disease. Now 
economic debate drew all attention, and the ecological tragedy of Samotlar, 
which the World Bank had declared an ecological disaster zone in 2000, 
disappeared into oblivion, at least in the Russian media. Roxo ends her 
discourse analysis with the conclusion that the vital importance of the oil 
wealth for the national economy led to a dramatic ecological blindness of 
both state energy policy and the energy consuming Russian people. 
Contradictory perceptions of energy resources were by no means 
confined to fossil fuels. The next contribution introduces readers to 
ambivalent public attitudes toward bioenergy in today’s Norway and 
Sweden. These ambivalent opinions exist at various levels. The case study 
focuses on views that have been ascribed to imagined publics by policy 
makers, experts and the bioenergy industry, as these protagonists of 
bioenergy interpret what they assume are public perceptions of bioenergy. 
According to insights from Science and Technology Studies, the success 
of controversial innovations hinges upon public engagement in science 
and technology. Thus, the protagonists of bioenergy innovations have to 
imagine their publics and engage them in their projects. Tomas Skjølsvold 
probes how the bioenergy players imagine their publics in Norway and 
in Sweden and how these imagined collectives determine the strategies 
of public engagement. Bioenergy occupies very different places in the 
respective energy regimes of Norway and Sweden. In Norway, where 
it gained political attention as a potential replacement for space heating 
based on hydroelectricity, bioenergy is a niche technology. In contrast, 
Sweden has a more diverse energy regime based on three nearly equally 
important energy sources: fossil fuels, hydroelectricity and nuclear power. 
Both to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear power and 
to mitigate climate change, the Swedes developed an early interest in 
bioenergy and advanced its contribution to total energy supply to one 
third. Therefore, in Sweden, bioenergy is at the core of energy policy, and 
it has become the largest energy-producing technology within the Swedish 
energy regime. Skjølsvold takes this significant difference between the two 
countries as point of departure to analyse how each nation’s bioenergy 
establishment construe its imagined publics. He demonstrates how this 
difference remarkably influenced the ideas about bioenergy’s respective 
publics. These ideas have been much more unfavourable in Norway than 
in Sweden. Norwegians are thought to be opposed to the construction of 
new bioenergy facilities because of landscape alterations, pollution, odors 
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and increased traffic. The Swedes, however, are construed as passive 
but positively-minded consumers who would not care about bioenergy 
production, as they take it for granted. To be sure, the ideas about the 
public have many more facets in both countries, as Skjølsvold clearly 
shows. But the significant difference between imagined more sceptical 
Norwegian and more affirmative Swedish publics remains visible even in 
the many-facetted picture. Accordingly, the bioenergy players draw different 
conclusions for their subsequent strategies to engage their publics. While 
the Swedes seek to enlighten the imagined passive consumers and to 
develop an open, two-way dialogue, the Norwegians opt for meetings with 
perceived stakeholders prior to the construction of new facilities in order 
to prevent protests. Through his comparative analysis, Skjølsvold shows 
how even imagined, culturally-constructed agents play important roles in 
shaping energy transitions. 
The final contribution in this anthology is concerned with the 
connection between energy and long-term economic growth in Europe. In 
her first part, Silvana Bartoletto analyses the debate whether there was an 
energy crisis in the 18th century that caused the transition from traditional 
to modern energy sources in the 19th century. Although the question has 
remained unsettled so far, there is no doubt about the multiple ways and 
chronological differences the energy transition took across Europe. The 
passage from the old to the modern energy system occurred rapidly in 
countries like England and Wales and to some degree in the Netherlands, 
while in Sweden, Italy and Spain, the transition followed only in the 20th 
century. In her second part, Bartoletto outlines the results of the transition 
as they are manifested in the structure of the fossil fuel system and the 
distribution of energy consumption by sector. She notes the gradual 
turning away from oil after the crises in the 1970s and gives evidence 
for industry, transport and the residential sectors as the main energy 
consumers in Europe in 2007. Changes in the intra- and inter-sectorial 
distribution of energy consumption cause important variations of energy 
demand due to structurally different energy intensities. Bartoletto uses 
the long-term development of energy intensity, i.e. the energy required 
to produce one unit of output, as an indicator to gauge the relationship 
between energy, economy and technological change. After a detailed 
discussion of a broad array of determining factors for energy intensities 
and their changes, Bartoletto concludes that this indicator alone is not 
sufficient to fully understand the relation between energy, economy and 
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technological change. Therefore, she introduces energy productivity as 
the reciprocal of energy intensity, i.e. the income produced per unit of 
energy. This allows her to draw a more detailed picture with the help of a 
decomposition analysis of per capita GDP, which enables her to determine 
the contribution of the growth rate of energy consumption per capita and 
the growth rate of energy productivity to the growth rate of per capita 
GDP. Her data reveal four distinct periods, each characterised by a specific 
energy-growth relationship. The first period, from 1830 to the end of the 
19th century, shows a reduction of energy productivity. In the next phase, 
from the beginning of the 20th century until World War II, the productivity 
of energy became more important for economic growth, especially because 
of improvements in the efficiency of techniques of energy utilization. 
From the end of the Second World War until the energy crises of the 1970s, 
readily available cheap energy was more important for economic growth 
than any gains in thermodynamic efficiency of the techniques in question. 
After the decade of the oil crises, finally, improvements in energy efficiency 
became more and more important in economic growth. As Bartoletto 
reveals these long-term trends in the relation between energy, economy and 
technological change for the European context, she raises our awareness of 
the long-running nature and complexities of energy transitions. Thus, we 
may better understand what the current – and increasingly urgent – energy 
transition to a more sustainable regime will entail. 
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Cultural Representations of Energy

Electrifying the World 
Representations of Energy and Modern Life at World’s 
Fairs, 1893-1982
Nina Möllers
“Sell the cook stove if necessary and come. You must see the fair.”1 With 
these words, novelist Hamlin Garland urged his parents to visit the 
World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893. Since their inception, 
contemporaries and academic scholars alike have been fascinated by what 
world’s fairs have had to offer: from spectacular architecture to technological 
‘firsts’ to – from a postcolonial perspective rather disconcertingly called 
– ‘midget’ and ‘savage’ African villages. Exhibitions in general and the 
hugely popular world’s fairs in particular function as mediators between 
the political, economic and social actors involved in exhibition-making and 
the public. Their exhibitionary scenarios convey ideas – realistic or utopian 
– on how we live, work and play. World’s fairs’ ingrained perspective 
toward future life models coincided perfectly with the role that energy – 
particularly electrical energy – was assigned to play in the 20th century. 
Similar to other media, world’s expositions offered interpretations of 
(future) energy production and use that were closely linked to discourses 
on modernity and progress. In contrast to print, radio and film, however, 
their displays visually created arrangements that could be explicatory, 
suggestive or illusionistic by means of their three-dimensional use of text, 
image, object and space.2 
1 | Qtd. in Justus D. Doenecke: “Myths, Machines and Markets: The Columbian 
Exposition of 1893”, in: Journal of Popular Culture 6:3 (1973), 535.
2 | Gottfried Korf f: “Scheinkapellen u. ä. Sieben Bemerkungen zu den diskursi-
ven und visuellen Strategien des Geschichtsmuseums im Jahrhundert seiner Eta-
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Moreover, world’s expositions’ treatment of technology was often 
characterized by a focus on the present, even the future. Serving as a 
“site within the transitory present from which the visitor could glimpse 
the future”, world’s fairs took advantage of what David Nye has called 
the technological sublime.3 According to him, a number of interrelated 
sublimes had emerged in America since the 1820s, i.e. the geometrical, 
the industrial and the electrical sublime, each of them having a distinct 
political and social relation to technology. Americans reinvested “the 
landscape and the works of men with transcendent significance”4 and 
developed a reasoning that saw inventions and new technological structures 
as continuations of nature, ultimately raising them to the status of “self-
justifying parts of a national destiny.”5 This blending of the natural and the 
technological sublime was supplemented by a third kind of experience – 
the “electrical sublime” – eliminating the distinction between natural and 
artificial sites.6 
As Nye has aptly shown, world’s fairs were ideal sites for the 
materialized display of the technological sublime in general and the 
electrical sublime in particular. On their exhibition floors, ideas of energy 
technologies as the sublime merged with modernist discourses to create 
narrations of the future built on inexhaustible energy resources and 
carefree consumption. However, because of its dual nature as “both a 
commodity and a fundamental aspect of being”7, energy and its narratives 
are at times difficult to disentangle from larger political, scientific and 
cultural discourses. This paper therefore offers a close reading of energy 
(re-)presentations in world’s fairs both as symbol for a progressive, modern 
lifestyle and as a consumer good from the late 19th to the late 20th century. 
Based on both visual and written documentation, it examines selected 
displays of the fairs of Chicago 1893 and 1933, New York 1939, Brussels 1958 
blierung”, in: Bernhard Graf/Hanno Möbius, eds. Zur Geschichte der Museen im 
19. Jahrhundert; 1789-1918. Berlin: G + H Verlag, 2006, 117.
3 | David Nye: American Technological Sublime. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1996, 205.
4 | Nye: American Technological Sublime, xiii.
5 | Nye: American Technological Sublime, 282.
6 | Nye: American Technological Sublime, 152.
7 | David E. Nye: Narratives and Spaces. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997, 75.
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and Knoxville 1982 as they relate to discourses on science and industry, 
nature, mass consumption and modernity. As pacemakers and role models, 
these American fairs played a decisive part in shaping the development of 
an energy-intensive lifestyle and consumption mode enabled by an implied 
and largely unquestioned narrative of energy abundance. Both national 
and corporate displays at these fairs served as reference points and models 
regarding visions of modern living and consumption as well as exhibition 
design and mediation that would be imitated in other parts of the world. 
Understanding exhibits as a particular form of communication, 
it makes sense to analyze the displays within the framework of larger 
political and social energy narratives which, according to David Nye, have 
historically focused on either one of these five contextual preconceptions: 
1) natural abundance, 2) artificial scarcity, 3) human ingenuity, 4) man-
made apocalypse and 5) existential limits.8 Although each of them has 
gained currency at some point in history, it is the narrative of abundance 
that dominates the way how energy is constructed, interpreted and cast 
in the media discourse in the United States for most of the 20th century. 
As shall be argued in this paper, it is also the narrative that comes to bear 
on the presentations of energy at the fairs in 1893 and the 1930s and to 
some extent the Brussels fair of 1958. Here, however, with the introduction 
of nuclear power, the narrative of abundance merged with the narrative 
of human ingenuity ensuring affluence by applying refined engineering 
skills. The final fair – Knoxville 1982 – represents an interesting mixture 
of narratives. While showcasing elements both of the artificial scarcity and 
the man-made apocalypse narratives, it simultaneously marks the return to 
the natural abundance narrative. 
No matter which energy narrative dominates, it is always mediated 
through exhibitionary means. These include, first and foremost, three-
dimensional objects displayed in the exhibition space, supplemented by 
texts, images, lighting arrangements and other media. Over the course 
of the fairs’ history, the exhibitionary modes have changed dramatically, 
influencing not just the ‘vocabulary’ used to convey its messages, but 
rather the content of the narrative itself. In many respects twins of the 
concurrently emerging department stores and shopping malls, the fairs 
served as mediators for America’s budding consumer society where people 
learned to view energy, especially electricity, as the doorway to a new quality 
8 | Nye: Narratives and Spaces, 77.
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of life. Modifying traditional museum display modes, the fairs created a new 
presentational vocabulary that could be read by a ‘republic of consumers’ 
within the codes of modern industrial culture. The more industrialized 
a nation and its culture became, the more symbolism was attached to 
technological and industrially manufactured goods, their representation in 
advertising, department stores and exhibitions and their consumption by 
the people. In the display context of world’s fairs, these goods became a 
defining part of a “rationalized mythology” in which the displayed object 
oscillated between the profane and the auratic.9 It was at Chicago’s White 
City in 1893 where this oscillation between sublime wonder and profane 
application found its supreme expression. 
WORLD’S COLUMBIAN E XPOSITION, CHICAGO 1893
In terms of its usage of electricity, Chicago’s first world fair would become 
known for both its elaborate lighting designs on the fairgrounds as well as 
its Electricity Pavilion prominently situated at the center of the fairgrounds. 
Figure 1: Electricity Building, World’s Columbian Exposition, 
Chicago 1893.
9 | Elke Krasny: “Zukunft ohne Ende: Das Unternehmen Weltausstellung”, in: Bri-
gitte Felderer, ed. Wunschmaschine Welterfindung. Wien: Springer, 1996, 322.
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Its architecture was meant to correspond with both the qualitative nature 
of electricity and the contents shown inside, giving “to the general design 
a movement which, in contrast with its neighbors, may be suggestive of 
the mysterious functions of electricity.”10 In accordance with the fashion 
and level of electrotechnology at that time, the fairgrounds presented 
themselves as an ‘electrified landscape’ including electrically-powered 
water fountains, enormous searchlights, an electric walkway and battery-
run boats on the basin.11 What presented itself to the visitors as a technical 
triumph “harnessing the thunderbolts at last”12 had actually been preceded 
by a furious battle between Thomas Edison’s General Electric Company 
and its rival Westinghouse. Due to a lower bid and apparently a stronger 
argument for reliable capacity, it was Westinghouse that ultimately got the 
job of illuminating the fair, thereby delivering the final deathblow to Edison’s 
direct current system.13 Yet, despite rapid innovations in the field of electric 
technology, many Americans remained skeptical about the reliability and 
safety of electric applications in their homes. The Chicago fair offered a 
prime opportunity for corporations involved in the electrification business 
to showcase electricity’s advantages and eradicate any persisting doubts. 
The inside of the pavilion contributed to that particular effort only to 
a limited extent. Firmly anchored in the systemic approach, the individual 
displays featured electrotechnical ‘hardware’ ranging from apparatuses 
illustrating the phenomena and laws of electricity to batteries, transmission 
gear and electro-chemical equipment.14 Most impressive among the 
10 | Rand, McNally & Cos.: A Week at the Fair Illustrating the Exhibits and Won-
ders of the World’s Columbian Exposition. Chicago: Rand, McNally & Cos., 1892, 
80, 82.
11 | For a discussion of outside electric lighting at world’s fairs see David E. Nye: 
“Electrifying Expositions, 1880-1939”, in: Robert W. Rydell/Nancy Gwinn, eds. 
Fair Representations. World’s Fairs and the Modern World. Amsterdam: VU Uni-
versity Press, 1994, 140-56.
12 | Murat Halstead: “Electricity at the Fair”, in: The Cosmopolitan. An Illustrated 
Monthly Magazine 15:5 (September 1893), 578.
13 | Judith A. Adams: “The Promotion of New Technology through Fun and Spec-
tacle: Electricity at the World’s Columbian Exposition”, in: Journal of American 
Culture 18:2 (1995), 49.
14 | Rand: A Week at the Fair, 83. Although the Austrian inventor and entrepre-
neur Friedrich Wilhelm Schindler presented the first electrical kitchen at the fair 
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“monster machines”15 was the generating station supplying all buildings 
at the fairground with electricity. The imposing machinery and sheer 
endless rows of electrical equipment tended to make engineering experts 
and technology buffs go ecstatic but the general public rather less so. 
Apparently, however, this had not been the exhibitors’ intention anyhow. 
The order in which the chief of the electricity department enumerated the 
target groups of his pavilion is by no means accidental: engineers, central 
station managers, manufacturers, students and – finally – the public in 
general.16 
Hence, the fair of 1893 proved to be transitional in its representation of 
electricity, exposing a two-lane display strategy separating the inside from 
the outside: While technical aspects of its production and distribution 
dominated the interior of the building, 27 million visitors strolling the 
fairgrounds outside got a foretaste of the consumption paradise to come 
by using the electrical railway and walkway and experiencing the nightly 
lightshow. Yet, powered by a large electrical system, lighting and railways 
appeared to be moved by a magical hand and related the qualities of the new 
energy form only indirectly to people. Although small electrical consumer 
appliances for mass consumption already loomed on the horizon, the 
Columbian fair focused on the communal experience of electricity as 
symbol for modernity. The electrical transportation and lighting systems 
thus retained a sublime touch: Using the moveable sidewalk and watching 
the buildings being bathed in artificial light disrupted people’s ordinary 
perceptions of their surroundings and forced them to grapple with its 
immensity and power.17 However, searching for new opportunities of 
application and sales markets, manufacturers and utilities wanted people 
to eventually overcome their awe and start treating, i.e. consuming, 
electricity unreservedly. The immateriality of electricity posed a serious 
problem to this endeavor. In what comes across as a clumsy attempt at 
making people ‘see’ and ‘feel’ electricity, exhibition designers came up with 
gaining him a gold medal, it was not named in any of the original sources sur-
veyed for this paper.   
15 | J. R. Cravath: “Electricity at the World’s Fair”, in: Review of Reviews (July 
1893), 38.
16 | Hubert Howe Bancroft: The Book of the Fair. Chicago: Bancroft, 1893, 405.
17 | Nye: American Technological Sublime, 15.
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rather bizarre object arrangements such as pyramids of copper wires and 
towers of insulators. 
Figure 2: Tower of Insulators, Electricity Building, 
Columbian World’s Exposition, Chicago 1893. 
Electricity’s intangibility confronted exhibition designers with problems that 
became symptomatic for the world’s fairs to follow. Even with the outside 
lighting spectacle that allowed for sublime sensations, the apparently 
mysterious nature of electricity needed earthing. The ceremonial opening 
of the fair provided this by means of a surrogate tactile action performed 
by President Grover Cleveland. With the president pushing a gilded button 
on a stand draped with the Star-Spangled-Banner, a connection was made 
between man and his actions and the miracle of electrical lighting. From 
one moment to the next, the rumble of machines was heard, water gushed 
from the fountains, banners and flags were unfurled and the massive 
Statue of Freedom was unveiled. The immateriality of electrical energy that 
proved to be both fascinating and threatening to people was packaged into 
symbolic acts of starting engines and pushing buttons. 
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In Chicago at the end of the 19th century, the energy narrative of 
abundance had yet to materialize. Setting the stage for a multitude of 
applications in transport, industry and at home, the fair hinted at the great 
utopia of infinite energy used for the building of a better world without 
quite formulating it yet. It rather allowed people from all walks of life to 
“gaze into the future and ponder upon the marvellous uses of electricity 
which must be in store for us at no very distant date.”18 
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS E XPOSITION,  
CHICAGO 1933-193419
About thirty years after the Columbian Exposition, three-fourths of private 
households in the United States had been electrified20, urban centers 
were growing, more and more cars traveled across the expanding highway 
system and mass-consumption was in full swing. Yet with the crash of 
1929, America had also sunk into a deep economic depression which left 
many in doubt about the merits of modern consumer capitalism. Although 
electricity had brought unknown comforts, Americans at the same time 
feared for their personal economic and social future. While utility companies 
and appliance manufacturers proceeded with building an infrastructure 
of high-energy consumption technology, cultural and social mediation 
was needed to keep people abreast with the fast developing and changing 
technical world around them. Alongside national advertising campaigns 
and mediating councils such as the Society for Electrical Development, 
exhibitions served as promoters of the modern ‘electrical way’. 
In the ambivalent mood oscillating between hope for a bright future and 
lingering fears about its fragility, the organizers of the second Chicago fair 
in 1933 conceptualized their exhibitions around the intricate relationship 
between science and industry to “demonstrate to an International [sic] 
18 | John Brisben Walker: “A World’s Fair. Introductory: A World’s College of De-
mocracy”, in: The Cosmopolitan. An Illustrated Monthly Magazine 15:5 (Septem-
ber 1893), 523.
19 | Due to high visitor numbers (22.5 million), the fair went into a second – 
largely identical – season from May 26 to October 31, 1934. 
20 | Martin V. Melosi: Coping with Abundance. Energy and Environment in Indus-
trial America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985, 112.
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audience the nature and significance of scientific discoveries, the methods 
of achieving them and the changes which their application has wrought in 
industry and in living conditions.”21 In order to overcome the competitive 
nature of foregone fairs, they stressed the cooperative element among 
nations and companies and between science and industry that had 
brought about “A Century of Progress”. Rufus C. Dawes, President of the 
Organizing Committee, formulated the fair’s concept and purpose in the 
following words: 
“The Exposition follows no pattern of former fairs; the competitive idea of other 
fairs is not in the modern spirit. […] The one great motif of A Century of Progress 
is the rise of mankind during the last hundred years [.…] The Story of the 
development of the industries that have contributed so strikingly to mankind’s 
comfort and progress is full of high adventure and romance. It has been a swif t-
moving drama recording their service to the public.”22
The fair that developed out of this approach was characterized by a general 
tendency toward scientification on the one hand and a strong focus on 
applicability of technology on the other. Both aspects were staged by new 
display designs realized in many cases by corporate industrial designers 
who relied on both their artistic and advertising skills. The importance 
attributed to science found its expression in the Hall of Science featuring 
21 | “A Century of Progress. Chicago International Exposition of 1933. A State-
ment of Its Plan and Purposes and of the Relation of States and Foreign Govern-
ments to Them”, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College 
Park, MD, RG 43: Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expo-
sitions, 1825-1979, Department of State, Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs, Office of International Conferences, Administrative Files, Entry 5536, 
Box 104, 3-4.
22 | Century of Progress International Exposition: Official Book of the Fair. Giv-
ing Pre-exposition Information 1932-1933 of A Century of Progress International 
Exposition Chicago 1933. Chicago: A Century of Progress, Inc., 1932, 5-6. For an 
elaborate discussion of scientists’ role in the conceptualization of the Chicago 
and New York fairs see Robert W. Rydell: World of Fairs. The Century-of-Progress 
Expositions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, chapter 4; Cheryl Ganz: 
The 1933 Chicago World’s Fair. A Century of Progress. Urbana: University of Il-
linois Press, 2008, 64-66.
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mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, geology and medicine which was 
to 
“unfold the story of the discoveries of science and invention which, within 
100 years have made the forces of nature the servant of man, and which are 
responsible for the incredible progress in this past century; of how science has 
added to the comfort and safety of man and is now utilized in his service; and of 
the promises that it offers for future benefits to man.”23 
The ‘deification’ of science as a motor for progress and its transformational 
power into technological adaptations as well as humankind’s assigned role 
in this drama found a particularly straightforward expression in the fair’s 
motto “Science Finds – Industry Applies – Man Conforms.” Materialization 
of this attitude became the Fountain of Science designed by Louise Lentz 
Woodruff and positioned at the main rotunda of the Hall of Science. 
According to a promotional flyer, its theme – Science Advancing Mankind 
– was “represented by the great robot-like figure typifying the exactitude, 
force, and onward movement of science, with its powerful hands at the 
backs of the figures of a man and a woman, representing mankind.”24 
The world that the fair of 1933 painted was scientifically, industrially, 
socially and implicitly politically progressive. The strong belief in 
modernization based on the use of abundant energy resources found 
expression both in architectural and exhibitionary terms. Energetic 
symbolism was prominent on the outside of the Electrical Group buildings 
featuring two bas-relief panels delineating, as it said in one guidebook, 
“man’s struggle to wrest power from nature.”25 The reliefs featured two 
figures representing Light and Energy, the latter being inscribed: “Energy 
is the substance of all things—the cycles of the atoms, the play of the 
23 | International Exposition Chicago 1933: A Century of Progress. Hall of Sci-
ence. Chicago: International Exposition, [1932?], n. p.
24 | “Fountain of Science. Century of Progress” (1933), pamphlet, Century of 
Progress 1933-34 World’s Fair Collection (CPWFC), University of Chicago, Spe-
cial Collections, http://century.lib.uchicago.edu/images/century0061.pdf, Ac-
cessed: 22.08.2011.
25 | Century of Progress: Official Book of the Fair, 40.
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elements are in forms cast as by a mighty hand to become the world’s 
foundations.”26 
Inside the Electrical Building which was a cooperative effort of different 
institutions and companies of the electricity sector, the central attraction 
was a large diorama showing electricity’s way from generation over 
transmission to usage. Accompanying this were many smaller dioramas 
ranging from historical instruments to the stylization of modern areas 
of application in homes, offices, shops and industrial plants. Guiding 
the design process had been, according to the accompanying brochure, 
the acknowledgment that “in the enchanting drama unfolded by this 
Exposition, electricity in all modesty might truthfully be cast in the role 
of Great Cooperator, extending to all other industry its hand of magic[.]”27 
From this view on energy resulted a two-fold approach to (electric) 
energy. On the one hand, exhibits aimed at transmitting a basic 
understanding of scientific and technological laws. On the other, they 
focused on what energy could do for the modernization of the private 
26 | Century of Progress: Official Book of the Fair, 40.
27 | “Electricity at Work”, pamphlet, CPWFC, http://century.lib.uchicago.edu/
images/century0132.pdf, Accessed: 22.08.2011.
Figure 3: Bas-Relief Panel 
“Energy” at the Electrical 
Building, Chicago World’s  
Fair, 1933.
Figure 4: Bas-Relief Panel 
“Light” at the Electrical  
Building, Chicago World’s 
Fair, 1933.
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household and economy. This consumptive spin on presenting energy 
called for new designs and exhibition styles. Not the production aspects of 
technologies were to be featured, but rather their applicability in everyday 
life, that is their desirability. The founder of Grand Canyon’s Scenic 
Airways and member of the fair’s exhibition team, J. Parker van Zandt, 
therefore called for less overwrought scientific exhibits in favor of simpler, 
easier-to-consume displays:
“Be dramatic! Whatever the story—dramatize it. […] There is drama in everything. 
No product that people purchase lacks dramatic possibilities. However lifeless, 
prosaic and commonplace to the unimaginative it may seem, actually it is alive 
with warm human feelings—with the hopes, fears, and wants of the people who 
buy it, not as an end in itself, but as a means toward the satisfaction of their 
desires. The ability to see inanimate things living, which other men think are 
dead, make successful advertising—and winning exhibits.”28 
Following van Zandt’s credo, General Electric (GE) constructed a ‘House 
of Magic’ that accommodated objects and demonstrations dedicated 
to the ‘science of electricity’ performed by personnel of GE’s research 
laboratories. Encoded as ‘serious scientists’ and/or magicians, the shows 
were as much vehicles for the popularization of science and the company’s 
products as pure vaudeville-style entertainment. Though the personalized 
approach added to their appeal, shows like the lighting of an incandescent 
lamp without wire connections or the popping of corn kernels with electric 
‘microwaves’ trivialized both the scientific processes and the practical 
applications in favor of mesmerizing, yet fleeting enjoyment. 
While the ‘House of Magic’ or the musical comedy “What a Night”29 
featuring a stingy husband who ends up being persuaded that electricity is 
in fact affordable made for good audience entertainment, manufacturers 
were at least equally interested in solid advertising by displaying their 
appliances hands-on. The ideal place for this was the Century of Progress 
Homes Exhibit consisting of eleven fully furnished model homes. Although 
the houses differed in the degree to which they presented revolutionary 
28 | J. Parker van Zandt/L. Rohe Walter: “King Customer at a Century of 
Progress”, in: Review of Reviews 90:3 (1934), 24.
29 | “What a Night” (1934), pamphlet, CPWFC, http://century.lib.uchicago.edu/
images/century0156.pdf, Accessed: 22.08.2011.
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modern architecture and interior design, all of them shared the underlying 
tone of progressiveness resulting in elaborate technological infrastructures 
made possible through consequent application of scientific findings: 
“In each of the eleven model houses, science has transformed what, in the 
century closing, was the kitchen into a laboratory of domestic science. Each is 
equipped with automatic refrigeration, self-regulating electric or gas ovens, 
dish-washing machines and electric mixers. Not the least interesting features of 
these sample homes, however, are that many of them were fabricated in faraway 
factories, simply being assembled on the exposition grounds, and all of them are 
tailored for modest purses.”30 
According to the exhibiting companies, it was not just the use of gas- or 
electrically-driven appliances that marked modernity’s invasion into 
American households, but also the employment of new building materials 
and modes of production. However, as Brian Horrigan has pointed out, 
there was an ambivalence inherent in the model homes’ exhibition. 
While the homes equipped with refrigerators, washing machines, kitchen 
‘laboratories’ and remote-control windows fascinated the visitors, they 
remained essentially a utopian dream in light of pressing economic 
needs.31 It was therefore mandatory for the fair’s organizers to provide 
a mental bridge between the audience’s often stark living reality and 
the dream world of the exhibited homes. They did this by incorporating 
presumably affordable homes such as the single-family home designed 
by Howard Fisher for General House, Inc. Relying on standardized mass-
produced building parts assembled on site, these houses were supposed to 
fulfill the American homeowner’s dream for thousands of average-income 
families.32 While these houses were advertised as modern in design and 
comfort, most manufacturers and architects simultaneously made sure not 
to distance themselves from the audience’s rather conservative image of an 
30 | Chicago and the World’s Fair 1933. Chicago: T. Husum Publishing Co., 1933, 
57.
31 | Brian Horrigan: “The Home of Tomorrow, 1927-1945”, in: Joseph J. Corn, ed. 
Imagining Tomorrow. History, Technology, and the American Future. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1986, 145.
32 | General Houses, Inc. Pamphlet, 1933, CPWFC, http://century.lib.uchicago.
edu/images/century0106.pdf, Accessed: 22.08.2011.
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ideal family home – practical, affordable, not too fancy in architecture and 
furnishing. 
Not so, however, George Fred Keck whose ‘House of Tomorrow’ 
blew people’s imagination in many ways. His house was boldly different 
and suggested a completely new way of living in tune with the evolving 
automobile culture. “Admittedly experimental, to test the reactions of 
visitors […] to a house that entirely upsets the conventional ideas of a 
home”33, the ‘House of Tomorrow’ was built around a central utility core, 
twelve-sided, steel-framed, completely glazed and fully air-conditioned. 
While the base floor offered room for both a garage and an airplane hangar, 
the top floor was entirely taken up by a sundeck and observatory. It was the 
middle floor where the living rooms, kitchen and bathroom – radiating 
like cake wedges from the utilities core – were to be found. Just as air-
conditioning and central heating was pronounced as a given in the ‘House 
of Tomorrow’, state-of-the-art electric and gas-driven appliances were 
presented as must-haves and future standard. 
Figure 5: House of Tomorrow, Chicago World’s Fair, 1933. 
In its promotional brochure, the house’s construction company Century 
Homes Inc. predicted that air-conditioning systems like the one used by Keck 
33 | Kaufmann & Fabry Co.: Official Guide Book of the World’s Fair of 1934. Chi-
cago: A Century of Progress International Exposition, 1934, 104.
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would soon “be considered as necessary as central-heating and bathrooms 
are today.”34 While this proved to be ahead of its time since air-conditioning 
would not become widely diffused in American private homes until the 
1960s, many of the other appliances shown in the model homes and the 
adjacent Home Planning Hall sent the simple, but intriguing message that 
progress was just around the corner for every American citizen. 
In a way, model homes did more for utility companies and appliance 
manufacturers than any ‘House of Magic’ ever could have done: They 
staged and sold a walkable, even touchable dream of modern living based 
on the assurance that the narrative of energy abundance had an equivalent 
in the material world. The fact that the production, the transportation of 
centrally manufactured building parts and the operation of these homes 
were highly energy-intensive was largely disregarded by producers and 
consumers alike. At the Chicago fair of 1933, energy was an emblem for 
modernity and progress finding its expression in artistic and architectural 
symbolism as well as down-to-earth hands-on appliances. Together, they 
painted a picture-perfect domestic life for those willing to let modern energy 
forms, particularly electricity, and corresponding consumer technologies 
into their lives. 
NE W YORK WORLD’S FAIR, 1939-1940 35
In many respects, the New York world’s fair built upon the concepts, 
designs and messages of its younger Chicago brother. Its two blockbuster 
34 | Century Homes Inc. House of Tomorrow. Chicago, 1933, pamphlet, 
CPWFC, http://century.lib.uchicago.edu/images/century0094.pdf, Accessed: 
22.08.2011.
35 | Similar to the Chicago fair, the New York World’s Fair reopened for a second 
season from May to October 1940. Dif ferent from Chicago, the second season 
showed some major changes in the displays; most notably the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union’s pavilion after the country had invaded Finland in November 1939. 
Germany – officially citing budget restraints – had not participated at all. Overall, 
the second season clearly stood under the impression of world events giving it-
self the new motto “For Peace and Freedom” and was characterized by stronger 
nationalistic tones. This ar ticle focuses on the displays as they were featured in 
the 1939 season. 
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attractions – the diorama “Democracity” in the Perisphere and GM’s 
“Futurama”36 – have intrigued both contemporaries and scholars alike. 
However, there is also much to say about the presentation of energy 
narratives and modern consumption society when turning towards lesser 
known pavilions. In fact, what distinguished New York from Chicago was 
its radical move towards the abundance narrative in interior displays as 
well as architecture. Most of the energy-related exhibits were situated in 
the power and distribution zone devoted “to industries whose task it is to 
transform natural resources into commodities necessary to the daily life of 
whole populations.”37 
 
Figure 6: Petroleum Industry Building, New York World’s Fair, 1939.
36 | Both “Democracity” and “Futurama” have been analyzed extensively in pre-
vious studies. See Robert Rydell: World of Fairs, 135; Roland Marchand: “The 
Designers Go to the Fair, II: Norman Bel Geddes, The General Motor ‘Futurama’, 
and the Visit to the Factory Transformed”, in: Dennis P. Doordan, ed. Design His-
tory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, 103-21.
37 | Frank Monaghan: Official Guide Book New York World’s Fair. New York: Expo-
sition Publ., 1939, 139.
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Aside from the usual suspects like Westinghouse and GE, cooperative 
exhibits of the gas and petroleum industries as well as public utilities 
presented themselves in this zone. Their displays often relied on time-
proven and straightforward exhibitionary approaches such as historical 
comparisons to emphasize the progress that electricity had brought 
or plain showrooms such as Westinghouse’s display of state-of-the-art 
electrical kitchens and GE’s electric appliance store. Beyond this hands-on 
approach, however, was a remarkable tendency towards abstraction and 
utopianism. The architecture of the production zone buildings featured 
striking references to those natural resources on which the respective 
industries were dependent and the technological tools with which they 
were extracted from the earth. While the Petroleum Industry Building 
rested on four huge oil tanks and exhibited an oil derrick in operation on 
the lawn outside38, the Gas Exhibits Building featured high towers from 
which gas flames shot into the sky. 
Figure 7: Electric Utilities Building, New York World’s Fair, 1939. 
38 | “The Petroleum Industry at the New York World’s Fair…”, pamphlet, Smith-
sonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Archives Center (SI), 
Larry Zim World’s Fair Collection, 1841-1988, Box 1.
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This “Court of Flames” was the gateway to an exhibit “presenting the true 
story of Gas, the modern magic that has made life modern for America […] 
the fuel that is as modern as tomorrow.”39
The Electric Utilities Building featured a massive waterfall running 
into a basin, the visitors entering the building through a glass spillway 
beneath parts of the waterfall. While giving a sense of the force of the 
water used for electricity generation, the tunnel enabling visitors to walk 
through it unharmed symbolized the conquest of this natural power. 
Inside, the building showcased the results of this mastery by means of 
a massive two-fold diorama with a live cast comparing a historical and a 
modern street scene to demonstrate the enormous comfort of living that 
electricity had brought in less than half a century. The separation between 
outer architecture focusing on nature’s resources and interior displays 
featuring spaces of application corresponded with the growing detachment 
of energy’s generation from its consumption practices in private homes, 
offices and shops. While the buildings claimed to be devoted to the all-
encompassing story of energy production, distribution and consumption, 
they actually bore witness to society’s increasingly fragmented view on 
energy. Architectural elements such as the oil derrick or the waterfall 
served as shortened symbols for the narrative of energy abundance that 
had decoupled consumption from the effects of production. There was no 
oil dirtying the grass in front of the petroleum building and no smoking 
stacks of gas plants clouded the air. Instead, the visitors were confronted 
with an abstract rendering of energy in which nature was estheticized and 
artificially re-pasted into the picture. The stainless steel lightning bolt in 
front of GE’s building symbolized the “taming of the savage natural forces 
of electricity to serve the needs of men”40 as did the showing of ten million 
volts of man-made lightning. What had long been considered magical 
beyond human beings’ comprehension had turned into a force controlled 
by “research and engineering in electricity that will provide, for the WORLD 
OF TOMORROW, even more goods for more people at less cost.”41 Hence, 
the formerly natural sublime had turned into the technological sublime by 
the exhibitions, “push[ing] the audience over the line from ordinary reality 
39 | “Meet me at the ‘Court of Flame’ New York World’s Fair 1939”, pamphlet, SI, 
Larry Zim World’s Fair Collection, Box 1. 
40 | Monaghan: Official Guide Book, 148.
41 | New York Herald Tribune, 30.04.1939, 22. Emphases in original.
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toward a simulated dream world in which everything seemed possible” and 
where the terror of the natural sublime had been eliminated.42
Coupled with the powerful expressions of future urban living based 
on the use of abundant energy, not the least for mass automobilism, these 
architectural renderings of energy created the vision of a smooth production 
and consumption cycle. Technology had set the stage and apparently both 
the exhibition creators and the millions of visitors exploring the fairgrounds 
wanted to believe that modernity, progress, well-being and a high living 
standard could and would be theirs at no cost at all.
BRUSSELS 1958
Of course, the Second World War destroyed all utopian dreams envisioned 
in the 1930s. By the time the first postwar fair opened in 1958 in Brussels, 
Belgium, the geopolitical situation had changed dramatically. Victorious 
over Germany and the axis powers, the Western world now faced new 
enemies. In the ensuing Cold War that pitted the United States against 
the Soviet Union, private consumption became a decisive issue. The 
fair was also marked by the recent war experience that had not only 
shaken people’s trust in the project of modernity, but also their beliefs in 
science and technology’s benign nature. To formulate a new relationship 
between science, technology and humankind and regain confidence in 
scientific achievements and applications became the theme of the fair, 
making it “a declaration of faith in mankind’s ability to mold the atomic 
age to the ultimate advantage of all nations and peoples.”43 However, the 
International Hall of Science, intended to overcome nationalistic rhetoric 
and to emphasize instead international cooperation in the research on 
basic science, failed to capture the public’s imagination.44 
42 | Nye: American Technological Sublime, 216, 224.
43 | “The Brussels World’s Fair 1958”, brochure, SI, Larry Zim World’s Fair Col-
lection, Box 1.
44 | Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus/David Cloutier: “Popularizing Science and 
Technology During the Cold War: Brussels 1958”, in: Robert W. Rydell/Nancy 
Gwinn, eds. Fair Representations. World’s Fairs and the Modern World. Amster-
dam: VU University Press, 1994, 163, 167.
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In terms of the energy narrative, the Brussels fair proves to be an 
interesting case. In essence, it was an expression of what Nye has called 
the narrative of human ingenuity. The need for abundant energy resources 
had become obvious to all nations during the war. Especially in Europe, 
the scarcity of energy supply had affected not just the military, but also the 
civilian population in their battle for survival in the immediate postwar 
years. Even though the United States had not been affected by this as much 
as Europe, there was a fear of energy scarcity curbing the economy and 
thus endangering the standard of living. Seizing upon this opportunity, the 
exhibition designers presented the American dealings in atomic energy 
entirely in scientific and peaceful terms, albeit of course simultaneously 
trying to keep rivaling nations from getting involved in atomic energy. 
At the fair, the new energy source was presented with a “mechanistic 
approach” explaining scientific laws in a matter-of-fact way and leaving 
out social, political and environmental implications.45 Aside from the Hall 
of Science46 and the iconic Atomium whose lower globes were home to 
exhibitions on atomic energy, nuclear power was featured in the British, 
French, Soviet and American pavilions. The American treatment was 
part of the pavilion’s concept of small display units and basically recycled 
elements of the “Atoms for Peace”-exhibitions that had toured European 
countries earlier. Covering about 10 percent of the main floor, it featured 
samples of irradiated food, a hospital cobalt-60-radiation unit and – 
the audience’s favorite – electro-mechanical hands for the handling of 
radioactive material that could be tried out by the visitors. A small cube of 
uranium was positioned in front of a large photograph showing railroad 
cars filled to the brim with coal suggesting that the cube provided as much 
power as 3,000,000 tons of coal.47 
America’s energy-related display looked progressive and optimistic, 
but the audience’s response was not overly enthusiastic. The topic simply 
remained too scientific and lacked emotional appeal.
45 | Nye: Narratives and Spaces, 78.
46 | The United States presented the AGN-211, an operating nuclear research 
reactor with an output of 1 watt, constructed by the Aerojet General Nucleonics 
Corporation in California.
47 | “Islands for Living”, NARA, RG 43, Entry P 16, Box 20.
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Figure 8: Nuclear Energy Exhibit, American Pavilion, 
Brussels Expo, 1958. 
But a closer inspection of the copious American records on the displays 
in Brussels reveals that it was private consumption rather than atomic 
energy anyway with which the Americans hoped to win the hearts of 
the people. That the danger of falling short of the public’s expectations 
worried many of the organizers – most of all the exhibition’s commissioner 
general Howard S. Cullman – becomes clear in one of his warnings to 
an assistant to the U.S. President in December 1957 when he relayed the 
words of one of his aides: “It becomes more and more apparent we would 
be derelict in our duty if we did not point out with all possible emphasis the 
kind of representation the Russians plan to put on in Brussels next year. 
It is propaganda with a capital P.”48 The war was apparently on and the 
United States decided to wage it on the terrain they knew best, America’s 
48 | Letter of Howard S. Cullman to Honorable Sherman Adams, December 12, 
1957, NARA, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1763-2002, 
Records Relating to the Brussels Universal and International Exhibition, com-
piled 1956-1959, Entry 5108, Box 2. Securing a sufficient budget for the Ameri-
can exhibit in Brussels remained dif ficult. According to a German news maga-
zine, the Soviets’ investment into the fair (126 million) doubled that of the United 
States (63 million). “Babel in Beton”, in: Der Spiegel, 09.04.1958, 46. 
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comfortable and enjoyable but also energy-intensive consumer lifestyle. 
In Cullman’s words, they tried to “present those highlights of life in our 
country which are most demonstrative of ever-increasing cultural activity 
in the face of technologically increased leisure and our accomplishments 
in improving the conditions of living of every American.”49
To achieve this goal, Cullman’s office had brought together a special 
committee consisting of fifty representatives from the intellectual, 
industrial, academic, diplomatic and artistic elite. In conjunction with the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), five themes were developed 
to be exhibited in the pavilion: Land and People, Life and Work, American 
Idealism in Action, Culture, and Science and Technology. Providing the 
“ideological glue” for the exhibitions were the underlying messages that 
“Americans are distinctly dynamic, energetic, impatient and restless for 
change, and that because of the vastness of America, the diversity of our 
people and the free conditions pertaining to American enterprise, thought 
and action, we are committed to constant, unremitting search for an 
improved way of life.”50 In view of the latest propaganda disaster, namely 
the Soviet Union’s successful launching of the first human-made object 
into the earth’s orbit, America had already dangerously fallen behind in the 
propaganda battle. In Cullman’s opinion as he expressed it to President 
Eisenhower, it was of utmost importance to make sure that the Brussels 
fair wouldn’t result in a similar debacle: “Properly handled, this could be 
a strong public relations weapon in combating Communist propaganda. 
With bungling, we could have a bombshell that could score a resounding 
victory for the other side. It seems to me it is vitally important to our whole 
foreign policy.”51 Setting about their task, the exhibition design team under 
49 | “Statement by Howard S. Cullman, United States Commissioner General to 
1958 Brussels Universal and International Exhibition”, NARA, RG 59, Entry 5108, 
Box 2.
50 | “A Report on Certain Considerations Involved in the Operation of an Exhibits 
Pavilion at a World’s Fair. Prepared by the Staff of the United States Pavilion at 
the Brussels Universal and International Exhibition, 1958. January 1959”, NARA, 
RG 306: Records of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Records Relat-
ing to USIA Expositions (World’s Fairs), 1959-1993, Entry 1058, Box 5, 7.
51 | Howard Cullmann to President Eisenhower, November 12, 1957, NARA, RG 
43, Entry P 16, Box 22. The press shared Cullman’s assessment as can be seen 
in the many ar ticles bearing titles such as “Fair Warning”, “Big Chance at Brus-
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the leadership of Peter G. Harnden developed a multitude of small display 
units covering art, technology, culture, politics, food and entertainment. 
Situated in the airy two-level interior of the American pavilion designed 
by Edward D. Stone, some of the individual thematic clusters dealt with 
automation, color television, city and industrial planning and typical 
American shopping in the so-called ‘Streetscape’. An American diner-
like restaurant and voting machines completed the ‘American experience’ 
while the “Face of America”-display gave the audience the possibility to 
acquaint themselves with typical American things such as a section of 
a California redwood, a Ford automobile, tumbleweed, the first Edison 
electric light bulb, a gold nugget or an Idaho potato.52 All of these exhibits 
were supposed to contribute to a favorable picture of the United States by 
adhering to six basic guidelines: avoid fragmentation – positive approach – 
accent on the future – subtle approach – visitor reference point – economic 
integration in the United States.53
In the conflict between the Western and Eastern bloc that was a cultural 
as much as a political and technological battle, home furnishings and lifestyle 
consumer goods soon became flagships of their respective system. It comes 
as no surprise, therefore, that kitchens and their appliances also found their 
way into the American pavilion at the Brussels fair. That a kitchen embodies 
“the ideology of the culture to which it belongs”54 was especially relevant 
for design team member Katherine Howard, who early on argued for a full-
fledged model kitchen like the ones displayed at Marshall Plan-sponsored 
exhibitions in Germany and other West European countries: 
“[W]e must not lose sight of the fact […] that first and foremost we are engaged 
in a psychological battle to win the uncommitted nations to the free way of life. 
[…] It is one of the wonders of the world that Americans in every economic strata 
sels”, “Empty Show Window at Brussels?”, “Uncle Sam in the Shade”, “Our Best 
Diplomacy!” and “Let’s Show Reds” to be found in the clippings collection with 
the NARA Records, RG 59, Entry 5108.
52 | “A Report on Certain Considerations”, NARA, RG 306, Entry 1058, 10.
53 | “Theme Development. Staff Discussions, November 6, 1956”, NARA, RG 43, 
Entry P 16, Box 8, 2.
54 | Ruth Oldenziel/Karin Zachmann: “Kitchens as Technology and Politics: An 
Introduction”, in: Oldenziel/Zachmann, eds. Cold War Kitchen. Americanization, 
Technology, and European Users. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009, 2.
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have kitchens with labor-saving devices which free the American woman from 
drudgery, which make the kitchen the heart of the home.”55 
Howard’s conventional approach to exhibition design, however, lost 
against the more experimental visions of Harnden and Cullman.56 
Nevertheless, her idea to showcase the manifold consumer choices open 
to Americans of any social and economic standing was incorporated and 
even taken to another level in the “Islands of Living.” Here, over 1,000 
objects – household appliances, toys, sports goods, office equipment and 
general gadgets – were displayed, demonstrating “not only the high design 
standards and beauty of America’s everyday living equipment, but also 
diversity, utility and convenience.”57
 
Figure 9: View from the Balcony onto Ongoing Fashion 
Show, American Pavilion, Brussels Expo, 1958. 
Part of this concept was a fashion show which took place several times a 
day and regularly drew high numbers of spectators. Dressed in the latest 
American fashion, models paraded through the islands, interacted with the 
55 | Howard to Cullman, memo, October 31, 1957, Katherine G. Howard Papers, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS, Box 25, Folder “Confidential Mrs. 
Howard”, p. 1, qtd. in Robert Haddow: “Material Culture Exhibits in the American 
Pavilion at the 1958 Brussels World’s Fair: Women’s Clothing, Men’s Gadgets, 
Hot Dogs and Haute Couture”, in: Popular Culture in Libraries 2:3 (1994), 64.
56 | For an account on the debates about the kitchen display see Robert H. 
Haddow: Pavilions of Plenty. Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s. 
Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997, chapter 6.
57 | “A Report on Certain Considerations”, NARA, RG 306, Entry 1058, 13.
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objects and descended from the balcony level onto a slab across the pool at 
the center of the pavilion. 
In the tense climate of the Cold War, this strong focus on consumption 
and lifestyle provoked mixed reactions. A flood of letters reached the 
American commissioner general and the American President in the 
weeks and months after the fair’s opening. Many of them complained 
about the fragmentary design of the exhibits, the too subtle ‘propaganda’ 
lacking informational give-away brochures for foreign visitors and the 
meaningless fashion show.58 Instead of “useless street signs and other odds 
and ends”, some citizens called for “model homes, furniture, appliances, 
automobiles, trailers, camping and barbecue equipment [… demanding to] 
show American life as it really exists, and pride automatically will replace 
our shame.”59 These often bluntly voiced opinions were supported by 
official audience evaluations stating that the American pavilion in almost 
all respects was outranked by that of the Soviet Union. The fashion show, 
despite having drawn high numbers, actually ranked first as the least-liked 
display in the entire pavilion.60
Even though neither the displays nor the controversy ensuing around 
it really centered on the atomic energy exhibit, the American pavilion 
nevertheless had a great significance for postwar energy history as it 
was exactly this subliminal character of the energy narrative underlying 
the exhibition that would become important. The American pavilion 
celebrated consumption practices that would become a model for many 
Western European societies61 in the years to come and thus contributed to 
the spreading of a careless high-energy consumption mentality. While the 
scientific background of potentially infinite energy resources by means of 
58 | Letter from Jaquelin H. Hume to the President of the United States, Septem-
ber 23, 1958; Letter from Arthur Cherkin to Gerson H. Lush, Department of State, 
June 26, 1958; both NARA, RG 43, Entry P 16, Box 11.
59 | Letter by Richard Van Zele to the Department of State, June 7, 1958, NARA, 
RG 43, Entry P 16, Box 11.
60 | Program and Media Studies PMS No. 29, “Visitor Reaction to the United 
States versus Major Competing Exhibits at the Brussels International Fair”, Of-
fice of Research and Intelligence, USIA, July 1958, NARA, RG 43, Entry P 16, Box 
11.
61 | See Victoria de Grazia: Irresistible Empire. America’s Advance through 20th-
Century Europe. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005; Oldenziel: Cold War Kitchen.
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nuclear fission had been meant to take center-stage at the Brussels fair, it 
was really the lifestyle in reach for an increasing number of people based 
on “diversity, mobility, portability and disposability”62 that made people go 
into raptures. Behind fashion, food and fun, energy in its physical and 
technological nature disappeared out of sight as if bikinis, hamburgers 
and television sets were entirely energy-insensitive in production and 
consumption. In the end, the American pavilion left its visitors with the 
impression and confidence that energy abundance was secured by the 
means available to scientists and engineers and that consumer paradise 
was just around the corner for everyone and – yet again – at no sacrifice 
at all. 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY E XPOSITION, KNOX VILLE, 1982
This assessment would of course change dramatically over the next two 
decades. As the postwar economic boom set in, bringing industrialization 
to more countries around the world, the demand for cheap energy sources 
increased dramatically. Finally, in the 1970s the world was shaken by the 
oil price crises that – for many rather abruptly – turned the narrative of 
abundance into one of scarcity.63 Whether the energy shortage was due to 
natural causes as the world approached peak oil or a result of artificially 
constructed limitations of supply is irrelevant for this paper. What matters 
is that energy was high on the agenda of politicians and economists and 
vividly present in the media. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the 
exposition in 1982 taking place in Knoxville, Tennessee was chosen to run 
under the theme “Energy Turns the World.” Modeled in many respects on 
the 1974 Spokane world’s fair which had distanced itself from technocratic 
approaches and focused on the topic “Celebrating Tomorrow’s Fresh New 
Environment”, the Knoxville fair was conceived by local businessman and 
executive director of the Downtown Knoxville Association W. Stewart Evans. 
Although one of the smallest cities ever to host a world’s fair, Knoxville was 
by no means an accidental choice. Home to the University of Tennessee’s 
energy research center and the Tennessee Valley Authority’s headquarters, 
the city was also close to the Oak Ridge’s National Atomic Laboratory 
62 | “Islands for Living”, NARA, RG 43, Entry P 16, Box 20.
63 | Nye: Narratives and Spaces, 80.
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and rich oil fields in the surroundings. Despite its topical motto, the fair 
turned out to be rather traditional, uninspired, even boring if we believe 
contemporary assessments. Although many of the participating nations 
made an effort to incorporate the theme into their presentations, most of 
them ended up re-activating the same cultural displays that had been a 
staple for over 50 years. 
Despite its limited significance for the history of world’s fairs in 
general, the Knoxville exposition is interesting for the topic of this paper as 
it signifies the shift of energy narratives in the 1970s and 80s in the United 
States. Firmly anchored in Republican energy politics, the fair of 1982 
gave expression first to the narrative of artificial scarcity brought about by 
foreign hands to be remedied by human ingenuity only to finally return to 
energy abundance and security. 
The primary stage for this succession of narratives from scarcity to 
abundance by way of ingenuity was the American pavilion which was 
supplemented by the landmark building of the fair, the Sunsphere. This 
steel tower topped with a glass globe symbolized the sun and its enormous 
energetic potential. Inside, however, there were no exhibitions but two 
observation desks, a dining room, a restaurant and their kitchen. Huge 
solar collectors on the roof provided power for the air conditioning and hot 
water system.
The pavilion told America’s “energy story” presenting all nine energy 
sources used in the United States at that time in separate glass towers. 
Artifacts “suspended in a beam of light” were joined by photographs and a 
multi-media presentation depicting “a geographical survey of our nation’s 
abundant energy resources.” Energy as basis for America’s technological 
advancement and society’s affluence was the underlying statement 
of another display in which historical artifacts ranging “from a metal 
bed warmer used in 1816 to parts from an IBM-360 computer” showed 
“energy’s importance as a central factor in our society’s growth.”64 Again, 
energy abundance and modernity, progress and material comfort were so 
closely linked as to not allow for any critical questioning. Ten years after 
the appearance of The Limits to Growth (1972) and Jimmy Carter’s call to 
“balance our demand for energy with our rapidly shrinking resources”, 
economic growth and energy consumption were still inextricably linked 
64 | United States Department of Commerce Expo ’82 News: “The Energy Place”, 
SI, Larry Zim World’s Fair Collection, Box 38. 
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in the designs of the pavilion’s displays. What had been declared a “test 
[of ] character of the American people” and a “moral equivalent to war” by 
Carter had been reduced to lip-service to conservation and efficiency efforts 
by the exhibition designers.65 The story told in the American pavilion was 
not so much about past mistakes or necessary adjustments in politics 
and practices, but rather a reaffirmation of the capitalist energy-intensive 
society powered by fossil resources and well-established technologies only 
to be supplemented, not substituted by renewables. 
Oil price crises, scarcity and environmental problems were presented 
as mere bumps in the road to eternal energy bliss while technology was 
seen as the key to mastering temporary bottlenecks in supply. In fact, it 
was not so much the energy resource but rather the technology used for its 
exploitation that was center-staged in Knoxville. This also became clear in 
corporate exhibits by Sun Co. (Sunoco) featuring solar energy technology, 
Occidental Petroleum and Tenneco, Inc. showing the extraction of oil from 
shale or United States Steel’s Oilwell Division which exhibited the ‘good 
old’ oil well that had already done the job in Chicago in 1933. All these 
displays relied on the expressive power of technology as humanity’s tool in 
the advancement of civilization. 
Consumption practices clad in the untouchable premise of economic 
growth and a rising standard of living were not questioned. Even efforts 
in energy efficiency and conservation were propagated not in terms of 
saving but ‘freeing’ energy, making it available for even more consumption 
and industrial growth. The “Home of the Future” by Cathedralite Inc., 
for instance, was fitted with a state-of-the-art heat reflective roof system, 
insulated shades, a heat pump for climate control, but also with a machine 
park of KitchenAid appliances.66 The message of this arrangement was 
clear: Save energy by using efficient technology and you may use as much 
energy as you like without feeling guilty or having to fear shortages. 
Perhaps the most political of the fairs examined in this paper, the 
Knoxville exposition that had been initiated by Democrat Jimmy Carter “to 
65 | Television Speech by President Jimmy Carter, April 18, 1977, WGBH Ameri-
can Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/prima 
ry-resources/carter-energy/, Accessed: 04.07.2011. 
66 | Press Release Sher, Jones, Shear and Associates Inc., SI, Larry Zim World’s 
Fair Collection, Box 38, 3.
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think anew of man’s relationship with the pervasive force of energy”67, 
turned out to be clearly marked by Republican energy policies. Redefining 
his predecessor’s existential narrative as a narrative of artificial limitation 
brought about by foreign enemies and misguided policies at home, Ronald 
Reagan used the fair for propagating energy-intensive production and 
consumption as assurance against industrial decline, impoverishment and 
communism: 
“We have seen the havoc and felt the pain brought on when vital energy 
sources outside our influence have been cut off. We have seen our economies 
manipulated, our industries hamstrung and our people squeezed between 
scarcity and inflation. […] The previous administration tried to manage a 
shortage by inter fering with the market process. […] [I]f America is to provide for 
her energy security, if we are to continue growing more self-reliant, if we are to 
free ourselves form foreign pressure, we must press toward the ultimate solution 
to our energy problems: The decontrol of all our energy sources[.]”68 
The Knoxville exposition thus forfeited its chance of redefining both the 
energy narrative and the display modes to convey it. In a way, it even 
represents a regression from the de-technologized landscapes of modern 
living that had characterized the American pavilion in 1958. In contrast 
to Brussels, the Knoxville displays focused on technology as a salutary 
force in the fight against energy limitations. Simultaneously architectural 
element and artifact, the individual technological objects displayed were 
a symbol for America’s – real or faked – belief in the omnipotence of 
technology to overcome any obstacle while remaining silent on any 
negative consequences for environment, society and culture. It comes as 
no surprise that the world did not remember Knoxville 1982 for its role in 
the environmentally informed energy discourse, but for the introduction of 
60-minute color photo processing and Cherry Coca-Cola.69 
67 | “The Exposition”, press kit, SI, Larry Zim World’s Fair Collection, Box 56, 3.
68 | The White House, Office of the Press Secretary: “Remarks by the President 
at the Opening of the 1982 World’s Fair”, May 1, 1982, SI, Larry Zim World’s Fair 
Collection, Box 38, 1-3.
69 | “The 1982 World’s Fair. You’ve Got to Be There!”, NARA, RG 306: United 
States Information Agency, Records Relating to Universal and International Exhi-
bitions, compiled 1966-1999, Entry 1092, Box 2, 3-4.
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CONCLUSION
Surveying energy-related displays by governments and companies over the 
course of almost a century of world’s fairs, it has become clear that primarily 
two types of discourses have been at work. One is the blatantly promotional 
discourse of utility companies and consumer goods manufacturers. The 
other one, less overtly but nonetheless influential, is the general narrative 
of energy abundance underlying even those displays that are seemingly 
unrelated to energy issues or those emphasizing human ingenuity and/
or energy scarcity. Both discourses depend upon each other, but it is the 
hidden one that has influenced the way we think about and consume 
energy. The American world’s fairs’ significance lies in their construction 
and communication of a careless attitude towards energy consumption 
which may or may not have been consciously pursued, but which surely 
served as a role model for many societies. From the early presentations 
of electricity in Chicago to atomic energy in Brussels to renewable energy 
technologies in Knoxville, the fairs have perpetuated energy narratives and 
to some extent contributed to growing energy oblivion. No matter which 
energy source we are dealing with, the narrative of natural abundance 
– or its transformed version of ingenious engineering that secures and 
prolongs that abundance – is shaping the displays. Aided by historical 
circumstances, industrial and private energy consumption was inextricably 
linked to economic growth, social progress and individual comfort in all of 
the fairs discussed. 
Nevertheless, although the underlying message stayed the same, the 
modes of mediation by exhibitionary means changed. While early displays 
of electricity had been meant to educate and familiarize with a completely 
new energy source, later fairs concentrated on the contextualization of 
energy – especially electricity – as fundamental prerequisite for everything 
that was good about America: modernity, prosperity, democracy. For a 
certain time in the first half of the 20th century, the technological object 
was pushed back in favor of the display of readymade consumer goods and 
utopias of modern living. Understanding how things worked became less 
important; one only needed to know how to use them. Instead of singular 
objects, dioramas, mural art and model homes created ‘landscapes’ of 
modern life that presented production and consumption as a seamless 
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process devoid of friction.70 Culminating in Brussels, exhibition makers 
reduced energy technologies to an adjunct of their displays paying tribute 
to what might be called the ‘consumption sublime’. 
The energy crises of the 1970s and to some extent the beginning 
environmental movement could not go unnoticed by world’s fairs. 
However, they did not result in a revision of consumption practices – at 
least not on a large scale – but rather in a return of the technocratic outlook. 
The problems – and there were many – would be solved if only scientists, 
engineers, industrialists and consumers believed in technology again. The 
practices of how this energy technology was used, which technology was to 
be favored and how to save energy instead of shifting the resources to be 
tapped was not prioritized. The average consumer as actor in the drama of 
energy was left out of the picture in most of Knoxville’s displays. 
Having taken a look at the world’s fairs discussed in a long line of 
development, it becomes clear that energy has been dematerialized over 
the course of the 20th century. As the processes of its production and 
distribution became disconnected from peoples’ lives, energy was reduced 
to a commodity coming out of wall-sockets. The raw materials depleted 
for the production of energy – coal, gas, oil, uranium – and the risks 
connected with them, were shunned. The fixation on the consumption 
aspects resulted in increasingly scenic presentations that favored vision 
and hearing over tactile sensation. Finally, and this makes exhibitions so 
intriguing to study, these developments at the same time prevented the 
complete abandonment of object-centered displays. It was exactly because 
of the tendency towards scenography that model homes retained their 
popularity. Both modes of presentation prove to be mutually dependent in 
the world’s fairs of the 20th century: While the ‘landscapes of experience’ 
created imaginative visions permeated with ideology, object-centered 
displays offered tangibility and points of identification in an increasingly 
complex (energy) world. 
70 | Laura Burd Schiavo: “Modern Design Goes Public. A Photo Essay”, in: Ro-
bert W. Rydell, ed. Designing Tomorrow. America’s World’s Fairs of the 1930s. 
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“We want to live electrically!” 
Marketing Strategies of German Power Companies  
in the 20th Century
Sophie Gerber
Over the course of the 20th century, Germans have turned into consumers 
of rapidly increasing amounts of energy in private households which 
became places cluttered with ever more energy-consuming gadgets. 
This development represents an important cultural process. Ever more 
mundane practices such as the storing and preparation of food or personal 
hygiene became dependent on the supply of electricity. Its introduction 
into private households and increasing consumption changed consumers’ 
lives and environments as well as their routines. Thus, German households 
participated prominently in the transition towards a Western high-energy 
society which has gained momentum since the 1950s. But what and who 
contributed to Germans ending up consuming ever more electricity and 
adjusting their daily routines to the increasing consumption of energy? 
In this paper I will argue that advertisements functioned as a crucial 
element and condition of the electrification and mechanization of 
households. According to the philosopher, sociologist and journalist 
Siegfried Kracauer, the analysis of advertising as 
“the simple sur face manifestations of an epoch can contribute more to deter-
mining its place in the historical process than judgments of the epoch about it-
self. [...] On the other hand the very unconscious nature of sur face manifesta-
tions allows for direct access to the underlying meaning of existing conditions.”1
1 | Siegfried Kracauer: “The Mass Ornament”, in: New German Critique 5 (Spring 
1975), 67.
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In this sense, advertisements are directly linked to society and their decoding 
leads to an understanding of societal contexts, although advertising cannot 
be read as a true or unbiased reflection of reality. But since advertisements 
have to be connected and communicated with society, there is a limit as to 
how imaginative they can be.2 Following Kracauer’s remarks, advertising 
is today perceived and accepted as an important source for cultural as well 
as economic and social history. It can be used as a crucial component of 
an interdisciplinary history of consumption. Although advertising is goal-
oriented, it is, like mundane objects, a part of everyday culture and therefore 
a rich source for historians. For a consumer-oriented history of technology 
which focuses on electricity in private households, advertisements are 
in fact indispensable sources since they were a crucial component and 
condition of electrification and the mechanization of households which 
so far have been investigated predominantly from a technological and 
economical point of view. From a historical perspective, a comprehensive 
contextualization of electricity advertising in Germany is a relatively new 
field of research.3
First and foremost, historical studies show – hardly surprisingly – that 
energy suppliers aimed at profits. One way to increase them was to balance 
the load curves of power plants. For example, installment credits for white 
goods were supposed to generate additional purchasing power and cheap 
electricity prices were offered in order to extend the demand and thus the 
efficiency and profitability of power companies.4 But the more important 
aspect for an analysis of advertising is that it is a means to charge the 
consumption of electricity with meaning and to make frames of meaning 
2 | Cf. Herbert Willems: Rahmen und Habitus. Zum theoretischen und metho-
dischen Ansatz Erving Goffmans. Vergleiche, Anschlüsse und Anwendungen. 
Frankfur t/Main: Suhrkamp, 1997, 387.
3 | For a first systematic outline see Peter Döring/Christoph Weltmann: “‘Die Er-
weckung von Stromhunger’. Elektrizitätswerbung im 20. Jahrhundert”, in: Horst 
A. Wessel, ed. Das elektrische Jahrhundert. Essen: Klar text, 2002, 93-108 and 
Theo Horstmann/Regina Weber, eds.: “Hier wirkt Elektrizität”. Werbung für Strom 
1890 bis 2010. Essen: Klar text, 2010.
4 | Ludwig Koch: “Die Haushaltsgeräte-Absatzpolitik in Elektrizitäts-Versor-
gungsunternehmen” (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München, 1957), 11-12. Koch’s work is one of the few contemporary studies on 
the marketing policy of electricity suppliers.
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and action visible for consumers. Following the French cultural theorist 
Roland Barthes, there is not only the literal meaning of advertisements, but 
a secondary, connotative meaning which is perceived more unconsciously 
and emotionally by consumers.5 Therefore, producers keep consumers 
in mind when creating advertisements and as a result, advertisements 
show designated user contexts and social as well as cultural values of a 
technology such as electricity.6 Therefore, an analysis of advertisements 
also reveals which functionalities and meanings of a technology producers 
and consumers appreciated and which they ignored. For example, during 
the 1950s, the laborsaving effects of electricity had been appreciated but its 
ecological consequences were ignored until the early 1970s.7 The symbolic 
value and cultural context of advertisements have to be decoded and 
interpreted by the beholder, and the advertised product – electricity and its 
use – has to be related to certain symbols. 
Advertising has to be considered as a mediating code which represents 
consumers as well as producers. In other words, advertising is “not only an 
impulse towards society, but a reflection of this society itself”8 or rather the 
reflection of the expectations of producers, advertisers and consumers and 
therefore it reveals predominant cultural ideals rather than social reality. 
If we want to understand how German households contributed to 
the transition to a high-energy society and to explore the mediation 
processes between the production and consumption of electricity, the 
notion of ‘mediation junctions’ helps to examine the negotiation space in 
which utility companies, engineers, advertisers, politics and consumers 
shaped the development of electricity consumption during the 20th 
5 | Roland Barthes: Mythen des Alltags. Frankfur t/Main: Suhrkamp, 1964, 
88-96.
6 | Heike Weber: Das Versprechen mobiler Freiheit. Zur Kultur- und Technikge-
schichte von Kofferradio, Walkman und Handy. Bielefeld: transcript, 2008, 78.
7 | Weber: Das Versprechen mobiler Freiheit, 78-79.
8 | Rainer Gries/Volker Ilgen/Dirk Schindelbeck, eds.: “Einleitung. Kursorische 
Überlegungen zu einer Werbegeschichte als Mentalitätsgeschichte”, in: “Ins Ge-
hirn der Masse kriechen!” Werbung und Mentalitätsgeschichte. Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995, 4. This and all following citations from 
German publications and sources were translated by the author.
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century.9 Advertisements show how electricity and its use are discussed 
among producers and became their most important means of technology 
mediation, created by engineers and electricity advisers before marketing 
specialists took on this task since the 1950s. 
Consumers and especially housewives, however, were crucial actors 
in the process of domestic electrification and its marketing. At the dawn 
of electrification a knowledge gap concerning the unknown form of 
energy had to be bridged by electric companies. Energy suppliers ought to 
educate housewives about the advantages and the use of electricity in their 
homes. Their aim was to find out about the desires and needs of electricity 
consumers and to emphasize the users’ viewpoint in the production and 
mediation of electricity.10 Moreover, consumers developed special relations 
to electricity as a product. Because electricity is not storable, users satisfy 
their need for electricity when they actually consume it and thus determine 
the capacity of energy production and distribution. Their practices, the 
number of energy-consuming appliances they switch on, the moment 
when they do so and the duration of operation is reflected in the daily 
load curves of power plants. Therefore, producers and users of electricity 
developed a very specific dependence upon each other. Increasing the 
efficiency of energy production and thus their profits required the utilities 
to determine the daily routines of their consumers because not just the 
amount but also the time of energy use was important.
Assuming that advertisements draw a picture of the West German 
society which became inextricably linked to the use of electricity during the 
20th century, I want to explore which methods and strategies of advertising 
existed and from which social and cultural contexts these advertisements 
evolved. Moreover, I will ask what advertisements reveal about the 
intentions and impediments of electricity consumption.
This article focuses on the specifics of advertisements as an important 
component of marketing strategies of power companies after 1945 and 
examines its characteristics compared to electricity advertising before 
9 | Cf. Ruth Oldenziel/Adri Albert de la Bruhèze/Onno de Wit: “Europe’s Media-
tion Junction. Technology and Consumer Society in the 20th Century”, in: History 
and Technology 21:1 (2005), 107-39.
10 | Carroll Pursell: “Domesticating Modernity: The Electrical Association for 
Women, 1924-86”, in: The British Journal for the History of Science 32:1 (1999), 
47-67.
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1945. It will analyze material from Berlin’s local electricity supplier Bewag, 
which was known by this name from 1934 to 2006. The predecessor had 
been founded as Germany’s first electricity company in 1884 and Berlin’s 
central power plant went into operation one year later. In its company 
archives, Bewag keeps a vast amount of advertising material, press releases 
and reports, photographic material as well as documents related to special 
advertising campaigns such as the rental of electric stoves. The material 
will be extended by an analysis of the magazine Elektrizität, a journal 
for electricity customer advice published by the ‘Main Advice Center for 
Electricity Consumption’ (HEA)11, to provide a more comprehensive insight 
into the advertising methods of energy suppliers.
FOCUSING ON OBJECTS:  
ME THODS OF ELECTRICIT Y MARKE TING
Energy producers used diverse advertising methods, some of them 
including objects as significant agents of mediation, to promote electricity 
and foster customer relations. Mediation processes related to electricity, 
however, are different from other products because electricity does not 
directly appeal to the senses and we usually perceive it through devices and 
appliances. Today, we are especially familiar with marketing for electricity as 
a product in a liberalized market.12 But during the early spread of electricity, 
the electricity and appliance industries recognized that they could benefit 
from each other since they shared the objective of the complete connection 
of households to the grid first and the all-electric household later on. In 
their joint advertising campaigns until the 1960s, their strategy of choice 
was to emphasize objects by advertising electricity-consuming appliances. 
11 | HEA saw as its purpose “to provide general education about the character-
istics of electric energy and its rational use, to advise all members of the elec-
tricity industry and interested parties on this subject and to work towards the 
use of appliances that are technically and economically as perfect as possible”, 
Hauptberatungsstelle für Elektrizitätsanwendung: Satzung (Fassung vom 18. 
März 1952). Frankfur t/Main: HEA, 1952, Archiv der HEA, Berlin.
12 | Cf. Regina Weber: “Elektrizitätswerbung zwischen Markt und Ökologie”, 
in: “Hier wirkt Elektrizität”. Werbung für Strom 1890 bis 2010. Essen: Klar text, 
2010, 318-21.
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Their cooperation aimed at increasing the number of electric appliances in 
households, an increase in sales for electric companies, and at establishing 
an extended electricity grid as a requirement and incentive for consumers 
to buy electric appliances for their homes. 
In general, methods of advertising for electricity were more varied than 
advertising for other products and they were not limited to print, radio 
and TV campaigns. Advice and education complemented visual media 
such as posters and advertisements in magazines. Popular forms for 
Bewag’s promotion campaigns, especially after 1945, were advertisements 
in newspapers and in public spaces, e.g. in subway stations or with the 
help of an advertising bus. Publications such as customer magazines and 
cookbooks brought the practical use of electricity closer to consumers. 
Installment systems, e.g. Bewag’s “Elektrissima” as well as renting 
campaigns, were supposed to ease the introduction of electrical appliances 
into German households despite financial constraints. In information 
and advice centers, consumers could inform themselves about domestic 
appliances, their purpose, price, electricity consumption and handling and 
watch demonstrations of electric stoves, refrigerators and food processors. 
Training kitchens, where housewives could familiarize themselves with the 
efficient handling of an electric stove as well as refresh and extend their 
cooking skills during free cooking courses were popular. Some training 
kitchens were even designed to be relocated and moved from one newly-
built residential area to another.13 A significant advantage of advice centers 
and training kitchens was their proximity to customers and markets. 
Electric cooking training was also offered in professional schools in order to 
address future consumers. As will be shown, promotional electricity prices 
had been another main characteristic of the strategies pursued by power 
companies. By all of these means, it was hoped that consumers could be 
firmly convinced of the usefulness of electricity and, beginning with the 
late 1950s, the all-electric kitchen. In France, promotional films as another 
advertising method of energy suppliers were popular. As a fruitful source 
for historians, they also help to reconstruct the cultural representations of 
energy, its consumption and consumers.14
13 | Irene Krause: “Hausfrauenwerbung in Berlin”, in: Elektrizität 9:5 (1959), 
112. 
14 | Cf. the contribution of Yves Bouvier in this volume. 
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In the second half of the 20th century, joint advertising campaigns 
of the electricity and appliance industry gradually decreased. Electricity 
suppliers began to use direct marketing for electricity whilst appliance 
manufacturers continued to advertise via objects. But the advertising 
strategies and motifs of both industries remained similar. Since the early 
1970s, they have concentrated their campaigns on the establishment of an 
ecological image. 
MAKING ELECTRICIT Y VISIBLE:  
ADVERTISING ELECTRICIT Y BEFORE 1945
In late 19th century Germany, entrepreneurs and engineers like the founder 
of the Deutsches Museum, Oskar von Miller, or Emil Rathenau, the founder 
of the famous producer of electrical equipment AEG, were among the first 
to popularize electric energy. In 1907, Emil Rathenau’s son Walther stated 
in a letter to his father that the propagation of electrotechnical applications 
“has to be organized and forced on consumers by producers.”15 The 
protagonists of electrification realized that far-reaching information 
campaigns by electricity companies and appliance manufacturers were 
required in order to promote electrification and local power networks as 
well as domestic mechanization. In 1886, electric domestic appliances 
were presented at a sample exhibition of the AEG (then Deutsche Edison 
Gesellschaft) for the first time. In the following year, the BEW16, Berlin’s 
public utility founded in 1884, opened its first permanent exhibition space 
with the aim of explaining electric lighting to potential customers and thus 
advertising it. 
15 | Qtd. in Jürgen Kocka: “Neue Energien im 19. Jahrhundert. Zur Sozialge-
schichte der Elektrizitätswir tschaft”, in: Evelyn Gröbl-Steinbach, ed. Licht und 
Schatten. Dimensionen von Technik, Energie und Politik. Wien: Böhlau, 1990, 21.
16 | Berlin’s public utility A.G.StEW was founded in 1884, AEG took over its ad-
ministration in 1887 and the company was renamed BEW. Beginning in 1923, 
Berlin’s Municipal Electric Company (Bewag) operated BEW’s plants and merged 
with Berlin Power and Light Corporation (Berliner Kraft- und Licht-Aktiengesell-
schaft) in 1934, renaming the company Bewag. It operated West Berlin’s power 
network beyond the division of Berlin from 1948 until 1993. In 2003, the Swed-
ish company Vattenfall bought the company, renaming it in 2006. 
SOPHIE GERBER86
The invisibility of electricity created fear and mistrust among consumers 
and hampered the process of domestic electrification. Electricity suppliers 
had to work hard to convince skeptical consumers and to provide the 
necessary knowledge about the new form of energy.17 In their advertising, 
companies therefore used anthropomorphisms such as magic fairies or 
helpful leprechauns in order to demonstrate the safe use of electricity 
in private households. Dancers with light bulbs and human candelabra 
presented the fascination of electricity at fairs and exhibitions.18 Moreover, 
luminous advertising on house facades promoted not only the advertised 
product, but the use of electricity as well.19 
Early electricity advertising was confronted with two difficulties. Firstly, 
there was a strong competition with the petroleum, the coal and the gas 
industry. And secondly, private households were a new market that had 
to be conquered, while electrification had already found a firm footing 
in industry, trade, traffic and public lighting. Accordingly, the strategy 
the electricity companies pursued was to focus on pertinent consumer 
information. With the Bewag getting more and more customers, Berlin’s 
electricity supplier published the first monthly customer magazine of 
a German electricity company as early as 1905. The first association for 
electricity advertising in Germany (Gefelek) was founded in 1911 by German 
electricity producers and electrical engineers. The Bewag inaugurated its 
first information centre in 1924 and added a training kitchen two years 
later, where the advantages of electric cooking were praised. Utilities began 
to advertise in cooperation with each other with the slogan “Electricity 
in every appliance” in 1927 and adjusted their campaigns to specific 
target groups, such as rural or urban households and craftsmen.20 Until 
the 1930s, exhibitions, demonstrations, posters and advertisements in 
newspapers were in the focus of electricity suppliers’ advertising efforts. 
They had consumers in mind who had to become aware of the safe and 
inexpensive use of electricity for household appliances.
17 | Koch: Die Haushaltsgeräte-Absatzpolitik, 33-34. 
18 | Döring: “Elektrizitätswerbung im 20. Jahrhundert”, 93.
19 | Döring: “Elektrizitätswerbung im 20. Jahrhundert”, 100.
20 | Christoph Weltmann: “Elektrizitätswerbung in den Zwanziger Jahren. Land-
wir te im Fokus und ‘Elektrizität in jedem Gerät’ – eine Werbemarke für Strom”, in: 
Theo Horstmann/Regina Weber, eds. “Hier wirkt Elektrizität”. Werbung für Strom 
1890 bis 2010. Essen: Klar text, 2010, 49.
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Electricity advertising was not only supposed to generate a general 
increase in sales, but power companies also aimed at the balancing of 
power plants’ load curves. But off-peak electricity was not yet easily saleable 
since refrigerators and hot water heaters, which are also operated during 
the night and therefore consume off-peak electricity, were still poorly 
engineered and hardly affordable before World War II.21 But in the early 
years of the Nazi period, general promotion was expanded in another 
direction, namely electric cooking, popularized with means such as the 
cookbook Das elektrische Kochen (‘Electric cooking’), which first appeared 
in 1936 and is still published today, meanwhile in its 53rd edition. In 1938, 
a non-linear rate system permitted an increase in electricity sales while 
entailing an automatic cost reduction for consumers.22 
It was only during World War II that the advertising efforts were 
cut back dramatically: Trainings were offered only in exchange for food 
stamps and housewives were taught preferably at home.23 Appliances were 
advertised according to the logic of war. The conserving characteristics of 
refrigerators should “fight the spoilage of food”, as the most important 
slogan pronounced, and electrical stoves were supposed to help saving 
solid fuels to the benefit of Germany’s autarky.24 
All advertising efforts of energy suppliers notwithstanding, the 
electrification of German households was not a smooth story of success. 
Especially the relatively high costs for power connections and electricity as 
well as consumers’ skepticism hampered the comprehensive introduction 
of electricity before 1945. 
“WE WANT TO LIVE ELECTRICALLY!”:  
PROMOTING ELECTRICIT Y AF TER 1945
The transition to an affluent high-energy society in West Germany gained 
momentum after a period of energy scarcity after World War II. First of all, 
in 1945, energy saving became an important issue when the Allied Control 
Council passed Law No. 7, which determined the rationing of electricity 
21 | Weltmann: “Elektrizitätswerbung in den Zwanziger Jahren”, 54. 
22 | Döring: “Elektrizitätswerbung im 20. Jahrhundert”, 102.
23 | Krause: “Hausfrauenwerbung in Berlin”, 112.
24 | Döring: “Elektrizitätswerbung im 20. Jahrhundert”, 102.
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and gas due to the lack of coal and other fuels.25 Indeed, from late 1946 
till late 1948, energy production had to be cut back even more than during 
World War II. The law designated the amount of domestic electricity 
consumption considered acceptable, overconsumption was fined and 
the use of electricity for heating as well as for lighting shop windows and 
advertisements was banned. 
Berlin’s first information centre and training kitchen already reopened 
shortly after the end of the war in 1946, teaching consumers about 
appropriate energy consumption in times of limited electricity supply.26 
Hence, electricity companies did not advertise more, but less consumption 
until 1949, when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded and 
Bewag’s most important power plant at that time, the power plant West, 
restarted.27
But as early as 1947, the Bewag used promotional cars even though 
Berlin was still in ruins.28 Moreover, electricity companies already tried 
to catch a glimpse of their future. For example, in 1948, Hans Saran, a 
pioneer of German electricity advertising, made it clear that 
“the electricity rationing, introduced by the occupying powers, still imposes 
restrictions on electricity consumers. But domestic appliances, especially 
electric stoves, are, after the currency reform and the end of rationing measures, 
available again today. Cooking classes and demonstrations have to be 
introduced again to teach housewives how to make advantageous use of ration 
cards.”29 
25 | Cf. Allied Secretariat, ed.: “Law No. 7. Rationing of Electricity and Gas”, in: 
Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 2 (30.11.1945), 32.
26 | Bewag: Beratungsstelle Steglitz am 12.11.1955 wieder eröffnet, 
15.11.1955, 5/52, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin. Although the Steglitz infor-
mation centre was already provisionally reopened in 1946, its formal opening 
was only celebrated in 1955. 
27 | Cf. footnote 16. 
28 | Illustrations “Bewag-Werbung”, 1946; “Elektro-Material Transport-Wagen”, 
1950, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin.
29 | Qtd. in Hanno Trurnit: Geschichte(n) hinterm Zähler. Die Beziehungen zwi-
schen Energieversorgern und ihren Kunden. München: Trurnit & Partner, 1996, 
142-43.
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As soon as the rationing of electricity had come to an end in 1948, 
utility companies aimed at broadening the market potential of domestic 
electricity consumption by promoting its use for more domestic activities 
such as heating water and space according to the slogan “Take advantage of 
electricity!” Moreover, architects and landlords became a new target group 
since old buildings had to be renovated and new homes were supposed to 
be completely electrified. 
But for the post-war generation, thrift was still the first priority and 
consumers had to be convinced to invest in electric appliances for their 
homes. Therefore, Bewag emphasized that “‘electric’ has nothing to do 
with luxury. To give something electrical as a present will be rewarded. 
Electric appliances save time, money and work.”30 Energy suppliers soon 
intensified their advertising efforts in order to promote electricity for 
every consumer and boost its demand. In general, the advertising efforts 
of utility companies after the rationing of electricity had ended were built 
on strategies which had already been known before World War II. Earlier 
discussions about the rationalization of the domestic workplace and the 
kitchen in the interwar period had created desires for domestic appliances 
that embodied contemporary modern lifestyle concepts and cultural 
notions, even though most consumers could not yet afford them.
The first German postwar magazine for electricity customers, Der 
Lichtblick (‘The Ray of Light’), was published by Bewag in 1950 and their 
fourth information center and training kitchen was inaugurated in the 
same year in Berlin’s Gesundbrunnen locality.31 For the Bewag, it was “an 
especially noble task to advise and educate our customers and thereby 
resume our promotional activities.”32 A lot of creative effort was put into 
the decoration of the window displays of Bewag’s information centers. 
Rhyming slogans were popular as well as comparisons between the dirty 
and exhausting ‘old times’ and the modern, convenient and electrified 
1950s. In advertisements, the housewives’ ‘revolution’ was shown and 
their slogan seemed to express the claim of every consumer in the 1950s: 
“We want to live electrically!” (Fig. 1). Moreover, the Bewag was “happy that 
30 | Der Lichtblick. Mitteilungen der Bewag 2 (1950), n.p.
31 | The topic of the first course was how to cook fish and a cake at the same 
time. Cf.: “Schmeckt’s bei der Bewag?”, in: Der Tag 61 (12.03.1950), n.p.
32 | Betr.: Werbemaßnahmen und Werbeeinrichtungen, 1950, 5/52, Bewag-Ar-
chiv/Vattenfall Berlin.
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posters shine from every advertising pillar, which assure us that electricity 
is available to us in any amount, at any time of the day.”33 As Heike Weber 
wrote, advertisements in the course of the 20th century aimed less and less 
at mediating the understanding of a technology, and instead shifted towards 
abstract characteristics and emotional as well as experiential values.34 In 
the case of electricity, the technological understanding was emphasized 
until World War II, whereas values such as modernity, freedom, leisure 
and progress were linked to electricity in advertisements during the 1950s 
and 1960s.
Figure 1: “Housewives’ Revolution – We want to live  
electrically!” – Window Display of a Bewag Information  
Center, around 1955.
But that electricity was available did not mean that it was affordable for 
everyone, even in Germany’s ‘economic miracle’ era. Therefore, consumer 
campaigns were initiated by German politics, such as the refrigerator 
campaign in 1953, which was declared the ‘year of the consumer’, followed, 
in 1955, by the campaign “Erhard helps the housewife”, launched by 
the then minister of economic affairs, Ludwig Erhard. German politics 
unreservedly embraced the American model of the resource- and energy-
intensive Fordist consumption regime. Erhard proved to be one of the 
most fervent protagonists of a new social contract that was based on mass 
33 | Der Lichtblick. Mitteilungen der Bewag 1 (1950), n.p.
34 | Weber: Das Versprechen mobiler Freiheit, 78. 
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consumption and expected to provide the basis for a new German nation. 
Moreover, for political actors as well as electricity suppliers it was a foregone 
conclusion that ‘promoting’ electricity prices would “assure inexpensive 
electric energy for consumers which guarantees the best earnings for 
electric companies.”35 Despite initial reluctance, utilities were eventually 
“willing […] to make a contribution to the campaign. The electric industry 
supported the efforts of Minister Erhard” because they rediscovered 
private consumers and their energy consumption as a means to balance 
the daily load curves of power plants.36 Moreover, they recognized that low 
electricity prices were the best way to promote private energy consumption 
and therefore increase their sales. Upper Bavaria’s electricity supplier Isar-
Amperwerke 
“realized early that the opportunities of electricity supply in general and its own 
development are not to be found in high but in promotional prices. The result of 
this tarif f policy did not disappoint our expectations. Today, the best guarantee 
for inexpensive electric energy for consumers is the fact that electricity has to be 
as cheap as possible to ensure the highest profits.”37 
Following this reasoning, Bewag kept their electricity prices steady from 
1938 even into the 1950s, although the costs for electricity production and 
distribution had risen. The efforts of energy suppliers and politics had the 
desired effects. In October 1955, the weekly paper Die Zeit stated: “Earlier 
than expected, it shows that Erhard’s price-cutting campaign is successful. 
In the middle of an economic boom, these price deductions are relieving 
consumers’ purses.”38
Not least because of this strategy, the electricity sector became a 
growth industry par excellence. The German Electrical and Electronic 
Manufacturers’ Association (ZVEI) stated that further development hinged 
35 | Isar-Amperwerke Aktiengesellschaft, ed.: Die Isar-Amperwerke. 50 Jahre 
im Dienste der oberbayrischen Stromversorgung. München: Isar-Amperwerke, 
1958, 164-65.
36 | Vereinigung Deutscher Elektrizitätswerke an Staatssekretär Dr. Westrick 
BMWi: Betr.: Strompreissenkung, 15.12.1955, B102/770, Bundesarchiv Koblenz 
(BArch).
37 | Isar-Amperwerke: Die Isar-Amperwerke, 164-65. 
38 | “Erhards Wunderkur hilf t doch”, in: Die Zeit, 13.10.1955.
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on the market for electric domestic appliances, which in turn depended 
on incomes and psychological factors.39 To persuade consumers of the 
advantages of electricity, the industry founded an advice center for electricity 
consumption (HEA) in 1952 which resumed the cooperative marketing of 
the electricity industry of the pre-war period by offering educational work 
about the characteristics of electric energy and its efficient handling. Public 
relations in the electricity industry were supposed to create trust and to 
improve the relationship between electricity companies and the public. 
In general, the need for domestic electricity increased, but the industry 
was convinced that electricity had to be promoted nevertheless to expand 
sales.40 Therefore, in the business year of 1957/58, Bewag conducted 282 
cooking courses with about 4,200 participants and almost 7,000 home 
visits.41 In contrast to the late 19th and first half of the 20th century, when 
lighting and small appliances had been dominant, bigger appliances, 
such as stoves and refrigerators, were now the main focus of interest 
for consumers and producers. As electrification progressed, electricity 
networks expanded and newly built homes had more than one electric 
socket per room. As a result, while about 1,800,000 electric stoves had 
been in use in West Germany in 1949, this number tripled by 1960, 
not least because of power companies’ massive advertising efforts.42 
Moreover, domestic electricity consumption in West Germany also more 
than tripled during the 1950s.43 These numbers illustrate the emerging 
establishment of a high-energy mentality in Germany during the 1950s. 
This development was possible not least because discourses on modernity, 
prosperity and progress from the pre-war period were revived during the 
era of reconstruction and linked to the consumption of electricity. Whereas 
the production and distribution of domestic appliances had been supposed 
to compensate times of low load in the early 20th century, utilities aimed 
39 | Uwe Jönck: Die Entwicklung des Stromverbrauchs in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland bis zum Jahre 1970. Forschungsberichte des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1963, 33-35.
40 | “Werbung – eine ethische Aufgabe”, in: Elektrizitätswirtschaft 54:21 
(1955), 753-54.
41 | Krause: “Hausfrauenwerbung in Berlin”, 113.
42 | Friedrich Bieling/Paul Scholl: Elektrogeräte für den Haushalt. Ihre Entwick-
lung im Hause Siemens. Berlin: Siemens, 1966, 9-13.
43 | Jönck: Die Entwicklung des Stromverbrauchs, 77-78.
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at an overall increase of electricity demand during the 1950s.44 Massive 
advertising efforts for electricity and domestic appliances were supposed to 
transform electric energy into a cheap mass product and thus promote the 
boundless consumption of electric energy. For consumers, the 1950s were 
therefore a crucial decade for the development of long-lasting convictions 
and consumption patterns. One example of a successful advertising 
campaign involving objects is the renting of electric stoves by Bewag.
“ELEK TROMIE T”: BE WAG’S STOVE RENTAL
This campaign had been launched in 1934 on the occasion of Bewag’s 50th 
anniversary as an ingenious alternative to Bewag’s installment scheme 
“Elektrissima”. Since installment schemes were not particularly popular 
with consumers who worried about long-term risks and increased costs, 
Bewag stepped up their advertising efforts by renting out stoves. Whereas 
the renting of hot water heaters had been successful already in the 1930s, 
Bewag’s stove rental became popular in the early 1950s during a literal 
‘consumption wave’ fostered by industry and politics.
In 1950 and 1951, 350 electric stoves were given free of charge to sales 
representatives and employees in West Berlin whose stoves had been 
destroyed during World War II to “support an increase in electricity sales.”45 
The appliance manufacturers AEG and Grätz collaborated with Berlin’s 
utility in providing the stoves. This sparked massive protests. Newspapers 
indignantly wrote: “Bewag gives away stoves for free – with ‘our money’!”46 
and even Berlin’s municipality was concerned, but this problem was 
overcome with the reference to labor law-related claims.47 Bewag referred 
to the workers’ right to receive benefits from their employers. 
44 | Heinz Weidauer: “Stromabsatzwerbung”, in: Elektrizität 4:8 (1954), 231.
45 | Betr.: Elektroherdaktion. 20.06.1951, 5/52, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Ber-
lin; Vorstandsvorlage. Betr.: Kostenlose Überlassung von Elektroherden an Be-
wag-Angehörige. 05.09.1951, 5/52, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin.
46 | “Bewag verschenkt Elektroherde. Für ‘unser Geld’!”, in: Der Tagesspiegel, 
15.06.1952.
47 | An die Mitglieder des Abgeordnetenhauses. Schenkungen der Bewag?, 
10.07.1952, 5/52, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin.
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When Bewag expanded their campaign in 1953, anyone could rent a 
stove, including electric circuits, pots and pans, but no longer for free.48 
Renters had to pay 3 Deutsche Mark per month, which was only about 
twice as much as the hourly wage of an industrial worker.49 The campaign 
was advertised by 100,000 brochures, which were distributed by installers, 
specialized tradespeople and Bewag’s information centers. An annual 
lease of 3,000 stoves was considered possible. But Berlin’s electricity 
supplier was convinced that renters had to be supervised throughout 
the introduction to electric cooking: “In the case of dissatisfaction due 
to the incorrect handling of the stove, this discontent could be stirred 
up by competitors and the renter would terminate the rental agreement. 
Therefore it is necessary to arrange professional service at home with 
one ‘lady’ per household.”50 Eventually, Bewag considered their renting 
campaign 
“one of the most successful advertising effor ts. Not only does the higher 
electricity consumption of a household equipped with such a stove contribute to 
the economic improvement of our company. The stove is also an incentive for the 
employee’s relatives and friends to buy a stove themselves because they get to 
know the true advantages of an electric stove in the private household.”51
The examples of Bewag’s stove rental as well as their cooking courses show 
that advertising after the currency reform concentrated on bigger appliances 
such as electrical stoves. One reason was that a lot of households would not 
abandon their coal fire stoves which heated their kitchens unless they had 
been convinced of the benefits of an electric stove. Gradually, fridges also 
received increasing attention during the 1950s. While in 1950, only 4 percent 
of German households kept their food in an electrical fridge, ten years later 
48 | Lieferschein für Materialbezug an Lager Schöneberg, 27.07.1966, 5/52, 
Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin.
49 | Ludwig Erhard: Wohlstand für Alle. Düsseldorf: Econ, 1957, 107.
50 | Betrif ft: Herd- und Speicher-Mietaktion, 24.06.1953, 4-5, 5/52, Bewag-
Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin.
51 | Vorstandsvorlage. Betr.: Kostenlose Überlassung von Elektroherden an Be-
wag-Angehörige, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin.
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this figure had already reached 40 percent.52 But first and foremost, this 
development was the result of consumer campaigns initiated by German 
economic politics to boost private consumption during the 1950s, e.g. with 
the help of installment rates and price cuts. At the same time, refrigerators 
served the interest of utilities in a rising electricity demand during daytime 
and nighttime hours, but while politics took over the task of promoting 
refrigerators, utilities such as Bewag continued to promote electrical 
stoves.53 In fact, the strategies of politics and the electricity industry 
complemented each other to boost private consumption.
The strategies pursued by Bewag were exemplary for the ‘economic 
miracle’ period in Germany. Their advertising efforts concentrated 
on “a larger increase in sales, but preferably during certain hours; a 
differentiated price structure and its promotional effects; offering an 
incentive for consumers not by exhibiting electricity itself but appliances; 
making it easier to tackle the problem of costs; cooperating with appliance 
manufacturers”54, as an engineer summed it up in 1954. 
Until the 1960s, the general electricity euphoria continued and even 
expanded in the context of the popularization of nuclear energy. Decreasing 
electricity prices, a wider variety of domestic appliances, increasing income, 
the rise in women’s employment and more living space per person favored 
this development. By 1960, even electric heating became more and more 
popular, not least because off-peak electricity got even cheaper. Since more 
and more households came closer to the ideal of the all-electric household, 
the demand for domestic electricity increased dramatically. To be modern 
meant to consume more energy. The need to save energy was – if at all – 
remembered as a characteristic of a past and premodern era, characterized 
by deprivation.
52 | Ricarda Haase: “Das bisschen Haushalt …”? Zur Geschichte der Technisie-
rung und Rationalisierung der Hausarbeit. Stuttgart: Museum für Volkskultur in 
Württemberg, 1992, 24.
53 | Hösel: Vermerk. Betr.: Konsumfinanzierung von langfristigen Gebrauchsgü-
ter, 14.04.1953, B102/35963, BArch. 
54 | Weidauer: “Stromabsatzwerbung”, 232.
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THE 1960S: AIMING AT THE ALL-ELECTRIC HOUSEHOLD
At the end of the 1950s when electricity sold effortlessly, the electricity 
industry specialized in what they called “accompanying advice” and 
Bewag’s promotion became more restrained. The electricity boom 
created new professional groups and fields, such as (female) electricity 
advisers for training kitchens and engineers who worked for electricity 
companies, supervising “customers in all aspects of electricity use in 
households, agriculture and trade.”55 Bewag trained their employees, 
especially those in field service, in special courses since they embodied the 
exemplary electricity user the company had in mind.56 However, appliance 
manufacturers began to promote their products on their own since the 
competition within their sector became stronger. 
But the advertising strategies of appliance and electricity producers still 
strongly resembled each other. Both aimed at the all-electric household, 
recognizing that they “approach electricity advertising carefully, maybe 
sometimes even too carefully and humbly. Only now we propagate the all-
electric supply including space heating.”57 The serial production of electric 
appliances had gained momentum during the 1950s and their mass 
consumption was supposed to compensate for times of low load. Electricity 
had become a cheap mass product, which in turn stimulated appliance 
sales.58 By offering electric heating, the industry aimed at increasing the 
peak load of power plants which provided an argument for the construction 
of new power plants, since West Germany’s power plant capacities were 
as yet sufficient for an all-electric nation.59 “You do not heat, you make 
yourself at home” was the slogan of a large advertising campaign for night-
storage heaters with reduced electricity rates in 1962.60 
55 | RWE: “Stellenanzeige Elektro-Ing.“, in: Elektrizität 23:2 (1973), A14.
56 | Johann Dittel: “Die Bewag-Schule”, in: Elektrizität 7:7 (1957), 179.
57 | “Auf dem Weg zum vollelektrischen Haushalt”, in: Elektrizität 13:12 (1963), 
351.
58 | Weidauer: “Stromabsatzwerbung“, 231.
59 | Wolfgang Zängl: Deutschlands Strom. Die Politik der Elektrifizierung von 
1866 bis heute. Frankfur t/Main: Campus, 1989, 246.
60 | Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft, ed.: 100 Jahre Strom 
für Berlin. Ein Streifzug durch unsere Geschichte in Wort und Bild, 1884-1984. 
Berlin: Bewag, 1984, n.p.
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But while electricity became an affordable mass product, the anti-
consumption and environmental movement of the 1960s emerged. 
Consumers began to worry about their health and deteriorating living 
conditions for them and their children.61 Books like Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring62 inspired this movement in 1962 and ten years later The Limits 
to Growth63 reflected widespread social concern. Environmentalists even 
succeeded in delaying plans to expand power plants.64 But consumers 
who began to critically assess their energy consumption in the 1960s 
were told by electricity advisers to reconsider their concerns in favor of 
electricity sales: “Urban customers enquire about the increased electricity 
consumption of quick freezing even smaller amounts of food. […] Our 
standard answer was that those watt-hours are cheaper than the price of a 
frozen meal or cake.”65
Furthermore, beginning with the 1966/67 recession in West Germany, 
power companies and appliance manufacturers were confronted with 
increasing market saturation. Indeed, most households were already 
equipped with white goods such as washing machines, electric stoves and 
fridges. Energy suppliers had to develop new strategies to tap into new 
markets and encourage even more energy consumption. One German 
electricity supplier from Nuremberg even awarded a medal for “exemplary 
electric facilities” – from a power company’s viewpoint – to eight households 
in their service area.66
Of major importance were the predictions of the electric industry, based 
on energy consumption statistics of the early 1960s, of an annual increase 
in private energy consumption of seven percent, blatantly negating the 
bad economic situation in the recession. According to them, an “energy 
61 | Cf. e.g. “Wir sind dabei, den Planeten Erde zu ermorden“, in: Der Spiegel 48, 
24.11.1969.
62 | Rachel Carson: Silent Spring. Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1962.
63 | Dennis L. Meadows/Donella Meadows/Jørgen Randers/William W. Behrens: 
The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament 
of Mankind. New York: Universe Books, 1972.
64 | “Kraftwerke. Gedanken an Strom”, in: Der Spiegel 33, 07.08.1972, 56-57.
65 | Gertrud Iven: “Antwort des Kunden auf unsere Werbung fürs Eingefrieren”, 
in: Elektrizität 18:7 (1968), 185.
66 | “Gold für vorbildliche elektrische Ausstattung”, in: Elektrizität 23:8 (1973), 
256.
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gap” had to be feared which would impact freezers, radios, TVs, heaters 
and so on. In advertisements, utility companies reminded their customers 
that new power plants and supply lines were necessary “to make sure you 
will always have electricity!”67 The German weekly news magazine Der 
Spiegel blamed power companies for having double standards. On the 
surface, they acknowledged the looming environmental crisis. But at the 
same time, they created fears of a gap in supplies among consumers while 
positioning themselves as reliable and trustworthy energy suppliers.68 
Actually, the predictions were excessive, but utility companies nevertheless 
managed to justify the construction of new power plants. Therefore, it 
became clear that despite all concerns, West German households were 
strongly integrated in large technical systems such as the power network, 
depending on high energy consumption and well-equipped kitchens. 
Despite some consumers’ concern and due to massive customer advice, 
the equipment of households with electric appliances increased rapidly 
until 1971. While 42 out of 100 households had owned an electric stove in 
1961 and 47 had owned a refrigerator, these numbers rose to 64 electric 
stoves and 88 refrigerators in 1971.69
NE W CHALLENGES: CHANGING STR ATEGIES OF  
UTILIT Y COMPANIES AF TER 1973
The electricity industry was able to promote an increase in sales despite 
growing ecological awareness during the 1960s, but the situation changed 
fundamentally in the following decade. Beginning with the 1970s, 
ecology and energy became controversial topics for politics, the industry 
and consumers in most Western, industrialized nations.70 The positive 
connotation of electricity as a modern, progressive and cheap form of 
energy was replaced by an ecologically harmful, expensive and, in the 
case of nuclear energy, health-threatening image. These developments 
led to widespread public opposition against the waste of resources and 
67 | “Kraftwerke. Gedanken an Strom”, 56-57.
68 | “Kraftwerke. Gedanken an Strom“, 56-57.
69 | Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft: 100 Jahre Strom für 
Berlin, n.p.
70 | Cf. the example of France in Yves Bouvier’s contribution in this volume.
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environmental pollution associated with electricity production and 
consumption. Electricity suppliers were increasingly criticized for their 
coal-fired power stations without filters, which caused air pollution and 
forest decline, and nuclear power plants became more controversial. 
Ecological concerns arose which concentrated not on the consumption, 
but on the production of electricity first. Bewag, for instance, reacted by 
beginning to inform interested consumers in 1972 about the air pollution 
control of their power plants.
At the same time, electricity had become an essential feature of 
consumers’ lifestyles, but its consumption had not been critically 
reflected since energy suppliers and politics had promoted its unlimited 
consumption in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, consumers were aware 
of the tense situation in the early 1970s:
“Electricity has become indispensable for our everyday life. But the more natural 
something becomes – such as electricity – the less we think about it, its origin, 
its future supply and its consumption. It is handled too thoughtlessly. But it is 
worthwhile thinking about efficient consumption, since reserves will last for 
a limited time only. This concerns every electricity consumer! A process of 
rethinking is necessary. [...] But it is also obvious that we cannot abandon 
certain standards of supply and comfort.”71 
Indeed, starting in 1972, electricity suppliers began to realize that 
consumers might soon reflect about their electricity consumption 
because of an impending resource scarcity. Moreover, the first oil crisis 
in the early 1970s hit Bewag hard and “rational energy use” became an 
abiding topic of customer advice, using the slogan “Use electricity – do 
not waste it”. The company called for an end to excessive electricity waste 
in private households and a reduction of pollution on their own part. In 
general, electricity companies recognized that they had neglected their 
public presentation and that it was hard to convince customers to opt for a 
judicious use of energy: “We have to assume that the advertising campaign 
71 | Irmgard von Meibom: “Der Energieverbrauch aus der Sicht des Verbrau-
chers”, in: Elektrizität 23:12 (1973), 385-86.
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with the slogan ‘Do it right’ is characterized by a protracted and complicated 
process of rethinking.”72
Another incentive to advise electricity customers resulted from public 
protests against power plant constructions. The industry, which aimed at a 
further expansion in sales, assumed that the power plant opponents were 
poorly informed: “Consumers have to be more aware of their electricity 
consumption which has to be demonstrated in a way that is clear and 
easy to understand. [...] To provide an appropriate transition from the 
image of electricity as a bargain to a new campaign, the well-known 
symbols – a friendly socket and electricity symbol – should continue to be 
used.”73 Image advertising was the most important means for electricity 
companies to retain and extend markets. But the 1973 oil crisis intensified 
the discussions about thoughtless energy consumption. Slogans like 
“Electricity makes everything easy and pleasant and it’s cheap too!” were 
soon out of date. 
In the 1970s, utility companies took on a paradoxical role. On the 
one hand, they felt obliged to guarantee the future supply of more and 
more electricity and on the other hand, they were held responsible for 
environmental problems and climate change.74 Because of increasing 
electricity prices and large profits, they had to face political and public 
criticism and were expected to take on social responsibility. They 
experienced a credibility dilemma: How could they recommend energy-
saving while being dependent on high electricity sales? In fact, there was an 
argument for power plant operators to promote energy saving appliances 
since they were supposed to prevent the construction of new power plants 
which would have caused high investment costs. 
But the public was becoming increasingly aware of its energy 
consumption and the electric industry’s former strategy of advising, 
educating and marketing to encourage electricity consumption had to 
be turned into the cultivation of a new image. It seemed to be the right 
moment to develop new advertising strategies. Acceptance and sympathy 
for the production of electricity had to be generated and information centers 
such as Bewag’s “Elektrotip” opening in Berlin in 1970 became energy-
72 | Wolfgang Dotzenrath: “Sinnvolle Elektrizitätsanwendung als Beratungsauf-
gabe der HEA”, in: Elektrizität 23:5 (1973), 108.
73 | Dotzenrath: “Sinnvolle Elektrizitätsanwendung“, 108.
74 | Weber: “Elektrizitätswerbung zwischen Markt und Ökologie”, 319.
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saving advice centers.75 The most popular form of advice were brochures 
containing instructions about the purchase of the right appliances and 
energy saving. Electricity suppliers published those brochures in order 
to educate consumers and, at the same time, to promote the industry’s 
responsibility by showing power plants or domestic appliances in settings 
showing customers and natural environments.
In general, electricity advertising decreased after the 1973 oil crisis and 
the minister for economic affairs, Hans Friderichs, even recommended 
being “more careful”76 because of the strong public opposition against 
nuclear power. The remaining advertising efforts of utility companies 
continued to concentrate on brochures and advice in the 1980s (Fig. 2). 
Besides that, Bewag offered mobile information and rented out devices 
called “energy saving detectives”, which helped consumers to check the 
energy consumption of their appliances.
Figure 2 and 3: “Clean Laundry and Clean Environment –  
Is the Possible?” / “The Dishwasher – Economical and  
Environmentally Friendly?”, Brochures, Energieversorgung 
Schwaben, around 1990.
While Bewag had celebrated “electric parties” during the German 
Industrial Exhibition in 1969, they opened an exhibition entitled “Energy 
75 | “‘Elektrotip’ nun auch in Berlin NW”, in: Spandauer Volksblatt, 05.11.1970, 
n.p.
76 | “Weniger Werbung für Strom”, in: Der Spiegel 33, 08.08.1977, n.p.
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from the Environment – Used for Electricity” after the second oil crisis ten 
years later, where energy-saving technologies, heat pumps, heat recovery 
systems and solar panels were shown.77 Street parties, painting and prize 
competitions were also supposed to increase customer loyalty after the 
crisis-ridden 1970s.78
Energy saving was elevated to a national virtue; even manufacturers 
apparently internalized the ‘eco paradigm’ during the 1980s. They 
committed themselves to produce more efficient appliances, which led 
to large savings in the energy consumption of the improved appliances79, 
but not of households in general. Nevertheless, ‘eco’-efficiency and 
the closeness to nature were the most important advertising strategies 
for electricity suppliers and appliance manufacturers after 1973. For 
example, the AEG was the first company which advertised its household 
appliance branch as explicitly ecological.80 The advertising of efficiency 
and low electricity consumption became the most important selling and 
purchasing criterion in a highly competitive market.81 Apparently, those 
strategies were successful. In 1987, a psychologist explained that even after 
the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, electricity as a whole retained a good 
public image, with only nuclear power plants and energy acquiring a very 
poor reputation. This was, in his mind, due to the fact that the marketing 
campaigns of the electricity industry concentrated on confidence-building 
77 | Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft: 100 Jahre Strom für 
Berlin, n.p. 
78 | Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft: 100 Jahre Strom für 
Berlin, n.p.
79 | “Sprechzettel – Zur Einleitung der Besprechung am 24.01.1980 mit den Ver-
tretern der Hausgerätehersteller über weitere Energiesparmöglichkeiten”, 1980, 
B102/289597, BArch.
80 | Cf. e.g. “Natürlich AEG. Ratgeber umweltfreundliches Haushalten”, 1990, 
I.2.060 P 1910, Firmenarchiv AEG-Telefunken, Stif tung Deutsches Technikmu-
seum Berlin (SDTB); cf. “Umweltbelastung abbauen. Spargeräte einbauen. Aus-
gewählte Einbaugeräte für die Küchenmodernisierung“, Januar 1994, I.2.060 P 
1816, Firmenarchiv AEG-Telefunken, SDTB.
81 | Sylvia Wölfel: “Von der Werbung für Strom zur Werbung für Energieeffizienz. 
Umweltfreundliche Haushaltstechnik in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR”, in: 
Theo Horstmann/Regina Weber, eds. “Hier wirkt Elektrizität”. Werbung für Strom 
1890 bis 2010. Essen: Klar text, 2010, 194.
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and reassurance, thus propagating a sense of responsibility and proximity 
to nature. Power plant operators even claimed that it was the general public 
and its demand for energy that should be blamed for the construction of 
nuclear power plants.82
CONCLUSION
Electricity companies contributed to the equipment of homes with energy 
consuming devices during the 20th century and the development of 
German consumers’ high-energy mentality since the 1950s. The foregoing 
analysis of electricity advertising is a contribution to the reconstruction of 
electricity-related discourses and has shown which image of consumers 
producers had in mind as well as the reasons and obstacles of electricity 
consumption.
At the turn of the 20th century, customers had been concerned about 
electricity and energy-consuming appliances. They had feared security 
hazards, a lack of space, excessive operating and especially purchasing 
costs and had expected marginal benefits. Against these low expectations, 
Walther Rathenau claimed that electricity should no longer be considered 
a luxury commodity and that its use had to be “forced” on consumers in 
order to create a market. But with its gradual spread, consumers were in 
need of advice concerning the use of electricity as a new form of energy and 
utility companies acted as their assistants and teachers. In the first twenty 
years of the 20th century, electricity was advertised as competing with 
petroleum, gas and coal, and presented as superior based on its cheap price 
and safety. During the 1920s, German electricity suppliers professionalized 
their advertising campaigns and in the subsequent early Nazi period they 
pursued marketing strategies that put appliances such as electric stoves 
center stage because they were supposed to save other fuels for Germany’s 
autarky.83 During World War II and in the first post-war years, campaigns 
for the saving instead of the consumption of electricity were common.
In the early second half of the 20th century, by means of campaigns 
such as the rental of stoves, Bewag employees acted as a modern, 
82 | Gerhard Hunnius: “Das Bild der Stromwir tschaft in der Öffentlichkeit 
1986/87”, in: Elektrizitätswirtschaft 86:16/17 (1987), 727-32.
83 | Döring: “Elektrizitätswerbung im 20. Jahrhundert”, 96. 
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progressive example for German consumers, even though the majority of 
West German homes were not yet equipped with an all-electric household. 
Electricity marketing experienced its successful peak in the 1950s, 
indicating the emergence of a high-energy mentality in Germany, although 
the origins of these promotional efforts date back to the beginning 
domestic mechanization before World War II. Power companies advertised 
by means of advising and educating consumers to popularize electricity in 
Germany. Due to their advertising efforts and supplemented by consumer 
campaigns of Germany’s economic policy, the all-electric kitchen and a 
comprehensive democratization of electricity were achieved by the 1960s. 
But contradictions soon emerged in the context of growing ecological 
awareness. Regarded as a problem solver and infused with great utopian 
expectations since its introduction84, electricity became a problem 
itself. Following the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, growing private energy 
consumption was criticized and electricity companies had to re-shape their 
image according to new paradigms such as ecology and sustainability. They 
had to develop new advice and education strategies to reinterpret their 
main business – producing and selling electricity – as an act of ecological 
responsibility. Electric appliances as advertising material became much 
less important for electricity suppliers over the years and marketing 
cooperation between utilities and appliance manufacturers diminished 
significantly. But although they went their separate ways, their campaigns 
have remained similar. Private households were still important settings for 
advertising and since the early 1970s, ecological values and abstract energy 
consumption data have characterized the advertising for electricity. 
Today, we have a fundamentally new situation. Electricity has become an 
everyday commodity and since the liberalization of the German electricity 
market in 1998, strong competition has emerged because areas of supply 
are no longer clearly divided.85 Due to the pressure of competition, utility 
companies have to position and profile themselves on the market with new 
and extraordinary advertising strategies. 
In the first half of the 20th century, it was the functional aspects of 
electricity such as its inexpensiveness and safeness that were the focus 
of electricity advertising. After World War II, emotional values such as 
84 | Cf. e.g. Beate Binder: Elektrifizierung als Vision. Tübingen: Tübinger Vereini-
gung für Volkskunde, 1999.
85 | Weber: “Elektrizitätswerbung zwischen Markt und Ökologie“, 319. 
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modernity and progress as well as benefits such as more leisure were 
promoted and related to electricity. Consumers’ responsibility to save 
energy was not discussed among electricity companies during the 1950s 
and 1960s and therefore not mediated via their marketing strategies. New 
images and forms of advertising had been in focus of electricity advertising 
since the early 1970s as a result of the oil crises and consumers’ ecological 
awareness. An image of ecologically responsible energy suppliers and 
harmless electricity has been the most important motif of advertising 
campaigns for electricity since then, combined with the appeal to consume 
electricity sustainably. 
This analysis of advertisements of electricity suppliers aims to 
contribute to the understanding of the fact that, despite the growing 
efficiency of appliances since the late 1970s, the total energy consumption 
of households has not decreased and electricity has retained a good public 
reputation despite its controversial role for the environment. Furthermore, 
this paper also shows that electricity advertising contributed to the fact 
that in the course of the 20th century, but especially since the post-war era, 
German private households and domestic life have become inextricably 
linked to electricity, even though electricity production and consumption is 
meanwhile associated with environmental damage.
The foregoing analysis expects to broaden the view on the changing 
meanings of private energy consumption in the course of the 20th century 
and especially after World War II by a study of changing electricity 
advertising, reflecting the transition to a high-energy society in Germany. 
For further studies, it would be worthwhile to closely examine electricity 
advertisements after 1990, in a united Germany, and to compare 
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Filming Electrical Consumption 
EDF’s Promotional Films (1946-2004)
Yves Bouvier
Energy consumption is a subject that closely blends the economic with 
the cultural sphere.1 Energy suppliers sell energy as a consumer good and 
households also consider energy as a good when bills arrive. But suppliers, 
when they aim to sell energy, are using all the symbols of this good. Energy 
consumption and meanings of energy are socially constructed and energy 
suppliers are players in this construction process. In shaping the image of 
energy, the suppliers envision the behavior of consumers. Thus, studying 
advertising and more particularly advertising of energy suppliers, is a good 
way to deconstruct the cultural representations associated with energy and 
analyze how these representations emerged within the scope of business 
strategies. In advertising, energy consumers are present as projected 
consumers imagined by the energy supplier.2 Analyzing advertising needs 
to refer to media and cultural studies as well as business history.
This article aims to explore promotional films as cultural representations 
of energy and energy consumption that have been produced on behalf of the 
French energy supplier Électricité de France (EDF). Within the framework 
of this article, I will interpret promotional films of the French national 
1 | I wish to thank Karin Zachmann and Nina Möllers for their useful comments 
and Scott Brown for his help with the translation.
2 | Nelly Oudshoorn/Trevor Pinch: “How Users and Non-Users Matter”, in: Nelly 
Oudshoorn/Trevor Pinch, eds.: How Users Matter. The Co-Construction of Users 
and Technology. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2003, 1-25; Ruth Oldenziel/Karin 
Zachmann: “Kitchen as Technology and Politics”, in: Ruth Oldenziel/Karin Zach-
mann, eds. Cold War Kitchen. Americanization, Technology and European Users. 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2009, 13.
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electric company from its creation in 1946 to the beginning of 2000s. 
The objective is to explore how the cultural representations of energy have 
been employed within the business strategies of a public company and 
which kinds of relationship between consumers and energy are staged in 
these promotional films. Meanings of energy consumption and uses of 
symbols have changed over the last six decades, especially considering the 
many different historical contexts since the end of WWII: energy shortage, 
affluent society, energy crisis, nuclear turn, the emergence of renewable 
energies and many more. How does EDF present electrical consumption 
in these promotional films and what are the relationships between the 
objects, the consumers and the firm staged in them? Symbols used in 
these advertisements need to be questioned as ideologies and modern 
myths. But it is also necessary to consider the technical and economic basis 
of these representations in order to go beyond the surface of the films and 
to detect the deeper meanings of these cultural productions. In his study 
on General Electric’s photographic collection, David Nye writes that “the 
corporation’s creation and control of such materials is a metaphor for its 
cultural hegemony.”3 The same statement could be applied for EDF and its 
promotional films as the electricity supplier produces not just energy but 
also culture.
EDF was created on April 8th, 1946 by the nationalization of all French 
firms of the energy sector (electricity, gas, coal). The idea of nationalization 
had already been present in debates during the mid-1930s.4 During WWII, 
in March 1944, the National Council of the Resistance adopted a program 
for the years after the end of the war, which included the nationalization of 
energy. Occasionally, the French considered EDF as a branch of government 
but it was a public firm with national goals: providing the perfect grid and 
low prices for electricity. These company tenets strongly determined its 
image and its strategy until the end of the 1980s. The national scale is 
the relevant level for an understanding of EDF’s behavior. In other words, 
EDF’s strategies aimed at national growth and modernization of national 
infrastructures. This is why EDF was the leader of the French electrical 
3 | David E. Nye: Image Worlds. Corporate Identities at General Electric, 1890-
1930. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1985, 3.
4 | Patrick Fridenson: “Réflexions sur les étapes de la nationalisation de l’élec-
tricité”, in: AHEF. La nationalisation de l’électricité en France. Nécessité tech-
nique ou logique politique? Paris: PUF, 1996, 383.
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sector, from industry to private homes. The Europeanization of energy 
markets and the decline of state-owned companies changed this context in 
the beginning of the 1990s. In August 2004 then, EDF was transformed 
into a stock corporation, but the state still owns about 85 percent of its 
shares.
The corpus I am researching is composed of 62 promotional films 
made for cinema or TV between 1955 and 2004. In France, TV advertising 
began in 1968. But until 2004, most of EDF’s promotional films broadcast 
on TV were also aired on the big cinema screen before feature films. This 
corpus includes only those promotional films shorter than 2 minutes, but 
not the various movies produced during the 1950s and the 1960s which are 
between 5 and 50 minutes in length and deal with EDF’s large projects like 
the building of dams in the Alps or the first nuclear power plant in Chinon 
in 1963. The choice to focus my research on these shorter advertisements is 
justified by my intention to put the focus on the socio-cultural stereotypes 
employed in the films. Advertisements concentrate on stereotypes to effect 
their meaning more efficiently. Not all the promotional films are relevant to 
my viewpoint on electricity consumption because some of the films show 
infrastructure or deal with the open offer of shares at the end of the period 
in question. I select only the advertisements on electricity consumption 
which constitute 41 promotional films. These films are in the database of 
the EDF Médiathèque and a few papers are to be found in EDF’s Center of 
Historical Archives in Blois. There are also some EDF publications such 
as Contacts, which became La vie électrique, then Vivre EDF and which has 
been the internal publication of the firm since the mid-1950s.
My paper is organized into three parts, defined by three periods:
• 1955-1973: EDF promoted electricity by showing the wide range of pos-
sible applications. Eleven films out of 13 made during this period can be 
attributed to this promotional topic.
• 1974-1992: EDF developed the discourse on energy-saving by showing 
consumers’ behavior. Ten promotional films out of 14 that were produced 
in this period are relevant.
• 1992-2004: EDF realized films dealing with a “new electrical comfort” by 
restoring the objects as cultural signs. This corpus contains 14 relevant 
films out of 35 during this period. 
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THE MAGICAL ATMOSPHERE OF ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES, 
1955-1973
The first period was a time of economic growth and the building of an 
affluent society in France. The objects of consumer culture were becoming 
more common, but still the ‘gadgetization’ of the kitchen did not occur 
before the beginning of the 1960s. The consumption society made these 
objects sacred, giving them a cultural value which exceeds their use value. 
Anthropological studies of modern societies, such as Jean Baudrillard’s 
critiques of contemporary civilization, analyzed the processes of the 
creation of modern myths.5 Objects and mass media are, not surprisingly, 
the two main fields of reference for him. Baudrillard analyzed how the 
objects changed the social relationships, the balance of the society and the 
cultural scheme of individuals. In this framework, advertisements shape 
the discourse and the image of modernity. For Roland Barthes particularly, 
some objects (a car, a toy, a plastic artifact…) are the new myths of modern 
society.6 He defines myth as a system of communication which opens the 
path to semiological studies. The idea of modern artifacts as systems of 
communication means that objects are “vehicles of meaning.”7
EDF did not develop a real communication policy until the mid-1950s. 
In 1946, and for its first decade, the objectives of EDF were to complete 
the electrification of the country and to harmonize existing electrical 
networks. Power cuts were still used until 1950 because of the insufficient 
electricity production in France. More than 1,000 private companies had 
been nationalized but they had not adopted the same technology (voltage 
for example) or the same prices. Of course, all the cities and most of the 
rural villages had electricity before WWII, but deep regional inequalities 
remained. In Brittany, for example, 23 percent of homes did not yet have 
5 | Jean Baudrillard: Le système des objets. Paris: Gallimard, 1968, 288; La so-
ciété de consommation. Ses mythes. Ses structures. Paris: Denoël, 1970, 318. 
6 | Roland Barthes: Mythologies. Paris: Seuil, 1970, 233. On Baudrillard and 
Barthes and their links with the electrical households appliances, see Claire Ley-
monerie: “Des formes à consommer. Pensées et pratiques du design industriel 
en France (1945-1980)” (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., EHESS-Université Toulouse II, 
2010).
7 | Roland Barthes: “Semantics of the Object”, in: The Semiotic Challenge. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, 179-190, 293.
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electricity in 1954. Thus, the focus of EDF’s business strategy was not 
toward the increase of consumption via intensified advertising (even if 
urban consumers liked the advertisements), the priority was instead on 
the installation of a coherent national network. It took 15 years to achieve 
this mission by the construction of new hydroelectric production units 
(factories of Malgovert and Brévières for the use of Tignes dam water for 
example8) and new coal and fuel power stations. At the same time, the 
standards of the transport network were defined by a 220 kV grid which 
took the place of the former 110 and 120 kV networks. These achievements 
attracted the attention of the media. EDF organized a press service in 1946 
to relay the announcements of the inaugural ceremonies of various power 
stations. However, it was only in 1955 that a real communication structure 
was created, the “communication cell”, led by Paul Auriol, son of the 
President of the Fourth Republic at that time.
The first promotional film to be analyzed is a cartoon entitled The 
Electricity Fairy (1955) in which a small woman waves her magic wand to 
install or transform old objects into electrical objects (Fig. 1). In her house, 
each room has an electrical object: lamp and radio for the living-room, 
refrigerator and oven for the kitchen, washing machine for the laundry and 
water heater for the bathroom.
The appearance of a household fairy, a perfect maid for all manual 
work, is a transformation of the old electricity fairy which was a well-known 
representation for the new energy at the end of the 19th century. In France, 
the electricity fairy was a political icon, linked with the ideology of social 
progress at the beginning of the Third Republic. The keywords of this 
cartoon from the 1950s are “cleanness, comfort and leisure”. 
8 | The Tignes dam is a good example of the political context of these years: The 
old Tignes village was destroyed for the building of the dam, in the name of the 
general interest. Newspapers, newsmagazines, cinema newsreel and TV related 
the history of this village. In a way, EDF experimented with the power of the mass 
media for the first time during the building of the Tignes dam. Denis Varaschin: 
Tignes, la naissance d’un géant. Arras: Ar tois Presses Université, 2001, 197-
207; Virginie Bodon: La modernité au village. Tignes, Savines, Ubaye… La sub-
mersion de communes rurales au nom de l’intérêt général. 1920-1970. Greno-
ble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 2003, 132-137.
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Figure 1: The Electricity Fairy, 1955. The fairy fills up the 
washing machine. 
But the main purpose of the film is to show an electrical system in the 
house. Two versions of The Electricity Fairy exist. In the second one, the 
rooms are different and the small fairy adds a coffee machine to the list of 
appliances. 
With regards to poster advertisements, the use of women as an icon for 
electricity had actually decreased since the 1930s. As electrical technology 
gradually lost its miraculous nature, the role of engineers was given more 
weight. The disenchantment of the world went hand in hand with its 
masculinization in the iconography.9 The comeback of the old symbol of 
the fairy in the films is a sign of the re-enchantment, not of the world 
but of the house. In the mid-1950s, the icon of the electricity fairy became 
modest: The area of action is limited to the house, whereas in the 1880s 
its ambitions were quasi-universal. The films show a pattern of lifestyle 
where the appliances are not only “little electrical servants”, as the ads 
said in the 1930s, but they are a system. The house is a closed world and 
electricity brings modernity into each room. The entire house is like the 
9 | Yves Bouvier: “Images de l’électricité”, in: So Watt! Du design dans l’énergie. 
Paris: Beaux Arts éditions, 2007, 10.
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modern kitchen: “[A] complex, technological artifact” which “embodies the 
ideology of the culture to which it belongs.”10 The link between electricity 
consumption and modernity was the main argument for EDF as an 
electricity supplier as it did not sell washing machines or fridges but rather 
the technological infrastructure needed for the use of these objects.
In fact, it was only from 1963 onwards that EDF reacted to changed 
patterns of consumption and that communication strategies took the turn of 
households’ electricity consumption. After the depression of the 1930s, the 
deprivations of WWII and of the end of the 1940s and the rebuilding of the 
1950s, an appetite for consumption was fed as the American consumerist 
pattern became a cultural reference. The American informal cultural 
empire, a mix of images and modern distribution systems, contributed to 
a change of European consumption.11 The extent of the ‘Americanization’ 
of Europe, however, is still heavily debated among historians: National 
references still remained strong especially in advertising. Consumption 
growth began during the last years of the 1950s and increased steadily 
during the two following decades. The cultural factor was articulated with 
a deep social change: extremely rapid urbanization, with the percentage of 
people living in urban settings increasing from 55 to 73 percent between 
1955 and 1975. This urbanization pattern produced a modification in the 
lifestyles of many and an access to ‘modernity’ symbolized by the car and 
the washing machine.12 
The context also changed for energy consumption in households which 
were now able to buy electric appliances more often. Several stages can 
be described in the structuring of the French mass market of appliances. 
In 1953, the Syndicat général de la construction électrique (General trade 
union of electrical engineering), representing the manufacturers and EDF, 
established a joint financial corporation, Cetelem (meaning Credit for 
electric household appliances). Cetelem made loans for households that 
wished to buy electric appliances. Another stage was the standardization of 
the distribution network at the voltage of 220/230 V. In 1946, 86 percent of 
the subscribers were served by a network at 110/130 V. But most European 
10 | Oldenziel: “Kitchen as Technology and Politics”, 2.
11 | Victoria de Grazia: Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th Cen-
tury Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, 586.
12 | Kristin Ross: Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and Reordering of 
French Culture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, 273.
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countries had made the choice of 220 V and EDF decided to convert its 
distribution network. This rendered many electric appliances obsolete. 
With the support of French manufacturers (particularly Moulinex), 
upgrading the intake voltage of a household to 220 was accompanied by a 
free replacement of its electric appliances. The law of December 21st, 1960 
prohibited the selling of appliances which could not function on 220 V.13 
The third element is the decision of EDF managers to develop and apply 
a commercial strategy for the first time. EDF was, and still is, a company 
of engineers and high-level civil servants, accustomed to celebrating their 
production capacities. This new strategy was described in a paper from 
1962 entitled “The Raising of Electricity Consumption in France” which 
stated that: “Electricity is a consumer good which needs to be developed. 
Electricity is an indispensable product for the social and economic balance 
of a country.”14 The first advertising campaign resulted in a deep change of 
strategy within the company. On the occasion of EDF’s board of directors 
meeting on February 23rd, 1962, a four-year plan of commercial action 
was presented in which the company adopted the ambitious objectives 
of the fourth national plan of equipment and modernization.15 Electricity 
consumption grew very quickly, doubling every ten years, and the users 
wanted to be able to use more and more electric household appliances 
without blowing fuses. In reality, irregularities in the network and 
insufficiently low voltage were the two reasons for lack of power in these 
homes.16 For the first time, EDF organized an advertising campaign on 
a national scale. The “blue meter campaign” was launched after rigorous 
preparation. The idea of the campaign was rather simple: In order to be 
able to use several appliances at once, it was necessary to have a good 
meter. Thus, the consumers had to install a meter with the necessary 
13 | Jean-François Picard/Alain Beltran/Martine Bungener: Histoire(s) de l’EDF. 
Comment se sont prises les décisions de 1946 à nos jours. Paris: Dunod, 1985, 
94.
14 | EDF Archives, 801043. Paper “The raising of electricity consumption in 
France”, May 30, 1962.
15 | Jean Dubois: “Le réveil commercial d’EDF. Compteur bleu et chauffage élec-
trique intégré”, in: AHEF: L’électricité et ses consommateurs. Paris, PUF, 1987, 
288.
16 | Patrice Carré/Alain Beltran: La fée et la servante. La société française face 
à l’électricité. XIXe-XXe siècles. Paris: Belin, 1991, 304-306.
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power. EDF decided to make this meter blue, as to distinguish it from older 
models. A house equipped with a “blue meter” became synonymous with 
modernity. By guaranteeing a power of 6 kW, then four times the average 
power demand of an individual household, EDF “broke the deadlock of 
the power.”17 The first campaign was bound to succeed. The consequences 
were dramatic: Domestic consumption, which represented 11.6 percent of 
the electricity national consumption in 1960, reached 30.2 percent in 1983. 
EDF’s commercial strategy followed consumer demand and advertisement 
strategies focused on electrical appliances.
This possibility to accumulate electrical appliances and electronics 
justified the “blue meter” campaign for EDF’s managers in 1963. Three 
cartoons were shown in the cinema and one of them illustrates the matter 
for households perfectly.
Figure 2: The Pair of Scales, 1963. A blue meter balances the 
accumulation of electrical appliances. 
In the first shot of the cartoon The Pair of Scales (1963), we see an electric 
meter which progressively sweeps across several electrical appliances in 
the following shot (Fig. 2). About 13 objects were drawn in this cartoon 
including a television set, an electric flat iron, a coffee machine, a 
17 | Jean Dubois: “La société de consommation électrique”, in: Henri Morsel, 
ed. Histoire de l’électricité en France. t.3: Une œuvre nationale: l’équipement, la 
croissance de la demande, le nucléaire (1946-1987). Paris: Fayard, 1996, 643.
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refrigerator, a vacuum cleaner, an electric heater, a washing machine, a 
cooker, a whisk, a sewing machine, etc. As the meter sweeps the scene, 
the narrator says: “Your meter is saturated. How can you enjoy the comfort 
of all your electrical appliances? Get a blue meter and contact EDF.” The 
words “incomparable electrical comfort” end the film. Using a meter to 
promote electricity consumption is at first surprising because it is the 
symbol of electricity as a consumer good (referring to measurement, 
control and price). But in this particular case, the symbol is reversed: The 
blue meter allowed a growth of electricity consumption and the constraints 
of material goods disappeared. In this campaign, the meter is perceived not 
just in its symbolic quality which usually refers to the expense of energy 
consumption, but rather the meter is presented as a technology making 
more consumption possible. 
In the film advertisements discussed so far, the main moving force had 
been the accumulation of electrical appliances. Resorting to cartoons was 
a way to show this accumulation. The graphic effects possible thanks to 
animation are definitely visible in The Pair of Scales in which the number 
of the appliances makes the former electric meter obsolete. In the 1955 
film The Electricity Fairy, six applications had been presented: lamp, radio, 
refrigerator, oven, water-heater and washing machine. Eight years later, 
there were no less than 13 appliances, including a TV, a fan, a washing 
machine, a sewing machine and a hair dryer. The concept of comfort itself 
had been transformed in a few years. Whereas comfort referred to the 
lessening of the more laborious household tasks in the middle of the 1950s, 
it became a lifestyle in the 1960s. In other words, the ideology of comfort 
triumphed over the hopes of progress. This fast change corresponds to 
another way of conceiving energy: From this point in history, the idea 
of energy as a source of progress and modernity tended to disappear. 
During the 1950s, electricity was a symbol of innovation, social progress 
and modernity. In the 1960s, the metaphors of innovation and progress 
increasingly shifted from the energy sector toward the new sectors of 
computing and telecommunications. Advertisements accurately point 
out this shift in the meanings and representations of energy. In this new 
pattern, energy is no longer pictured as coming from the outside into the 
households (in the 1955 film the fairy enters the house through a window), 
but rather as something already integrated into the lives of the consumers. 
EDF no longer had to focus on convincing its consumers to use electricity 
because it had already become an integral part of French life at the time, 
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but their insistence now was on the quality, regularity and safety of the 
product they provided. It is a way, for EDF, of following the rapid changes 
in French society.18 EDF presented itself as a silent partner in the daily life.
During the 1950s and the 1960s, the company sought to equate 
electricity to modernity, safety and comfort. This is a challenge which needs 
a mediator. The female figure was the fitting cultural icon for this equation. 
At the end of the 1960s, the number of women employed was at its lowest 
level in the 20th century: In 1968, 60 percent of women between 20 and 
60 years were housewives. This situation is partly explained by the French 
baby-boom between 1942 and 1975. Today, film scenes showing women 
in the kitchen while their husbands are idly sitting in an armchair seem 
like caricatures to us, but it is necessary to remember that those situations 
corresponded with the social norms of the time. These norms assigned 
the domestic area to women and, in fact, the female figures of these films 
are always shown indoors. They control and organize this closed world.19 
When their husbands or children appear, these ‘intruders’ are relegated to 
secondary roles. In its promotional films, EDF reintroduced the woman 
as an actor of modernity. Women made most of the purchases (but, if we 
believe statistical data produced by EDF20, big electrical appliances were 
purchased by men), and so, are the mediators of the system of electric 
appliances. The following table shows that electric appliances took time 
to change French homes. We should notice that less than 50 percent of 
households had a refrigerator in the mid-1960s. 
18 | Jean Fourastié: Les trente glorieuses ou la Révolution invisible de 1946 à 
1975. Paris: Fayard, 1979, 288. Michelle Zancarini-Fournel/Christian Delacroix: 
La France du temps présent, 1945-2005. Paris: Belin, 2010, 656.
19 | Jean-Claude Soulages: “Les avatars de la publicité télévisée ou les vies rê-
vées des femmes”, in: Le temps des médias 12 (2009/1), 117.
20 | In 1958, EDF created a division Études économiques générales (global eco-
nomic studies) to plan electricity demand and ordered statistical surveys. Robert 
Janin: “Convergence des pratiques technico-économiques à l’EDF (1946-1985)”, 
in: Henri Morsel, ed. Histoire de l’électricité en France. t.3: Une œuvre nationale: 
l’équipement, la croissance de la demande, le nucléaire (1946-1987). Paris: Fa-
yard, 1996, 371-75.
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Table 1: Proportion of French Households Equipped with Electrical  
Appliances, 1954-1982. 
1954 1964 1974 1982
Refrigerator 7,5 % 46,7 % 87,3 % 98,6 %
Washing machine 8,4 % 34,2 % 66,4 % 80,7 %
Dish washer 5,3 % 18,9 %
Freezer 10,2 % 30 %
Contrary to the United States, France’s favorite technologies of the 1950s 
were also the favorite technologies of the 1960s. Women were the users of 
electrical appliances because they were at home. But this historical context 
also explains why it took a relatively long time for the appliances to find 
their way into the households: their income was low because they relied on 
the single earning of the male breadwinner.
ENERGY SAVING AND CONSUMERS IN ACTION, 1974-1992 
As in many countries of the developed world the oil price crisis of 1973 
(quadrupling in October of that year) was a turning point in French 
energy history that created a radically new context. Consequently, the 
representation of energy also changed drastically from a formerly abundant 
to a now, almost instantly, scarce resource. The effects of the crisis were also 
immediate and radical on EDF. They developed two strategies to cope with 
the new situation: boosting nuclear power and promoting energy savings. 
The government considerably accelerated the civil nuclear program 
that it had already launched in 1957. More than 50 nuclear reactors were 
planned, and the building of 18 reactors began between 1974 and 1977. Such 
a program was, in fact, a complete reshaping of the electricity production 
in France and led to the decline of traditional coal and fuel power stations. 
The aim of this policy, decided by President Pompidou in March 1974, 
was to reduce the nation’s oil bill. France has a particular relationship 
to nuclear energy. Without detailing here the various components of the 
French ‘nuclear choice’, it is necessary to briefly discuss certain points. The 
French nuclear program, initially military, was started with the creation of 
the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) in 1945. Based on scientific 
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knowledge and a team of worldwide reputable scientists (Frederic Joliot-
Curie, Francis Perrin), the CEA built experimental reactors and France 
obtained the atomic weapon in 1960. From 1956 on, civil applications were 
studied, even though it took until 1963 to see the first French civil nuclear 
power plant producing electricity in Chinon on the left bank of the Loire. 
The civil nuclear program was and is studied, developed and managed by 
EDF. The choice of a public firm to lead the building of nuclear reactors 
expressed the hope that those reactors would provide reliable electricity 
production and did not represent simply technological experimentation.21 
In 1969, EDF made the first change in its nuclear policy by abandoning 
their initial French technical path, which was based on natural uranium 
as fuel, carbon dioxide as coolant and graphite as a moderator. Instead, 
EDF now adopted American technology (enriched uranium as fuel and 
pressurized water as coolant), which was first implemented for the nuclear 
power plant of Fessenheim, built between 1970 and 1977. The aim of the 
public authorities was to lead a ‘Francization’ of PWR (Pressurized Water 
Reactor) technology, a process which occurred during the 1970s by EDF 
and the manufacturers Creusot-Loire and Alsthom.
But the nuclear turn was not the only decision linked to the oil crisis. 
The government started an energy-saving policy. Law number 74-908 
of October 29th, 1974, obliged energy suppliers to promote responsible 
behavior among consumers.22 Energy advertising was forbidden and the 
only message the suppliers were allowed to convey had to deal with energy 
saving. Consequently, EDF had to rework its communication policy. The 
firm was in a very delicate situation. On the one hand, it had to maintain, 
even raise, electricity consumption but on the other hand, the state-owned 
firm had to respect the government’s energy policy. In 1974, EDF made two 
cartoon ads for TV: the first one about a washing-machine and the second 
one about a dishwasher. In both, the slogan was “Don’t throw your kilowatt 
hours out of the window!” The message, however, was not as clear as the 
21 | Gabrielle Hecht has shown the ambiguous relationship between EDF and the 
CEA. Gabrielle Hecht: The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Iden-
tity after World War II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, 453.
22 | Aurore Toulon: “La sensibilisation de l’opinion publique aux économies 
d’énergie 1974-1986”, in: Alain Beltran/Christophe Bouneau/Yves Bouvier/
Denis Varaschin/Jean-Pierre Williot, eds. État et énergie. XIXe-XXe siècle, Paris: 
CHEFF, 2009, 263-264.
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slogan suggested. The second cartoon promoted the tag line: “Fill your 
machines up all the way to economize.” The ambiguity of EDF’s position is 
summarized in these cartoons: reconcile energy saving with economizing 
electricity consumption. 
A real change in EDF’s communication strategy occurred in 1977 when 
the company ordered six promotional films on consumer behavior. The 
advertising campaigns became more and more institutional in putting 
forward EDF’s image. The main slogan of this period, in tune with energy 
saving slogans, was “men in the service of the people” (1979 campaign). 
Contrary to the promotional films of the affluent society of the 1950s 
and 1960s, the ads of the two following decades explicitly casted energy 
consumers in an active role. For the first time, the cartoons were replaced 
by movies with actors playing the role of ordinary consumers. Starting with 
this campaign, the films’ characters – up until the most recent films – always 
lived in an electrified universe whose slogan was: “Use electricity; do not 
waste it.” These advertisements accentuate the concrete character of these 
situations: using an overly large hotplate, filling a washing machine half-
way, leaving the refrigerator door open, etc. Electrical appliances lost their 
“soul” by sacrificing drawn images for the realism of film: They became 
objects of the everyday life used by ordinary people. We have to be cautious 
in the analysis of these films. They seem to show “technology in the context 
of their use”23, but users are defined by the firm’s idea about their projected 
users. Creating a concrete, uniform vision of everyday behavior is a trap 
in which we should not fall, and in these films electricity consumers are 
idealized based on an image EDF wanted to promote. 
In the movie entitled The Cooking (1977), we see a woman boiling water 
on a large hotplate. Her husband and her father are seated, waiting for the 
coffee (Fig. 3). The father says: “Doesn’t your saucepan get bored in the 
middle of that big hotplate.” The woman then moves the saucepan from 
the big hotplate to a smaller one. The father says again: “Don’t you need 
a flat saucepan instead of your badly dented saucepan? And perhaps you 
have to put a lid on it, and then the water will boil quicker.” The woman 
asks him: “Hey Dad, do you know tricks for boiling water now?” And the 
man answers: “For water no. But I do for saving money.”
23 | Oudshoorn: “How Users and Non-Users Matter”, 2.
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Figure 3: The Cooking, 1977. A typical situation to promote 
energy saving. 
As we see in this example, the theme of the campaign was not consuming 
more electricity but consuming it efficiently. Dialogues centering around 
the accumulation of electrical appliances or on the gain of comfort, which 
had dominated the films of the 1950s, were now replaced by economic 
slogans such as: “Don’t have your meter running for nothing” (1977 
campaign). Electrical appliances had become everyday things and had lost 
their status as the protagonists of consumption in promotional films. If 
they still are ‘vehicles of meaning’, this meaning is restricted to energy 
saving. Now it was the consumer in person who stood in the center of the 
films. Electricity was shown as a consumer good and no longer as a symbol 
of modernity.
Another film in this campaign, The Washing Machine, depicts an old 
woman filling her washing machine. Her granddaughter suggests filling 
the machine up to the brim. In another film, the same scene is played out 
by a man and his son who scolds his father for turning on more lights 
than needed in the living-room. In a third film, it is also a young boy who 
tells his mother to close the refrigerator door. In these everyday scenes, 
the consumer in action does not show the most energy-conscious behavior 
and obviously needs advice. The role given to young boys and girls is a 
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way of symbolizing the society’s future, and also the future of electricity 
consumption. 
What were the results of these energy saving campaigns? There were 
none. This table shows the repartition of electricity consumption by users, 
documenting a steady rise in electricity consumption of households from 
1951 to 1984. 
The share of households in electricity consumption reached nearly one 
third of the national consumption in the mid-1980s. In GWh, household 
consumption almost tripled in the ten years between 1974 and 1984. 
Electricity consumption rose drastically after 1973 and it seems like the 
films did not work at all. This important peculiarity of the French energy 
system is due to electrical heating. Two reasons explain the choice of 
electrical heating: the reduction in cost of imported oil (fuel heating) and 
using cheap electricity provided by nuclear power plants at night. The 
proportion of new apartments equipped with electric heating grew from 
10 percent in 1974 to 40 percent in 1977 and 72 percent in 1988 (compared 
to the European average that amounted to 21 percent of new apartments 
equipped with electrical heating in 1988). The example of electrical heating 
displays an ambiguity within the French energy policy: promoting energy 
savings in the time of vast nuclear propagation which is based on the 
growth of electricity consumption. EDF, as energy supplier, was of course 
affected by this duality. In EDF’s promotional films, this ambiguity is also 
perceptible by the juxtaposition of two discourses on energy: consuming 
and saving. Consumers were the main agents in promotional films of this 
1951 1963 1973 1984
Industries 24 371 GWh 55 273 GWh 95 379 GWh 118 644 GWh
Services 5 513 GWh 15 351 GWh 34 387 GWh 62 545 GWh






10,55 % 12,80 % 18,86 % 30,58 %
Table 2: Repartition of Electricity Consumption by User Sectors.
FILMING ELECTRICAL CONSUMPTION 125
period. In other words, electricity was shown as a consumer good and 
occasionally as a national commodity.
THE NE W ELECTRICAL COMFORT OR THE RE APPE AR ANCE OF 
ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES, 1992-2004
The last of the three defining periods in promotional film marketing began 
with the 1992 campaign on nuclear energy. For the first time since 1974, 
it was not consumer behavior which was at the core of promotional films 
but, once again, as in the 1950s and the 1960s, the electrical appliances. 
The 1992 campaign was made up of three films: The Drill, The Dance and 
The Dentist. In the first film, a character is using his electric drill to fix a 
shelf (Fig. 4). 
Figure 4: The Drill, 1992. “It’s not an electric drill, it’s a 
nuclear drill.” 
His neighbor, furious because of the noise, knocks at the door and says: 
“It’s impossible to have some peace and quietness, even on a Sunday. 
Could you stop your damn drill?” The man answers: “My damn drill, my 
damn electric drill. Yes sir, electric.” The neighbor angrily says: “Electric 
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or not, your drill gets on my nerves.” But the man, drill in hand, replies: 
“Electric drill, but you can also say my damn nuclear drill. Because 
when I bore through my wall – our wall I should say – it is thanks to the 
electricity, which is nuclear.” This promotional film was broadcast in 1992 
and 1993 on TV and the sentence “my nuclear drill” became a popular 
media reference in public discourse for several years. It is surprising to see 
such a campaign, which reminded consumers that 75 percent of electricity 
production came from nuclear energy, only six years after the Chernobyl 
disaster. In a way, the discourse on the nuclearization of the electrical 
appliances is an answer to the ambiguity that emerged in 1974 between 
production technologies (nuclear energy) and consumer behavior (energy 
saving). In Barthes’ framework, the ‘nuclear drill’ could be a modern 
myth because “the meaning overflows the object’s use.”24 These three 
films directly link electrical appliances with their production process and 
with EDF’s industrial choices. The objects are parts of a global productive 
system and the drill is the bearer of meaning.
While electrical appliances made a reappearance in EDF’s promotional 
campaigns, the campaigns themselves became more diverse. Consumers 
and appliances were the focus of only 14 out of 35 advertising films during 
this period. The ecological argument shaped many of the other films and 
nuclear energy was presented as a way to reduce the nation’s oil bill. From 
the beginning of the 2000s, nuclear reactors also began to be presented 
as low-carbon energy. In this direction, several institutional films showed 
the attachment of EDF to sustainable development: solar energy in Africa, 
wind energy, rational energy consumption in cities and so on. All the 
promotional films, even for electric heating, favorably mention energy 
saving, since the law of 1974 still applies. 
In the 2000s, the corporate image of EDF became a strategic field to 
prepare the open offer of shares. These various communication strategies 
suited the variety of energy-related issues as described by David Nye: “At 
the end of the twentieth century, consuming power had become at once a 
technical question, an ecological dilemma, an economic field, a political 
problem, and a highly personal matter.”25 This explains why electrical 
applications are only a branch of the communication strategy. But in one 
24 | Barthes: “Semantics of the Object”, 182.
25 | David E. Nye: Consuming Power. A Social History of American Energies. 3rd 
ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, 250-251.
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third of the communication actions, they still remain at the center of 
promotional films.
The reappearance of electrical appliances was not simply a fashion. It 
began in the mid-1980s when the designers tried to create new appliances, 
using electronic technologies and recyclable materials. The 1960s and 
1970s were two decades of standardization while the 1990s was a decade 
of new design.26 This trend materialized in the interactive technologies 
which are now integrated in electrical appliances (screen, program, variety 
of functions). EDF’s promotional films followed this trend. The film 
entitled The Boat (1992) shows a man in a small boat, rowing to cross 
the Atlantic Ocean and dreaming of the electrical comfort of his home by 
recounting each of his appliances: an electric blanket, a toaster, a kettle, a 
micro-wave oven, a water heater, etc. The appliances named in this film are 
quite different from the list of the electrical appliances present in the 1960s 
(refrigerator, washing machine). Now, comfort is not something magic, it 
is merely normal and the electrical appliances are more everyday objects. 
It is not their use but their absence which reminds the consumer of their 
utility.27 
The sentence “the new electrical comfort” was used for the first time 
in 1997 in the film Marie-Amélie. A little girl, named Marie-Amélie, 
walks around in her home and notes the appliances of this new comfort: 
micro-wave oven, videogames, and air-conditioning (Fig. 5). She is also 
the narrator and comments to herself on the world she explores as the 
appliances are seen through her eyes. “The natives are very sociable,” 
she says when she sees her brothers playing video games. “The kitchen 
is as warm as the milk,” she says as she passes the thermostat because 
the electric heating adapts the temperature for each room. “The rain is 
always at the right temperature,” when she passes the bathroom where her 
mother showers. The colors of this film (orange, yellow) are a reference to 
the 1970s, the period of the birth of the film’s older characters. This film 
26 | Andrea Branzi: “Disparition et retour des serviteurs fidèles”, in: Raymond 
Guidot/Marie-Laure Jousset, eds.: Les bons génies de la vie domestique. Paris: 
Éditions du Centre Pompidou, 2000, 162.
27 | Paul Virilio named this process “the aesthetics of disappearance”. Paul Vir-
ilio: Esthétique de la disparition. Paris: Galilée, 1989, 126.
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illustrates perfectly the fact that “the high-energy society was increasingly 
a white-collar world.”28 
Figure 5: Marie-Amélie and the New Electrical Comfort, 
1997. Marie-Amélie is looking at the thermostat which regulates 
the temperature in each room. 
The woman is not doing domestic work but takes a shower; the man is not 
watching TV but watering plants. Of course we can see in this film that the 
new electrical comfort is based on new electrical appliances. The washing 
machine, the dish washer and the electric iron have disappeared. The 
meaning carried by objects is quite clear: Objects communicate and adapt 
their energy consumption to consumer behavior without any consumer 
action. But neither the appliances nor the consumers are the main agents 
of this promotional film: The key role is the architect of this lifestyle, EDF. 
Electricity consumers have become passive in this ideal home shaped by 
the energy supplier.
28 | Nye: Consuming Power, 208.
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Figure 6: Objects, 2004. Everyday things dominate the scene 
while the consumer remains faceless.
This strategy was further developed in the film Objects (2004). This was 
the year of EDF’s status change. This film relates the life of a man without 
showing his face (Fig. 6). More than 60 electrical appliances appear during 
the 60 seconds of the film, illustrating the “hyper-consumer society.”29 
We can imagine that he was born during the first half of the 1970s and 
we see the electrically operated objects of his life: bottle-warmer, orange 
yogurt-maker, toaster, string of lights on a Christmas tree, alarm clock, 
hair clippers, TGV train, drill, heater, coffee-machine, subway car, elevator, 
fax machine, and computer. The electrical artifacts are celebrated as a 
substitute for identity. There is no narrator or slogan, just music (“The End 
has no End”, by The Strokes) and the objects. The screen is divided into 
two or three parts, sometimes horizontally and sometimes vertically. In 
each window, we can see an object in use. In this film, the omnipresence of 
electrical appliances causes the disappearance of the consumer. EDF writes 
the history of a generation by filming a succession of electrical appliances. 
29 | Gilles Lipovestsky: “La société d’hyperconsommation”, in: Le Débat 124 
(March-April 2003), 74-98.
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Consumers and technology have fused together under the patronage of the 
electric supplier. 
CONCLUSION
Two conclusions should be made to end this paper. The first deals with 
the social relationship to energy and the second with the construction of 
cultural representations. EDF’s promotional films allow us to distinguish 
three socio-cultural relationships to energy. The cartoons of the 1950s and 
1960s associated electricity consumption with usefulness (this theme had 
also been the main slogan of the advertisements in the interwar period) 
and comfort. The housewife was the leader in the modernization of French 
homes but, in promotional films, the main agents were the electrical 
appliances. The system of electrical objects shaped a closed world, 
apparently independent of the electricity network or of the production 
technologies. 
This pattern changed with the 1973 oil crisis. Consumers took over the 
main role in promotional films and the ideology of comfort was replaced 
by advice on energy-efficient behavior. Electricity consumption had lost 
its magical halo and the concrete situations shown in the films were 
strengthened by the substitution of cartoons with movies. Of course, this 
change followed the general trend of the growth of the marketing budget. 
At this time of energy saving, energy consumption became an economic 
affair for individual households but also for the nation. More efficient 
electricity consumption was presented as a solution to the energy crisis. A 
communication strategy was created that used energy as a consumer good.
For two decades, the relationship established between energy and the 
consumer, as staged in the promotional films, was a cultural lifestyle. The 
reappearance of electrical appliances in promotional films of the 1990s and 
2000s did away with the role of consumers in the films and put forward 
the role of the supplier. 
This paper has illustrated the idea that energy is a socio-cultural 
construction. But this construction is also created by other power companies 
the world over. David Nye has expressed this idea in his book about the 
photographic collection of General Electric: “Thus, if these images emerged 
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from the necessities of corporate communication and from routinized 
work in the photographic department, they nevertheless did not serve to 
reinforce or reify an older social order but to visualize a new one.”30 In this 
way, EDF’s films are not only products of the marketing strategy but also 
milestones in the construction of energy as a socio-cultural commodity.
In the films I analyzed, EDF consistently used stereotypes and prevailing 
social norms from the time of the films’ making. The rapid changes in 
technological and economic context over the course of the 20th century 
have created new cultural relationships with electricity. Advertisements 
are relevant reflections of EDF’s ambiguous and sometimes wavering 
strategies. The cultural relations I tried to identify between consumers 
and electricity are, finally, compromises between the state of technology, 
economic public policy, prevailing social norms and the strategies of an 
industrial company.
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Managing Energy Consumption 
The Rental Business for Storage Water Heaters of   
Berlin’s Electricity Company from the Late 1920s   
to the Early 1960s
Nina Lorkowski
Having a wash, a shower, a bath – behind the bathroom door a lot of energy 
is consumed every day, in particular for water heating. Modern households’ 
warm water heaters are mainly powered with electricity. They can provide 
warm water on demand and in no time. Today’s water heaters work so well 
that we don’t even think about the appliance working in the background. 
However, it is worth asking how this appliance became accepted in private 
households and how standards of cleanliness and convenience have 
changed since its introduction.1 Instead of having a wash in the weekly 
bath, today we shower at least several times a week or take a bath just for 
relaxation.
The electric industry promoted water heaters since the 1920s in order 
to encourage residential electricity consumption not only with regard to a 
quantitative increase of electricity supply but rather to improve the efficiency 
of power plants.2 The main challenge for an efficient capacity utilization is 
the fact that electricity is not storable. Electricity must be produced and 
1 | Cf. on changing consumers’ expectations and practices of personal hygiene: 
Elizabeth Shove: Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience. The Social Organization 
of Normality. Oxford: Berg, 2003.
2 | Frauke Langguth: “‘Elektrizität in jedem Gerät’. Die Elektrifizierung der priva-
ten Haushalte am Beispiel Berlins”, in: Barbara Orland, ed. Haushalts-Träume. 
Ein Jahrhundert Technisierung und Rationalisierung im Haushalt. Königstein im 
Taunus: Langewiesche, 1990, 93-102.
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transmitted when it is needed. This became especially important with the 
economic boom during the interwar period. The increase of industrial 
electricity consumption and a growing number of households connected 
to the grid called for expanding power plant capacities. A power network 
is a large technological system. When it grows, all of its elements have to 
change accordingly.3 
In order to achieve improved efficiency of their power plants’ capacities, 
utility companies in Germany and Europe saw great promise in the use of 
specific household appliances which could compensate for lower electricity 
demand during off-peak hours, when these expanded power plant 
capacities were not fully utilized. Even though energy is not storable, there 
are appliances whose energy consumption does not necessarily coincide 
with its usage. Such an appliance is the thermal storage water heater: It 
is possible to heat up the hot water tank during the night with electricity 
that can be supplied at a low price and that is then used as thermal energy 
during the day.4 Therefore, utility companies tried to install thermal 
storage water heaters in private households by offering special installment 
schemes and even renting them out to their customers. Furthermore, they 
encouraged the use of electricity for water heating by providing special 
rates. The systematic promotion of electric water heating as a means for 
selling off-peak power was common in many German cities5 as well as in 
other European countries and proved to be so successful that it was even 
adopted in the United States.6
3 | Cf. Thomas P. Hughes’ notion of the power network as a system in his Net-
works of Power. Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
4 | J. Schwarz: “Die gegenwärtige Marktsituation für elektrische Heißwasserbe-
reiter”, in: Elektrizität. Zeitschrift für Abnehmerberatung. Organ der Hauptbera-
tungsstelle für Elektrizitätsanwendung (HEA) 9:4 (1959), 80.
5 | Sven Tetzlaff: “‘Laß mich hinein...!’ Die Eroberung der Haushalte durch die 
Elektrizitätswir tschaft”, in: Ursula Schneider/Detlef Stender, eds. Das Paradies 
kommt wieder. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 10-25.
6 | “Amerika und das Problem des Heißwasserspeichers”, in: Elektrizitätswirt-
schaft. Mitteilungen der Vereinigung der Elektrizitätswerke 29 (1928), 612.
MANAGING ENERGY CONSUMPTION 139
This article takes a closer look on the rental service for storage water 
heaters of Berlin’s utility company “Berliner Kraft- und Licht-AG” (Bewag).7 
It was introduced in 1929 as a strategy to push the household mechanization 
and electrification and influenced the manner of electricity consumption. 
Bewag supplied electricity for the whole city of Berlin. Private households 
evolved as important power network users in the densely populated city. 
After World War II, the company was divided and Bewag lost 40 percent 
of its supply area. It was not until the German reunification that Bewag’s 
supply areas were reunited again.8
However, electric power companies could not simply impose the 
adoption of new technologies without active participation of the consumer. 
The history of household mechanization is characterized by the interplay 
of institutions and organizations of manufacturers, experts and last but 
not least, consumers. Women in particular, who organized themselves 
in consumers’ or housewives’ associations played an important part in 
the process of household mechanization when they collaborated with 
engineers, architects, businessmen, municipal agencies, doctors etc. in 
order to bridge the knowledge gap between the producers and experts and 
the users of household technology.9
In this article, I shall not focus on consumers represented by 
organizations or institutions. Rather, I wish to examine how the designing 
engineers projected the users of their products on the one hand and how 
7 | Initially Berlin’s electricity company was called “Städtische Elektrizitäts-
Werke” and renamed “Berliner Kraft- und Licht-AG” in 1934. For the sake of co-
herency I will use the name Bewag throughout the paper.
8 | Berliner Kraft-und-Licht-(Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft, ed. 100 Jahre Strom für 
Berlin. Ein Streifzug durch unsere Geschichte in Wort und Bild, 1884-1984. Ber-
lin: Bewag, 1984, n.p.
9 | Karin Zachmann: “Technik, Konsum und Geschlecht – Nutzer/innen als Ak-
teur/innen in Technisierungsprozessen”, in: Petra Lucht/Tanja Paulitz, eds. Re-
codierungen des Wissens. Stand und Perspektiven der Geschlechterforschung in 
Naturwissenschaft und Technik. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2008, 69-86; Caroll 
Pursell: “Domesticating Modernity: The Electrical Association for Women, 1924-
86”, in: The British Journal for the History of Science 32:1 (1999), 47-67; Martina 
Heßler: “Die Einführung elektrischer Haushaltsgeräte in der Zwischenkriegszeit. 
Der Angebotspush der Produzenten und die Reaktion der KonsumentInnen”, in: 
Technikgeschichte 65:4 (1998), 297-311.
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the real users adopted the appliances, on the other. The differentiation 
between projected and real consumers and a perspective that moves 
constantly between both is inspired by Madeleine Akrich’s concept of the 
de-scription of technical objects.10 Following her notion of technological 
appliances as an outcome of a negotiation process between producers and 
consumers, I shall analyze how the design of storage water heaters and 
their rental conditions have been negotiated between the utility company 
Bewag and its customers. I will follow the development of the rental 
service and its changing conditions. By its specific setting and design 
of installation and service, Bewag’s engineers inscribed certain ideas of 
electricity usage into the appliance. Consumers adjusted to the appliance 
and the inscribed expectations of its use in their daily routines – or failed 
to adjust in case of diverging expectations of consumers and producers. 
Bewag’s strategy to balance load curves repeatedly fell short because of the 
intractability of consumers’ behaviour. In reality, there are various ways 
of using a technological artefact. By incorporating an appliance into their 
daily routines, consumers reshape the script that producers, i.e. the utility 
company Bewag, initially provided for them. Therefore, I shall enquire 
how the outcome of this, metaphorically speaking, negotiation process is 
translated into the appliance or the service provided.
The sources for this article originate from Bewag’s company archive 
in Berlin (today Vattenfall) and have been complemented by magazines 
of the electrical industry in order to analyse the changing setting of the 
rental service and its appliance. The article will portray the development 
of the rental service and its changing ensemble of appliances and rental 
conditions over the years and compare the two periods of rental and 
installment service for storage water heaters from 1926-1941 and 1953-
1975. Beginning with the introduction of a hire-purchase scheme in 1926, 
I shall describe how Bewag attempted to systematically influence the 
manner of energy consumption by promoting certain appliances. The 
article will subsequently discuss the conditions of the rental service that 
were modified with changing economical conditions. Finally, the rental 
service was restarted in 1953. Its new orders provide evidence of a modified 
consumption regime that became a challenge for attempts to influence 
10 | Madeleine Akrich: “The De-Scription of Technical Objects”, in: Wiebe E. Bi-
jker/John Law, eds. Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotech-
nical Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, 205-24.
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energy consumption. Simultaneously, this period marks the transition to 
the high-energy society. In the end, Bewag was no longer trying to adjust 
electricity consumption to technical demands in order to increase the 
efficiency of electricity production. Rather, they adapted electricity supply 
to changing consumption habits – to a prospective consumption regime of 
energy abundance – by expanding power network capacities.
DE VELOPING THE POWER NE T WORK AND  
MAKING APPLIANCES AVAIL ABLE
When Bewag discovered private households as a promising market in 
the 1920s, residential electricity consumption seemed to be a valuable 
opportunity to optimize the load factor of power plant capacities by adding 
additional non-industrial electricity consumption. Thus, Bewag was 
required to compete more effectively with the gas industry. With the increase 
of electricity supply, private households became especially important 
as customers. Bewag expected at that time that electricity consumption 
would grow, not least because an increasing number of households had 
been connected to the grid since the beginning of the decade. At that time 
Bewag’s energy provision was not covered completely by its own power 
plants but depended on long-distance supply from power plants outside 
their supply area. Expecting an increasing electricity demand, Bewag 
decided in the 1920s to become more independent from long-distance 
power supplies and wanted to shift their activities toward producing 
electricity on their own instead of buying and distributing electricity that 
had been generated elsewhere. For these reasons, Bewag started running 
a new large-scale power plant in 1926 and expanded machine capacities of 
existing power plants.11 
In Berlin, more than 50 percent of all households had electricity available 
in 1927.12 Yet, at this time electricity was almost exclusively used for lighting 
11 | C. Matschoß/E. Schulz/A. Th. Groß, eds. 50 Jahre Berliner Elektrizitätswer-
ke. 1884-1934 (=Veröffentlichungen der Bewag II. Vol 14). Berlin: VDI-Verlag, 
1934, 56-57.
12 | Christian Stadelmann: “Strom für alle. Schritte der Elektrifizierung und Ge-
räteausstattung des Haushalts bis zur Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts”, in: Blätter für 
Technikgeschichte 66/67 (2004/05), 117-41.
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and most households were only modestly equipped with technical devices. 
At the time, household appliances were expensive consumer goods that 
were hardly affordable for the average household. The German market for 
consumer goods was rather small and catered to the needs of a wealthy 
consumer elite. In the United States, by contrast, the market was less 
determined by class boundaries.13 In particular the provision of appliances 
on installment schemes had proven a success in stimulating consumption 
for durable and more expensive goods in the United States. In order to 
pursue their idea of the household as an increasingly important electricity 
consumer, German utility companies began to mediate and distribute 
household appliances.14 Following the American example, the electricity 
as well as the gas industry offered low-priced household appliances and 
made them available for installment schemes.15 Bewag was the pioneer in 
establishing a hire-purchase scheme in Germany.16 It was introduced in 
1926 and came to be known as Elektrissima or E³. 
Consumers used Elektrissima mainly to secure electricity supply in 
their homes. The most popular devices purchased with Elektrissima were 
small ones with a low load such as heating pads, hair dryers, electric irons 
and vacuum cleaners.17 Residential electricity consumption increased, but 
it was mainly used for lighting. This caused peak loads that still overlapped 
with industrial peaks loads. For this reason, improving the balance of load 
factors on power plants became more important than increasing overall 
13 | Victoria de Grazia: “Changing Consumption Regimes in Europe, 1930-1970. 
Comparative Perspectives on the Distribution Problem”, in: Susan Strasser/
Charles McGovern/Matthias Judt, eds. Getting and Spending. European and 
American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, 67-68.
14 | Martina Heßler: ‘Mrs. Modern Woman’. Zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte der 
Haushaltstechnisierung. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2001, 136-48.
15 | Langguth: “Elektrizität in jedem Gerät”, 96-97.
16 | Herbert F. Müller: “Elektrizitätswerke als Absatzvermittler”, in: Elektrizitäts-
wirtschaft 25:2 (1926), 77.
17 | Frauke Langguth: “Zur Geschichte der Elektrifizierung der privaten Haus-
halte. Die Absatzpolitik der Bewag gegenüber den privaten Haushalten in Berlin 
während der Weimarer Republik” (Unpublished Master thesis, TU Berlin, 1988), 
77-78.
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electricity consumption of households.18 As a result, Bewag established a 
“Büro für Sonderaufgaben” (office for special tasks, N.L.) in 1928. It was 
charged with improving the development and marketing of household 
appliances in order to increase the use of off-peak power.19 Bewag especially 
focused its marketing strategies on electric stoves and water heaters, which 
were supposed to be used regularly and had a higher load factor. 
“STORING” ELECTRICIT Y
Facing the problem of producing and selling a product that is not storable, 
the electricity industry recognized the potential of private households 
as, metaphorically speaking, a means of electricity storage. By the use of 
certain appliances, it was possible to influence the manner of electricity 
consumption and match it to the loads of the electric power company. A 
water heater could, when charged during the night, store electric energy to 
be consumed as heat energy during the day. Therefore, the implementation 
of storage water heaters into private households ranked first for the “Büro 
für Sonderaufgaben”. 
A storage water heater is not just a simple electric consumer good, 
but rather an installation. Connected to two networks, the waterline and 
the power circuit, it requires professional placement. It was furthermore 
equipped with armature, a special meter and a time switch. This made 
the appliance expensive for purchase and required regular maintenance 
service.20 It was not before the 1950s that bathrooms became a standard 
element of dwellings and coal was still the most common fuel for heating 
water, because operation costs were low and boilers that were powered with 
fossil fuels also heated up the bathroom. Therefore, Bewag’s customers had 
little interest in buying electrical water heaters, even though the company 
offered to sell them by installment payment. Thus, from 1929 onward, 
Bewag provided water heaters also for rent. The rental service provided 
18 | Langguth: “Elektrizität in jedem Gerät”, 97-98.
19 | Berliner Städtische Elektrizitätswerke Akt.-Ges., ed.: Jahrbuch der Ver-
kehrsdirektion 1929. Berlin, 1930, 43.
20 | H. Wasserzier: “Grundlagen der mietweisen Abgabe von Heißwasserspei-
chern durch das Elektrizitätswerk”, in: Elektrizitätswirtschaft 30:12 (1931), 
351-53.
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customers with the necessary installation work, including a second electric 
meter, and a regular maintenance service. At first, Bewag rented out 1,000 
heaters with a volume of 30, 50 or 80 litres, mainly expecting to supply 
households with smaller water heaters for the kitchen or for taking a 
shower. The rent for the water heater was added to the monthly electricity 
bill and ranged from 3.75 to 5.00 Reichsmark, depending on the size (Fig. 
1).21 Bewag introduced the appliance together with a special discount for 
night-time power usage. Between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. the price of power was 
reduced from the average standard rate of 18 to 8 Reichspfennig.22
Figure 1: Electrity Bill with Box for Charging Storage 
Water Heater Rent, 1933. 
The inexpensive rate was intended to convince consumers to rent the 
appliance. The heating-up periods were restricted to night-time hours 
and consumers could not choose between the two rates according to 
their demands. Bewag designed the installation in terms of their interest 
in selling exclusively off-peak power. Therefore, the proper use of the 
21 | Jahrbuch der Verkehrsdirektion 1929, 45.
22 | Berliner Kraft-und-Licht-(Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft: 100 Jahre Strom, n.p.
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appliance, running it only with off-peak power was regulated by the 
interplay of appliance design, meter and time switch.
REGUL ATING ENERGY CONSUMP TION BY APPLIANCE  
AND INSTALL ATION DESIGN
Initially, consumers could choose between two models of storage heaters: 
a drawdown storage heater or an overflow storage heater. In terms of their 
operation, they differed mainly in the degree of automation. A drawdown 
heater had to be replenished by the consumer, at least in the evening to 
heat it up during the night. Therefore, depending on their hot water needs, 
the consumers defined the amount of hot water that was heated in the tank 
of the drawdown heater.23 In contrast, when hot water was tapped out of 
an overflow storage heater, cold water replenished the tank automatically. 
When the overflow storage heater was exclusively heated up during the 
night, the water’s temperature decreased the more water was tapped from 
the tank during the day. Even when no water was tapped at all, heat losses 
during the day called for heating the water during the night.24 But in 
contrast to the drawdown storage heater, the full volume of the tank was 
heated up during the night, without the possibility to adjust the volume 
to the prospected demand and to avoid heat losses of water that was not 
needed. 
Heating-up times were controlled by a time switch. Storage water heaters 
were installed with an extra meter, separated from the main meter.25 At the 
beginning of the defined heating period the timer switched the relay circuit 
and connected the meter to the electric power supply, which provided the 
water heater with electricity. At the end of the defined heating period, the 
23 | “Entleerungsspeicher für die Warmwasserversorgung von Siedlungen. Mit-
teilung der Fabrik für Elektrobeheizung, Abteilung Vertrieb”, in: AEG-Mitteilungen 
3 (1931), 185-86.
24 | “Untersuchungsmethoden für die Beurteilung der wärmetechnischen Eigen-
schaften von elektrisch-beheizten Warmwasserspeichern”, in: Elektrizitätswirt-
schaft 25:1 (1926), 485-88.
25 | Ihno Thiemens: “Die Wir tschaftlichkeit des vollelektrischen Haushaltes für 
das Elektrizitätswerk mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Heißwasserbereitung 
(Nachtrag)”, in: Elektrizitätswirtschaft 31:30 (1938), 795.
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relay circuit switched off the power supply again.26 Thus, consumers were 
not able to adjust the water’s heating-up periods to their requirements. 
When the water in the tank was cold, caused by the replenishment with 
cold water and heat losses, it was not until the next morning that warm 
water was available again. The only thing consumers had control over was 
switching the appliance off completely when it was not needed for a longer 
period of time.27 
Shortly after the introduction of both the hire-purchase and the rental 
service, Bewag decided to offer only overflow storage heaters.28 As stated 
by the “Büro für Sonderaufgaben”, these heaters were superior not only 
because they operated fully automatically but because they enabled a 
permanent and more constant use of heating power. The design of the 
storage water heater thus reflected the expectation that consumers would 
use hot water on a daily basis. Due to heat losses, even when only a small 
amount of water was tapped, a constant amount of off-peak power was 
used every night because neither water volume nor temperature could 
be manipulated. The use of the appliance was expected to be efficient 
when used everyday and thus to contribute to a more balanced electricity 
consumption. 
Many consumers, however, followed a different routine in their personal 
hygiene. Taking a bath was a weekly event, usually performed on Saturdays. 
Thus consumers took the appliance off the grid during the week. In doing 
so, they could avoid the costs for heat losses when the appliance was not 
needed during the week.29 Representatives of the electricity industry 
complained that this use of the appliance did not contribute to a balanced 
load factor because it charged the off-peak power only during the weekend 
which was even recognizable as a ‘bathing peak’ in the load curves of the 
electricity industry.30 
26 | Fritz Wallmüller: Der Elektrizitätszähler in Theorie und Praxis. Berlin: Druk-
kerei und Verlagsanstalt Noden GmbH, 1935, 1093-97.
27 | “Ausführungsbestimmungen für Miet-Heißwasserspeicher-Anlagen der BE-
WAG”, 1931, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52, 6.
28 | Jahrbuch der Verkehrsdirektion 1929, 45.
29 | Jahrbuch der Verkehrsdirektion 1929, 43.
30 | “Elektrische Koch- und Badeeinrichtungen einer neuzeitlichen Siedlung”, in: 
AEG-Mitteilungen 5 (1930), 363-64.
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ADJUSTING THE RENTAL SERVICE TO NE W CHALLENGES 
SINCE THE ENERGY CRISIS OF 1930
Private households played a particularly important role as electricity 
storage via the installation of certain appliances, in particular storage water 
heaters, when the rental service was introduced. Bewag designed the rental 
service conditions first and foremost in order to balance peak loads. As a 
result of the international financial and economic crisis at the end of the 
1920s, however, it was in particular industrial energy consumption that 
decreased dramatically from 1930 till 1933.31 During that period, Bewag 
shelved further plans to expand power plant capacities that it had initiated 
in 1926. But since the extension and construction of new power plants had 
partly already been carried out, Bewag now faced an increasing amount 
of surplus energy capacities and at the same time decreasing electricity 
sales.32 Hence, private households became even more attractive as 
promising energy consumers for the electricity industry. Utilities such as 
Bewag extended their advertising for residential electricity consumption. 
However, the goal now was no longer to encourage private households to 
use surplus electricity during specific periods, but to stimulate electricity 
consumption by any means, regardless of peak loads.33 
Therefore, Bewag intensified their efforts to promote electric cooking 
and hot water heating in particular. The rental service for water heaters had 
already proven its worth for adjusting residential electricity consumption to 
the conditions of the energy market, depending on the provided appliances 
and their installation. First of all, Bewag reduced night-time power use 
to five Reichspfennig and supported every newly-installed heater with a 
financial subsidy of 15 Reichsmark in order to encourage its incorporation 
into private households.34 Now however, facing surplus capacities that 
could be consumed in private households, Bewag redesigned the rental 
31 | Wolfgang Zängl: Deutschlands Strom. Die Politik der Elektrifizierung von 
1866 bis heute. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1989, 120-75.
32 | Matschoß: 50 Jahre Berliner Elektrizitätswerke, 57-60.
33 | Herbert F. Müller: “Wir tschaftskrise und Stromwerbung”, in: Elektrizitäts-
wirtschaft 31:8 (1932), 166; Berliner Städtische Elektrizitätswerke Akt.-Ges., 
ed.: Jahrbuch der Verkehrsdirektion 1931. Berlin, 1932, 43.
34 | “Direktionsrundschreiben 3/1932”, 08.02.1932, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall 
Berlin, folder 5/52.
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business to prevent consumers from switching off their appliance during 
the week and furthermore encouraged additional heating-up during the 
day. In doing so, Bewag counteracted consumers’ intractable behaviour by 
installing more and more storage heaters with two or three outlets, one of 
which supplied the kitchen.35 Bewag expected a certain amount of hot water 
to be needed in the kitchen almost every day in the majority of households. 
Using appliances that served the bathroom as well as the kitchen, Bewag 
supposed, consumers would not take the appliance off the grid anymore. 
Despite more outlets, the size of the tank was not changed. Thus, the 
volume of water heated up during the night in the common 50 and 80 
litre tanks was sufficient to supply, for instance, the hot water needed in 
the kitchen but not, in addition, the water for a hot bath in the evening. 
However, the modification in the appliance’s design (i.e. the additional 
outlets) was supplemented by a transformation of the time switch. From 
now on, the exclusive restriction of heating-up periods to night-time hours 
was abandoned.36 Water heaters could now be charged for several hours 
during daytime and if consumers used water both for preparing meals and 
personal hygiene during one day, the new appliance design even allowed 
additional heating-up during the day. With regard to Bewag’s motivation 
of stimulating electricity consumption in general this was supposed to 
extend the time when the appliance consumed electricity.37 However, even 
additional daytime charging could not provide several bath fillings on one 
day. Hence it was hard to continue the family’s bathing day, given that a 
fresh bathtub filling was required for each member of the family. Since 
at this time the habit of several persons bathing one after the other in the 
same bath water was widespread, the limited volume of water provided 
by storage water heaters probably even encouraged many users to keep 
this routine going. Actually, the design and installation of the appliance 
was more intended to make consumers abandon their ‘bathing day’ and 
have a bath for every single person on a different day. In that way, there 
would be an even amount of electricity consumption for hot water heating 
throughout the week, which would contribute to a more efficient utility 
35 | Ihno Thiemens: “Wir tschaftliche Fragen bei der Vermietung von Heißwasser-
speichern”, in: Elektrizitätswirtschaft 3:8 (1932): 171.
36 | “Das Heißwasserspeicher Mietsystem der Bewag”, 1932, Bewag-Archiv/
Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52, 14.
37 | Thiemens: “Wir tschaftliche Fragen”, 171.
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capacity operation. However, this required reorganizing the bathing 
routines by using a ‘bathing calendar’. This calendar – which, according 
to the electricity industry, could be found in quite a few households – 
envisaged one bathing day per person during the week and was regarded 
as a practical answer to the existing technological constraints.38 
However, the actual users of the rental service attached less importance 
to electric water heating in the kitchen, which could be provided in passing 
on the kitchen stove. Contrary to Bewag’s initial assumption, bathroom 
storage heaters were the most appealing appliances for consumers because 
they did away with the laborious heating of water with coal.39 In particular 
the bathroom storage heaters of 80 litres were rented and installed and 
ever more frequently replaced by even larger heaters of 120 and 150 litres 
that were rented out since 1932. The number of rented heaters increased 
year by year and with it their volume. The average volume of rented heaters 
increased from 68 litres to 81 litres.40 This provides evidence for growing 
hot water consumption in private households since the introduction of the 
appliance. By enlarging the average storage size, Bewag enabled energy use 
that was more attuned to consumers’ demands. Water heaters with larger 
volume could provide a larger amount of hot water in case of need. This 
indicates that some consumers did not reorganize their bathing routines 
but rather used the appliance when it was needed. For instance, they used 
the entire water volume provided by the appliance during one day in order 
to have a bathing day, but switched the appliance off completely the other 
day, when no hot water was needed. Since this conduct was still bemoaned 
by the electricity industry in 1960, it seems to have been a common practice 
with storage water heaters.41
Bewag adjusted their rental service to the changed consumers’ demands 
by supplementing the rental service with large-scale storage water heaters 
38 | Theodor Stiebel: “Der Badekalender. Ein Betrachtung zur Kapazität von 
Nachtstromspeichern im Hinblick auf die Kopfzahl größerer Familien”, in: Elektri-
zität 3:3 (1953), 57-58.
39 | Thiemens: “Wir tschaftliche Fragen”, 168.
40 | Berliner Städtische Elektrizitätswerke Akt.-Ges., ed. Jahrbuch der Verkehrs-
direktion 1933. Berlin, 1934, 40.
41 | P. Borstelmann: “Elektrische Heißwasserbereitung im Haushalt”, in: Elektri-
zität 10:11 (1960), 243.
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with volumes of 120 and 150 litres.42 This did not exactly correspond to 
their initial marketing strategies. But with the partial adjustment of the 
rental service to the consumers’ routines of personal hygiene, Bewag 
succeeded in promoting an appliance that was at first neither common 
nor regarded as attractive but was now used increasingly often. From 1,305 
rented storage water heaters in 1931, the number of rented heaters grew up 
to 7,454 water heaters in 1935.43 
Bewag continued its marketing strategies to stimulate the usage of 
certain household appliances during the Nazi period. But in 1941, the 
company terminated the rental and hire-purchase business for household 
appliances.44 This was due to restrictions and, later, even a ban on the 
production of household appliances in the context of the wartime economy 
that marks a break in the history of consumption.45 At the same time as 
Bewag abandoned its hire-purchase and rental service, the first upswing 
of household mechanization and electrification ended. It had led to a more 
widespread adoption of consumer goods such as electrical water heaters for 
which there had formerly been little demand. This period, however, is not 
primarily significant in terms of the quantity of household appliances that 
found its way into private households, but rather with regard to evolving 
consumer wishes and the emergence of a material infrastructure that 
helped to popularize electric household appliances as affordable consumer 
goods.46
However, it was not before the 1950s when consumption of durable 
goods like household appliances became more widespread. Based on 
new social, political and economical premises, the housing situation and 
private household incomes improved. This marks the transition to a new 
42 | Thiemens: “Wir tschaftliche Fragen”, 169.
43 | E. Albrecht: “Einige Zahlen aus unserer BEWAG”, in: Der Stromkreis. Werk-
zeitung der Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft 2:6/8 (1935): 
98.
44 | Herber Baddack: “Elektrissima – Ein Berliner Begrif f”, in: Elektrizität 9:5 
(1959), 99.
45 | Heßler: ‘Mrs. Modern Woman’, 19.
46 | Martina Heßler: “Visionen des Überflusses. Entwürfe künftiger Massenkon-
sumgesellschaften im 20. Jahrhundert”, in: Hartmut Berghoff/Jakob Vogel, eds. 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Dimensionen eines Perspektiv-
wechsels. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2004, 455-80.
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consumption regime that is based on the Fordist consumption pattern.47 
Appliances became mass consumer goods and lost their character as a 
social distinction of a consumer elite.48
STEERING CONSUMERS AWAY FROM THE LOAD PE AK  
IN THE 1950S
In the course of the economic recovery and reconstruction, Bewag did not 
hesitate to boost electricity consumption in private households. In 1949, 
the company took up the hire-purchase business and resumed the rental 
business for storage water heaters in 1953. For a short period, they even 
expanded the service to rent out electric stoves.49 During the ‘economic 
miracle’ an increasing number of gadgets and appliances found their 
way into private households and thus opened a new era of residential 
consumption and energy use. Now, energy suppliers like Bewag faced new 
challenges. The growing electricity consumption of an increasing number 
and diversity of appliances that were mostly used during the day produced 
inefficient peak loads.50 Due to the acceleration of household electrification 
it was henceforth necessary to balance the intensive residential peak loads.51 
Therefore, those appliances consuming off-peak power again became 
more attractive as potential ‘electricity storage’. Night-time electricity usage 
was still considered an important and expandable factor to balance peak 
capacities and storage water heaters were regarded as the most appropriate 
appliance to reach this target.52 Simultaneously, electricity usage for water 
heating was regarded as hugely expandable during the 1950s because it was 
used in fewer than 10 percent of private households and thus was in fierce 
47 | de Grazia: “Changing Consumption Regimes in Europe”, 78-83.
48 | Arne Andersen: “Das 50er-Jahre Syndrom – Umweltfragen in der Demokrati-
sierung des Technikkonsums”, in: Technikgeschichte 65:4 (1998), 329-44.
49 | Cf. the contribution of Sophie Gerber in this volume.
50 | Heinz Weidauer Obering: “Stromabsatzwerbung”, in: Elektrizität 4:8 (1954), 
232.
51 | Ludwig Koch: “Die Haushaltsgeräte-Absatzpolitik in Elektrizitäts-Versor-
gungsunternehmen” (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München, 1957), 110-111.
52 | Koch: “Die Haushaltsgeräte-Absatzpolitik”, 110, 151. 
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competition to coal and gas usage for water heating.53 In 1950, 78.3 percent 
of all dwellings in Germany did not have a bathroom or a shower at all. 
Even in 1957, 72.9 percent of private households were not even equipped 
with hot water supply.54 Beginning with the first housing law in 1950 and 
complemented by other construction and renovation programs aimed 
at improving the inadequate housing situation, it became increasingly 
important for the utilities to literally get a foot in the door, especially in 
order to be able to compete with the gas industry.55 Just like other utilities56, 
Bewag expanded their rental business to the housebuilding market and 
supplied newly-built housing estates and landlords with their rental storage 
water heaters in order to set the course for the fully electrified household 
of the future.57
Seeing new challenges on the energy market, Bewag aligned their 
rental service to the determining factors of the electricity industry and 
developments of the appliances. The company rented out 80 litres 
bathroom water heaters and 15 litre boilers for the kitchen.58 Both were 
configured with a second electric circuit. Thus, the appliance charged 
off-peak power during the night but could be switched on additionally 
during the day. The most crucial change to the former rental service 
was the complete abandonment of the technically based restriction, the 
relay circuit controlled by a time switch, in favour of a simple price-based 
regulation by providing special tariffs for night-time charge. Bewag had 
53 | Jean Schwarz: “Er fahrungen in der Heißwassergerätewerbung nach Einfüh-
rung der Typenbeschränkung”, in: Elektrizität 9:9 (1959), 256.
54 | Statistisches Bundesamt: 50 Jahre Wohnen in Deutschland. Ergebnisse aus 
Gebäude- und Wohnungszählungen, Stichproben, Mikrozensus-Ergänzungserhe-
bungen und Bautätigkeitsstatistiken. Stuttgart: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000, 
86-87.
55 | Wilhelm Strahringer: “Tradition, For tschritt und Freiheit im Energiebereich 
des Haushalts”, in: Elektrizität 9:6 (1959), 121.
56 | “Viele Wege führen zur vollelektrischen Siedlung”, in: Elektrizität 3:2 
(1953), 30-31.
57 | “Betrif f t Herd- und Speicher Mietaktion”, 24.06.1953, Bewag-Archiv/Vat-
tenfall Berlin, folder 5/52, 5; “Anlage zum Bericht über die Sonderaktion im Miet-
speichergeschäft”, 1958, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52.
58 | “Aktennotiz: Betrif f t Herd- und Speicher-Leihaktion”, 30.10.1953, Bewag-
Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52.
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already considered abandoning the relay circuit in 1938, shortly before the 
rental service had been interrupted. Balancing load peaks was not the main 
concern of the utility at this time. Bewag had come to the conclusion that 
this step was more inefficient in terms of their power plant utilization, 
but that it could advance energy sales.59 In the 1950s, giving up the time 
switch not only reduced installation costs for Bewag, but was also intended 
to make the rental business more suited to new consumption habits and 
new expectations of convenience. Even though the electricity industry 
continued to prefer the use of night-time power, they also acknowledged the 
fact that lifestyles were changing. This became recognizable for instance in 
a gradually increasing use of hot water and the expectation to have this 
demand satisfied whenever it was needed.60 Therefore, all modern storage 
water heaters were now fitted with a second electric circuit.61 In contrast, 
the former very limited volume of warm water that had called for the use 
of a family-bathing calendar was regarded more and more inappropriate.62
Meanwhile, in addition to new, modernized appliances like the 
continuous-flow water heater, appliances had not only been technologically 
improved but had also become cheaper. Although these heaters consumed 
mainly peak electricity that was usually more expensive, these appliances 
became more and more popular in Germany from the second half of the 
1950s onwards.63 Since Bewag was particularly interested in introducing 
more off-peak consuming appliances to private households, they did not 
promote continuous-flow heaters.64 On the contrary, a special tariff was 
designed to make customers use primarily night-time power for water 
heating. However, in 1956, Bewag’s management was unsatisfied with 
the development of the rental service. According to an internal discussion 
on the efficiency of the rental service, the financial incentive had failed 
to adapt consumers’ use of the appliance to the determining factors of 
59 | Thiemens: “Die Wir tschaftlichkeit des vollelektrischen Haushaltes”, 795.
60 | W. Petrus: “Einfluß der Heißwasserbereitung auf die Verteilungsnetze”, in: 
Elektrizität 8:2 (1958), 32-34.
61 | Hans Oeljeschlager: “Zweikreisspeicher. Ihre Möglichkeiten und Grenzen”, 
in: Elektrizität 3:3 (1953), 53.
62 | Stiebel: “Der Badekalender”, 57-58.
63 | Petrus: “Einfluß der Heißwasserbereitung”, 33. 
64 | “Bedingungen des Elektrissima-Teilzahlungssystems“, November 1956, Be-
wag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/53, 4.
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the energy market. On the contrary, storage water heaters with a second 
electric circuit were heated up increasingly often during the day. Their 
electricity consumption coincided with the peaks of other energy-intensive 
appliances in the household.65 Thus, the households lost their function 
as ‘storage’ for off-peak power that was to compensate residential and 
industrial peaks.
The management bewailed the lack of a technical element that 
controlled heating-up times in order to regulate consumption more strictly. 
They discussed developing a control equipment for storage water heaters 
that was expected to “steer consumers away from the load peak.”66 Rents 
for water heaters without this control equipment were intended to be more 
expensive. However, this technology-based solution was never realized. 
Instead, Bewag’s management regarded the rental service more and 
more as a financial burden. Its costs were felt to progressively exceede the 
revenues from the renters and the management considered giving up the 
rental business altogether.67
Nevertheless, Bewag continued the rental service. Due to the political 
division of the city of Berlin, the western part of the company had become 
an island with regard to energy production and supply. The separation of 
the electricity supply network called for an independent electricity provision 
in West Berlin. Furthermore, in densely populated West Berlin, private 
households’ energy consumption constituted the lion’s share in Bewag’s 
supply area. Thus, the load compensation by off-peak power usage was an 
important economic factor for the utility. As Bewag’s annual report for the 
years 1957-1958 shows, the utility company anticipated a growing challenge 
of balancing the peak loads of the – for the most part – daytime consumers 
that were expected to increase. The report stated that consequently the 
advertisement of night-time usage in private households was to be treated 
with priority.68 Therefore, Bewag’s management decided to keep the rental 
service for the time being.
65 | “Bedingungen des Elektrissima-Teilzahlungssystems“, 3-4.
66 | [Original: “Wegsteuern aus der Spitze”, transl. N.L.]. “Bedingungen des 
Elektrissima-Teilzahlungssystems”, 3-4.
67 | “Bericht über eine Sonderaktion im Mietspeichergeschäft”, 20.08.1958, 
Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52, 1.
68 | “Umschau: In Berlin bestimmt der Haushalt”, in: Elektrizität 9:1 (1959), 
19-20.
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THE BARREL ON THE WALL
Nevertheless, the attempt of steering consumers’ routines of hot water 
consumption via the rental business according to the utilities’ interest in a 
balanced load factor of their power plants turned out to be an unsuccessful 
enterprise. In 1958, Bewag doubted that the rental business would pay off 
in its existing way. For this reason, the utility offered rental heaters for sale 
and raised the rent for continuing contracts up to 50 percent.69
At least 59 percent of Bewag’s customers then purchased their 
water heaters. Besides, Bewag’s management had to realize that only 
an insignificant number of storage water heaters were sold in shops. 
Furthermore, 50 percent of the remaining consumers reacted to the rent 
increase by returning their appliance to Bewag. At this time many of the 
rental service’s appliances were technologically outdated.70 Some of them 
had been rented out since the 1930s.71 Now, less chunky storage heaters, 
continuous flow heaters and appliances that combined the night-time 
charging with additional continuous flow heating during the day were up-
to-date. Hence, consumers lost interest in the rental service and its storage 
heaters. But adjusting the rental service to state-of-the-art appliances would 
have required additional capital investment in a business that already had 
turned out to be a financial burden for the company.72 Not willing to invest 
additional money, Bewag restricted its rental service to the existing heaters 
in 1959. From now on, they only re-rented appliances that were returned. 
Although the rental service remained a cheap possibility to install hot water 
supply in a dwelling, consumers’ interest in the rental service diminished. 
The appliances were technologically outdated and could no longer meet 
rising consumer expectations.73
69 | “Mitteilung”, 10.02.1958, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52.
70 | “Aktenvermerk. Betreff: Mietspeicher”, 27.07.1959, Bewag-Archiv/Vatten-
fall Berlin, folder 5/52.
71 | “Betr.: Stellungnahme zu den Kalkulationen von SL über das Heißwassspei-
cher-Mietgeschäft”, 13.08.1959, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52.
72 | “Aktenvermerk. Betreff: Mietspeicher”.
73 | “Rundschreiben Nr. 1-1959/60”, 22.10.1959, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Ber-
lin, folder 5/53.
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So the storage water heaters became a “barrel on the wall.”74 Neither 
did architects or house builders want them, primarily for aesthetic reasons, 
nor were they preferred by consumers, whose water needs had increased 
together with their expectations of convenience, of having hot water 
available in any required amount at any time of the day. 
The growing amount of electricity consumption for hot water heating 
sparked a discussion on the efficiency of night-time charging in general. As 
an investigation on electricity usage in a fully electrified new housing estate 
in Hamburg indicates, the night-time charging produced a peak that was 
partly higher than the daytime electricity consumption, due to the growing 
demand for hot water. Because of the still very common bathing day, this 
peak even intensified on weekends. This was a very unfavourable peak load 
because it would have required additional power plant capacities.75
Instead of steering consumers away from the load peak by a specific 
appliance design, the electricity industry redesigned the appliance in 
accordance with consumers’ preferences. As the electricity industry 
stated even in 1953, appliances and tariffs were adjusted increasingly to 
consumers’ progressing expectations of convenience and hygiene: 
“In the past it was the utility company that defined which appliance should be 
used by its customers, by means of a more balanced capacity utilization. For 
this reason the utilities introduced the storage water heater. But the latest 
trends lead to appliances that are first and foremost adjusted to the needs of the 
consumers.”76 
With regard to these changed needs the notion of utilising the household as 
storage that uses electricity for water heating only during defined periods 
became obsolete. Instead of focusing on steering consumers in order to 
make capacity utilization more efficient, the electricity industry discussed 
74 | [Original: “Walze an der Wand“, transl. N.L.]. Borstelmann: “Elektrische 
Heißwasserbereitung im Haushalt”, 244.
75 | E. Moslener: “Er fahrungen mit vollelektrifizier ten Wohnbauten in Hamburg”, 
in: Elektrizität 3:2 (1953), 20.
76 | [transl. N.L.] “Zur Entwicklung der elektrischen Heißwasserbereitung”, in: 
Elektrizität. 3:3 (1953), 52.
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whether it would be more promising to stimulate electricity consumption 
in general and to balance peaks by the simple diversity of appliances.77
The development of the rental service can be interpreted as a negotiation 
process between the utility company and its customers, the outcome of 
which were technologically developed appliances, adjusted tariffs and last 
but not least the extension of the power network. Thus, Bewag decided 
to invest no further capital into the rental business for an appliance that 
had become a barrel on the wall. The rising needs of consumers were 
rather used as a legitimization to build up network capacities. Bewag’s 
management determined to put more money into the expansion of the 
electric power network to meet the demands of appliances with a higher 
load factor such as continuous flow water heaters that could satisfy the 
needs of the prospective consumers.78 Since the electricity industry already 
predicted a growing residential electricity utilization, this development was 
intended to pioneer the increasing usage of bigger, more energy-intensive 
appliances.79
Corresponding to these new targets of the Bewag, they also reformulated 
their tariff system in 1960, promoting electricity consumption following the 
principle “who consumes more, pays less.”80 The utilization of appliances 
that consumed off-peak power was still advertised by a cheaper night-time 
tariff. However, using a water heater during the day became relatively 
cheap as well. Since off-peak power usage for space heating became more 
popular during the 1960s and 70s81, water heaters became less important 
as night-time power consumers. In 1975, Bewag eventually terminated the 
extant rental agreements. Hirers could either buy their formerly rented 
appliance or Bewag uninstalled it.82
77 | “Zur Entwicklung der elektrischen Heißwasserbereitung”, 48.
78 | “Aktenvermerk. Betreff: Mietspeicher”.
79 | “Stromverbrauchsentwicklung”, in: Elektrizitätswirtschaft 54:11 (1955), 
384-85.
80 | Berliner Kraft-und-Licht-(Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft: 100 Jahre Strom, n.p.
81 | “Nachtstrom-Knappheit”, Der Spiegel 38 (1973), 97.
82 | “Bewag verleiht keine Boiler mehr”, in: Der Tagesspiegel, 24.01.1975 [in: 
“Presseauswertung Nr. 242”, Bewag-Archiv/Vattenfall Berlin, folder 5/52].
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EPILOGUE: A TROJAN HORSE IN THE BATHROOM
Due to their rental service, Bewag succeeded in placing storage water 
heaters in private households. The company had precise expectations about 
appropriate hot water consumption in private households as a means to 
make power plant utilization more efficient. The design of the appliance was 
as important in this effort to influence the manner of consumption as was 
the ensemble of meter, heater and time switch. With the interplay of these 
elements, certain ways of using the appliance and consuming hot water 
were inscribed into the appliance.83 By the regulation of heating-up time and 
water volume, the rental service defined appropriate routines of personal 
hygiene. The suitable usage of this ensemble called for consumers that 
turned every day into a potential bathing day.84 Consumers partly refrained 
from adjusting their routines to the appliance but they nevertheless acted as 
co-producers of the technology. Thus, the modification of the rental service, 
as it was adjusted to consumers’ behaviour and their changing needs, 
provides clear evidence for consumers’ crucial role in the development of 
an appliance. This becomes particularly apparent with Bewag’s attempts 
to manage residential electricity consumption during the second period of 
the rental service. Now technological and tariff-based solutions that were 
supposed to manage consumption according to new challenges of the 
energy market fell short of a changed consumption regime. Along with 
higher incomes and improved housing standards, consumption was no 
longer characterised by constraints but by abundance.85 Just as appliances 
became affordable as mass consumer goods, the mentality towards energy 
consumption modified from a regime of scarcity to a regime of abundance.
Along with, in relation to the average income, cheap energy and 
automated appliances to provide hot water, routines of personal hygiene 
changed. The daily hot shower became slowly but surely indispensable 
in daily routines and expectations regarding length and temperature 
became gradually higher.86 Simultaneously, the load factor of hot water 
83 | Akrich: “The De-Scription of Technical Objects”.
84 | Cf. a similar conflict between users’ bathing routines and building experts 
on the usage of electric storage water heaters in Heßler: ‘Mrs Modern Woman’, 
293-302.
85 | de Grazia: “Changing Consumption Regimes in Europe”, 83.
86 | Shove: Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience, 79-116.
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heating appliances had progressively increased. Modern appliances 
provided hot water almost instantaneously whenever it was needed and 
influenced expectations of convenience. Due to growing hot water usage, 
the charging periods of these appliances during daytime and night-time 
hours intensified as well. Bewag was no longer able to meet the rising 
standards of convenience and hygiene with their rental appliances and 
therefore finally adjusted their marketing policy to changing patterns of 
consumption. 
Eventually, increasing demand for hot water did not only contribute 
to private households’ daytime peak loads. Electricity consumption for 
water heating during night-time and daytime hours and supplementary 
space heating turned out to exceed the available off-peak capacity of power 
stations.87 The appliances consuming night-time power such as storage 
water heaters that had been intended to increase electricity sales by using 
surplus off-peak electricity without necessitating additional bulk electricity 
systems became a Trojan Horse. Now, private households that had initially 
been discovered as potential storage of surplus energy became a reason for 
the electricity industry to build up power plant capacities.88
The focus on hot water heating as a negotiation process between a 
utility company and its consumers reveals how a technology is shaped 
by the interplay of engineers, manufacturers and consumers. Engineers 
or manufactures inscribed certain ideas of energy consumption into the 
appliance but the integration of the appliance in its environment as a 
consumer good reshaped the initial concept of energy utilization. 
The concept of using private households as ‘storage’ for electricity is 
again emphasized in conjunction with today’s attempts to feed in more 
regenerative energies to the power network and to design electricity 
consumption more efficiently.89 Using smart meters, energy consumption 
is supposed to be easily adjustable to the energy disposable by wind 
turbines and photovoltaic arrays. This concept is also based on the notion 
that private households are more flexible consumers than the industry. 
87 | “Nachtstrom-Knappheit”, 97.
88 | Zängl: Deutschlands Strom, 288.
89 | Inge Røpke/Sophie Nyborg: “Energy Impacts of the Smart Home – Conflict-
ing Visions”, in: Energy Efficiency First. The Foundation of a Low-Carbon Society, 
ECEE 2011 Summer Study; 6-11 June 2011; proceedings. Stockholm: European 
Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, 2011, 1849-1860.
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Using certain technologies, like the smart meter, residential consumption 
can be partly adjusted to the load of the power network. Therefore, new 
challenges arise to mediate the appropriate usage of the technology to 
private households. Once introduced, smart meters control the turning-on 
of several appliances according to the load factor of the power network. 
Thus, the technology can contribute to residential electricity savings.
However, experts warn that this technology could become a Trojan 
Horse as well. For instance, the development of the smart grid may even 
intensify the trend of integrating an increasing number of information 
and communication technologies into private households. Therefore, 
the potential of the smart home to save energy could even contribute to 
increasing residential electricity consumption.90 
Similar to the off-peak power promotion that eventually fell short of 
contributing to energy supply efficiency, the concept of the smart meter 
could fail if consumers’ expectations on convenience are not taken into 
account accurately. It becomes evident that a simple technology-based 
solution is inadequate for governing consumption. Rather, consumption 
patterns have to be regarded as socially constructed and embedded in a 
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Saving Energy by Shifting Clocks?  
Energy Policy and the Introduction of Daylight Saving Time 
in East and West Germany 
Mathias Mutz 
In his essay Energy and Equity (1974), Ivan Illich gives an interesting 
contemporary starting point for interpreting the social role of energy in 
the last third of the 20th century. He describes the growing dependency of 
modern societies on their energy supply: 
“High quanta of energy degrade social relations just as inevitably as they destroy 
the physical milieu. […] The energy policies adopted during the current decade 
will determine the range and character of social relationships a society will be 
able to enjoy by the year 2000. A low-energy policy allows for a wide choice 
of lifestyles and cultures. If, on the other hand, a society opts for high energy 
consumption, its social relations must be dictated by technocracy and will be 
equally degrading whether labeled capitalist or socialist. […] Even if nonpolluting 
power were feasible and abundant, the use of energy on a massive scale acts on 
society like a drug that is physically harmless but psychically enslaving.”1
In uttering this opinion, Illich was a maverick. But until today most people 
would interpret the implementation of Daylight Saving Time (DST)2 in 
1 | Originally published as Ivan Illich: Energy and Equity. London: Calder, 1974. 
See download version: http://clevercycles.com/energy_and_equity, Accessed: 
15.07.2011.
2 | This paper uses the American English expression Daylight Saving Time in-
stead of the British English Summertime, although the latter is closer to the Ger-
man Sommerzeit. Both terms imply misleading or biased connotations; Daylight 
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his spirit. Indeed, changing the clock twice a year has become one of the 
most widespread rituals of western industrial societies. Standard time is 
advanced in the summer months for one hour in order to increase the 
hours with daylight in the evening. In Germany, the scheme has been 
in constant use since 1980, when East and West Germany introduced 
it jointly. Looking at the history of daylight saving throughout the 20th 
century it could be easily described as a strategy of ‘social engineering,’ a 
scientific approach to achieve efficiency and coherence by arranging and 
channeling environmental and social forces.3 Hence, it is not only a far-
reaching intrusion into everyday life, but also a bureaucratic sanction to 
redistribute power over energy according to specific interests. 
But is the story really that simple? On closer inspection, it becomes 
obvious that there is a lack of clarity about why DST was introduced. It is a 
common misperception that this was first and foremost an energy saving 
measure. The corresponding Time Act (Gesetz über die Zeitbestimmung) 
does not speak of energy saving at all, but of “a better usage of daylight” 
and “adjustment of time measuring to neighboring states.”4 Public records 
and contemporary publications show that the West German government 
expected a marginal energy effect – less than 0.1 percent of total energy 
demand. In 1978, the conservative politician Werner Broll stated in 
parliament: “It is not a question of energy savings […]. It is – to use a term 
from popular sociology – about improving the quality of life.”5 
Saving Time, however, seems more accurate and definable. My thanks go to Ingo 
Köhler, Laura Rischbieter, Samantha Taber, and the participants and organizers 
of the Munich workshop for their help in improving the paper.
3 | Cf. John Alexander/Joachim K. H. Schmidt: “Social Engineering: Genealogy of 
a Concept”, in: Adam Podgórecki/Jon Alexander/Rob Shields, eds. Social Engi-
neering. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996, 1-19; Thomas Etzemüller: “So-
cial engineering als Verhaltenslehre des kühlen Kopfes. Eine einleitende Skizze”, 
in: Thomas Etzemüller, ed. Die Ordnung der Moderne. Social Engineering im 20. 
Jahrhundert. Bielefeld: transcript, 2009, 11-40.
4 | “Gesetz über die Zeitbestimmung”, 25.07.1978, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, 
31.07.1978, part I, 1110-11. All citations originally in German were translated by 
the author.
5 | Deutscher Bundestag: Stenographische Berichte der Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Bundestages, Bonn 06.06.1978, 8015.
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With this in mind, why is the idea of daylight saving time as energy 
saving time still so popular today? What role did energy play in the debates 
of the 1970s? And what does this tell us about the societal role of energy, 
especially in German society “after the boom”6, i.e. after the end of the 
‘economic miracle’? How does it relate to Illich’s idea of human ‘energy 
addiction’? An analysis of political decision-making shows that the 
discussion was closely linked to the ‘German Question.’ The fear of a new 
time border through Germany and Berlin was responsible for a significant 
delay in implementing DST. While legislation for it had been prepared in 
Bonn as early as 1976, East Berlin’s reluctance led to a substantial delay. 
From an energy perspective, the dimension of Cold War politics might 
seem distracting. On the other hand, this provides a unique opportunity to 
compare two interlinked debates in two closely related societies and their 
different political systems. 
To decode the social meaning and interpretation of DST and analyze 
its function within the energy discourse, this paper conducts four steps. 
First, it highlights the traditional link between DST and energy shortage, 
referring to experiences from before 1970. Second, it discusses the energy 
argumentation concerning DST in both East and West Germany. Third, it 
retraces the political decision-making process with a special focus on the 
interplay between East Berlin and Bonn. Fourth, it looks into the material 
and symbolic significance of DST in relation to energy and energy saving. 
This approach aims to take into account both historical and structural 
particularities of the case studies. While there are a few historic accounts of 
DST in the United States, literature on Germany and Europe is scarce.7 But 
records from the responsible public institutions as well as contemporary 
media reports provide substantial insight into the constellation of interests 
and argumentation. 
6 | Anselm Doering-Manteuffel/Lutz Raphael: Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf 
die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008.
7 | Cf. David Prerau: Seize the Daylight. The Curious and Contentious Story of 
Daylight Saving Time. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2005; Michael Down-
ing: Spring Forward. The Annual Madness of Daylight Saving Time. Berkeley, CA: 
Counterpoint, 2009; Ian R. Bartky: One Time Fits All. The Campaigns for Global 
Uniformity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007, 161-99; for Germany 
Dirk Schindelbeck: “Wem die Stunde schlägt”, in: Damals. Das Magazin für Ge-
schichte und Kultur 32:4 (2000), 6-9.
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THE HISTORY OF DST AS A HISTORY OF ENERGY SHORTAGES 
It is little known that the German Empire introduced DST for the first 
time in 1916 – a world premiere provoked by World War I and its 
resource shortages. A few years earlier, the contractor William Willett 
had popularized the idea of shifting clocks in summer in the United 
Kingdom, but between 1909 and 1911 the parliament in London rejected 
several private bills to introduce DST.8 Then, starting on April 30, 1916, the 
German Federal Council (Bundesrat) decided to introduce DST, because of 
the “necessity of using heating and lighting materials economically”, and 
the UK followed its example three weeks later.9 Most other war participants 
followed suit, including the United States in 1918. German authorities later 
estimated annual savings of 250,000 tons of coal. Against the will of the 
new German government, the National Convention (Nationalversammlung) 
abolished the DST scheme in 1919, while Britain and France stayed on DST 
in the interwar years. Especially agrarian interest groups and shift workers 
opposed the new time rule, as it interfered with their daily routines.10 DST 
was reintroduced in April 1940, after the beginning of World War II. It 
remained in place during the winter months in 1940/41 and 1941/42. After 
the war, the occupying powers continued daylight saving, but directly after 
their founding, both German states stopped changing the clocks. For a long 
time DST was a marginal topic – apart from isolated petitions of individual 
8 | William Willett: The Waste of Daylight. London: Author, 1907. Sometimes the 
concept is attributed to Benjamin Franklin, but he propagated a change of hu-
man behavior to make the best use of daylight, not changing clocks. Cf. Benjamin 
Franklin: “To the Authors of The Journal of Paris” (1784), in: Nathan G. Goodman, 
ed. The Ingenious Dr. Franklin. Selected Scientific Letters. Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1931, 17-22.
9 | “Staatssekretär des Innern to Staatssekretär des Reichs-Postamts”, Berlin 
24.03.1916, in: Bundesarchiv (Federal Archive, BArch,), R 4701, no. 207. For 
other countries, cf. Prerau: Seize the Daylight, 84-94.
10 | “Reichsminister des Innern to Reichswir tschaftsrat”, Berlin 10.03.1926, in: 
BArch, R 401, no. 727; “Schreiben Reichsverkehrsminister to Reichsminister des 
Innern”, Berlin 27.11.1939, in: BArch, R 3101, no.10361.
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citizens or interest groups like the German Sports Association (DSV) and 
the ADAC automobile club.11
Figure 1: Introduction Dates of DST in Postwar Europe.
In Germany, DST remained a wartime action. It had always been advocated 
with energy saving arguments and used as war propaganda, even though 
its success was sometimes questioned within the state apparatus.12 Before 
the 1970s, Great Britain and Ireland (permanently since 1916) as well as 
Italy (since 1966) had been the only European countries using DST (Fig. 
1). The United States had re-introduced DST on a national level in 1966, 
but before that, it had only been applied on a regional or municipal scale. 
The breakthrough in the late 1970s and early 1980s coincides with the so 
called ‘oil crisis’ and, in retrospect, stresses the link between energy saving 
and DST. The perception of DST as an emergency measure was central 
11 | Cf. “Stellungnahme der Bundesministerien zur Frage der Einführung der 
Sommerzeit”, February/March 1951; “ADAC Motorwelt to Bundesinnenministeri-
um”, Munich 28.02.1967, in: BArch, B 106, no. 104135.
12 | In 1919, for example, the National Coal Commissioner (Reichskohlekommis-
sar) “after detailed investigation came to the conclusion that the savings in coal 
will carry no weight.” “Reichsminister des Innern to Preußischer Ministerpräsi-
dent”, Berlin 29.03.1924, in: BArch, R 3101, no. 10361.
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to public expectations, and renewed attempts of other nations amplified 
historic experiences.
In October 1973, the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
proclaimed an oil embargo in response to the Israeli Yom Kippur War. This 
led to an unprecedented rise in oil prices and caused Western countries 
to rethink their dependence on fossil fuels. In the United States, shifting 
clocks was an immediate reaction to these events. President Nixon asked 
Congress to pass emergency legislation to authorize DST on a year-round 
basis. Only six weeks after the oil embargo was launched, House and Senate 
passed the ‘Emergency Daylight Saving Time Energy Conservation Act.’ It 
provided for a two-year trial period starting January 6, 1974. But the public 
opposed year-round DST because of the dark winter mornings. Energy 
savings of 0.7 to 1.0 percent of the monthly demand failed to convince as an 
argument. The scheme was suspended from November 1974 to February 
1975 and the United States returned to the old system.13 Then, in spring 
1975, President Giscard d’Estaing announced that he planned to introduce 
DST in France the following year. In public as well as in consultations 
with its partners in the European Economic Community (ECC), France’s 
main argument was energy saving. Le Monde explained to its readers: “c’est 
l’objectif de l’operation.”14 The government expected savings of 300,000 
tons of oil.
The German parliament likewise discussed DST in the context of the ‘oil 
crisis’. In December 1973, Kurt Spitzmüller, a liberal member of parliament, 
started an inquiry into this question. The Federal Ministry of Economics 
agreed to examine the effects of DST, but the administration pre-estimated 
savings of only 0.1 to 0.2 percent of annual energy consumption.15 In the 
following months, further enquiries and government statements showed 
13 | Cf. Prerau: Seize the Daylight, 190-192.
14 | “La nouvelle heure d’été”, in: Le Monde, 09.03.1976, 42. Cf. “Memorandum 
über die Zweckmäßigkeit einer Koordinierung auf Europäischer Ebene zur Ein-
führung eines Sommerzeitsystems”, Bruxelles 21.04.1975, in: BArch, B 106, no. 
104136.
15 | Deutscher Bundestag: Stenographische Berichte der Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Bundestages, 13.12.1973, 4415. Cf. “Sparen mit der Sommerzeit”, 
in: Die Zeit, 14.12.1973. For earlier statements cf. Bundesministerium des In-
nern to Petitionsaussschuß des Bundestags, Bonn 16.09.1966, in: BArch, B 
106, no. 104135.
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that politicians did not see a compelling connection between DST and 
energy saving. The administration in Bonn had developed a doubtful rating 
of DST’s energy effects in the previous decades that persisted throughout 
the 1970s. The East German leadership did not take up the initiative at all, 
even though the People’s Republic of Poland followed the French example 
in 1977.16 So, if the Western and Eastern neighbors introduced DST out of 
energy considerations, why didn’t East and West Germany do the same? 
Did energy policy not matter to them? 
DAYLIGHT SAVING AND ENERGY POLICY 
The oil price shock of 1973 was not the direct stimulus for implementing 
DST in either West or in East Germany. In the case of the GDR (German 
Democratic Republic), this attitude is not surprising, as the crisis did not 
affect the country at all. At the beginning of the 1970s, East Germany did 
not depend on oil the way West Germany did – oil covered 13 percent of 
primary energy demand in the East compared to 53.1 percent in the West. 
Instead, lignite accounted for 78.4 percent of East Germany’s supply. 
Furthermore, the ‘oil crisis’ was not a price shock, as payments within the 
Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) did not reflect the 
prices on the world market. The crude oil price for deliveries from the 
Soviet Union was agreed upon by contract for five-year periods. Starting in 
1975, prices were based on the average world market price of the previous 
five years. As a result, rising prices reached the East German economy with 
a time lag. By the end of the 1970s, however, the relevance of oil imports 
had grown significantly. Hence, the Politbureau initiated a reorientation of 
energy policy in 1979, and the shift away from oil was accelerated after 1981. 
This led to a rise in the use of lignite from 63.4 percent in 1979 to over 70 
percent throughout the 1980s.17
16 | The country had earlier experiences with DST in the years 1957 to 1964 
(and as an occupied country in World War II). Cf. “Deutsche Botschaft to Auswär-
tiges Amt”, Warsaw 06.12.1976, in: Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges Amt (PA AA), 
Zwischenarchiv, no. 109.340.
17 | Cf. Barbara Breuer: Die Energiewirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
und der DDR im Vergleich. München: Oldenbourg, 1987, 78; Harm G. Schröter, 
“Ölkrisen und Reaktionen in der chemischen Industrie beider deutscher Staaten. 
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West Germany had conducted a comparable re-orientation of energy 
policy subsequent to the developments of 1973. The share of oil was reduced 
to 43.5 percent within ten years.18 At the same time, the Energy Security 
Act (Energiesicherungsgesetz) of November 1973 took immediate measures 
to reduce oil consumption. Even today the so called ‘car-free Sundays’ 
have a place in German collective memory, although their symbolic power 
vastly exceeded their actual energy effect.19 In the context of this policy, it 
is surprising that the idea of daylight saving did not persuade government 
officials. One compelling argument against ‘ad hoc action’ were traffic-
related problems. Here, some attention had to be given to the coordination 
of European timetables, and according to experts this required a preparation 
period of at least twelve months.20 However, the Ministry of Economics 
remained interested and, for further inquiry, obtained expert advice from 
Professor Helmut Schaefer of the ‘Research Center in Energy Economics’ 
(Forschungsstelle für Energiewirtschaft) in Munich. Schaefer submitted a first 
report in September 1974, before then publishing his results at various times 
with several revisions. According to his calculations, introducing DST from 
April to September could save about 5 percent of the annual demand for 
lighting electricity (1.7 terawatt hours). This was equivalent to 0.6 percent 
Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung wir tschaftlicher Leistungsdif ferenzen”, in: Johannes 
Bähr/Dietmar Petzina, eds. Innovationsverhalten und Entscheidungsstrukturen. 
Vergleichende Studien zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im geteilten Deutsch-
land 1945-1990. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996, 114; Friedrich-Ebert-Stif-
tung, ed.: Die Energiepolitik der DDR. Mängelverwaltung zwischen Kernkraft und 
Braunkohle, Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1988, 26-27. It must be considered 
that payments were processed in so called transfer roubles.
18 | Cf. Breuer: Energiewirtschaft, 78. For the wider historical context, cf. Rainer 
Karlsch/Raymond G. Stokes: ‘Faktor Öl’. Die Mineralölwirtschaft in Deutschland 
1859-1974. München: Beck, 2003, 325-278; Rüdiger Graf, “Between National 
and Human Security: Energy Security in the United States and Western Europe in 
the 1970s”, in: Historical Social Research 35:4 (2010), 329-348.
19 | Cf. Jens Hohensee: “Und sonntags wieder laufen… Die erste ‚Ölkrise‘ 
1973/74 und ihre Perzeption in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, in: Michael 
Salewski/Ilona Stölken-Fitschen, eds. Moderne Zeiten. Technik und Zeitgeist im 
19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1994, 175-196.
20 | “Bundesverkehrsministerium to Bundesministerium des Innern”, Bonn 
21.12.1973, in: BArch, B 106, BMI, no. 104135.
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of total electricity demand and 0.08 percent of total energy demand. 
Schaefer described this as impossible to measure, however, as the effects 
of business fluctuations or annually changing weather conditions exceeded 
these projected savings. Additionally, Schaefer assumed increasing energy 
consumption in other sectors. First, this was the case with automobile 
traffic which was stimulated by daylight in the evening. Furthermore, DST 
increased the demand for heating: “The ‘low temperature point’ of the day 
is now part of the main heating time.”21 Hence, it was pointed out that DST 
had a reverse effect on oil consumption: “The savings of coal, water and 
nuclear energy are replaced by an increased consumption of oil products 
for road traffic and heating.”22 
The rapid downturn of political debates on DST in Germany indicates 
that Schaefer’s point of view was widely accepted. However, although 
the energy topic disappeared from ministerial papers, newspapers still 
presented this perspective in looking at the debates on a new Time Act. 
“DST should allow for a better use of daylight – thus making energy 
savings possible,” the Süddeutsche Zeitung simplified in 1978.23 West 
German politicians now discussed a symbolic value of daylight saving. 
Parliamentarian Torsten Wolfgramm (FDP) argued in 1977 that “the 
psychological effect of time change will clearly be a notable momentum 
in regard to energy saving.”24 Here, the collective practice of changing 
clocks was interpreted as a stimulus for public awareness. But experts like 
Schaefer opposed this strategy sharply: “This approach does a disservice 
to true efforts to use energy economically, which can only be achieved 
through appropriate information of each individual.”25 
21 | K. F. Ebersbach/H. Schaefer: “Sommerzeit und Energieeinsparung. Über-
raschendes Ergebnis einer detaillier teren Untersuchung: Es wird mehr Öl ver-
braucht”, in: Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 30 (1980), 497. As a summary 
“Note: Einführung der Sommerzeit”, Bonn 10.09.1975, in: BArch, B 106, BMI, no. 
104136.
22 | Ebersbach: “Sommerzeit”, 498. Cf. Gerhard Bischoff/Werner Gocht: Das En-
ergiehandbuch. 4th ed. Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1981, 350.
23 | Diethart Goos: “Bonn kann jetzt die Uhren vorstellen – tut es aber nicht”, in: 
Die Welt, 23.06.1978.
24 | Deutscher Bundestag: Stenographische Berichte der Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Bundestages, Bonn 05.05.1977, 1750.
25 | Ebersbach: “Sommerzeit”, 498.
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In East Berlin, the DST debate started with a considerable time lag. The 
presidency of the Council of Ministers established a working group in March 
1977, but in the end, GDR experts came to results that were surprisingly 
similar to those of their West German counterparts. The Ministry for Coal 
and Energy calculated that annual savings would amount to 60 gigawatt 
hours – equivalent to 0.06 percent of the total energy demand of 1976. In 
1980, energy savings were officially estimated at 100 gigawatt hours (the 
demand of 80,000 households) or 200,000 tons of lignite.26 Additionally, 
energy experts saw positive effects of not introducing DST. International 
time differences were seen as advantageous, as this reduced the peak load 
of the East European electricity network system.27 In conclusion, officials 
in East and West Germany shared a reserved or even negative judgment of 
DST’s energy saving possibilities. 
This is an obvious contradiction to the interpretation of DST as an energy 
saving measure; or at least it indicates that we must interpret decision-
making processes in a wider context. Energy policy is not determined by 
simple, hard facts. Additional factors that frame the perception of energy 
saving must be taken into account. The obvious differences in political 
and social evaluation of DST mainly reflect the complexity of energy 
regimes and their cultural settings. Material differences as well as cultural 
(mis)interpretations of energy flows have to be reconsidered. In regard 
to the German debates of the 1970s, this leads to two specific questions: 
First, why did the German judgment differ from neighboring countries? 
Second, why didn’t the experts’ opinion determine the public perception 
of DST?
Here, the statements of the German experts involved can give important 
evidence. Their discussions often focused on differences in lifestyle. The 
Council of Ministers of the GDR explained the different approach of France 
and Poland with differences in everyday rhythms of life: 
“The advantages in countries that advance standard time by an hour are a 
question of energy management. This is mainly connected with the fact that 
26 | Cf. “Neumann to Stoph”, Berlin 09.03.1977, in: BArch, DC 20, no. 9438; 
“Draft: Ab 6. April: Sommerzeit in der DDR”, in: BArch, DC 9, no. 104; “17. Sitzung 
des Präsidiums des Ministerrates”, 10.03.1977, in: BArch, DC 20, no. I/4/3743.
27 | Kulturbund der DDR, ed.: Energiepolitik und Kulturfortschritt. Berlin: Kultur-
bund der DDR, 1981, 21.
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their lifestyles are dif ferent than in East Germany (star ting work later, breaks 
from work at lunchtime and thus working later into the night, also an extensive 
enter tainment industry that runs far beyond midnight).”28 
The West German government similarly advanced the argument of 
differences in evening energy consumption in the case of Italy, stating that 
“the problem seems to be different because of the long midday rest.”29 
This figure of thought became commonly used. The Spiegel magazine 
highlighted differences in consumption patterns in relation to the United 
States arguing that “even more than in glittering America […] the hopes 
of a crisis time-setting in the comparatively light-poor Federal Republic is 
illusory.”30 In regard to intra-German differences, West German officials 
pointed to “East German citizens, whose everyday life, in general, starts 
earlier and ends earlier.”31 Along the same lines, West German specialists 
expected, “that more daylight in the evening will lead to an extension of 
‘activity time’ and, therefore, a considerable reduction of sleep.”32 Experts 
did not come to a conclusion whether this led to an increase in energy 
consumption or not. But their considerations clearly emphasize that 
the implementation of DST was related to complex social and cultural 
processes that go far beyond energy saving.33
28 | “Neumann to Stoph”, Berlin 09.03.1977, in: BArch, DC 20, no. 9438. In the 
case of Poland, it was said that this was visible in dif ferent daily load curves of 
electricity as “we [the GDR] deliver electricity to Poland in the evening and de-
rive electricity from them for our peak demand in the morning.”, “Niederschrif t 
über die am 21. März 1977 stattgefundene 2. Beratung über die Zweckmäßigkeit 
der Einführung der Sommerzeit in der DDR entsprechend dem Beschluß des PMR 
vom 10. März 1977”, in: BArch, B 106, no. 104136.
29 | “Kurzprotokoll über die Ressortbesprechung am 28. Mai 1975 im BMI”, 
Bonn 30.05.1975, in: BArch, B 106, no. 104136.
30 | “Leuchtet schön”, in: Der Spiegel, 04.02.1974, 53.
31 | “Aktennotiz des Arbeitsstab Deutschlandpolitik: Zeitgesetz”, Bonn 
08.06.1978, in: BArch, B 136, no. 18391.
32 | Ebersbach: “Sommerzeit”, 497.
33 | For the cultural dimension of time, cf. Robert Levine: A Geography of Time. 
The Temporal Misadventures of a Social Psychologist, or How Every Culture 
Keeps Time Just a Little Bit Dif ferently. New York: Basic Books, 1997; Hartmut 
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A second set of arguments evolved around the role of geographic 
preconditions. It is important to realize that the global system of 
standardized time zones established in the late 19th century has its 
counterpart in diverging times of sunrise and sunset from place to place. 
As the length of day in summer decreases on your way south, the positive 
effect of DST in France exceed the results in Germany where sunset 
(on average) is already later on standard time.34 Additionally, not only 
latitude, but also longitude influences the results of DST. For instance, 
Poland is east, while Germany is west of the relevant time meridian 15° 
East (the meridian of Görlitz). As a result, the sun rises and sets earlier 
in Poland, thus increasing the daylight saving effect of changing clocks. 
Even without a detailed discussion or empirical data it is plausible that 
geographic factors as well as cultural differences had at least some effect 
on the outcome of DST. But most of the discussants did not acknowledge 
the different framework conditions. Many newspaper articles indicate that 
the perception of DST in other countries influenced debates in Germany. 
This is one reason why – as Schaefer pointed out – “every time [DST] was 
discussed, the main argument was energy saving for artificial lighting.”35 
The traditional public perception of DST as an emergency measure (as 
described earlier) probably served as a basis for this development. 
Additionally, disputes over DST highlight both the technical importance 
and the social unawareness of energy’s multiple materialities. The 
widespread notion of ‘energy’ as a uniform entity – regardless of where it 
comes from and where it is going – often blurred the differences between 
energy resources and their transformation. On the side of energy input, the 
question of which energy source satisfied which kind of demand is crucial 
to understand diverging national priorities. In Germany, saving electricity 
for lighting could not significantly help to reduce oil consumption in the 
1970s, but a higher oil input for electricity generation did substantiate the 
Rosa: Alienation and Acceleration. Towards a Critical Theory of Late-Modern 
Temporality. Malmö: NSU Press, 2010.
34 | Cf. “Note: Sommerzeit”, Bonn 22.07.1975, in: BArch, B 106, no. 104136. 
The effect is observable in Germany as well. On August 1, for example, Hamburg 
has 43 minutes more daylight than Munich.
35 | Ebersbach: “Sommerzeit”, 496.
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energy effect in France.36 On the side of energy use, high expectations can 
be attributed to common misperceptions of energy demand for specific 
applications. In 1980, a newly added chapter on DST in the fourth edition 
of Gerhard Bischoff and Werner Gocht’s Handbook of Energy pointed out 
that one kilowatt hour can either be used for illuminating a 60 watt light 
bulb for 17 hours or for showering with warm water for two minutes.37 
The example illustrated the fact that lighting has a comparably low energy 
consumption while DST could only save energy used for light, but not 
energy used for heat or power. Historically, this constraint led to a decrease 
in energy saving potential. In proportion to other uses, the expenditure 
for lighting diminished: In 1960, West German households used one 
quarter of their total electricity demand for lighting. In 1980, this share 
had decreased to 10 percent – even though absolute lighting energy use had 
doubled.38 Additionally, increasing leisure time and leisure time facilities 
led to a situation where the social effects of DST overcompensated for its 
energy effects. Increased consumption of energy due to a higher standard 
of living, in general, reduces the (relative) potential of DST to save energy.
While the pitfalls of a highly aggregated concept of energy help to 
explain differences in the perception of saving potentials, the effects of 
cultural, social, and technical settings described before illuminate some 
national varieties. However, differences in numbers alone were not 
decisive for political decision-making. In the end, energy saving effects 
elsewhere neither substantially outranked Germany, nor were they 
extremely overrated or misjudged. Even French officials did not consider 
the calculated savings as outstanding. It is illuminating that they did not 
speak of (less impressive) percentages that could be saved, but of millions 
of tons of coal or oil (as did advocates of DST in Germany). Here, more 
general ideas about energy policy and government strategies come into 
play. A decisive difference between supporters and critics of DST was the 
appreciation of smaller achievements in energy saving – either in a material 
or a symbolic sense. In this spirit, the Bavarian Minister of Economy and 
36 | In 1972, oil covered 67.3% of French, but only 55.2% of German energy de-
mand. Cf. Hans R. Krämer: Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Ölkrise. Ba-
den-Baden: Nomos, 1974, 56. 
37 | Bischoff: Energiehandbuch, 350.
38 | Cf. Reinhard Schüssler: Der Energieverbrauch der privaten Haushalte, 
Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 1987.
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Transport advocated DST in 1974, stating that “only the full exploitation of 
all possibilities in total” can lead to success.39
Most West and East German officials, however, did not follow this 
kind of step-by-step rationality. In their minds a rather complex image of 
advantages and disadvantages of the new time scheme emerged. When 
clocks were advanced by one hour on April 6, 1980, the energy argument 
was part of the official statements, but by no means their core message. A 
West German government spokesman proclaimed: “DST permits a better 
use of daylight in the evening hours, so that even more outdoor activities 
are possible. It can also entail a certain degree of energy saving.”40 In the 
newspaper Neues Deutschland, the East German leadership argued quite 
similarly:
“Citizens have better opportunities for recreation, sports, and other spare time 
activities in the summer evenings. To a certain degree, economic reserves can be 
mobilized. The longer use of daylight improves working conditions for the second 
shif t, especially for outdoor work like construction and transportation. Also, 
savings of electricity, especially for lighting, are expected.”41
According to political players, this wide variety of motives led to the 
implementation of DST. Various aspects highlight the social embeddedness 
of energy rationality: the role of different geographical, technical and 
socioeconomic ideas and settings both within Germany and in regard of 
its neighbors. But the German example also illustrates the dependence of 
energy policy on wider political configurations and developments. Here, 
daylight saving became an arena for intra-German negotiations.
39 | “Jaumann to Friderichs”, München 25.06.1974, in: BArch, B 106, no. 
104135.
40 | “Note: Einführung der Sommerzeit”, Bonn 04.02.1977, in: BArch, B 136, no. 
18391.
41 | “Was bezweckt Sommerzeit?”, in: Neues Deutschland, 21/22.10.1979, 2.
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THE SHARED POLITICAL HISTORY OF DST IN  
DIVIDED GERMANY 
On April 28, 1978, the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, wrote 
a letter to Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and Chairman of the Council 
of State of the GDR. Schmidt explained: 
“It is of great importance for the Federal Government to learn the position of 
the German Democratic Republic regarding the question of introducing daylight 
saving time. […] It is in the interest of good-neighborly cooperation within Europe 
to avoid time dif ferences between the dif ferent states as far as possible.”42 
In a rather direct way, the West German government tried to persuade 
its counterpart in the East to introduce DST. But the answer from East 
Berlin, coordinated by Günter Mittag, Secretary of Economy at the Central 
Committee of the SED, was negative. It stated that the implementation 
was not planned as there were “no advantages, but instead disadvantages 
for various aspects of people’s work and lives.”43 Party officials had re-
evaluated the results of the working group of 1977, and they had come to 
the conclusion that there were no noteworthy economic advantages and 
that “the decision to implement DST can only be made from a political 
point of view.”44 First of all, this meant that it was a matter of international 
coordination and not of energy policy. At the same time, this interpretation 
gave room for political maneuver and demarcation from West Germany. 
This was especially the case since Schmidt and his social-liberal 
government were under severe political pressure. DST had become a 
matter of European integration, after France had opted for DST “in a then 
surprising decision”45 and formally asked its EEC-partners to join the new 
42 | “Helmut Schmidt to Erich Honecker”, Bonn 28.04.1978, in: BArch, DY 30, 
no. 3020.
43 | Cf. “Protokoll Nr. 20/78 zur Sitzung des Politbüros”, 23.05.1978, in: BArch, 
DY 30, no. J IV 2/2/ 1727.
44 | “Abteilung Grundstoffindustrie des ZK der SED to Günter Mittag”, Berlin 
(East) 12.05.1978, in: BArch, DY 30, no. 3020.
45 | “Sprechzettel für den Regierungssprecher”, Bonn 18.10.1979, in: BArch, B 
106, no. 104138.
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time regime. In 1977, seven of the nine members of the EEC used DST 
(with different start and end dates), with only Germany and neighboring 
Denmark opting out. In summer, West Germany had a new time border 
in the west, causing considerable difficulties, especially in transport. There 
was growing European pressure to introduce daylight saving, which led 
to the idea of writing directly to Honecker, even though the approach was 
controversial within the chancellery. The other cabinet members were only 
informed after the event. Only one of them, the Minister for Intra-German 
Relations, Egon Franke, learned of the wording of the correspondence.46 
Throughout the discussions within the administration his ministry 
had emerged as one of the most important opponents of DST and had 
emphatically stressed the intra-German implications of unilaterally 
introducing DST. In retrospect, Franke pointed out:
“For years, people have called for the introduction of DST. So far, however, we 
have no reason to believe that East Germany will do the same, meaning that the 
introduction of DST would bring an additional time border to Germany and Berlin. 
It would create many dif ficulties for intra-German traffic and – still more – for 
listening to and viewing West German radio and television programs. […] Every 
decision on this question should be made in a way that does not diminish the 
commonalities within Germany, but – wherever possible – extends them.”47 
In June 1978, a coalition discussion arrived at the conclusion that DST 
should not be introduced for the time being as, “compared to the importance 
of the inner German aspects, economic and technical advantages are not 
that essential.”48 Nevertheless, in the same month parliament approved 
a new Time Act, which included an authorization to implement DST by 
ordinance. But government officials had to announce that they would 
not use this authorization unless they achieved an agreement with East 
46 | “Note: Sommerzeit”, Bonn 05.05.1978, in: BArch, B 106, no. 18391.
47 | Egon Franke: “Speech given at Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland”, 
18.06.1979, in: Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, ed. Texte zur 
Deutschland-Politik, series II, vol. 7, Bonn: Deutscher Bundesverlag, 1981, 438-
439. Cf. “Note: Probleme einer Zeitgrenze in Deutschland”, Bonn 22.02.1977, in: 
BArch, B 136, no. 18391.
48 | “Chef des Bundeskanzleramts to Arbeitsstab Deutschlandpolitik”, Bonn, 
12.06.1978, in: BArch, B 136, no. 18391.
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Berlin. The emotional appeal of the debate is exemplified by the fact that 
Herbert Wehner, then chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, had his 
disagreement with the Time Act officially recorded because of his fear of a 
potential time border.49 This was the climax of a lengthy controversy. For a 
long time the Foreign Office had warned to not “inflate the affair as a false 
alternative – ‘European Integration vs. Intra-German Policy’ – but instead 
to address it as a practical task.”50 Now it looked as if DST had reached 
a dead end. The ‘German Question’ clearly superseded all other related 
issues.
In order to correctly assess the impact of the ‘German Question’ it 
is important to follow up the course of negotiations chronologically. A 
mutual decision of Bonn and East Berlin to introduce DST had several 
times seemed a possibility. In 1976 and 1977, there was evidence that East 
Germany would also shift to DST after Poland had decided to do so.51 The 
Foreign Office – strongly supporting DST because of its possible “political 
psychological pro-Europe effect”52 – scrupulously recorded every relevant 
statement from representatives of the GDR. In May 1977, for example, Dr. 
Meißner, counselor of the East German Permanent Representation, said 
that – if all neighboring states introduced DST – “the GDR in [his] opinion 
will possibly decide similarly.”53 By that time, the consultations of the East 
German working group had reached a positive outcome, despite its energy 
evaluations. It concluded that a “certain expediency of implementing DST” 
49 | Cf. Deutscher Bundestag: Stenographische Berichte der Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Bundestages, Bonn 22.06.1978, 8019. 
50 | “Note from the Foreign Office: Zeitgesetz (Sommerzeit)”, Bonn 17.05.1977, 
in: BArch, B 136, no. 18391.
51 | Cf. “Draft: Beschluss der Bundesregierung zur Frage der Sommerzeit in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Bonn 02.03.1976, in: BArch, B 106, no. 104137.
52 | “Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit to BMI”, Bonn 
16.07.1975, in: BArch, B 106, no. 104136. Cf. “Kurzprotokoll über die Bespre-
chung am 12. Februar 1976 im BMI”, Bonn 19.02.1976, in: BArch, B 106, no. 
104137.
53 | “Note: Gespräch zwischen Zilch und Dr. Meißner”, Bonn 03.05.1977, in: PA 
AA, Zwischenarchiv, no. 122.339. Cf. “Note: Äußerungen der DDR zur Sommer-
zeit”, Bonn 16.06.1977, in: BArch, B 136, no. 18391.
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resulted from the “requirement of warranting undisturbed cross-border 
traffic of passengers and goods.”54 
Of course, West German officials did not know this. Instead, there were 
controversial political debates. In June 1977, Herbert Wehner personally 
made sure that the Time Act was removed from the parliamentary agenda 
at short notice. Two days before the scheduled vote, he had received a cable 
from the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB). It gave a warning 
“in the interest of health protection of a great part of the workforce not to 
introduce DST, especially because of the additional health risks for shift 
and night-shift workers.”55 Although the unions redrew their protest soon 
afterwards, the delay of decision altered the course of action. In September, 
Meißner was more restrained: “For them [i.e. the GDR leadership] there are 
certain sociological and medical concerns. There is no economic benefit. 
But our [i.e. the West German] decision is important for the GDR.”56 
Finally, an ‘Ordinance on the determination of standard time in the GDR’ 
(Verordnung über die Festlegung der Normalzeit in der DDR) was released that 
did not mention DST. 
One has to conclude that chances were good for a shared introduction 
of DST in the summer of 1977 – due to international interdependencies, 
not energy saving. Expert groups from both countries perceived the 
problem as multidimensional. As early as 1975, the West German Home 
Office observed: “Every decision pro and contra can be supported by good 
arguments. We should thus avoid an all too hasty decision.”57 The East 
German Council of Ministers followed a similar, two-pronged strategy in 
1977.58 The delayed decision in West Germany, however, diminished the 
54 | “Niederschrif t über die 2. Beratung über die Zweckmäßigkeit der Einführung 
der Sommerzeit in der DDR entsprechend dem Beschluß des PMR vom 10. März 
1977”, Berlin 21.03.1977, in: BArch, DC 20, no. 9438.
55 | “DGB to Herbert Wehner”, Düsseldorf 14.06.1977, in: BArch, B 136, no. 
18391.
56 | “Note: Gespräch zwischen Zilch und Dr. Meißner”, Bonn 26.09.1977, in: BAr-
ch, B 136, no. 18391.
57 | “Note: Sommerzeit”, Bonn 06.05.1975, in: BArch, B 106, no. 104136.
58 | As a matter of fact, the working group elaborated lines of argument for both 
outcomes. “Niederschrif t über die 3. Beratung über die Zweckmäßigkeit der Ein-
führung der Sommerzeit in der DDR entsprechend dem Beschluß des PMR vom 
10. März 1977”, 28.03.1977, in: BArch, DC 20, no. 9579.
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arguments of international coordination and let to a repositioning of the 
GDR leadership. For two years there was no significant progress on the 
intra-German agenda. But on October 11, 1979, the Council of Ministers 
of the GDR decided to implement DST in the following year. East Berlin 
informed the Federal Chancellery by phone on October 15. The West 
German cabinet debated the question two days later and finally, on October 
24, decided for DST. 
Because of the limited sources it is difficult to judge the decision-
making process in the Politbureau. The move was interpreted as a sign 
of détente in the West German press. The official records do not reflect 
the notion that DST was exploited for political reasons of demarcation or 
appeasement.59 If we want to understand energy policy, however, it is not 
necessarily crucial to define beyond doubt the role of hard politics. Instead 
it is more illuminating to see how fears and pure assumptions interfered 
with decision-making. From today’s perspective, it seems convincing to 
explain the East German changes in attitude both in 1977 and 1979 in regard 
to energy policy. In the fall of 1979, East Germany made a decisive turn in 
energy policy in order to “enforce a deliberate, high discipline in the use of 
energy everywhere and stop any waste of energy in the interest of society 
in general.”60 Additionally, the international constellation had changed 
once more after Czechoslovakia had introduced DST in 1979. Thus, actual 
advantages and disadvantages of DST determined the position of the GDR. 
One case in point is the fact that – unlike in West Germany – the topic 
was clearly discussed from an energy perspective in the administration and 
party apparatus: Lead-agencies were the Ministry for Coal and Energy and 
the Division for Primary Industry of the Central Committee of the SED. 
In West Germany, the Home Office was the lead-agency. The different 
59 | The point can only be found in the mirror-inverted argument that the deci-
sion-making of the EEC was “like extor tion”. “Niederschrif t über die am 21. März 
1977 stattgefundene 2. Beratung über die Zweckmäßigkeit der Einführung der 
Sommerzeit in der DDR entsprechend dem Beschluß des PMR vom 10. März 
1977”, in: BArch, B 106, 104136.
60 | Cf. “Beschluß des Ministerrates der DDR über rationellen und sparsamen 
Einsatz von Elektroenergie, Wärme sowie Brenn- und Treibstoffen”, in: Neues 
Deutschland, 21.09.1979.
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perspective is apparent in the title of the files from the chancellery, which 
was ‘Summertime in Europe in relation to the Berlin traffic.’61 
There is another ‘surprise twist’ in the intra-German story. On October 
8, 1980, the East German leadership declared that it did not plan to use 
DST in 1981, “because the experiences of this year show that there are no 
advantages connected with it.”62 West German newspapers spoke of an 
“intra-German ice age.”63 Only two months later, the GDR revoked its 
decision. The Soviet Union had decided to implement DST, and changing 
clocks became a question of “coordination with the socialist countries.”64 
Again, it is too easy to label East German politics as a power game. From 
an energy perspective abolishing DST was a rational decision; or as the 
newspaper Neues Deutschland put it: “Based on scientific expertise, that is 
available to the government of the GDR, and the experiences of the year 
1980 […] it is not advisable to repeat the experiment with DST next year.”65 
It is not a coincidence that international dependencies were decisive 
in keeping DST in East Germany, as they were for its introduction in West 
Germany. In both countries the decision-making process was superseded 
by political interests of international integration. In the long run, not 
energy politics, but power politics or, to be more precise, the anticipation of 
power politics determined the outcome of the debates. Of course, divided 
Germany during the Cold War era is a rather special case, but this is not 
an argument for ignoring the historical interweaving of energy issues and 
politics. Even more telling, interdependencies between the transnational 
political setting and economic and technical considerations worked out 
61 | “Sommerzeit in Europa im Zusammenhang mit dem Berlinverkehr”, 1975-
78, in: BArch, B 136, no. 18391. 
62 | “Protokoll Nr. 40/80 zur Sitzung des Politbüros”, 08.10.1980, in: BArch, DY 
30, no. J IV 2/2/1860.
63 | Joachim Nawroth: “Rückgrif f auf Ulbrichts Rezepte”, in: Die Zeit, 
11.11.1980.
64 | “Protokoll Nr. 49/80 der Sitzung des Politbüros”, 02.12.1980, in: BArch, DY 
30, no. J IV 2/2/1869. 
65 | “Keine Sommerzeit für 1981”, in: Neues Deutschland, 28.10.1980. A similar 
interpretation is given by the Spiegel magazine: “The decision of the GDR against 
DST, viewed as a new act of demarcation in the West, mainly has economic rea-
sons.”, “Verlorene Zeit”, in: Der Spiegel, 03.11.1980, 40.
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differently in East and West in regard to energy saving. In a large part this 
can be attributed to different societal debates on energy policy.
THE SOCIAL ROLE OF ENERGY CONSERVATION 
Questioning a well-established time regime must be interpreted as a sign of 
deep-rooted uncertainty in a society. Throughout the German debates one 
point seems certain: If the energy effect had been larger, this would have 
decided it for DST. In 1974, the West German Home Office made clear: 
“In answering this core question it will be possible to draw the necessary 
conclusions for the introduction of DST. Other aspects cannot be […] of 
any relevance for the decision, if the question of energy is answered in a 
way that makes the introduction of DST compelling.”66 This readiness to 
change clocks for energy considerations, therefore, indicates the immense 
importance that was given to energy supply.
In West Germany the social importance of energy saving is central to 
explaining why the implementation of DST did not encounter more serious 
resistance: Perceived as an energy saving measure, DST fits perfectly within 
the guiding political principles of the 1970s as a decade of crisis. Additionally, 
it corresponded to the mixture of insecurity and search for alternative 
orientation in society. The oil price shock of 1973 – revitalized in the rising 
oil prices of the late 1970s – led to a new energy policy. The economy of 
the early Federal Republic had been subject to a “primacy of the cheapest 
energy supply possible.”67 Now, more weight was given to energy security 
and a diversification of supply. Before, cheap energy not only contributed 
considerably to an impressive economic growth and a rising living standard; 
it also symbolized this development. In his book on the ‘oil price shock’, 
66 | “Haushaltsreferat to Referat VI6”, Bonn, 26.07.1974, in: BArch, B 106, no. 
104135.
67 | Martin Czakainski: “Energiepolitik in der Bundesrepublik 1960 bis 1980 im 
Kontext der außenwir tschaftlichen und außenpolitischen Verflechtungen”, in: 
Jens Hohensee/Michael Salewski, eds. Energie – Politik – Geschichte. Nationa-
le und internationale Energiepolitik seit 1945. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993, 
17. Cf. Hans Michaelis: “Die Energiewir tschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
von 1970 bis 1990”, in: Hohensee/Salewski, eds. Energie – Politik – Geschichte, 
51-74. 
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Jens Hohensee speaks of a “change in attitude in society.”68 In general, 
the crisis is seen as the starting point for debates on energy saving in West 
German society. The practical results were considerable. Due to government 
provisions specific industrial energy consumption was reduced by almost 25 
percent between 1973 and 1986, when heating one square meter of housing 
space required 20 liters of fuel oil instead of 29 liters.69 
Judging the scope of these savings must remain controversial. Hohensee 
states that “this process of reflection and the change in attitude was not 
persistent.”70 It might at least be said that the focus shifted from ‘energy 
saving’ to ‘energy efficiency’. The reinterpretation of energy consumption 
was difficult because, in essence, it questioned the idea of progress. In the 
1970s, the political discussions on energy still advanced the assumption of a 
tight connection of economic growth and increases in demand for primary 
energy. Although the idea of ‘decoupling’ was discussed – with some 
controversy – the political focus was on new energy options, mainly nuclear 
fission.71 The Energy Security Act (1973), the Energy Saving Act (1975), and 
the regularly updated Energy Program of the Federal Government gave 
political stimulus for raising energy efficiency. But at the same time even 
proponents of energy saving avoided an equation between energy saving and 
austerity: “This perception does more harm than good; […] the aim to use 
energy efficiently and therefore economically is much more comprehensive 
and does not focus on a sacrifice of comfort.”72 Under these circumstances 
68 | Jens Hohensee: Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973/74. Die politischen und ge-
sellschaftlichen Auswirkungen der arabischen Erdölpolitik auf die Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland und Westeuropa. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1996, 236-238. 
69 | Cf. Bundesminister für Wir tschaft, ed. Energiebericht der Bundesregierung 
vom 24.09.1986, Bonn: Bundesregierung, 1986, 31. 
70 | Hohensee: “Und sonntags wieder laufen…”, 193.
71 | Cf. Werner Müller/Bernd Stoy: Entkopplung. Wirtschaftswachstum ohne 
mehr Energie? Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978; Klaus Traube/Otto Ull-
rich: Billiger Atomstrom? Wie die Interessen der Elektrizitätswirtschaft die Ener-
giepolitik bestimmen. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1982; Alfred Geißler/Botho Riegert: En-
ergiepolitik für eine lebenswerte Zukunft. Kohle contra Super-GAU. Bonn: Verlag 
Neue Gesellschaft, 1988.
72 | Geißler: Energiepolitik, 63. Cf. Deutscher Bundestag, ed. Energiepolitik 
im Deutschen Bundestag (7. und 8. Wahlperiode). Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, 
1980.
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it seems obvious that saving without sacrifice would have been the charm 
of DST from an energy perspective. The linkage between energy saving and 
DST, therefore, is not only evidence of the deep roots of energy saving in 
society, but also of its limits. Or, as Klaus Meyer-Abich wrote: 
“The broad consensus that energy saving is a good thing is problematic in 
the sense that it partially involves an interest in setting the principle so high 
that everybody involved is allowed to easily slip through. The truly interesting 
question is not whether we are in favor of saving energy, like we are in favor of 
family and against war, but instead where, when, how, how much energy can be 
saved, and by whom?”73
Saving energy legitimized DST. At the same time, DST created acceptance 
for energy saving as it allowed everybody to contribute without changing 
individual consumption patterns. 
In East Germany, DST was part of a technocratic approach to the 
problem. A similar change in attitudes like the one in West Germany 
could only have occurred with delay and only gradually. The ‘oil crisis’ 
was interpreted as a crisis of the capitalistic system. Until the mid-1970s 
high energy input was viewed as “proof of the economic power of true 
socialism.”74 East Germany long took pride in numbers showing that 
total electricity production exceeded that of France or West Germany. In 
retrospect, Otto Reinhold, president of the Academy of Social Sciences of 
the Central Council of the SED, pointed out: 
“In the past, the prevailing opinion was that more production, more national 
income could only be achieved through more material, more energy, and more 
investment. By now, we have realized that economic growth is only possible if 
existing resources are used more efficiently.”75 
73 | Klaus M. Meyer-Abich, ed. Energieeinsparung als neue Energiequelle. Wirt-
schaftspolitische Möglichkeiten und alternative Technologien. München: Hanser, 
1979, 27.
74 | Friedrich-Ebert-Stif tung, Energiepolitik, 7. Cf. Institut für Internationale 
Wir tschaft und Politik, ed. Energie- und Rohstoffprobleme im heutigen Kapitalis-
mus, Berlin (East): Institut für Internationale Wir tschaft und Politik, 1978.
75 | Otto Reinhold: “Über die wachsende Dynamik unserer wir tschaftlichen und 
gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung”, in: Gesellschaftschaftswissenschaftliche Kon-
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The policy shift bears a resemblance to West German debates. Energy 
prices for industrial usage rose significantly after 1976. September 1979 
became a turning point in energy policy, when state holding companies 
were subjected to strict maximum demands for energy. In 1981, after the 
Soviet Union reduced its export quantities, these measures were tightened; 
energy policy now resembled “pulling the emergency break.”76 The 
officially mandated energy-saving measures were more comprehensive 
and somehow more fundamental compared to those in West Germany. 
In the following years, the East German economy was able to disconnect 
growth and energy demand. But in the long run, the efforts were of little 
effect. Per-capita consumption of primary energy exceeded West Germany 
by 25 percent in 1987, which indicated a low degree of energy efficiency – 
especially since the GNP per capita was approximately one quarter lower.77
The political system of the GDR cut off the emergence of an energy 
debate comparable to that in West Germany. Energy saving was ordered 
from above and governed by technocrats. To some extent, the limited results 
emerged from a lack of willingness to directly cut back private energy 
consumption. The government had kept the price for a kilowatt hour of 
electricity constant at 8 Pfennig since 1946. Energy experts were aware 
of the fact that “state-subsidized prices for energy […] were no material 
stimulus for an economical use of energy in households.”78 But they were 
kept as a matter of ideology and social policy. Attempts to mobilize citizens 
for energy saving remained limited despite of corresponding media 
campaigns. Emphasis was given to industrial productivity and official 
ferenz des ZK der SED, ed. Gesetzmäßigkeiten unserer Epoche – Triebkräfte und 
Werte des Sozialismus. Berlin (East): Dietz, 1984, 158. Cf. Hans J. Hildebrand: 
Wirtschaftliche Energieversorgung. 3rd ed. Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Grund-
stoffindustrie, 1975, 78-79.
76 | Schröter: “Ölkrisen”, 121. Cf. Willi Riesner: Rationelle Energieanwendung. 
2nd ed. Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Grundstoffindustrie, 1982, 3.
77 | According to the information available, between 1979 and 1983 GNP rose 
4.1%, while energy consumption decreased by 0.7%. Cf. Wolfgang Stinglwagner: 
Die Energiewirtschaft der DDR unter Berücksichtigung internationaler Effizi-
enzvergleiche. Bonn: Gesamtdeutsches Institut, 1985, 17; Breuer: Energiewirt-
schaft, 111. 
78 | Kulturbund der DDR: Energiepolitik, 12-13.
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ordinances. As a consequence, although energy saving was a public issue, 
debates did not reflect the full complexity of energy demand.79
Under the given circumstances, a symbolic dimension of DST as 
energy saving time – complementing or substituting energy savings – 
could hardly emerge. Debates on DST mainly mirrored prevailing ideas 
of social and economic management and its implementation. East and 
West Germans shared the idea of energy as basis for economic growth and 
symbol of living standard – until this image was shattered in the 1970s. 
On the one hand, different sources of energy and the resulting differences 
in the course of crisis help to explain the different approaches in divided 
Germany. On the other hand, political ideologies and strategies as well 
as basic societal mechanisms contributed to diverging dynamics and 
meanings of energy policy. Once more, this demonstrates that DST cannot 
be examined as an isolated phenomenon. Instead, the starting point of any 
historical analysis must include its social context.
CONCLUSIONS 
Energy was the starting point of debates on DST in Germany in the 1970s. 
Shifting clocks emerged as a measure of ‘social engineering’ recalling 
experiences from two world wars. However, there is no distinct and one-
dimensional connection between energy saving and daylight saving. First 
of all, historical debates show that at least two dimensions of relations 
must be distinguished. On the one hand, measurable energy savings and, 
on the other, an emblematic stimulus of energy saving. The complexity of 
the issue made DST part of political decision-making processes as well as 
conflicting energy discourses. Thus, it became subject to historical change 
and structural conditions. It is by chance that DST was introduced directly 
after the so called ‘second oil crisis’ of 1979. Introducing it in Germany 
was not an energy emergency measure. In East Germany, officials judged 
79 | Matthias Vogel: Energiewirtschaftliche Handlungszwänge in der DDR. Zu 
Möglichkeiten einer marktwirtschaftlichen Energieversorgung auf dem Terri-
torium der DDR aus der Sicht internationaler Entwicklungstendenzen unter der 
Bedingung des Zusammenwachsens beider deutscher Staaten in den 90er Jah-
ren. Berlin (East): Institut für Internationale Politik und Wir tschaft, 1990, 15. Cf. 
Riesner: Rationelle Energieanwendung, 48.
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DST as unsuitable despite its appeal as a planned economy of daylight. 
As a matter of fact, it seems as if the administrative view of energy was 
too technocratic to realize its potential as a tool of social engineering. In 
West Germany, after 1975 the political debate went beyond energy saving. 
Marginal savings were included into the argument to use a symbolic effect 
as a moment of energy saving. Its significance is part of the “high position 
that is assigned to energy saving today”, as energy expert Schaefer put it.80 
Here, DST can be interpreted as part of a process of social re-organization 
along the line of ‘greening everyday life’. 
If questioning time order is a sign of uncertainty, producing new 
securities must be seen as a complex process. Certainly, the process did 
not work out as a planning from above aiming at modernization and 
rationalization. In this sense, Illich’s concept of ‘energy addiction’ is an 
oversimplification. The multiple ways daylight saving was connected 
to energy issues illustrate a tendency to ‘energize’ social debates. But 
DST is also closely connected to other key issues of the 1970s and 80s 
like ‘individualization’, ‘leisure society’, and ‘quality of life’. Even if the 
aspect of energy saving is part of the public image of DST, it is important 
to see the limitations of such an approach. Everyday life soon gave way 
to a different incorporation of DST which was not anticipated in most of 
the governmental and parliamentary debates. Starting in 1980, people in 
East and West Germany developed a shared interest in the recreational 
value of daylight saving. “Most citizens have discovered that more daylight 
means that they can make a little more of their lives. Tennis fans and 
hobby gardeners appreciate the gift of an hour just like do-it-yourselfers, 
clandestine workers and fans of outdoor bars,” wrote the Spiegel magazine. 
“East Germans, for example, use the longer summer evenings for extra 
car rides to the countryside [.]”81 The transformation of a discourse of 
economic crises and energy shortage into a momentum for quality of life 
is remarkable. Would DST have been accepted in a similar way without 
the ‘side effects’ of leisure and recreation? Its flexibility makes DST not 
only a widely accepted tool for social re-orientation, but also a fruitful 
subject matter for historians who want to understand the practices of social 
stability. 
80 | Ebersbach: “Sommerzeit”, 498.
81 | “Weniger hitzefrei”, in: Der Spiegel, 01.09.1980, 104; “Verlorene Zeit”, in: 
Der Spiegel, 11.11.1980, 42.
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Daylight saving time as energy saving time is a myth. Not because its 
effects on energy consumption are questionable but rather because of the 
constructiveness of energy issues as a whole. In an impressive way the 
debates on daylight saving illustrate how societies discuss, constitute, and 
create energy problems. First, the legacy of DST as an emergency measure 
clearly calls for a historical contextualization. Its meaning and outcomes 
cannot be assessed timelessly. Second, the difficulties of judging its effect 
on energy consumption highlight the complexity of scientific and public 
concepts of energy and how this affects our views. Not only specific ways of 
using energy (as well as of using time) came into play, but geographic factors 
and energy infrastructure as well. Third, the decision-making process 
interfered with topics that – at first sight – bear no relation to energy policy. 
The political dimension of DST in divided Germany stresses this context-
sensitive character. Energy issues were not simply instrumentalized for 
political reasons, both issues were durably interlinked. Forth, the overall 
picture of energy’s social and cultural embeddedness has to include the 
dimension of social structures and mechanisms. The scope of action for 
DST was limited by the way energy saving discourses in East and West 
Germany related to their specific societal surroundings. 
Combining these aspects, a historical perspective offers the possibility 
of understanding how energy policy and consumption are shaped by 
societal values, economic interests, and political choices (as by technology 
and available resources).82 It is not the job of an historian to judge the 
arguments for and against DST. It is more revealing why, when, and where 
they were uttered. Historians have to ask to what extent this constellation 
was open to historical change. The better we understand that it matters 
how we talk about energy, how we define its societal role, and how we 
conceptualize its materiality, the more we can judge and rate the scope and 
limitations of our contemporary decisions as consumers and citizens.
82 | Cf. Paul Sabin: “‘The Ultimate Environmental Dilemma’: Making a Place for 
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Energy Consumption Practices and  
Social Inequality 
The Case of Low-Income Households
Karl-Michael Brunner, Anja Christanell, Markus Spitzer
“Energy […] penetrates significantly into almost all facets of the social world. 
Life-styles, broad patterns of communication and interaction, collective 
activities, and key features of social structure and change are conditioned by 
the availability of energy, the technical means of converting energy into usable 
forms, and the ways energy is ultimately used.”1
This quotation clearly shows that energy is a basic requirement for 
social integration and social life, and that it is also tightly linked to social 
structure and power relations. Energy consumption is a manifestation and 
part of social stratification, and social inequalities often become evident in 
energy practices. Today’s industrialised, high-tech societies – as opposed 
to societies of the past – are characterised by their energy-intensive ways 
of life. 
Current lifestyles include patterns of consumption based on a high level 
of consumption of (finite) resources. For a long time, excessive consumption 
of energy was equated with social progress and modernisation. This 
equation, however, is increasingly being questioned as an effect of the rising 
awareness of the side-effects of the modern industrial era (climate change 
and exploitation of finite resources, for example). Meanwhile, a consensus 
about the non-sustainability of present energy systems has been reached, 
and the need for a transition to a ‘low-carbon-society’ is being affirmed. 
1 | Eugene A. Rosa/Gary E. Machlis/Kenneth M. Keating: “Energy and Society”, 
in: Annual Review of Sociology 14 (1988), 149.
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However, this transition can not only consist of ecological dimensions, 
but also has to include the social part of sustainable development and the 
question of “environmental justice”2, which plays an important role here. 
In this context, analyses of the social differentiation of energy 
consumption are crucial because they shed light on patterns of social 
distribution and ways of appropriating the use of resources. This becomes 
relevant, especially politically, in the context of strategies for sustainability 
and fighting climate change (keyword: environmental justice). Up to 
now, connections between energy consumption, poverty and climate 
change have mainly been discussed in the context of global inequalities.3 
Regarding the development worldwide, a trend towards imitation of 
Western lifestyles and consumption patterns can be identified in many 
developing societies, entailing an increase of energy consumption.4 It 
has to be kept in mind though, that massive global inequalities regarding 
energy still persist. On a global level, 1.4 billion people have no access to 
electricity, and another billion only has unreliable access. 3 billion people 
are dependent on biomass and coal for satisfying their basic needs. Each 
year, 2 million people (mainly women and children) die from indoor air 
pollution by household use of solid fuels, burning dung, wood, crop waste 
and coal in unventilated kitchens. For this reason, the UN defines energy 
access for the poor as a development priority.5
But also in industrialised countries, considerable differences in 
energy consumption exist to some extent. Although the industrialised 
lifestyle could generally be considered high in energy consumption, this 
generalisation disregards the social differences of energy consumption 
within this lifestyle. While (unlimited) availability of energy is the norm 
for some social groups in industrialised countries, other parts of society 
are faced with the problem of not being able to afford energy in sufficient 
2 | Horst-Dietrich Elvers/Matthias Gross/Harald Heinrichs: “The Diversity of En-
vironmental Justice: Towards a European Approach”, in: European Societies 10:5 
(2008), 835-56.
3 | Anthony Giddens: The Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2009.
4 | Norman Myers/Jennifer Kent: The New Consumers. The Influence of Affluence 
on the Environment. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004.
5 | United Nations Development Programme: Fast Facts. UNDP and Energy Ac-
cess for the Poor. New York: UNDP, 2010.
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quantities or having to limit their use of energy services. To give an example: 
Even in European countries, deaths related to energy causes are not the 
exception because some people are not in a position to keep sufficiently 
warm in winter or to protect themselves from heat in summer. In the UK, 
for example, almost 30,000 people died from cold-related illnesses in 
2007/08.6
In recent years, the analytical focus has shifted towards inequalities 
and vulnerabilities in the Northern countries, bringing forward evidence 
that financially weaker households are more vulnerable to climate change 
(e.g. in periods of extreme weather conditions) than better-off households, 
although – compared to the more affluent – their contribution to climate 
change is usually lower (e.g. due to lower mobility rates). Different 
lifestyles are characterised by different impacts on the environment.7 In 
a study conducted in the UK, Angela Druckman and Tim Jackson point 
out empirical relations between lifestyles, energy consumption and carbon 
emissions. Referring only to income, they show that “[t]he poorest 10% of 
households use, on average, only 43% of the energy used by the richest 10% 
of households […] The poorest 10% produce, on average, 45% of the carbon 
dioxide generated by the richest 10%.”8 With regards to individual groups 
of lifestyles, Druckman and Jackson distinguish “fuel-rich” and “fuel-poor” 
households. The latter includes the socially deprived group of lifestyles 
which are “constrained by circumstances”, who are most likely hit by fuel 
poverty, lying 21 percent below the UK mean for energy consumption 
and 20 percent below the mean for carbon dioxide emissions. Although 
socially less privileged groups in general have a lower consumption of 
energy (which actually could be considered as positive on the way towards 
a low-carbon society), their position on the energy market is feeble, i.e. 
in most cases they have to spend more on energy than households on a 
higher income (e.g. due to reminder fees because of delays in the payment 
of their bills). Moreover, they profit less from a liberalisation of the energy 
6 | Brenda Boardman: Fixing Fuel Poverty. Challenges and Solutions. London: 
Earthscan, 2010, 168.
7 | Fritz Reusswig: Ökologie und Lebensstile. Frankfur t/Main: IKO, 1994.
8 | Angela Druckman/Tim Jackson: “Household Energy Consumption in the UK: A 
Highly Geographically and Socio-economically Disaggregated Model”, in: Energy 
Policy 36 (2008), 3183.
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market because they change their energy providers less frequently than 
households on a better income and thus often keep paying higher rates.9
In addition, socially less privileged groups are notably more frequently 
hit by fuel poverty. The definition of a fuel-poor household generally 
includes those which have to spend more than 10 percent of their income 
on energy to heat their home to an adequate standard.10 In the face of the 
complex interplay of rising energy prices, stagnant or decreasing incomes, 
high levels of unemployment, processes that multiply casualisation and the 
slow rate of redevelopment of residential buildings in terms of improving 
energy efficiency, the problem of fuel poverty has become increasingly 
urgent in recent years. Low-income and/or fuel-poor households are 
frequently incapable of satisfying basic needs such as heating their homes 
adequately. These groups of energy consumers are vulnerable to the 
consequences of insufficient or insecure access to energy.
It has been estimated that within the EU, between 50 and 125 million 
people are living under conditions of fuel poverty, and these figures are 
predicted to rise further in the near future. Social and political awareness for 
this problem, however, is still relatively low and varies considerably.11 From 
a scientific viewpoint, it is particularly obvious that there is a lack of studies 
investigating the matter from the perspective of the people concerned, 
focusing on their energy practices, conditions for action, and coping 
strategies.12 The project NELA (German acronym for “Sustainable Energy 
Consumption and Lifestyles in Poor and at-Risk-of-Poverty Households”) 
takes exactly this stance, shedding light on energy consumption in low-
income and fuel-poor households in the Austrian capital Vienna.
Before discussing the results of the research project in greater detail, 
the following paragraphs shall elucidate the theoretical basis of the project, 
providing an outline of the understanding of energy consumption in social 
sciences.  
9 | Boardman: Fixing Fuel Poverty, 90.
10 | Druckman: “Household Energy Consumption in the UK”, 3178.
11 | Sergio Ernesto Santillán-Cabeza: Opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee on Energy Poverty in the Context of Liberalisation and Eco-
nomic Crisis. Brussels: EESC, 2010.
12 | Boardman: Fixing Fuel Poverty, 174.
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SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMPLE XIT Y OF 
ENERGY CONSUMP TION
For at least 40 years now, social sciences have been investigating energy 
consumption from various angles. In the 1970s, the energy crises raised 
awareness of questions about the development and the determining 
factors of energy consumption and efficiency. Consequently, the increased 
relevance of these questions also had an effect on energy consumption 
research; a scientific field which until this date had predominantly adopted 
a technical stance focusing on optimising efficiency. In the wake of the 
crises and subsequent to the discovery that identical households sometimes 
showed considerable differences in energy consumption, research started 
to include behavioural factors as well. It became increasingly evident that it 
is the people who consume energy, not their dwellings or devices.13 
While research in this field had been dominated by psychological and 
economic approaches in the 1970s and 1980s, a genuinely sociological 
perspective started to prevail from the 1990s onwards. The emphasis thus 
shifted to the socially mediated nature of energy consumption and its 
socio-technical and infrastructural embeddedness. 
Analyses rooted in economic approaches usually centre on income and 
energy prices, resulting in the finding that income and energy expenses are 
directly related. In absolute numbers, increased income entails increased 
expenses for energy, while at the same time, the share of energy expenditure 
in the total consumption expenditure decreases. Low income households 
consequently spend a larger part of their income on energy. If the energy 
prices increase, therefore, this could have an accelerating effect on the 
development of energy efficient technologies or stimulate higher demand 
for and investment in energy saving devices and measures. However, this 
does not necessarily hold true for households on a lower income, which 
tend to answer increases in energy prices with changes in behaviour (e.g. 
13 | Elizabeth Shove/Loren Lutzenhiser/Simon Guy/Bruce Hackett/Harold Wil-
hite: “Energy and Social Systems”, in: Steve Rayner/Elizabeth L. Malone, eds. 
Human Choice and Climate Change. Vol. 2. Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1998, 
293.
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reduced room temperature) rather than by investing in more efficient (but 
probably expensive) technologies or facilities.14
Along with income, other socio-demographic factors matter when it 
comes to evaluating energy consumption: For instance, a larger number 
of residents in a household signifies an increased energy consumption 
in total, while, at the same time, the per capita energy consumption 
decreases with growing size of the household. In fact, it has been stated 
that energy expenses also increase with the size of the dwelling. In terms 
of the differences between town and country, it has been shown that energy 
expenses are generally lower in urban areas with a higher population 
density.
(Socio-)psychological approaches offer insights into the relevance of 
factors other than economic ones, especially attitudes and values. However, 
it is debatable to which extent attitudes influence behaviour, as a large 
number of studies only discover small correlations between the two.15
From the point of view of sociology, individualist models of behaviour 
within different economic and psychological theories are often critically 
judged, as they disregard the social embeddedness of actions, thus 
understating the intrinsically social nature of energy behaviour. The 
starting point for sociology when analysing (energy) consumption is 
always a social contextualisation of different states of consciousness and 
behaviour. In contrast to individualist theories derived from the fields of 
economy or psychology, these approaches do not limit explanations for 
the agents’ behaviour and actions to conscious choices but also include 
preconscious and unconscious behaviour and routines. There is a variety 
of social practices in households (e.g. cooking, heating) which strongly 
determine energy consumption but which are based on the ‘performance’ 
14 | Don D. Dillman/Eugene A. Rosa/Joye J. Dillman: “Lifestyle and Home Energy 
Conservation in the United States”, in: Journal of Economic Psychology 3 (1983), 
299-315.
15 | Karl-Werner Brand: “Social Practices and Sustainable Consumption: Ben-
efits and Limitations of a New Theoretical Approach”, in: Matthias Gross/Harald 
Heinrichs, eds. Environmental Sociology: European Perspectives and Interdisci-
plinary Challenges. Dortrecht: Springer, 2010, 217-35.
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of largely embedded everyday routines rather than being the result of 
conscious choices.16
It has frequently been pointed out in sociological research how deeply 
human behaviour is rooted in social milieus and lifestyles, and how social 
groups increasingly differentiate in the course of social change according 
to socio-cultural features they have in common. Attitudes and behavioural 
orientations should therefore be taken into account when analysing energy 
consumption, although this should not necessarily include a culturalistic 
de-valorisation of distinguishing social features. Orientations towards 
efficiency can differ widely among lifestyle groups, just as energy saving 
behaviour does. Therefore, different technologies can acquire various 
meanings, depending on their respective social contexts. According to their 
lifestyles, households thus display different behavioural patterns which 
can be termed distinctive “energy cultures.”17
Energy use, in most cases, is invisible and not discussed, silently 
accompanying everyday actions and routines. Therefore, awareness for 
the factors determining energy consumption can only be raised if lifestyle-
specific ideas about what ‘home’ means (what is understood by comfort, 
a cosy atmosphere or hospitality), as well as their consequences in terms 
of energy (the ‘right’ lighting, a ‘pleasant’ room temperature) can be 
identified. 
Apart from the internal social structure of a household, it is also the 
embeddedness of consumer behaviour in everyday life that needs to be 
investigated. The pragmatic, workaday life calls for viable solutions to the 
coordination of lives within time and space. 
Patterns of consumption are also embedded in and influenced by social 
discourses about energy, the environment and poverty, just to name a few. 
These discourses, to a smaller or larger extent, determine the role models 
of our society, which in turn feed back into the legitimisation of certain 
patterns of consumption (cf. for example the public discussion about 
advantages and disadvantages of the prohibition of common light bulbs). 
In addition, it should be stressed that the scope of consumption could be 
limited, but also stretched by macro-structural trends in society (as, for 
16 | Alan Warde: “Consumption and Theories of Practice”, in: Journal of Consum-
er Culture 5 (2005), 131-53.
17 | Margrethe Aune: “Energy Comes Home”, in: Energy Policy 35 (2007), 
5457-65.
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example, individualisation), political, legal and economic frameworks, the 
structures of production and supply, or technological developments.18
Thomas Berker rightly points out that the technical aspects of energy 
use are frequently neglected in analyses originating in the fields of social 
sciences.19 One possible remedy could be a socio-technical approach, 
focussing on the dynamic interrelations between technology and everyday 
energy use and including the constructed environment and infrastructural 
and institutional frameworks as well. 
All in all, it can be said that energy practices are influenced both by 
resources and restrictions determined by the respective living situation 
(e.g. income, size of dwelling, facilities) as well as by attitudes, values, social 
and cultural norms, ways of leading everyday life, technologies, the built-
in infrastructure of homes, and the complex interrelations between all of 
these factors, which are in turn influenced by discourses, infrastructure, 
institutions and social trends. 
THE NEL A PROJECT
The aim of the project NELA is to investigate energy consumption in 
low-income households in the Austrian capital Vienna.20 The core of 
NELA is a comprehensive survey including qualitative interviews in 50 
Viennese households afflicted by poverty. For purposes of comparison, 
ten more interviews were additionally conducted in better-off households. 
Research is based on the methodology of “Grounded Theory”, which 
focuses on the systematic development of theories directly from the 
18 | Karl-Michael Brunner: “Ernährungspraktiken und nachhaltige Entwicklung 
– eine Einführung”, in: Karl-Michael Brunner/Sonja Geyer/Marie Jelenko/Walpur-
ga Weiss/Florentina Astleithner, eds. Ernährungsalltag im Wandel. Chancen für 
Nachhaltigkeit. Wien: Springer, 2007, 1-38.
19 | Thomas Berker: “Energienutzung im Heim als sozio-technische Praxis”, in: 
Corinna Fischer, ed. Strom sparen im Haushalt. München: ökom, 2008, 175-92.
20 | The project is funded by the Austrian Climate and Energy Fund and is being 
administered by the Austrian Institute for Sustainable Development, in coopera-
tion with the Institute for Sociology and Social Research at the Vienna University 
of Economics and Business, and the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environme-
nt and Energy.
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data.21 The interviewers used an open interview guide, complemented 
by a questionnaire for eliciting socio-demographic data and information 
on equipment and infrastructure of the households. The criteria for the 
selection of interview partners were based both in socio-demographic 
characteristics and in their adherence to significant groups at risk of 
poverty. The interviews were transcribed and analysed according to 
hermeneutic methods and computer-based, qualitative data analysis. 
On the following pages, selected results of the project will be described, 
focusing on energy-related housing and living conditions as well as on 
energy consumption practices.
HOUSING AND LIVING CONDITIONS
A large number of households display conditions of more or less severe 
austerity because of their low income. Often, debts, lack of provisions and 
economising as a way of life are the order of the day. Adopting a modest 
lifestyle in various dimensions is frequently a necessary long-term strategy 
in order to cope with the situation. Asked about desired changes in their 
housing conditions, the interviewees often show low demands in their 
responses. Answers include, for example, an additional room which can be 
used as a bedroom so as not to have to spend the night in the living room. 
This could be interpreted as a manifestation of their habitus of necessity or 
modesty, respectively.22
In recent decades it could be observed in numerous spheres of everyday 
life that the standards of what is considered normal with reference to 
energy consumption in our society have gradually increased (e.g. higher 
room temperatures, more marked hygienic standards, doing the laundry 
more frequently). Faced with these developments, many of the low-income 
households included in the survey react to the burdens they bear with a 
clear lowering of their living standards, adapting successively to conditions 
below the level of what would commonly be considered a ‘normal’ 
lifestyle. This becomes especially obvious in the case of people who have 
experienced a radical descent on the social ladder but are still trying to keep 
21 | Anselm L. Strauss/Juliet Corbin: Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded 
Theory Procedures and Techniques. London: Sage, 1990.
22 | Pierre Bourdieu: Distinction. London: Routledge, 1984.
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up their former standards of normality. On the long run, however, this 
venture is bound to fail. A comparative analysis shows that financially well-
situated households do not even think about some of the things that poor 
households already consider a luxury (e.g. heating all rooms of the house 
or taking a full bath). We will subsequently show that the subjectively 
perceived well-being is frequently adapted to a room temperature that is 
regarded as (apparently) financially affordable, not the other way round. 
What is characteristic for many households is an attitude that already 
anticipates shortages and hardships. An unexpectedly high supplementary 
payment for energy costs, for instance, could severely exacerbate the often 
quite delicate financial planning – as much as a broken household device 
could cause great problems in coping with everyday life. Those who are 
tightly embedded in social networks (friends, family, social organisations) 
have less difficulty in managing their lives in precarious conditions and 
shortage of resources than those who cannot draw on these resources. 
Having recourse to supportive people or organisations is of immense 
importance as this can prevent grave consequences of any shortages that 
might occur (e.g. eviction or power cuts). However, feelings of shame 
frequently inhibit the activation of social networks. 
The limited financial resources of most of the interviewees are also 
evident in their dwellings. The majority lives in blocks of council flats or 
similar blocks of flats for rent, in buildings that are often very old, badly 
insulated or not at all, with leaky windows and doors. Adverse conditions 
have a particularly strong impact when the flats cannot profit from ‘co-
heating effects’ of the neighbouring flats because of their location (ground 
floor, external walls). Altogether, the scope of action regarding energy-
saving practices is limited. Redevelopments of the housing stock are often 
delayed for years, especially in the case of private landlords, who see little 
need for immediate action. When redevelopments do take place, they 
are often welcomed by the residents, but also met with doubts and fears 
concerning possible rises in rent and running costs. 
Income does not only limit the free choice of dwelling, but is frequently 
also reflected in household equipment and appliances. The furnishings 
and devices in most households at the lower scale of the income spectrum 
are often a mix of things – largely of a lower quality – that came with the flat, 
were acquired new or used, or were received as a present (mostly used). No 
matter how important a supporting social network may be, when it comes 
to household equipment it can help out in matters of basic fittings and the 
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replacement of broken devices. Often, old or out-of-use devices are given 
to households with a low income. From an energy point of view, however, 
these are unintended ‘Greek gifts’, as they are often defective or prone to 
defects and energy intensive. Old household devices could even represent 
a safety hazard: If they are defective but are not replaced due to financial 
straits in the near future, makeshift solutions or workarounds representing 
a health hazard are opted for in some cases. Makeshift solutions also 
have to be accepted even in the case that functioning appliances cannot 
be used because of power cuts. 69-year old Ms Reisinger23, for instance, 
was forced to do the cooking with a gas camping cooker and ‘lighting’ her 
flat with a cheap, battery-driven camping torch for several months, as gas 
and electricity had been cut off in her flat. Short-term makeshift solutions, 
however, in some cases turn into long-term ones and become normality. 
When financial resources do allow the acquisition of new appliances, it 
is frequently the cheapest option that is purchased, implying less energy 
efficiency. In many cases, used devices are bought in second-hand shops or 
at flea markets, making the household fully functional again, but, on the 
other hand, also entailing diminished quality or additional repair expenses 
because of higher rates of failure. 
For many households, high energy expenses or unexpected additional 
payments can cause tremendous difficulties. Even though different 
strategies are adopted in order to keep energy costs at a minimum and exploit 
every potential for economising, doubts always remain about whether the 
actions taken are really relevant to the problem. Frequently, they are due to 
a lack of feedback systems, as many of the people interviewed complained 
about the inability to evaluate their own attempts at saving energy. It is 
exactly in those households, however, that the interest in behaviour-related 
saving measures is particularly high, despite often already having reached 
the limits of their saving potentials. What remains as a source for feedback 
is only the annual statement, which often comes as a shock to the people 
interviewed – first and foremost in those cases where high additional 
payments jeopardise the already fragile financial management of the 
household. One of the major problems here is the large time gap between 
energy saving initiatives and the potentially resulting cost reduction. In 
fact, it is in most cases only the annual statement which shows whether the 
23 | To safeguard the anonymity of the interviewees, fictitious names are used 
here.
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saving measures taken have been fruitful. Moreover, it is difficult to relate 
single practices to the energy consumption they entail. In some cases, a 
lack of monitoring in terms of consumption could even cause people to 
refrain from using some of the appliances in the household, trying to avoid 
estimated high energy expenses, and opt for a service provider instead. The 
following example of one interviewee serves to illustrate this point: Instead 
of washing his shirts at home, he engaged the services of a dry cleaner 
since the singular payment for this service seemed more reasonable to him 
than the accumulated energy use of his own washing machine. 
Since the liberalisation of the energy market one possibility for lowering 
costs is changing the energy provider. But even though some of the 
interviewees considered such a change it was ultimately rarely carried out. 
Changes of this nature demand certain defined conditions, and therefore 
are considered to be high-involvement decisions. Apart from actively 
procuring information (some households are not equipped with internet 
access), physical and mental resilience as well as a systematic approach 
to the matter are required. However, these conditions are not always 
sufficiently present in low-income households. Moreover, considering 
the market power of some energy providers, some people doubt that an 
unproblematic change of providers is possible. Accounts by acquaintances 
about difficulties in switching the provider confirm this worry, and many 
interview partners complained about the lack of transparency of service 
charges.
Disconnections are the order of the day for some of the interviewees: 
More than a quarter of the people interviewed reported having been 
disconnected, sometimes more than once, from the power supply due to 
non-payment of arrears. Frequently, the debts are settled within a few days 
after disconnection and the services are restored. Sometimes, however, 
the financial crisis continues, and the household remains cut off from 
energy services. In the most extreme cases this situation could even last for 
several years. The problems disconnections cause are manifold: Besides 
the obvious direct consequence of having to cope without electricity and/or 
heating, a number of additional direct (e.g. fines and charges) and indirect 
(e.g. spoilage of foods) expenses resulting from this have to be taken into 
account in households which are considered poor or at risk of poverty. 
Subjective consequences like “feelings of shame”, roused by the inability 
to afford a life in dignity with access to basic services, should be kept in 
mind here, too. 
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The analysis of housing and living conditions yielded a number of 
contextual factors which affect energy behaviour in poor and at-risk-
of-poverty households. In the following paragraphs, empirical results 
focusing on two crucial energy practices will be discussed: heating and 
lighting. The central concern here is to describe the coping strategies24 the 
interviewees adopt in order to satisfy the basic needs for warmth and light 
in their constrained situation of limited financial resources and restricted 
housing and living conditions (which could even be aggravated by rising 
energy prices). 
HE ATING PR ACTICES
From an economic perspective, people at risk of poverty should be saving on 
energy costs because of their financial situation. This would be a rationally 
replicable measure in reaction to rising energy prices concomitant with 
stagnant welfare benefits or incomes. But the real heating costs for any 
type of dwelling depend on a number of factors that are often beyond the 
reach of the interviewees, as, for instance, the cladding of the building and 
its windows, the heating system, the location of the flat within the house, 
the size of the living space, but also the severity of the winter season. 
Households at risk of poverty characteristically have drastically limited 
possibilities for investing in improvements, which is why coping strategies 
here mostly consist of user behaviour. 
Within the sample of 50 interviewees, a large number of different 
coping strategies could be identified and divided into strategies for 
efficiency and strategies for sufficiency, both of which are characterised 
by low investments. Therefore, what could be termed efficiency strategies 
are low-cost investments which allow for increasing the efficiency of the 
dwelling (e.g. windows) or appliances (e.g. water-saving tops). They include 
sealing leaky windows and/or covering them with thick protecting curtains, 
or installing window blinds, all aimed at preserving heat. 
All actions geared towards reducing energy consumption through 
cutbacks and sacrifices can be considered sufficiency strategies. Among 
24 | The concept of ‘strategy’ is not used in the sense of a purposive-rational ac-
tion in the following, but mostly to indicate more or less reflected ways of dealing 
with the matter.
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these strategies feature, for example, heating only the main living area or 
heating as little as possible during seasonal transition periods. Some of the 
people interviewed sat directly in front of the radiator in order to avoid loss 
of warmth. There were even cases of dwellings which had not been heated 
for several years. 
In 21 of the 50 households included in the survey, the heating is turned 
on in only one room of the flat. This was found to be the most common 
coping strategy in order to reduce costs, especially in smaller flats, but was 
also observed in the case of larger ones. It mostly occurs when some of 
the rooms are not being used, or if the bedrooms are adjacent to the living 
room, and it is therefore sufficient to open the doors at night in order to 
facilitate heat circulation. This strategy is particularly popular because it 
permits to reduce the heating costs while at the same time still having one 
heated room. 
In one third of the households, the cold part of the year also signifies 
having to put on various layers of clothing inside the house – that is, 
in most cases, at least two pairs of warm socks, sometimes even long 
underpants, and several layers of clothes on the upper part of the body. 
Being dressed like this provides warmth to people within the limits of their 
financial resources; however, it is rarely sufficient to reach the personal 
comfort temperature. 
Another related strategy for coping with the cold inside the flat is 
‘slipping under the covers’. Six of the people interviewed claimed this 
to be part of their practices for enduring cold temperatures. As with all 
the coping strategies quoted, there are many different possibilities of 
interpreting these practices: For some, the thought of slipping under their 
favourite blanket is a pleasant idea; others might feel considerable mental 
strain having to accept that going to bed is their only choice for fighting 
the cold. 
31 out of 50 households adopt one or more of these three strategic 
options aimed at lowering the heating costs. 
Including technological factors into the analysis expands the horizon 
of a socio-economic point of view considerably. Frequently, households are 
not able to generate a pleasant room temperature despite the fact that they 
possess the necessary equipment. Ms Leitinger, for instance, is forced to 
regulate her storage heating meticulously in order to evenly distribute the 
accumulated heat throughout the day. On extremely cold days, turning up 
the heating would result in a cold flat later in the day because the heating 
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would no longer be available after 4 p.m. Turning the heating down, on 
the other hand, would mean suffering from the cold during the day, but 
could at least stabilize the temperature at a lower level until the evening. 
Therefore, the heat stored by the technology used here is the determining 
factor for heating practices and coping strategies. Assuming that heating 
practices are not merely the result of individual rational decisions but 
are also influenced by processes of appropriation of the technologies in 
question, it can be asked how people actually reach an understanding of 
the functioning of the technology in place (e.g. heating, thermostat). 
How this is dealt with shall be illustrated using the example of the 
accounting procedure for long-distance heating. The basic procedure here is 
as follows: Each radiator is equipped with an evaporimeter which measures 
evaporation. After the period of a year, the annual heat consumption is 
calculated on the basis of this data. Usually, this billing method does not 
influence heating practices. However, a number of the people interviewed 
try to comprehend this technology and the corresponding accounting 
method in more detail. Believing that the calculation is made for each 
radiator, even if it is not used, they deduce that their rate of fixed costs is 
too high. The truth is that fixed costs are calculated according to the size 
of the flat in square metres. Thus, in extreme cases, it can happen that 
radiators are dismantled or that the apartment is heated using only the 
minimum number of radiators in order to avoid evaporation on the others. 
This is based on the logic that fewer radiators produce lower heating costs. 
In the most extreme case, represented by Ms Milich, the flat is heated up to 
28° C using two radiators in one room but none in the other rooms. This is 
thought to be an economical practice of heating, as several radiators remain 
turned off. What seems to be rationally justifiable from a subjective point 
of view though, can result in excessive energy costs. Often, reasoning and 
ideas other than economic ones can determine how people understand and 
appropriate technologies. Lay concepts about energy-related technology 
can play a major role in this.25
Heating practices are also affected by social norms. This was 
corroborated by the interviews, particularly regarding one point: the norm 
which decrees that nothing should be wasted. Regarding heating, this norm 
is largely binding for the majority of interviewees: If heating the entire 
25 | Willett Kempton/Laura Montgomery: “Folk Quantification of Energy”, in: En-
ergy 7 (1982), 817-27.
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apartment is regarded as wasteful (or a luxury) it is often avoided, even if it 
would be technologically and economically feasible. Concentrating the heat 
in one room is an indication of a habitus that centres on avoiding waste, 
which often had already developed in the interviewees’ original family or 
has been acquired over years of living in conditions of poverty. 
Apart from cost calculations, individual approaches to technology and 
habitual dispositions, it is also people’s attitudes which influence heating 
practices. If, for instance, low income and high ecological awareness 
coincide, the chances are high that energy saving is a target, and it could 
even occur that ecological motives predominate. A comparative analysis of 
the 10 interviews conducted in households with a higher income (more than 
6,000 Euro monthly) reveals that sufficiency is clearly not an issue for them 
and that efficiency strategies are markedly less developed here. The heating 
is left on until an agreeable comfort temperature is reached throughout the 
whole flat. Warmth represents the norm in these households and does not 
receive special consideration. For many households with a lower income, 
however, heating is an issue omnipresent in everyday life, at least during 
wintertime. Incertainties about the energy consumption being too high 
and looming consequences in the form of disconnections and energy debts 
are constantly present in many households. This does not apply to well-off 
households. In general, the people interviewed do not want to spend too 
much thought on heating. It simply has to function and should ideally 
be programmed to start in advance, so that the flat is already comfortably 
warm when they come home from work. The dwellings of households with 
a higher income represent an oasis of tranquility, relaxation, and a place for 
leaving behind stressful everyday realities. Being comfortable in this place 
is crucial, and heating practices are adjusted to facilitate this feeling of well-
being. Investing in efficiency measures or forms of renewable energy is 
the exception to the rule among the group of people interviewed in this 
survey, although most of the heating systems are older and technically not 
up to date. It therefore follows that greater financial possibililties do not 
necessarily entail investments in the area of efficiency, even in the face of 
rising energy prices. 
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LIGHTING PR ACTICES
There are a number of studies that predict a continuing rise of power 
consumption from residential lighting in the future. On the one hand, this 
is attributed to the rising number of different types of smaller households 
which means that energy consumption for lighting is increasing per 
person due to the disappearance of co-use; on the other hand, changing 
needs regarding lighting and forms of usage are to be held responsible. 
Up to the present day, however, hardly any studies have investigated the 
consumption of light from the consumers’ point of view26, which is why 
the reasons for the rise still largely remain unknown. 
As with heating practices, the example of illumination makes 
abundantly clear that energy consumption is characterised by an interplay 
of economic, social, cultural and technological factors. Lighting practices 
do not only depend on the location of the flat but also, for some part, on 
the seasons and times of the day and the resulting amount of daylight. 
According to the combination of these factors, the requirements for 
illumination can vary considerably. In the most extreme cases, a dense 
stock of trees in front of the window makes it indispensable to keep at least 
one source of lighting on when someone is present in order to allow for 
certain activities. The sample of interviews features a large number of dark 
dwellings, which entails an increased need for lighting.
Apart from the question of the availability of daylight, a large part of 
the requirements for lighting results from the necessities (factors for well-
being) and activities of the inhabitants. If dimmed, indirect lighting is 
preferred for reasons of well-being and comfort; domestic tasks (reading, 
cooking, changing diapers, etc.) require different qualities and intensities 
of lighting. In this context, a large preference for brighter (and partly also 
more intense) light was noted; therefore, the ceiling lamp or frequently 
also additional sources of light are switched on. 
Almost without exceptions, the results from this study prove the 
existence of a ‘European’ lighting culture, manifesting itself in the duality 
of the modes of illumination. ‘European lighting culture’ refers to the 
difference between ‘brightness’ and ‘cosiness’ with reference to lighting 
which has become apparent in intercultural studies. For example, the 
26 | Mats Bladh/Helena Krantz: “Towards a Bright Future? Household Use of 
Electric Light: A Microlevel Study”, in: Energy Policy 36 (2008), 3521-30.
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differences between Japan and Norway that have been identified include 
a preference for one central source of light, suspended from the ceiling, 
which illuminates the room brightly in Japan, as opposed to a Norwegian 
preference for various smaller lamps spreading a feeling of cosiness. These 
cultural differences in lighting practices also have repercussions on the 
energy consumption: The consumption in Japanese households averages 
at 2.5 light bulbs per room; Norwegian households have an average of 
9.6.27 
To cite one interviewee of our study, these dual modes could be 
termed “illumination for a purpose” and “atmospheric illumination”, 
respectively. The first refers to central sources of light, mostly suspended 
from the ceiling, which illuminate the room and are mostly connected 
with brightness, immediacy, glaring or artificial and cold light; sometimes, 
they are compared to the ambience of offices and associated with the 
corresponding tasks and activities (work) which mostly require bright 
lights. “Atmospheric illumination”, in contrast, provokes associations of 
decentralised sources of light, dimmed and indirect lighting, comfort, 
warmth, tranquillity, and romance. The latter form of lighting is in most 
cases perceived as being more pleasant and associated with ideas of a 
comfortable home. The results of the present study also corroborate that 
mood is a central factor for determining lighting practices. 
The problem of the infrastructure available in the household, which 
is dated in many cases, also extends to lighting practices. Many of the 
people interviewed refer to light fittings that came with the flat or to lights 
they have become used to because they have been part of the household 
for a considerable stretch of time, and which are often seen as difficult 
to modify or regarded unsuitable for energy saving lights. Frequently, 
these fittings are chandeliers that are considered as having an extremely 
high consumption of power. However, even a source of light that has 
high-energy consumption, provokes aesthetic objections and is therefore 
perceived as problematic, can be integrated into the lighting practices 
within a prolonged process of domestication.28 It could even be integrated 
27 | Harold Wilhite/Hidetoshi Nakagami/Takashi Masuda/Yukiko Yamaga: “A 
Cross-Cultural Analysis of Household Energy Use Behaviour in Japan and Nor-
way”, in: Energy Policy 24 (1996), 799.
28 | Thomas Berker/Maren Hartmann/Yves Punie/Katie J. Ward, eds. Domesti-
cation of Media and Technology. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 2006.
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into the fittings of the dwelling, inhibiting changes. Preferences for sources 
of light integrated into the furniture are frequent, be it kitchen lights, the 
lighting of small bathroom cabinets, or the lights of a kitchen hood. They 
are either used as additional sources of light (in the evening) or as the only 
source of light (e.g. when using the toilet). Forming part of the inventory of 
the dwelling, they thus immediately suggest themselves for this use, even 
if they are extremely inefficient in their energy consumption.
Efficiency and sufficiency strategies could also be identified regarding 
lighting practices. Starting with sufficiency strategies, modesty regarding 
lighting becomes evident in many interviews, manifesting itself in 
accordingly adapted lighting. One strategy, for instance, consists of using 
the potentially available sources of light only selectively or not at all. Thus, 
chandeliers are sometimes only equipped with a part of the light bulbs (if 
some of these have broken over time they are not replaced) to dim the light. 
This could be attributed to economic reasons, but could also be related to 
the intensity of the light (too strong) in single cases. Some of the sources 
of light considered as having excessive energy consumption are only used 
scarcely or not at all (e.g. neon tubes). Moreover, using small lights instead 
of larger ones or generally reducing illumination (using light bulbs with 
less luminosity or only using one instead of many sources of lights) also 
belongs to these practices. In many households, the light emission from 
a TV set serves as the only source of illumination in the evening, justified 
with the argument of being sufficient for the activities that accompany 
watching TV. Another frequent practice is combining the light emitted by 
the TV set with a second, smaller source of light. 
Some low-income households use candles as an additional or the 
main source of light – sometimes for reasons of reducing illumination, 
sometimes because of the warmth of the light they radiate, especially in 
winter. 
Another strategy that is tightly linked to the respective heating practices 
consists in only lighting one room – in most cases, the main living room –, 
thus benefiting from the light for the adjacent rooms (e.g. the bathroom). 
A further strategy, corresponding to the widespread norm of not 
wasting energy, is the practice of switching off the lights when leaving a 
room. This is a central practice especially in those cases where children are 
being trained to save energy. The parents in these cases in turn refer back 
to their own upbringing when explaining the roots of this attitude. Often, 
this practice is being taken for granted and considered to be an evidence 
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of energy saving behaviour. However, some cases show the development 
of this attitude over time (e.g. in the case of a recent radical social descent) 
following a period of wasteful lighting.
Even if many of the people interviewed refer to more or less developed 
practices of reducing the lighting in their everyday illumination habits, 
there are many examples where a reduction is considered inadequate and 
a full illumination of the house is opted for. This seems to be the norm 
particularly in the presence of visiting friends or relatives: For visitors, the 
flat has to be bright and well-lit. Illumination, therefore, appears to be a 
way of showing respect, and brightness as opposed to saving money could 
be considered an indication of hospitality.29
Despite a considerably developed consciousness regarding energy, 
Christmas lights could be quoted as another example of abandoning the 
norm of reducing consumption. Installing these lights signifies being able 
to participate in cultural celebrations without restrictions, and therefore 
permits feeling like an integrated member of society. However, a minority 
of the interviewees appear not to reflect on their lighting practices in spite 
of their restricted conditions, nor do they show intentions of saving or 
identifying potentials for economising in their households. 
With regard to efficiency strategies, it might be of interest to ask 
whether affordable ‘minor investments’ (e.g. energy saving bulbs) which 
contribute to raising energy efficiency are carried out despite limited 
financial resources. As the results of the study show, a fifth of the 
people interviewed already shifted to using mostly compact fluorescent 
lamps; three fifth changed at least partly to energy saving lights, and the 
remaining fifth does not use them at all. Consequently, more than three 
quarters of the households are already equipped with compact fluorescent 
lamps, which reveals a strikingly high tendency in low-income households 
towards saving energy through affordable investments. 
The differences between low and high-income households that became 
apparent from the questionnaires about household appliances reveal 
that low-income households are generally already trying to operate on a 
low energy level and to implement many potential measures for saving 
energy. While households with lower incomes have 12 lamps on average 
(ranging between 2 and 34), better-off households own an averaged 32 
29 | Harold Wilhite/Loren Lutzenhiser: “Social Loading and Sustainable Con-
sumption”, in: Advances in Consumer Research 26:1 (1999), 281-87.
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lamps (ranging between 22 and 46). In low-income households, the share 
of energy-saving lights comprises 24 percent of the lamps used, whereas 
households on higher incomes only show 18 percent on average. Eight of 
the poorer households even use 100 percent compact fluorescent lamps, 
but this was not found to be the case in any of the better-off households in 
the current sample. Whereas other studies have explained the use of energy 
saving lights with motivations rooted in cost and environmental aspects30, 
the factors that clearly predominate in the impoverished households under 
investigation in the present study are mainly related to expenses.
CONCLUSION
The example of energy consumption in households with a low income 
and the problem of fuel poverty has served to illustrate the ways in which 
people from lower social classes deal with energy in the household and 
which difficulties rising energy prices, energy-inefficient dwellings and 
appliances as well as low incomes entail. Energy practices of better-off 
households were rudimentarily included for the purpose of comparison. 
What is, then, the relevance of analyses such as these? From a social 
theory perspective the analysis serves to show how social inequalities 
become manifest in energy practices, contributing to the analysis of the 
connection between social differentiation and environmentally relevant 
consumption. 
Politically, investigations of this kind are relevant in two ways: Firstly, 
policies and possible political measures for fighting fuel poverty could be 
deduced from the insights gained. The results of the NELA project clearly 
show that low-income and fuel-poor households are characterised by a 
number of energy burdens and related coping strategies. Regarding the 
structural framework, the factors that make households more vulnerable 
and are, at the same time, beyond the reach of their influence, were found to 
lie in inefficient construction features of buildings, heating technology and 
larger household appliances. Thus, if the structural framework mentioned 
here exerts a decisive negative influence on energy consumption and 
30 | Rob Wall/Tracie Crosbie: “Potential for Reducing Electricity Demand for 
Lighting in Households: An Exploratory Socio-Technical Study”, in: Energy Policy 
37 (2009), 1021-31.
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well-being, any measures to be taken would have to start from there. 
The study at hand reveals that these households have great difficulties in 
tapping their full efficiency potentials due to the cladding of the building, 
the heating technology and the household equipment. Smaller and cost-
neutral efficiency potentials are often already being exploited to a large 
part (for example, by using energy saving lights). For further measures, 
however, financial resources are often insufficient, even if there is a 
recognised need for greater efficiency in the building. It is exactly from 
this point that measures for raising the efficiency of buildings and tools 
could start, offering solutions that are ideally as cost-neutral as possible for 
the people concerned. On the long run, refurbishing the entire building 
would be the most efficient way of lowering energy costs and preventing 
fuel poverty. Besides long-term strategies like these, however, additional 
short-term measures to effectively combat fuel poverty are necessary. 
To name just a few: energy efficiency funds for the replacement of old 
devices, energy counselling tailored to the needs of fuel-poor households, 
a power-disconnection prevention system, and monthly energy bills.31 The 
proposed measures should, however, not be implemented separately and 
in an uncoordinated manner but integrated into a (national) strategy for 
the reduction of fuel poverty. 
As mentioned in the beginning, these analyses are also politically 
relevant in relation to the question of managing the transition to a 
sustainable energy system and ecological as well as social equality. In the 
discussion on climate change, ‘climate justice’ is increasingly becoming 
a relevant topic. A further focus of attention is the differences between 
various population groups and regions in their contribution to climate 
change together with the fact that they are affected by the consequences 
in different ways.32 A study from Israel on energy consumption and use 
of cars by private households, for example, calculated that the Israeli 
31 | For fur ther details see Karl-Michael Brunner/Markus Spitzer/Anja Christa-
nell: “Fuel Poverty. A Case Study of Vulnerable Households in Vienna/Austria”, in: 
ECEEE, ed. Proceedings of the 2011 ECEEE Summer Study. Stockholm: ECEEE, 
2011, 2057-68.
32 | Robin Leichenko/Adelle Thomas/Mark Barnes: “Vulnerability and Adapta-
tions to Climate Change”, in: Constance Lever-Tracy, ed. Routledge Handbook of 
Climate Change and Society. London: Routledge, 2010, 133-51.
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population with the highest income produces emissions that are 25 times 
higher than those of the population with the lowest incomes.33
Sustainable politics should take these differences and related questions 
regarding the equality of distribution into consideration. It is necessary 
to test the effects of political tools (e.g. environmental taxes or trading 
systems) on socially and economically vulnerable groups in order to 
prevent pressure in the form of excessive costs on those which contribute 
less to the exploitation of resources anyway. In order for this to happen, 
however, it is necessary to obtain more data on energy consumption of 
different social groups.  
To date, research on the socio-structural dimensions of energy 
consumption is still only fragmentary. In the face of the social challenges 
that climate change and the transition to a ‘low-carbon society’ entail, a 
more differentiated insight into energy practices of various social milieus 
and lifestyles is required. The project NELA has attempted to take a step in 
this direction.
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Societal Perceptions of  
Energy Resources

Cultural Meanings of Wood Gas as 
Automobile Fuel in Sweden, 1930-1945
Helena Ekerholm
Researchers within the social and human sciences have conducted several 
interesting historical studies on alternative fuels to petrol.1 Wood gas has 
not been given the same attention as a topic for scientific research2, despite 
the fact that wood gas was almost fully implemented in an automotive 
society, albeit for a short period of time. Although based on a variety of 
conceptual frameworks and theoretical terms, research on the history of 
alternative fuels refute the notion that technological failures have lost out 
due to a natural selection in which the better performer wins the race. 
What causes market dominance is not a clear-cut case of undisputed 
technological superiority or one-dimensional price issues. It is also not 
necessarily true that a new form of technology finds a market as soon as 
the necessary infrastructure is erected.
1 | Research for this ar ticle was funded by the Swedish Research Council Formas 
and was conducted within the programme The Fuel of the Future: A Research Pro-
gramme on the Science, Technology and Selling of Biofuels in Sweden. I would 
like to thank my colleagues in this programme, readers and participants of the 
workshop ‘Deified – Damned – Depleted: Energy as Resource, Symbol and Con-
sumer Good’ at the Deutsches Museum and for instructive comments on earlier 
manuscript drafts.
2 | For notable research on the history and user cultures of the electric vehicle 
see for example Michel Callon, Heidi Gjøen, Mikael Hård, Gijs Mom and David 
Nye. The steam engine automobile has been researched by e.g. Clay McShane, 
Mikael Hård and Andrew Jamison. Wood gas is currently researched by Camille 
Molles at L’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.
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This article investigates the cultural meanings of wood gas as an 
automobile fuel in Sweden in the 1930s and during World War II. 
I will show how the proponents for wood gas as an alternative fuel for 
automobiles understated its socio-technical problems in order to achieve 
a politically motivated socio-technical change: a national fuel transition 
from petrol to domestic alternatives. This could not be realised without the 
practical user evaluations of a sufficiently large group of pioneer users. The 
second part of this article discusses how the cultural meanings of wood 
gas changed during World War II, as user problems known to the wood 
gas proponents of the 1930s became common cultural goods. As has been 
shown by researchers of alternative fuels and of the automobile culture, 
personal transportation is more than the physical re-location from one 
place to another. It encompasses additional social values and symbolisms. 
It is therefore relevant to discuss the topic of wood gas in relation to the 
culture and ideals of an automotive age in formation. It is also interesting 
how the cultural meanings attached to wood gas related to those of other 
means of automotive propulsion, e.g. steam, electricity, petrol and ethanol. 
Goods are neutral objects, but as an integral part of an information 
system goods communicate social meanings to consumers. Consumption 
is a ritual that takes place within and generates cultural patterns. Therefore 
the commodity under scrutiny must be analysed in relation to the social 
context in which it exists and is used.3 A problem of using consumption 
theories on the wood gas case relates to the definition of consumption as 
an act or ritual performed by a free agent driven by want or desire.4 This is 
true of wood gas use during the interwar years, whereas the wood gas case 
during the war years mainly was a matter of using wood gas as automobile 
fuel or not using an automobile at all. This makes wood gas a difficult 
commodity to make sense of from a consumption perspective, but it also 
raises the question of what happens to the cultural meanings of goods 
previously purchased and used through choice when these become more 
or less forced on consumers.
3 | Mary Douglas/Baron Isherwood: The World of Goods. Towards an Anthropo-
logy of Consumption. New York: Basic Books, 1979. Reprint, London: Routledge, 
1996, 38-41, 44-45, 48-52; Arjun Appadurai: “Introduction: Commodities and 
the Politics of Value”, in: Arjun Appadurai, ed. The Social Life of Things. Commo-
dities in Cultural Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
4 | Douglas: The World of Goods, 36-37.
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In this article, I analyse wood gas as automobile fuel through policy 
ideals and praxis, technicians’ (engineers and wood gas specialist 
mechanics) assessments of wood gas, user testimonies and symbolic 
associations. The source material includes public official archives from 
state boards responsible for wood gas related issues, governmental 
commissions, parliament and government. These volumes contain a 
variety of source material types, such as correspondence within authorities 
and with individual civilians, meeting protocols, commission statements, 
formal reports from referral bodies in the official and private sectors 
and news articles. Popular press material about wood gas has also been 
accessed through the archive at Tekniska Museet (National Museum of 
Science and Technology) in Stockholm. The source material includes wood 
gas instruction publications written for wood gas users in the civilian sector 
and wood gas publications by the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering 
Sciences (Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien).
WHAT IS WOOD GAS?
Wood gasification technology is a British invention from the 19th century. 
Initially, the technology was intended for industrial production, e.g. 
ironworks and smelting-houses. Stationary gasifiers were not compact 
enough to be used for fuelling vehicles but in the interwar years wood 
gasifiers for smaller, mobile internal combustion engines were developed. 
In Sweden, interest in wood gas as an automobile fuel arose in the 1920s 
when engineer Axel Svedlund constructed the first Swedish automobile 
gasifier.5 Internationally, France and Germany were at the cutting edge, but 
wood gas as one of several alternative means of automobile propulsion also 
attracted interest in other nations with ambitions for fuel autarky, e.g. Italy, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Austria, Hungary, the Soviet Union, 
Finland, Canada, Japan, Norway and India.6
5 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas. Svenska erfarenheter från åren 
1939-1945. Stockholm: Generalstabens litografiska anstalts förlag, 1950, 1-3.
6 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetänkande, 09.12.1937, 9-12, in: Jordbruksde-
partementet, konselj 56, 12.03.1938. Riksarkivet (National Archives, Sweden), 
henceforth abbreviated RA.
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In simple terms, the wood gasifier produced combustible carbon 
monoxide gas, which was used to fuel internal combustion engines adapted 
for petrol. The gasifier could be fuelled with wood, peat or charcoal. For the 
sake of simplicity, I will use the term wood gas when referring to vehicle 
fuel gasification regardless of gasifier fuel. Because private individual 
automobility was limited during the investigated time period, especially 
during the war years, the driving and maintenance of wood gas vehicles 
was mainly an activity performed by professional bus and taxi drivers and 
repair shop personnel. Wood gas was also widely used within the military 
sector, but this paper’s main focus is the civilian sector. 
Domestic automobile fuel alternatives were interesting for Swedish 
politicians because oil production, and consequently petrol, had two 
globally universal problems: Its import was sensitive to international crises 
and in peacetime there were considerable concerns about the depletion 
of oil reserves.7 During the interwar years, contemporary observers 
witnessed a steadily expanding automotive fleet. Due to the ever increasing 
importance of the various types of motorised vehicles, combustible oils 
became indispensable.8 Sweden is a nation without direct access to oil 
reserves, a problem which needed to be addressed as the transport sector 
grew in importance. Political measures were directed both at developing 
domestic fuel alternatives and at controlling oil import.9
SUPPORTING THE FORESTRY INDUSTRY OF  
NORTHERN SWEDEN
Wood gas did not arouse much interest among elected officials until 
a crisis struck the expanding forestry industry. Early in 1930, a member 
7 | Bosse Sundin: “Från avfall till möjligheter. Etanol i början av 1900-talet”, in: 
Polhem. Uppsala: Svenska nationalkommittén för teknikhistoria, 2005, 72-74.
8 | Axel F. Enström: “Motorproblemet inom automobilindustrien”, in: Teknisk tid-
skrift: Automobil-och motorteknik, 16.04.1938, 25.
9 | Thomas Jonter: Socialiseringen som kom av sig: Sverige, oljan och USA:s pla-
ner på en ny ekonomisk världsordning 1945-1949. Stockholm: Carlssons, 1995, 
13, 98-103, 140-42; Erland Mårald: “Methanol as Future Fuel: Effor ts to Develop 
Alternative Fuels in Sweden after the Oil Crisis”, in: History and Technology 26:4 
(2010), 335-36, 341-42, 349; Sundin: “Från avfall till möjligheter”, 72-74.
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of parliament called into question the social situation of workers in 
the region of Norrland. Considered an important supplier of natural 
resources, this geographical area of Sweden was an industrially and 
economically expanding region, but it had been afflicted by reduced 
production and industry close-downs at the end of the 1920s.10 For the sake 
of general nationwide economic progression the state had to intervene. A 
governmental commission – in short called Skogssakkunniga and mainly 
consisting of leading figures within the forestry industry and its labour 
unions – was appointed to investigate how this could best be done. The 
commission’s task was to propose policy measures for increasing the sales 
of domestic forestry products, predominantly from the northern regions, 
thereby increasing profits and creating employment opportunities.11 
Skogssakkunniga was part of larger policy crisis deliberations including 
social politics and the elimination of poverty. The progress of society stood 
in direct relation to the state of domestic industries, of which forestry had 
emerged as a cornerstone.
A possibility was the automobile fuel market, as forestry could provide 
two promising fuel alternatives: wood gas and sulphite ethanol, both based 
on the profitable utilisation of forest product waste. Gasifiers could be 
fuelled with poor quality timber and brushwood while sulphite ethanol 
was derived from sulphite lye waste from pulp and cellulose production. 
Market stabilisation of these two fuels would be a step towards two 
important goals: national self-sufficiency and an expansion of one of the 
nation’s most important industries.12
The commission engineers also listed negative aspects of wood gas 
usage: poor hill-climbing and acceleration capacities, consistently lower 
speed and inconvenient user procedures such as refilling and emptying the 
gasifier. The lower engine effect and thermal value of wood gas compared 
with petrol could be parried by an increase in the engine’s compression. 
Thus, the engine effect was not considered to be affected to a degree that 
would disqualify wood gas as an important fuel, especially considering that 
fuel costs with wood gas would be reduced to 70 percent of the price of 
petrol in 1932. Appropriate wood gas users were state authorities, boards of 
10 | Parliamentary bill 1930:38, second chamber.
11 | Parliamentary bill 1930:38, second chamber, 17; SOU 1933:2. Stockholm: 
Jordbruksdepartementet, 1933, 9, 15.
12 | SOU 1933:2, 164-72, 180, 186.
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road administration and farmers with adjoining forestry from which cheap 
gasifier fuel was easily accessible.13
In some parts of the report, the commission expressed optimistic hopes 
and visions for the future establishment of wood gas as a fuel, at least for 
the users mentioned above. But optimism seems to have been rhetorical. 
Although presenting measures for promoting increased wood gas usage, 
the commission made specific mention of a prevailing opinion among 
engineers that the technological development of charcoal gasification 
fuelling had not made significant progress, neither in Sweden nor abroad, 
during the preceding years. Nevertheless, nationalist incentives to improve 
national finances and diminish dependence on imported petrol motivated 
the introduction of a gasifier loan fund, which could aid civilian gasifier 
investments. The idea behind introducing gasifier loans was to achieve 
more widespread wood gas use without spending too much public means 
on a form of technology in its experimental phase. The consequence was 
that large costs and risks of politically desirable socio-technical change were 
transferred to private sector companies and some individual motorists.14
Wood gas technology was new and untried and could prove to be a 
risky investment, especially for farms and businesses that had felt the blow 
of financial crisis in the early 1930s. To sweeten the deal, the commission 
argued that the terms and interests of the loan should be especially 
favourable in order to attract loan applicants. This included compensation 
for expected infrastructural problems, as the commission suspected that 
access to charcoal briquettes would become difficult for wood gas pioneers.15 
If prematurely introduced and promoted, gasifiers could become labelled 
a bad investment whose teething problems would become symbolically 
confirmed as unavoidable socio-technical characteristics. 
In order to avoid negative wood gas associations among prospective 
users, loan stipulations were designed to counteract unreflected 
investments. Due to uncertainties regarding quality, loan applications had 
to be approved by technical experts within academia. A market overflowing 
with badly functioning gasifiers would, according to the commission, 
fail to produce the desired effect: the continuing development of wood 
gas technology. The loan fund was also designed in accordance with 
13 | SOU 1933:2, 94-95, 183, 186, 190.
14 | SOU 1933:2, 185, 187, 190; Governmental bill 1932:212, 11, 15, 17.
15 | SOU 1933:2, 187-89.
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nationalist sentiments. Eligible loan applicants were Swedish citizens in 
sound economic circumstances and joint-stock companies who wished to 
purchase a charcoal-fuelled gasifier for use within the country. The latter 
condition was stipulated in accordance with the proposal’s main aim, 
namely to promote national industry through increasing sales of domestic 
timber and job opportunities within Sweden.16 
IMMEDIATE DISAPPOINTMENT
Initially, the loan fund seemed successful. After its introduction in 1932 
gasifier manufacturer AB Gasgenerator received 250 orders for gasifiers, 
compared to 57 orders placed during the six months preceding the 
introduction. Interest had been so considerable that demand had surpassed 
supply, causing delivery problems.17 Due to high consumer demand, an 
additional 500,000 SEK (approximately 15 million SEK of today’s value) 
was added to the loan fund for the budget year of 1933/1934.18
During the same time period, however, dissatisfied wood gas pioneers 
dismantled their gasifiers. Low fuel effect, questionable dependability, 
few wood gas education opportunities for the users, inferior service and 
difficulties in acquiring charcoal put wood gas at a disadvantage. In 1932, 
201 wood gas automobiles were in use. Gasifier producers received orders 
for an additional 672 gasifiers. Almost all of these orders were cancelled 
within a year. Approved gasifier loans dropped from 225 in 1933, to four 
in 1934 and 1935 respectively. In 1936, no loans at all were extended and 
in 1937 only a single loan was approved. The 500,000 SEK that had been 
added to the loan fund budget in 1933 were therefore not utilised.19
The loan fund fiasco illustrates a discrepancy between policy 
anticipations on the one hand and user experience on the other. More 
than double the original loan fund sum was added for a budget year 
16 | SOU 1933:2, 1933, 187, 189.
17 | SOU 1933:2, 94-95.
18 | Parliamentary communication 1933:210. Money value recalculation 
through the National Museum of Economy’s online re-calculator. http://www.
myntkabinettet.se/web/Hem.aspx, Accessed 01.01.2011.
19 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetänkande, 09.12.1937, 13, 16, 28, in: Jord-
bruksdepartementet konselj 56, 12.03.1938, RA.
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when user interest dropped to near insignificancy. Wood gas had seemed 
promising but optimism was swayed by user discontent. For government 
politicians and high-ranking military officials the fuel issue was no less 
important than it had been in 1932. Another governmental commission 
(Gasgeneratorsakkunniga) was initiated in 1937 to examine how wood gas 
users could overcome their strained relationship with the new technology. 
Just as in 1932, the well-being of the Swedish forestry industry was an 
important factor in 1937. However, the main objective behind appointing 
Gasgeneratorsakkunniga was to safeguard military preparedness. The 
mission was to investigate the technical and economic preconditions for 
the wider use of wood gas for vehicles and how to guarantee sufficient 
production of gasifiers in peacetime – creating an infrastructure that would 
ease a fuel transition should war break out. Sulphite ethanol fuel was 
briefly addressed as a potential petrol surrogate but then dismissed, since 
it could not be produced in satisfactory amounts. Wood gas was deemed a 
more reliable surrogate fuel in both civilian and military sectors.20 
Although the views regarding the usability of wood gas had changed, the 
commission saw questionable loan benefits and infrastructural problems 
as more plausible explanations for the loan fund failure. Infrastructures 
had been insufficient: no streamlined industrial production of gasifiers, 
too few education possibilities for wood gas user and inefficient charcoal 
distribution. Also, the price of charcoal had risen, increasing fuel costs by 
40 percent in 1937 compared with 1932. Choosing wood gas over petrol was 
thus no longer a cost-saving measure for the user.21 
During their investigations, the Gasgeneratorsakkunniga commission 
received letters expressing a variety of opinions from the wood gas 
pioneers of 1932. One factory owner claimed he had been fooled into the 
most deplorable investment he had ever made. After his chauffeur quit his 
employment in refusal to use wood gas, the factory owner had dismantled 
the gasifier and urged the state to cover the expenses he had incurred for 
20 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Betänkande, 08.07.1939, 6-8, in: Jordbruksde-
partementet, konselj 58, 29.09.1939, RA; Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetän-
kande, 09.12.1937, 7. Jordbruksdepartementet, konselj 56, 12.03.1938, RA.
21 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetänkande, 09.12.1937, 25, in: Jordbruksde-
partementet, konselj 56, 12.03.1938, RA.
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trying out wood gas.22 Experiences with unsuccessful wood gas usage 
had caused loan takers difficulties. Not only had gasifiers of questionable 
quality and durability been a bad investment. Some loan takers had 
incurred additional costs brought about by engine failure.23 After four 
years of using the Svedlund gasifier, another company compared wood 
gas usage to that of Lättbentyl (a 75 percent petrol and 25 percent ethanol 
blend fuel), arriving at the conclusion that the truck fuelled by wood gas 
had required two weeks longer repair service than the Lättbentyl-fuelled 
counterpart. Not only had maintenance been more time-consuming, the 
wood gas fuelled vehicle had a lower average speed than the vehicle fuelled 
by the petrol-ethanol blend.24 
NE W EVALUATIONS
Early accounts of user experiences were deemed subjective and unreliable 
by Gasgeneratorsakkunniga, who effected systematic user evaluations 
by equipping ten test groups within state road administration and 
private sector companies with wood gas vehicles. Usage was regularly 
documented and evaluated by users and the commission alike.25 Although 
some deemed wood gas user-friendly and reliable26, commonly reported 
operational problems included user inconvenience, poor effect due to moist 
charcoal, burnt soot filters and nozzles and starting difficulties. For two test 
groups, burnt soot filters and a faulty rubber packing led to severe engine 
failures requiring thorough repairs since soot and small gravel had leaked 
into the system. More dramatic examples of operational problems were 
carburettor fires due to gas accumulation under the engine bonnet prior 
22 | Letter from Oscar Rylander, 04.03.1937, in: Gasgeneratorkommittén 1937, 
RA.
23 | Statement from Kommerskollegium (National Board of Trade), 2-3, in: Gas-
generatorkommittén 1937, RA.
24 | Letter arrived 26.04.1937, 2, in: Gasgeneratorkommittén 1937, RA.
25 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetänkande II, 07.02.1939, 3, in: Jordbruksde-
partementet, konselj 58, 29.09.1939, RA.
26 | Letter dated 04.08.1937, 1-3, in: Gasgeneratorkommittén 1937, RA; Gas-
generatorkommittén, Betänkande, 08.07.1939, 9, in: Jordbruksdepartementet, 
konselj 58, 29.09.1939, RA.
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to gasifier ignition, and an explosion in a gas purifier. Roughly half of the 
difficulties could be repaired in only one or two hours by the driver, but the 
commission stated repeatedly that wood gas usage required knowledgeable 
and interested drivers, whose patience would not be strained by frequent 
small repairs.27 
Despite this, the commission stated that technological development 
had advanced to a point where wood gas was a satisfactory surrogate fuel.28 
In peacetime, wood gas was not a fuel technology that would replace petrol 
for all types of automobility, but it would serve the needs of certain user 
groups and sectors. Usage preconditions included a high total vehicle 
weight, sufficient engine cylinder volume and continuous long distance 
driving with few stops. It was concluded that wood gas was best suited 
for heavy trucks used for long transports of approximately 200 kilometres 
and ten hours of driving, during which gasifier maintenance was said to 
possibly constitute a welcome break.29 The availability of qualified service 
personnel also made the military sector a potentially appropriate wood gas 
consumer.30 
WORLD WAR II – THE WOOD GAS ER A
The outbreak of World War II finally brought the wood gas issue to the fore. 
Not only had the total number of civilian vehicles increased; the armed 
forces were also highly dependent on motorised transportation. In the 
autumn of 1939, political efforts endeavoured to smoothen the transition 
from petrol to wood gas by addressing infrastructural problems. A state 
27 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetänkande II, 07.02.1939, tabell III:1-12, in: 
Jordbruksdepartementet, konselj 58, 29.09.1939, RA; Gasgeneratorkommit-
tén, Betänkande, 08.07.1939, 22a, in: Jordbruksdepartementet, konselj 58, 
29.09.1939, RA.
28 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Betänkande, 08.07.1939, 30, 62, in: Jordbruksde-
partementet, konselj 58, 29.09.1939, RA.
29 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetänkande II, 07.02.1939, 20, in: Jordbruks-
departementet, konselj 58, 29.09.1939, RA; Gasgeneratorkommittén, Betänkan-
de 08.07.1939, 22a, in: Jordbruksdepartementet, konselj 58, 29.09.1939, RA.
30 | Gasgeneratorkommittén, Delbetänkande, 09.12.1937,32-33, in: Jordbruks-
departementet, konselj 56, 12.03.1938, RA.
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wood gas board, Gengasnämnden, was set up to further the technical 
advancement of wood gas. To streamline its related trade, the state-
controlled Svenska gengasaktiebolaget was launched in the summer of 1940 
to distribute and supervise the trade of wood and charcoal.31 
Gengasnämnden stated that operational disturbances and high 
conversion costs put motorists off wood gas. The only factors that could 
make motorists use wood gas were a state forced fuel shift and the threat 
of Swedish capital disappearing to foreign petroleum interests. However, 
Gengasnämnden did not want to present drastic measures to achieve a fuel 
transition through scare tactics. Instead, endeavours were aimed at making 
a transition attractive to consumers by solving immediate problems such 
as the insufficient gasifier fuel distribution and hazards linked to technical 
flaws. Potential wood gas users would be won over with tax exemptions.32 
Another issue was the plethora of different gasifiers.33 Streamlining and 
rationalising all levels of wood gas infrastructure was essential for a large-
scale wood gas launch. 
With the occupation of Norway and Denmark in the spring of 1940, 
the primary import routes of petrol to Sweden were cut off. Petrol import 
dropped dramatically, forcing a fuel transition from petrol to wood gas.34 
Fuel ethanol and shale oil were reserved for emergency rescue automobiles 
and some military vehicles, whose purpose disallowed time-consuming 
maintenance and starting procedures. Electric propulsion was used to 
some extent for remodelled petrol-fuelled internal combustion engine 
trucks operating in city traffic and for motorcycles. Approximately 16 
percent of all heavy motorcycles in 1942 and 1943 were electric.35 But wood 
gas was the primary automobile fuel.
31 | Governmental bill 1940:298.
32 | Protocol 21.12.1939, 1-2, 4, 6, in: Gengasnämnden, vol. A1. Statens brän-
slekommission (1940), RA; Protocol No. 27 23.11.1939, appendix C, 1-5. Gen-
gasnämnden, vol. A2. Statens bränslekommission (1940), RA; Governmental bill 
1940:298, 12.
33 | Governmental bill 1940:298, 12.
34 | Protocol 2.11.1944, 7, in: Drivmedelsutredningen 1944, vol. 3, RA; Kom-
merskollegium: Sveriges offentliga statistik, handel.
35 | Bevillningsutskottet (the Committee on Supply), report 1945:33, 2; Pär Gie-
row: “Svenska er farenheter av elbilen”, in: Teknisk tidskrift, 18.05.1946, 485, 
490, 493.
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Switching to wood gas was no longer a matter of choice; it was a 
necessity for those wanting to continue to use an automobile. Although 
bus and truck transportation was maintained at a level close to that prior 
to the war, the number of registered civilian passenger cars dropped from 
circa 180,000 in 1939 to circa 32,000 in 1941.36 In only one year, from 1940 
to 1941, the number of civilian wood gas vehicles increased from 9,141 to 
68,872. In 1943, it peaked at 73,853 wood gas automobiles, constituting 
around 90 percent of the land-bound civilian motorised transportation in 
Sweden.37 
A substantial number of passenger car owners did not acquire gasifiers, 
but deregistered their vehicles, putting them out of operation. This is not 
necessarily proof of widespread antipathy towards wood gas. It could also 
be a result of infrastructural problems. Moreover, purchasing a gasifier 
caused additional expenses that the ordinary household might not have 
been prepared to prioritise in times of crisis, unless individual automotive 
transportation was of vital importance. During the interwar years, private 
ownership of passenger cars and motorcycles was a luxury enjoyed by only 
a minority of the Swedish population. The outbreak of the war further 
diminished this minority. It is possible that the cultural perceptions of 
wood gas were affected not only by the practical issues linked to driving 
a wood gas fuelled automobile, but also by the fact that the majority of 
passenger car and motorcycle owners could not use their vehicles at all. 
Wood gas perception was effected by the experience of enforced privation 
that was characteristic of wartime consumption restrictions in general.
Although there were still infrastructural problems such as limited 
access to gasifier fuel38, wood gas was now the fuel that upheld motorised 
transportation on a diminished scale. Initially, contemporary observers 
were optimistic regarding the future of wood gas (Fig. 1). Although 
technically a wartime surrogate, the widespread usage was seen by 
enthusiastic optimists as the breakthrough of wood gas that would carry 
over into peacetime. If and when petrol returned, wood gas would retain 
36 | Statistiska centralbyrån: Statistisk årsbok för Sverige. Stockholm 1924-
1940, 1949.
37 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas, 10; Motormännens Riksförbund: 
Motormännens gengasbok. Stockholm 1940. Reprint, Stockholm 1941, 12-13.
38 | Parliament communication No. 93, of the extraordinary session of the Riks-
dag, 1940.
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a market niche. The crisis meant an opportunity for wood gas to prove its 
worth for users sceptical towards new technologies.39 
Figure 1: “I am Wood. The Automobile Fuel of the 
Future.” During the first war years, advertisements for 
Swedish gasifier manufacturers expressed optimistic 
expectations of a bright future for wood gas usage.
39 | See for example “En knuff framåt”, Aftonbladet 24.09.1940; “Gengasens 
definitiva genombrott i Sverige”, Aftonbladet 16.11.1940; “Gengasen surrogat 
eller framtidens motorbränsle?”, Aftonbladet 12.11.1940; “Gengasen är här för 
att stanna!”, Gengas-journalen (special edition of Vecko-journalen) 17.11.1940; 
Motormännen: Motormännens gengasbok, 7, 63; “Jag tror på gengasen…”, Bil-
journalen No. 2 1940, 3; “Se till att ni köper ett godkänt aggregat!”, Biljournalen 
No. 2 1940, 10; “Philipsons står rustat!”, Biljournalen No. 2 1940, 24. Bräns-
letekniska kommittén vid Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengasdagen 8 juni 
1943: Meddelande och diskussionsinlägg, Meddelande nr 15, 1943, 3.
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HA Z ARDS
One of the most defining negative user associations of wood gas was 
danger, specifically in the forms of fire and poisoning. Between 1939 and 
1944, 2,865 wood gas related fires were reported. The fire frequency was at 
its highest during the first two years of widespread wood gas usage, before 
fires caused by erroneous technical design were averted as lessons learnt 
led to new safety regulations. 
Figure 2: “Well Equipped during Gasifier Emptying and  
Refilling. Protect Yourself against Soot and Heat.” Due to the  
unpredictability and hazard associated with wood gas usage,  
protective gear was marketed, although with questionable success. 
Gengasnämnden received several reports of flames shooting out from 
open gasifier fuel filling shutters, inspection hatches and ash container 
shutters, leading to burn injuries on the arms and faces of those standing 
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in front of shutters.40 To avert fires caused by careless gasifier cleaning, 
locations especially assigned for emptying gasifiers were decreed. Wood 
gas fuelled automobiles had to carry fire extinguishers and a ten litre vessel 
for emergency fire extinguishing. Fires ascribed to the human factor also 
declined as users became more adept through practical experience (Fig. 
2).41 
Another hazard connected to wood gas usage was acute and chronic 
carbon monoxide poisoning. Emissions from petrol-fuelled cars consisted 
of 6-7 percent carbon monoxide, compared with 20-30 percent for wood 
gas. When inhaled, even in small doses, carbon monoxide blocks the blood 
cells’ absorption of oxygen, causing suffocation. In 1940, 60 cases of wood 
gas induced acute carbon monoxide poisoning became known, seven of 
which resulted in death. The following year the number of known cases 
had increased to 901 (17 deaths) and 1,135 (eleven deaths) in 1942.42 During 
the war years, carbon monoxide poisoning was so strongly associated with 
wood gas usage that it often was referred to as wood gas poisoning, rather 
than carbon monoxide poisoning.
Wood gas users and automobile mechanics were advised to never 
work alone and to keep a close watch on co-workers’ state of health.43 As 
most automotive transportation and repair during World War II took place 
within the professional transport sector, carbon monoxide poisoning was 
mainly discussed as a work place hazard.44 Particularly dangerous aspects 
were gasifier ventilation and the gas accumulation after the engine was 
shut off. Gas could also leak into vehicles during driving – a consequence 
of poor welding and faulty packings. The cold winter season proved 
particularly problematic as employers and workers were less inclined to air 
out their premises with cold outdoor air. According to the Gengasnämnden 
40 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas, 328-331; Gengasnämnden, vol. 
EIIbc:2. Statens bränslekommissionen (1940). RA; Gengasnämnden, vol. EIIc:1. 
Statens bränslekommission (1940), RA.
41 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas, 331, 333, 341; Motormännen: 
Motormännens gengasbok, 71-73.
42 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas, 316-317; Gengas. Stockholm: 
Sveriges läkarförbunds förlagsaktiebolag, 1943, 7.
43 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas, 318; Motormännen: Motormän-
nens gengasbok, 78.
44 | See for example Governmental bill 1945:215, 7.
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employed engineer Nils Gustafsson, faulty gasifiers and the users’ 
negligence of safety instructions were equally common causes of carbon 
monoxide poisonings.45 According to carbon monoxide specialist medical 
doctor Ernst B. Salén, traffic accidents increased as a direct result of the 
obscured judgement of drivers in the early onset of acute carbon monoxide 
poisoning.46
Awareness of the poisoning risk linked to wood gas became widespread, 
resulting in several brochures on wood gas safety and chapters in wood 
gas maintenance instruction books and leaflets.47 Labour unions and state 
authorities responded to the poisoning risk by decreeing that warning 
signs should be hung up in all work places where wood gas was used. 
Carbon monoxide indicators and information campaigns became relatively 
effective tools for decreasing the percentage of carbon monoxide poisonings 
with a lethal outcome from 11.7 percent in 1940 to less than one percent in 
1942.48 
Acute carbon monoxide poisoning was the first known poisoning 
hazard of wood gas. Gradually, however, attention was also directed towards 
chronic carbon monoxide poisoning (during the war more commonly 
referred to as chronic wood gas poisoning). Because of the correlation to 
wood gas usage it was defined as an occupational disease during the war 
years. The hypothesis behind the diagnosis was that constant exposure to 
small doses of carbon monoxide over a prolonged period of time caused a 
state of lethargy. The most common symptoms included fatigue, headache, 
vertigo, broken sleep, apathy, change in temperament and cardiac 
symptoms. Due to the diffuse nature of the condition and the difficulties 
in proving a somatic origin to the condition, the diagnosis became the 
subject of a post-war medical-scientific controversy.49 Regardless of the 
45 | Gengas. Stockholm: Sveriges läkarförbunds förlagsaktiebolag, 1943, 
19-25.
46 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas, 332.
47 | Tore Leonhart: “Kontroversiell förgif tningsepidemi lade grund för yrkesmedi-
cinen”, in: Läkartidningen 102:14 (2005), 1062.
48 | Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien: Gengas, 318; Motormännen: Motormän-
nens gengasbok, 325-26, 333-43.
49 | Helena Ekerholm: “Gengas och ohälsa. Den medicinsk-vetenskapliga kon-
troversen kring kronisk koloxidförgif tning 1944-1961”, in: Lychnos. Uppsala: Lär-
domshistoriska samfundet, 2010.
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scientific controversy surrounding it, chronic carbon monoxide poisoning 
was often pinpointed as a serious risk of wood gas usage. From 1943 to 
1944, the officially recognised cases of chronic carbon monoxide poisoning 
increased from circa 300 to circa 1,600.50 For labour unions and Sveriges 
kommunistiska parti (the Swedish communist party represented in 
Parliament) combatting chronic carbon monoxide poisoning became a 
work place safety issue. Necessary measures could not wait for medical 
science to resolve the controversy.51 Wood gas usage, with its negative 
health effects, thus became a political issue for left-wing organisations and 
labour unions. 
TROUBLESOME MAINTENANCE
As the wood gas commission had stated in the interwar years, the 
preconditions for successful wood gas use were substantial user interest in 
and knowledge of the socio-technical characteristics of wood gas. However, 
not all drivers or repair shop personnel could summon up sufficient 
enthusiasm. Employers who had the good fortune of finding employees 
with the necessary skills for dealing with wood gas ran the risk of losing 
their wood gas specialist to the conscription army.52 The specific wood 
gas driving technique demanded special attention from the driver.53 Apart 
from the extra workload of emptying the gasifier and then, carefully and 
with precision, refilling and lighting it again, which in itself was a process 
that could take up to 15 minutes, driving a wood gas propelled vehicle 
required a different driving technique from that used by petrol-driven 
vehicles. The driver had to keep a constant eye on the air-gas mixture 
proportion in order to avoid engine stops. Engine rpm needed to be kept 
50 | Preliminary report from Sabbatsbergs sjukhus, 21.09.1945, in: Drivmedels-
utredningen 1944, vol 1, RA; Sveriges officiella statistik/ Riksförsäkringsanstal-
ten: Socialstatistik. Olycksfall i arbete. 1938-1951, tables 11a-b.
51 | Governmental bill 1945:215; Parliamentary bill 1945:348, second cham-
ber; Statsutskottet (Budget Committee), formal report 1945:68, 6-7. 
52 | Letters from Aktiebolaget Lovén & Co 07.05.1940 and Motorkompaniet Lin-
der & Forsberg 26.04.1940, in: Gengasnämnden, vol EIa:4. Statens bränslekom-
mission (1940), RA.
53 | Motormännens Riksförbund: Motormännens gengasbok, 63.
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at a constant level, which entailed energetic gear shifting. Stops needed 
to be kept to a minimum, both in occurrence and length of time. After 
three hours the gasifier had to be completely restarted.54 Also, due to a 
relatively low thermal value, wood gas propelled vehicles were slower, had 
poorer acceleration and hill climbing capacity than petrol and ethanol-
fuelled automobiles. Wood gas specific waste such as odour, grime and 
cinders, forced authorities to decree premises for starting, cleaning and 
maintenance of wood gasifiers.55 Wood gas maintenance was described as 
specifically unfit for women and minors, due to the difficulties of adapting 
to wood gas user practice. But imagery of women engaged in wood gas 
maintenance was sometimes used to illustrate the simplicity of wood gas 
use in gasifier manufacturers’ marketing strategies and cheerful articles in 
popular press.56 If women could use wood gas, then anyone could.
Although it could be used in a large number of application fields, 
wood gas did not have the multifunctional, easy-usage qualities of liquid-
fuelled internal combustion engine automobiles. In this capacity, wood 
gas vehicles could be likened to electric and steam vehicles, which also 
had socio-technical characteristics seen as being disadvantageous within 
automobile culture: slowness, starting procedures with higher demands 
54 | Motormännen: Motormännens gengasbok, 31-32, 53-59; Carl Skånberg: 
Gengasboken. Stockholm: Saxon & Lindströms förlag, 1940, 51-53.
55 | “Våldsam reaktion mot gengaslukten tvingar myndigheterna till hand-
ling. Generalplan för 70 ‘gengaskarantäner’ framlägges i Stockholm. Chauf-
för som slaggade på gatan fick två tänder utslagna”, in: Nya dagligt allehanda 
09.01.1941; “Att slagga på kvällen – medel mot gengasos. Illaluktande ny-
tändning på gatan ofrånkomlig, men det rör sig...”, in: Svenska Dagbladet, 
12.01.1941. Both ar ticles from volume 5:45 at Tekniska museets motorhistor-
iska samling, (Archive, Tekniska museet) Stockholm. See also advertising for the 
gasifiers Vedi and Koli, which were advertised as clean, easy-use gasifiers that 
would “spare your suit” and make driving a “‘pure’ pleasure”, in: vol. L7, Tekniska 
museets motorhistoriska samling, (Archive, Tekniska museet) Stockholm.
56 | See letter from Lovén & Co, 07.05.1940, in: Gengasnämnden, vol EIa:4. 
Statens bränslekommission (1940), RA; Communication to Folkhushållningsde-
partementet from R. Bennet, 17.04.1940, 9, in: Gengasnämnden EIa:6. Statens 
bränslekommission (1940), RA. See also photo of women in wood gas related 
occupation in: Biljournalen 2, 1940, 16.
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for user effort and a symbolic label of old-fashionedness.57 Like wood gas 
vehicles, the steam automobile was considered dirty and dangerous. Fear 
was a common negative association with the steam engine58, and was also 
one of the most defining perceptions of wood gas. But a comparison also 
shows considerable differences between these three automobile types. The 
sources suggest that wood gas usage was seen primarily as an occupational 
activity entrenched in masculine working-class symbolism, whereas the 
use of an electric vehicle encompassed feminine higher strata coding.59 
The defining qualities of the wood gas, electric and steam automobiles 
were not in line with user practice ideals: trouble-free operation, long 
uninterrupted driving distances, high speed and multi-functionality.
PE TROL RE TURNS
As the prospect of peace appeared on the horizon, there was evidence in 
the popular press of growing hopes for a future without wood gas. The 
assessments of wood gas were, however, ambiguous. On the one hand, it had 
enabled vehicle transportation for private and enterprise consumers alike 
during a time of great hardship. On the other hand it was inconvenient.60 
57 | Mikael Hård/Andrew Jamison: “Alternative Cars: The Contrasting Stories of 
Steam and Diesel Automotive Engines”, in: Technology in Society 19:2 (1997), 
148-49.
58 | Clay McShane: Down the Asphalt Path. The Automobile and the American 
City. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, 97.
59 | About the properties of the electric vehicle see Gijs Mom: The Electric Ve-
hicle. Technology and Expectations in the Automobile Age. Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, 128, 150, 278-81.
60 | “Moren kan gå”, in: Dagens Nyheter, 03.11.1944; “Bränslet skapar nä-
stan panik i bussbolag och verkstäder”, in: Stockholms-tidningen, 18.10.1945. 
Both from volume 5:45 at Tekniska museets motorhistoriska samling, (Archive, 
Tekniska museet) Stockholm. See also: “Moren har g jor t sin plikt, moren går, 
säger gengasman”, in: Dagens nyheter, 02.11.1944; “Gengasen högst impop-
ulär bland vår or ts trafikbilägare”, in: Lidköpings-tidningen, 25.10.1944; “Fort-
sätter Ni med gengasen efter kriget? 100 svara NEJ – d.v.s. under förutsättning 
att bensinen inte blir alltför dyr”, in: Aftonbladet, 23.07.1944; “Försvinner gen-
gasen med kriget? Motormännen spå återgång till bensindrif t”, Mellersta Skåne, 
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In competition with other ‘strong’ and ‘powerful’ fuels it was expected 
to become a fuel to look back on, rather than having hopeful visions of. 
News articles on the topic of automobile fuel mainly focused on the less 
attractive characteristics of wood gas usage: messy maintenance, low effect 
and hazard. There is also an interesting comparison to ethanol which was 
the other main fuel alternative in Sweden during the war years. Although 
petrol and ethanol have been in on-and-off contestation for decades, they 
are quite similar when compared with other fuel alternatives. Apart from 
adjusting the engine for one or the other, user practice required few, if any, 
adjustments. Automobile design aimed at constructing engines of higher 
speeds, with ever increasing rpm and more horsepower, as these have 
been desired socio-technical characteristics of an automobile, symbolising 
the independence of the modern life-style.61 Speed, covered distance and 
maintenance procedures were technical characteristics similar enough to 
make petrol and ethanol symbolic equals. Whereas a bus propelled with 
liquid fuels was ‘real’, a wood gas fuelled bus was something else, even 
if it performed essentially the same task, namely the transport of people 
from point A to point B. Automobility entailed freedom of mobility 
with high speed and power and a minimum of operational hassles. The 
passenger car served as a symbol of modernity and development.62 None 
of these attributes were credited to wood gas usage. For the contemporary 
12.08.1944. Examples of ar ticles which address the usefulness of wood gas dur-
ing war time, in spite of substantial user problems: “‘Gif tburkens’ saga ej slut i 
och med det att kriget upphör”, in: Aftonbladet, 06.11.1944; “Gengasen får stor 
uppgif t även i fred, anser Svedlund”, in: Örebro-kuriren, 04.11.1944. All from 
Drivmedelsutredningen 1944, vol. 1, RA.
61 | Tom McCarthy: Auto Mania. Cars, Consumers and the Environment. New Ha-
ven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007, 28, 253, 262; Wolfgang Sachs: For Love of 
the Automobile. Looking Back into the History of Our Desires. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1992, 91-124.
62 | Georgine Clarsen: Eat My Dust. Early Women Motorists. Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, 158; Olle Hagman: Bilen, naturen och det 
moderna: om natursynens omvandlingar i det svenska bilsamhället. Göteborg: 
Socialantropologiska institutionen, 1999, 69-72; Sachs: For Love of the Automo-
bile, 8-9; Virginia Scharff: Taking the Wheel. Women and the Coming of the Motor 
Age. New York: Free Press, 1991. Reprint, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press 1992, 165-66.
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observer, the use of wood gas did not correlate to the ideals of modernity.
Instead, the characteristics of wood gas usage can be likened to those of 
the horse and carriage at the beginning of the 20th century: powerlessness, 
slowness, tangible dirt, danger and frailty.63 General Manager of Svenska 
gengasaktiebolaget, Gunnar Magnusson, concluded that the Swedes’ 
inherent dislike of the relatively troublesome and dirty gasifier maintenance 
was likely to cause a general return to petrol.64 Similar sentiments were 
aired at a confidential meeting held in November 1944, at which civil 
servants responsible for fuel issues and representatives for the automobile 
industry discussed the future of wood gas. The meeting was arranged by 
the Swedish government to foresee the future of automobile fuels during 
peacetime. Although representatives for the gasifier production industry 
were hopeful, or at least gave that impression, others concluded that 
without incentives such as tax exemptions, most wood gas users would 
dismantle their gasifiers at the first possible opportunity. The army, some 
state authorities and farms were mentioned as possible wood gas using 
sectors in the future, although the participants at the meeting had varying 
opinions on the usability of wood gas even for these users.65 
In 1948, Gengasaktiebolaget was dissolved. Although wood gas usage 
was still of value for military purposes, in the civilian sector it was not 
continued as petrol import was resumed. The loan fund which had not 
been used since World War II, was discontinued in 1961 as the social 
democratic Minister for Agriculture thought it unnecessary to retain the 
loan funds merely for the sake of military preparedness.66 
63 | For the horse carriage see Sachs: For Love of the Automobile, 1992, 5-9.
64 | “Moren har g jor t sin plikt, Moren går, säger gengasman”, in: Dagens nyheter, 
02.11.1944; KAK, gengasenkät, appendix 5, 3, 18, in: Drivmedelsutredningen 
1944, vol 2, RA.
65 | Meeting protocol 02.11.1944, in: Drivmedelsutredningen 1944, vol. 3, RA. 
For information about the meeting participants affiliation, see short meeting pro-
tocol summary, 7, in: Drivmedelsutredningen 1944, vol. 1, RA.
66 | Budget bill 1961:1, appendix 31:6; Parliamentary communication 1961:6.
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CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
At the outbreak of World War II, the replacement of petrol with wood gas 
was no longer a policy vision but a necessity. As wood gas usage became 
more common, so did voices airing discontent with the drawbacks of wood 
gas. Influential trade unions representing professional wood gas workers 
cooperated with equally influential figures in the medical profession to 
pursue the debate on workplace safety. Wood gas became symbolically 
labelled as being hazardous. Although the negative health effects of wood 
gas were probably the main concern, the other characteristics did little to 
award it even a rhetorical civilian market niche in peacetime. Users were 
not ready to make the necessary adjustments to the socio-technical traits of 
wood gas. Furthermore, one of the most important political arguments for 
promoting wood gas in the interwar years had been to widen the market for 
forestry products. Rebuilding Europe after World War II, however, meant 
increased sales for Swedish forestry. There were no longer an economic 
crisis and production surplus motivating state initiatives for wood gas 
promotion.
Although the use of wood gas was in line with the idea of basing 
Sweden’s wealth on the forestry industry, wood gas breached the standards 
set by ideologies more influential in daily life, namely automotive culture 
and progress-oriented ideals. Wood gas for automotive propulsion was a 
chronologically younger invention, but petrol (and to some extent ethanol) 
propulsion had the status of symbolic modernity for interwar and World 
War II automobile users. The symbolic connotations of surrogate and war 
gave wood gas a dating, a kind of ‘best-before’ label, which strengthened 
the symbolic division between wood gas as outmoded and low-tech, and 
liquid fuels as innately modern.
Viewed from an environmental perspective, the contemporary 
definition of dirt put wood gas at a disadvantage. The sooty refuse and 
odorous exhausts from wood gas were highly tangible; petrol emissions 
were discreet to the eye, hands and nose. To sum up, if wood gas propulsion 
meant reversing progress and moving back in time, the use of liquid fuels, 
especially petrol, was the self-evident choice for the future.
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Missing Green in the Black Gold 
Environment in the Public Debate on West Siberian Oil 
Production from the 1970s to the Present
Valentina Roxo
West Siberia’s substantial oil reserves have played a central role in Russia’s 
geopolitical and economic rebirth. West Siberia is Russia’s most highly 
developed oil province, producing 78 percent of all Russian oil. The process 
of development, which started in the late 1960s, has been characterized by 
a minimal regard for environmental protection, preservation of cultural 
properties, or effective consultation with indigenous peoples. Over the last 
50 years from a poor, sparsely populated area (around 120,000 in 1960) 
there emerged a highly industrialized region with a population of 15 million 
and the highest gross regional product. 
The choice of West Siberia as the regional focus of my study has to do 
with the uniqueness of this area, which despite its remoteness, mirrors the 
entirety of Russia in several respects: Geographically, its territory stretches 
from the northern to the southern state borders, including almost all of 
Russia’s climate zones. From a historical perspective, the region has 
experienced all major stages of development, typical for most Russian 
territory: conquest by the expanding Russian state, establishment of military 
and later total political control, agricultural cultivation, development of 
the processing industry along with the construction of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway, and forced industrialization. Ethnically, the region’s population 
includes all three groups represented in the Russian population – Slavic, 
Turkic, and Finno-Ugric. In terms of politics and administration, the 
region has a federal structure with the problems of separation of powers 
and clashes between the centre and the regions – problems typical of 
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Russian federalism. But most importantly, it is the development of the oil 
industry in West Siberia that has had a deep impact on the late Soviet and 
post-Soviet history of the region and of the entire country. 
Russian historiography, however, clearly lacks works on the late 
and post-Soviet environmental history.1 Material histories concerned 
with the late Soviet Union and the newly created Russian Federation 
are just beginning to accumulate. This project attempts to fill this gap 
as it constructs an environmental history of the region by studying the 
meanings which the society attributed to the natural resource oil.2 By 
focusing on West Siberia, this study offers a perspective on the provinces, 
a much neglected area in terms of research. Existing historical works on 
Russian oil production either analyze political decisions regulating oil 
exploration3, or praise the heroism of the first geologists and oilmen.4 With 
the exception of anthropological5 and ethnological6 studies related to West 
Siberian indigenous population, humanities research on Soviet and post-
Soviet oil production omits the issue of environmental impact. Given both 
1 | More on Russian environmental historiography in Andy Bruno: “Russian Envi-
ronmental History: Directions and Potentials”, in: Kritika: Explorations in Russian 
and Eurasian History 8:3 (2007), 635-50.
2 | More on the subject of environmental history in Donald Worster, ed.: The 
Ends of the Earth. Perspectives on Modern Environmental History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, 289-308. 
3 | Maria Slavkina: “Istoria Prinyatiya Reshenia o Promyshlennom Osvoenii Za-
padnoi Sibiri” (History of Decision Making on Industrial Development of West Si-
beria), in: Economicheskaya Istoria 10 (2005), 146-62. Hereinafter, all Russian 
quotations and titles were translated by the author.
4 | See e.g. Matvey Krol, ed.: Neftianaya Epopeya Zapadnoy Sibiri (The Oil Epic 
of Western Siberia). Moskva: Parnas, 1995 or Sergey Kazantsev, ed.: Ener-
gia Ugry: Istoki (Energy of Yugra: the Roots). Vol. 4: Vsem Mirom (All Together). 
Yekaterinburg: Parkus, 2002.
5 | Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer: “The Tension between Might and Rights: Siberi-
ans and Energy Developers in Post-Socialist Binds”, in: Europe-Asia Studies 58:4 
(2006), 567-88.  
6 | Anna Sirina: “Oil and Gas Development in Russia and Northern Indigenous Peo-
ples”, in: Elana Wilson Rowe, ed. Russia and the North. Ottawa: University of Ottawa 
Press, 2009, 187-203.  
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its insufficiency and policy importance, historians could contribute to the 
development of an environmentally conscious public discourse on oil. 
This paper aims to trace the change of oil meanings over the last four 
decades in order to evaluate the public awareness about the environmental 
damage caused by West Siberian oil production, and the state’s disposition 
to conduct a responsible energy policy. This analysis will help understand 
the historical background of contemporary Russian energy mentality. 
To fulfill this task, this work examines a bulk of oil discourse sources 
consisting of a variety of newspaper accounts, and articles in historical 
and sociopolitical journals related to West Siberian oil industry over the 
investigated period. This paper employs the notion of ‘discourse’ as an 
aggregate of utterances, speech acts and practices related to a certain issue 
and positioning this issue within the public sphere. 
The meanings attributed to oil are analyzed against the backdrop of 
their respective political and economic contexts. What images of oil did the 
state impose on the society and what meanings of oil did the society in turn 
construct? How did people perceive the change which oil development 
had caused to the environment? The study pays special attention to the 
emergence of such themes as environmental awareness and resource 
finiteness in the oil discourse. When and why did the analyzed discursive 
themes appear? Did they signify a transition to a more environmentally 
sensitive society?
The investigated Soviet media dating from before 1986, as well as 
historical and sociopolitical journals, were heavily propagandistic and 
praised the progressive role of oil. Only in the late 1980s did scholarly 
journals begin to publish articles that described the catastrophic 
environmental condition of the largest oil province. But such writings have 
remained rare until now and are dominated by articles on the danger that 
oil dependence poses to the national economy. The first comprehensive 
works on the damage that West Siberian oil production caused to the 
environment, the indigenous population and the national economy 
appeared in the early 1990s and were published abroad. Other valuable 
sources for this study are transcripts of meetings of Soviet Council of 
Ministers behind closed doors, found in the state archive. Further primary 
sources, analyzed in order to put the investigated patterns of the oil debate 
into appropriate historical context, are governmental acts and statistics. 
My research rests on the hypothesis that the collapse of the totalitarian 
regime in the 1990s caused a discursive shift, but that the change of oil 
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perceptions to more critical ones did not mean that either the state or the 
society became more sensitive to environmental damage inflicted by oil 
production. 
Russian environmentalists argue that in the past three decades Russia 
has seen several changes in attitudes towards environmental protection 
on behalf of both society and state: The state ecology experienced a rapid 
upsurge in the late 1980s and a brisk rollback during Putin’s presidency.7 
However, this study argues that the indicated rise of environmentalism 
did not have any effect either on Soviet oil production in general or on the 
perception of the oil-related ecological problems. 
The time frame of my study begins in the 1970s as it is the starting 
point of ‘big West Siberian oil’ and simultaneously the years that brought 
the world oil shock and first Soviet environmental legislation. The period 
under investigation stretches over the peak oil of the mid-1980s, the rise 
of environmental movements in the USSR in the late 1980s, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union to the transformation years until the present day. The 
analyzed period allows the examination of not only the beginnings of a 
high industry region, but also the economic and political concerns which 
led to a change in the implications of oil.
1970S: BIG OIL AND COLD WAR GEOPOLITICS
In 1970, West Siberia was already considered a large oil region by 
international standards. During the following twelve years, oil production 
there increased twelvefold. The Soviet government discussed intensively 
how to exploit the West Siberian deposits most effectively. The oil industry 
experts warned CPSU8 leadership and Gosplan9 that it would be impossible 
to increase the production at such a rapid pace in the future without facing 
serious technical problems. The 1965-1977 oil minister Shashin often 
engaged in heavy discussions with the Gosplan decision-makers, arguing 
that the planned extraction rates went against geological norms and that such 
7 | See e.g. Vladislav Larin/Mnatsakanyan Ruben/Igor Chestin/Evgeniy Shwarts: 
Okhrana Prirody Rossii: ot Gorbacheva do Putin (Russia’s Nature Protection: 
from Gorbachev to Putin). Moskva: KMK, 2003.
8 | The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
9 | The State Planning Committee.
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policy was short-sighted. Thus, he would criticize a Gosplan representative: 
“You are a risk taker! Where are you taking the country with your policy, 
do you think about the consequences of such a production increase?”10 
Yet, the party told the oil ministry there was no other choice. The Soviet 
premier, Aleksey Kosygin, used to call the chief of the Tyumenneftegaz (the 
oil and gas mining division at the time), Viktor Muravlenko, and explain the 
desperation of the situation: “Please give three million tons on top of the 
plan. The situation with bread is awful.”11 Oil exports were the only reliable 
source of Soviet hard currency earnings between 1973 and 1985. This is what 
Gorbachev’s colleague, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai 
Ryzhkov, explains in his book: “We export raw materials because nobody 
wants to buy anything else from us for free convertible currency.”12 By the 
1970s, when not enough such raw materials were available for exports, the 
state was on the verge of bankruptcy. Starting in 1964, the Soviet government 
had to increase its grain imports annually.13 Without the discovery of 
Siberian oil, the Soviet Union might have collapsed decades earlier simply 
because it would not have had enough hard currency to pay for its wheat 
imports. The only reason why the Soviet Union did not cease to exist after 
it had become the world’s largest grain importer, was the discovery of West 
Siberian oil fields. Luckily, the new deposits were truly unique due to the 
shallow bedding and high flow rate. Besides, the oil was relatively light, 
with low content of sulfur and paraffin. In particular, oil originating from 
the Latitudinal Ob region has been even qualitatively better than the Brent 
Crude – the oil blend used as a benchmark to price two thirds of the world’s 
internationally traded oil supplies.14 Thus, the ninth and tenth five-year 
10 | Qtd. in Egor Gaydar: Gibel’ Imperii. Uroki dlia Sovremennoi Rossii (The Col-
lapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia). Moskva: Rosspen, 2006, 48.
11 | Qtd. in Maria Slavkina: Triumf i tragedia: razvitie neftegazovofo kompleksa 
SSSR v 1960-1980-e godi (Triumph and Tragedy: Development of the Oil and Gas 
Complex in the USSR 1960s-1980s). Moskva: Nauka, 2002, 143. 
12 | Nikolai I. Ryzhkov: Desyat let velikikh potryaseniy (Ten Years of Great Dis-
tress). Moskva: Assotsiatsiya “Kniga, Prosvyashenie, Miloserdie”, 1995, 229. 
13 | Vneshniya Torgovlya SSSR (Foreign Trade of the USSR), 1966-1978. Minis-
try of Foreign Trade, Moskva: Statistica. 
14 | Oil characteristics are taken from Vagit Alekperov: “Zapadno-Sibirskoye 
‘Chernoye Zoloto’” (West Siberian ‘Black Gold’), in: Neftyanik Zapadnoy Sibiri, 
31.10.2009, 2.
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plans for 1971-1975 and 1976-1980, respectively, scheduled the doubling of 
oil extraction. The realization of this strategy relied largely on the newly 
discovered oil fields in the Tyumen oblast.15
The 1973 oil shock made the Soviet government rely even more on the 
profits from selling Tyumen oil to pay for imported grain, equipment, and 
most importantly to keep military spending at its traditionally high level. 
The resulting excessive oil pumping did not correspond with the geological 
and environmental norms, leading to premature field depreciation and 
to long-term ecological problems. But in the 1970s environmental issues 
were still far from entering the discourse on oil development. At that point, 
the government was mainly concerned about the sufficiency of oil export 
revenues to keep the stagnating economy afloat. The task of the Soviet press, 
however, was to persuade the people of the richness of their motherland that 
was supposed to be rapidly pacing toward the bright communist future.16 
Newspapers were glorifying the abundance of the country’s petroleum 
reserves: “The Soviet Union has plenty of oil and we generously share it 
with other countries of the socialist camp.”17 Thus, the discovery of West 
Siberian oil created the notions of ‘oil excesses’ and ‘oil beyond plan’.18 These 
notions, in turn, became convenient propaganda tools to create the myth of 
a prospering economy, serving as the locomotive of the entire Socialist bloc. 
The geopolitical implication of the new deposits was praised in nearly 
every oil-related writing of the time: “Each year West Siberian oil and gas 
complex plays a greater international role, which strengthens the positions 
of the USSR on the world arena, as well as of the other socialist countries, 
and gives them new opportunities to compete economically with the West 
[…] and Siberian oil thus serves the development of international cooperation 
15 | Tyumen Oblast (district) is the largest administrative unit in West Siberia.
16 | According to The Third Program of the CPSU, adopted by the 22nd Congress 
of the CPSU in 1962, the Soviet society would have built communism by 1980, 
which, among others, meant that “[…] all the springs of cooperative wealth will 
flow more abundantly and the great principle ‘From each according to his abili-
ties, to each according to his needs’ will be implemented.”, Program of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union. New York: International Publishers, 1963, 71.
17 | “Kuda potechyot neft?” (Where Will the Oil Flow? ), in: Pionerskaya Pravda, 
13.12.1960, 1.
18 | Sergey Bogatko/Sergey Chursin: “Sopernichaya s solntsem” (Competing 
with the Sun), in: Pravda, 30.06.1971, 2.
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and forges peace in the whole world.”19 But the structure of oil exports that 
was established by the beginning of the 1980s was far from economically 
viable. In 1981, the USSR sold 90 million tons of crude oil to the Socialist 
‘brother-countries’ (12% of the oil extracted in 1981) at the average of 117-130 
rubles per ton.20 In comparison, the price on the capitalist market, to which 
USSR exported around 65-70 million tons a year, was 250-270 USD per 
ton.21 Obviously the goal of this trade was to ‘buy’ the political obedience of 
the Socialist bloc. By the early 1980s, the Soviet government almost ran out 
of the resources that nourished this political cooperation. 
1980S: PE AK OIL AND THE SOVIE T EDITION OF 
‘PROME THE AN’ DISCOURSE 22 
In the 1970s, Soviet people sincerely believed in the imminent approach 
of communism, which the party had promised to achieve by 1980. The 
19 | Viktor Alekseyev: “Istoricheskiye ocherki. Otkritiye Sibirskoy nefti” (Histori-
cal Outlines. Discovering Siberian Oil), in: Voprosy Istorii 5 (1986), 79. 
20 | Vneshniya Torgovlya SSSR v 1981 (Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1981), Min-
istry of Foreign Trade, Moskva: Statistica, 1982, 254.
21 | Vneshniya Torgovlya SSSR v 1981, 256.
22 | ‘Promethean’ or ‘cornucopian’ view of nature-human relationship emerged 
in the early 1980s as a response to survivalism and was manifested first by Ju-
lian Simon in his work The Ultimate Resource (1981). Ecosystems impose no real 
constraints on human activity – in particular, on economic growth. In Greek my-
thology, Prometheus stole fire from Zeus and thereby empowered people to ma-
nipulate the world for their benefit. Prometheans perceive nature as brute matter 
that can be transformed into goods in order to keep the economy on a positive 
growth track. Any problems that might occur in the transformation, i.e. environ-
mental problems, can and will be solved through technological innovation. These 
Promethean ideas match well with the Marxist-Leninist concept of natural re-
sources and the relationship between humans and their environment, both dis-
cussed in this section. Drawing an analogy between the Soviet (and later Rus-
sian) discourse on natural resources and the Promethean discourse is helpful for 
the analysis of the oil-related abundance rhetoric. For fur ther reading on the Pro-
methean discourse see John S. Dryzek: The Politics of the Earth: Environmental 
Discourses. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
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environment, they believed, could not be endangered in the country so 
close to the most advanced form of society, which was comprised of flawless 
Soviet people. According to the leading ideologist of the official ‘new 
biology’23, the dean of the Faculty of Biology at Moscow State University, 
Isaac Present, the Soviet Union did not need environmental protection: 
“Who do you want to protect our nature from? From the Soviet people?”24 
Such ideology destroyed all elements of Soviet ecological science which 
had developed before 1948. 
Until the mid-1980s, environmental data was secret in the USSR. 
Only as the result of glasnost reforms, catalyzed by the Chernobyl disaster, 
the government released its measurements of contamination levels, 
estimations of doses of absorbed radiation, and health statistics.25 For 
the first time in Soviet history, it became possible not simply to conduct 
a full-scale ecological inspection but also to publish its results. This was 
the jump-start of the ecological movement in the country. The All-Russia 
Society for Nature Protection (the first Russian ENGO) gained political 
power and participated in law making. In 1988 the State Committee on 
Nature Protection was founded. First Western ecology textbooks were 
translated into Russian.26 Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund 
opened their offices in the USSR. The Sixth Congress of the Union of Writers 
23 | The ‘new biology’ (currently referred to as ‘Lysenkoism’) was a pseudo-bio-
logical science, conform to Marxism-Leninism, developed in 1948 by a Ukrainian 
agronomist Trofim Lysenko, a political favorite of Stalin. Lysenkoism rejected the 
advancements of genetics and mandated that all biological research conducted 
in the USSR conform to a modified Lamarckian evolutionary theory. Its underly-
ing appeal was that all organisms were not genetically constrained, which was 
consistent with the desire in the USSR to assert that heredity had a limited role 
in human development; that people living under socialism would lose any bour-
geois or fascist instincts. 
24 | Nikolai Vorontsov: “Dlia Nas i Potomkov. Okhrana Prirody do Lysenko, Berii, 
pri Nikh i Segodnia” (For Us and Our Descendants. Nature Protection before Ly-
senko, Beria, at Their Time and Today), in: Izvestia 228, 12.06.1989, 3. 
25 | For fur ther reading see e.g. Ar thur T. Hopkins: Unchained Reactions: Cher-
nobyl, Glasnost, and Nuclear Deterrence. Washington, DC: National Defense Uni-
versity Press, 1993. 
26 | Eugene Odum: Ecology. 2 Vols., 1963, translated from English. Moskva: Mir, 
1986. 
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of the RSFSR (December 1985) turned into a tribune for protest against 
the project of Siberian river reversal.27 In 1987, a short novel Povorot (‘The 
Turn’) by Sergey Zalygin was published in the literary journal Novyi mir. 
The author criticized the government’s project of river rerouting as an act 
of tremendous violence towards nature. There was also an earlier example 
of literary criticism of official modernization projects, causing destructive 
transformation of landscape – Valentin Rasputin’s 1979 novel Farewell 
to Matyora. However, no such literature was dedicated to gluttonous oil 
pumping.
The adaptation of the Decree on the Fundamental Reorganization of 
Nature Protection (1988) and the foundation of the State Committee for 
Nature Protection of the USSR (1988) were heralded by a debate, which 
referred to the catastrophic ecological situation around the West Siberian 
oil fields. Nevertheless, this issue, in contrast to the project of the river 
reversal, did not gain publicity. The only mention of oil in the new 
legislation on nature protection addressed the Ministry for Chemical and 
Petroleum Engineering, which was then obliged to work out guidelines for 
assuring that machine manufacturing was environmentally compliant.28 
Despite the rise of glasnost, the critical situation in the oil sector seemed 
to be completely left out of the public debate. However, the developments 
in the oil production in the mid-1980s deserved public reaction. In 1983, 
for the first time, West Siberia did not fulfill its production target, being 3 
million tons short of the plan and 5 million tons below the plan in 1984.29 
The deteriorating national economy was losing its main source of revenue: 
27 | In the 1980s, twelve of the Arctic Ocean-bound rivers were proposed to be 
redirected to the south, in order to supply water to the southern part of West Si-
beria and to Kazakhstan. The project was closed due to environmental risks it 
was posing, which were actively discussed by Soviet writers in the mass media 
and in the published literature.
28 | Postanovlenie CK KPSS, Sovmina SSSR ot 07.01.1988, N32 “O Ko-
rennoy Perestroike Dela Okhrany Prirody v Strane” (Decree of the Cen-
tral Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR from 
17.01.1988, No. 32 “On the Fundamental Reorganization of Nature Protection 
in the Country”), paragraph 24. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.
cgi?req=doc;base=ESU;n=770, Accessed: 06.09.2011. 
29 | Matthew J. Sagers/Milford B. Green: “Transport Constraints in Soviet Petro-
leum”, in: Energy Policy 13:4 (1985), 376.
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But the government badly needed additional petrodollars in order to cover 
the budget deficit, worsened by the continuing war in Afghanistan. All 
existing economic plans, however, were based on the assumption that the 
oil production would steadily grow. From 1981 to 1986, the world oil prices 
decreased six-fold. This meant the collapse of the Soviet economy. The 
government was perfectly aware of the approaching decline, as is obvious 
from the minutes of a meeting at the prime-minister’s office in 1989: 
“Over the last 10-15 years we have increased capital investments fivefold, but 
there is still no growth in oil production. Since 1989 there has been a sharp 
decline. We import 15-18 percent of the equipment for the oil industry. In 
several years we will be at 30 percent. The structure of oil deposits is changing 
dramatically: the active deposits are becoming smaller, mining costs are rising. 
Export is declining. Next year we will be able to export only 60 million tons […] 
and then we are going to bury everything […] I see, if there’s no oil there’s no 
national economy.”30 
However, the public was not aware of such government discussions behind 
closed doors and was told the country needed more oil for its rapidly 
developing automotive and air transport.31 At his meeting with the Tyumen’s 
oilmen, Gorbachev said they needed to extend mining in order to support 
the economic growth of the Soviet Union on its way to communism: “The 
party has put forward serious goals of increasing economic growth. And 
I’ll be direct: for reaching them, the country has to have enough oil and 
gas resources at its disposal. And this primarily depends on the work of 
30 | Transcript of the meeting at the office of the USSR Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers comrade Ryzhkov N.I. “O postavke dlia gosudarstva nefti, gazovo-
go kondensata I nefteproduktov v 1990 godu” (On the state supplies of oil, gas 
condensate and oil products in 1990), 17.09.1989, State Archive of the Russian 
Federation, F. 5446, Op. 162, D. 379, L.143. 
31 | Postanovlenie XXVI S’ezda Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza 
po Proyektu CK KPSS “Osnovniye Napravleniya Economicheskogo I Sotsialnogo 
Razvitiya SSSR na 1981-1985 gody i na Period do 1990 goda” (Decree of the 
26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Project of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU “The Main Directives for Economic and Social 
Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 as well as until 1990”), in: Pravda, 
03.03.1981, 1. 
MISSING GREEN IN THE BL ACK GOLD 259
the oil- and gasmen in Tyumen. Tyumen district is the main source of 
hydrocarbon resources, like no other.”32 
Due to additional capital investments and extensive extraction, West 
Siberia again managed to drag the country away from unavoidable 
collapse, and brought another five million tons beyond the plan.33 Such 
headlines kept the public faith in the power of the state for a short time, 
during which it was de facto disintegrating and inefficient in its economic 
reforms. Despite the growing environmental consciousness of the 1980s, 
the oil discourse still lacked an ecological dimension. Not least because of 
the Chernobyl catastrophe of 1986, as a result of which petroleum was seen 
as a more secure source of energy than nuclear power. 
The firm belief of the state in its capacity to constantly manipulate 
complex natural systems in combination with the rejection of 
environmental implications of such manipulations allow the classification 
of the official Soviet oil discourse until the late 1980s as a socialist edition 
of a ‘Promethean’ discourse. Notions of finiteness of natural resources 
as well as environmental limits were simply denied. For ‘Prometheans’, 
there are no natural resources, ecosystems and even no nature itself at the 
ontological level.34 Likewise the Soviet oil industry treated nature as a brute 
matter and a store of energy. ‘Prometheans’ believe that nothing should 
constrain human activity. The concept of ecosystem does not play any role 
in their discourse. Accordingly, neither the term ‘carrying capacity’35 has 
any useful meaning to them. Interestingly enough, only rare (and relatively 
recent) Russian works on oil production use this term and use it in English, 
as there is no established Russian equivalent for it.36 ‘Prometheans’ have 
32 | Michail S. Gorbachev: Izbrannie Rechi i Stat’i (Selected speeches and ar-
ticles). Moskva: Politizdat, 1985, 237.
33 | “Sverkhplanovaya neft” (Oil beyond Plan), in: Trud, 05.11.1987.
34 | Dryzek: The Politics of the Earth, 49. 
35 | ‘Carrying capacity’ of environment or an ecosystem is the threshold limit of 
use of that system without damaging the system. Every ecosystem has its re-
sources that are used for economic development, for survival and for habitat 
creation. Environment and ecosystems have got the abilities to recover the loss 
of these resources by regenerating them over a period of time. Environments, 
whose carrying capacity is exceeded, generate risks. 
36 | Eduard Kulpin/Oleg Yanitsky: “Resursy i Perspectivy Socialno-Ecologiches-
koy Modernizatsii: Problemi Sibiri i Dalnego Vostoka” (Resources and Perspec-
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unlimited confidence in the ability of humans and their technologies to 
overcome any problems they would encounter. Similarly, Soviet and Russian 
leaders attributed the occasional resource shortages to technological 
imperfections, which could be easily corrected by scientists and engineers. 
Despite having reached the peak oil in the mid-1980s, the Soviet leadership 
still regarded oil depletion with skepticism: “‘Limitation’ of oil resources is 
a relative factor and can be overcome not only by prospecting activities, but 
also by technological improvements in oil extraction. Until recently, there 
was no particular urgency for elaborating such technology.”37 In fact, it was 
not the lack of urgency, but simply the inability to increase oil production 
by means of technological improvements: The technological base of the 
Soviet oil industry was poor and obsolete, lagging far behind international 
standards. Thus, production growth could only be extensive. Devastating 
environmental effects of the extensive oil extraction had not at all been a 
matter of concern.
While the Soviet leaders recognized that natural resources were finite, 
they did not share the pessimism of many of their Western counterparts. 
To many Westerners, the energy crisis in 1973 was only the first symptom 
of a general natural resource shortage which would eventually engulf the 
world.38 While the USSR recognized the existence of short-term energy 
and raw material shortages, Moscow did not agree that they were caused by 
the depletion of natural resources. Instead, the shortages were attributed 
to the socioeconomic organization of Western capitalism. Many Soviet 
sources stressed that the Western fear of resource depletion was not based 
on fact. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, referring to hypothetical energy-
resource depletion emphasized: “[M]ankind – and all the specialists seem 
to agree on this point – is not threatened by energy strangulation. Science 
tives of the Socio-ecological Modernization: Problems of Siberia and the Far 
East), in: Rossia Reformiruyushayasya 7 (2008), 464.
37 | A. S. Astakhov/A. D. Khaitun/G. E. Subbotin: “Socio-economic Aspects 
of Oil and Gas Development in West Siberia”, in: Annual Review of Energy 14 
(1989), 124. 
38 | Daniel S. Papp: “Marxism-Leninism and Natural Resources: The Soviet Out-
look”, in: Resource Policy 3:2 (1977), 138.
MISSING GREEN IN THE BL ACK GOLD 261
has by no means had its final say in the development of new sources of 
energy.”39
Other Soviet sources cited statistics to show that there was no short-
term danger of either energy or resource depletion. Sotsialisticheskaia 
Industriia informed its readers that, at the current rate of consumption, 
chemical fuels would last another 150 years and nuclear fuels substantially 
longer, and that much more productive energy sources would be mastered 
long before existing fuel resources are exhausted.40
But unlike the capitalist Prometheanism, the socialist paradigm 
of industrial cornucopia arising from the pages of Pravda and 
Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia promised that once the Soviet Union and its 
allies (generously fueled with West Siberian hydrocarbons) had won the 
socialist competition and defeated capitalism, communism would create 
a world of unlimited plenty for everyone. Surely, such promises were a 
necessary propaganda tool to justify the miserable working conditions and 
poor social infrastructure in the areas of petroleum production.
OIL-REL ATED MODERNIZ ATION: TR ANSFORMING REMOTE 
VILL AGES INTO INDUSTRIAL CENTERS AND ‘SAVAGES’ INTO 
COMMUNISTS
West Siberia’s industrial development had begun in the second half of the 
20th century and its first stages had been connected mainly with geological 
prospecting of oil. The oil industry transformed the city of Tyumen from 
‘the capital of villages’ into a West Siberian metropolis. Until the early 
1990s, the petroleum industry was portrayed as a driving force behind 
economic development and social modernization in the region. Passages 
like the one below were in almost every newspaper article referring to 
West Siberia, emphasizing the beauty of the new industrial landscape and 
diverting the public eye from miserable living conditions in the emerging 
oil cities:
39 | Vystuplenie Gromyko na VI Spetsialnoy Sessii Generalnoy Assamblei OON 
(Gromyko’s Speech at the VI Special Session of the UN General Assembly), in: 
Pravda, 12.04.1974, 4.
40 | Sotsialisticheskaia lndustriia, 28.11.1974, 1.
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“The music of oil fountains woke the Tyumen North up […] The music of motors 
is accompanied by the never ceasing rumble of helicopters […] Flying in the 
Siberian skies has now become merrier: instead of the dull green spots of 
swamps – clear lines of railways and roads, electric power lines, pipelines and 
concrete stripes […] Towns, production fields and roads are born faster than 
maps are printed. Constantly developing new fields, the conquerors of the taiga 
are competing with the sun, reaching new deposits faster than the sun rays.”41
Soviet propaganda praised the heroes taming the wild nature for the sake 
of producing more and more petroleum beyond plan to fuel the socialist 
construction. Monuments like the 1978 “Conquerors of Samotlor”42 
were erected. The giant male figure near the town of Nizhnevartovsk is 
still cordially referred to as “our Alesha” (gently called after the legendary 
folklore giant) and despite its explicit propagandist nature has turned into 
one of the main landmarks of today’s Tyumen region. 
Soviet media also eagerly glorified as progress that indigenous people 
of West Siberia had been integrated into the socialist system. “Under the 
influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution and with the help 
of the glorious Russian proletariat […] the small peoples of the North, 
backward in their past, whose life was dominated by semi-savagery and 
even genuine savagery, now contribute significantly to the […] construction 
of communism.”43 In the meantime, Khants, Mansi and Nenets – the West 
Siberian indigenous groups whose culture dates back to the ust-poluyskaya 
culture44 – were becoming a minority on their lands and began losing 
41 | Bogatko: “Sopernichaya s solntsem”, 2.
42 | Samotlor is Russia’s largest oil field, rating as the sixth in the world, discov-
ered in 1965. 
43 | Aleksey Novgorodov: “Istoricheskaia nauka v SSSR. Retsenzii. M. E. Buda-
rin. Put’ malykh narodov Krai’nego Severa k kommunizmu” (Historical Science in 
the USSR. Reviews. M.E. Budarin: The Road of the Small Peoples of the Far North 
to Communism), in: Voprosy Istorii  6 (June 1970), 134.  
44 | Ust-poluyskaya is an archaeological culture of the Iron Age (6th century BC-
2nd century AD) found on the territory of the today’s Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug (an entity in the Tyumen Oblast). For fur ther details see Elena G. Fedorova: 
Rybolovy i ochotniki bassejna Obi: problemy formirovaniya kul’tury khantov i mansi 
(Fishermen and Hunters of the Ob Bassin: Problems of Formation of Khant and Mansi 
Culture). Sankt-Peterburg: Evropejskiy Dom, 2000, 6. 
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resources to pursue their traditional semi-nomadic family-life based on 
hunting. Although a number of valuable ethnographic and archeological 
studies about these peoples had been published in the post-war years45, 
most of the mass media accounts on indigenous groups (including those 
published in the glasnost years) were highly conformist and praised the 
modernization evoked by the Soviet oil industry:
“Soviet people woke the tundra up, found oil and gas in its depths and […] as V.I. 
Lenin mentioned, helped the small peoples of the North to pay the cultural debt 
of many centuries. From the Stone Age people here stepped into Socialism! Oh, 
healing pains of the world, Creator of the Earth – the Working Class!”46 
Such lines, although written by a Mansi author, do not show any regrets 
about the loss of traditional livelihoods due to construction infrastructure 
for oil-extraction. The native tribes had no choice but to conform to the 
Soviet ideology and get involved in the propaganda of the system, which 
was actually destroying their traditional way of life. 
Glorification of the heroic oilmen on the one hand and of the progress 
to socialism of the indigenous people on the other clearly showed that 
in the minds of the Soviet elites, oil production was not just a process of 
acquiring an energy source. Its intention was also to ideologically conquer 
such remote and underdeveloped territories and set them on a socialist 
path.
Klaus Gestwa, who recently published a study about large-scale Stalinist 
projects, put forward the idea that erecting gigantic industrial complexes 
particularly in the energy sector was a form of technological colonization.47 
This paradigm perfectly fits the development of the West Siberian oil 
industry in the 1970s and 1980s. Transformation of virgin landscapes into 
highly industrial regions was linked to the hope that the society and its 
individual members could be similarly transformed. What Gestwa says 
about the transformation of the river landscapes in the post-war years 
45 | Valentina I. Moshinskaya: Archeologicheskiye pamiatniki severa Zapadnoi 
Sibiri (The Ar tifacts of the North of West Siberia). Moskva: SAI, 1965.
46 | Yuvan Shestalov: “S vysoty rodnogo ochaga” (From the Height of My Native 
Hearth), in: Pravda, 20.11.1985, 3.
47 | Klaus Gestwa: Die Stalinschen Großbauten des Kommunismus. Sowjetische 
Technik- und Umweltgeschichte, 1948-1964. München: Oldenbourg, 2010. 
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is a perfect illustration of the landscapes surrounding West Siberian oil 
fields: By producing energy, the gigantic constructions sites also produced 
illusions for the Soviet people. The large industrial construction projects 
also functioned as “stages of the Soviet modernity”48 with the task of 
delighting the public. At the same time the ‘construction giants’ became 
sites of tragic confrontation and ecological disaster zones. But in the case 
of West Siberian oil industry the confrontation of interest groups and the 
recognition of the disastrous environmental impact arrived only after the 
demise of the system that had created this industry. 
Ideologically, this technological colonization was largely based on 
the Marxist-Leninist tenet of continually expanding production which 
remained a major concern of the Soviet government. Accelerating 
economic growth was kept in high esteem in the socialist system, whereas 
Western scholars at that time began to advocate economic constancy and 
zero growth, in an effort to conserve scarce natural resources. The creation 
of the ‘material and technical basis of communism’ remained as important 
to Gorbachev in the late 1980s as it had been to Brezhnev, Khrushchev 
and even Vladimir Lenin in 1918. The concept of zero growth to conserve 
natural resources was decried by Soviet authorities. Without the growth 
of productive capabilities, they argued, attainment of communism would 
be impossible. Thus, keeping up growing oil production – at least on the 
pages of printed media – was an essential tool of legitimization. The denial 
of oil’s finiteness was certainly connected to these ideas and allowed Soviet 
politicians to present the future in a more optimistic light and thus justify 
the aspired conquest. 
DISPELLING THE SOVIE T OIL MY THS
The Soviet oil-related progress rhetoric was nothing but a propaganda tool. 
Only as late as after glasnost reforms, the true recognition of the destructive 
effect of the oil industry on the local population entered public debate. 
This time, the first critique came not from academic circles, but from oil 
workers themselves. An electrician from Nizhnevartovsk sent a letter to the 
historical journal Voprosy Istorii where alongside with unpaid salary, food 
and electricity shortages, he lamented gasoline deficit: “Here, where we 
48 | Gestwa: Die Stalinschen Großbauten, 46.
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send hundreds of millions of tons of oil and gas to the entire country and 
abroad, there is not enough gas to fill up our cars!” Despite a commonly 
held assumption in many Western historical journals that oilmen had 
been the adversaries of indigenous people because of conflicts over land 
use and cultural rights, it was this electrician from a Nizhnevartovsk 
oil field who as one of the first posed a very daring question: “And who 
should be held responsible for the tragedy of Khanty, Mansi, Nenets and 
Selkupy? […] Doctors are begging for help: Tuberculosis is taking over! […] 
Contamination of the River Ob is 90 times higher than the permissible 
norms! [...] The Nizhnevartovsk district alone throws annually more 
than 300 thousand tons of petrochemicals in the river! Who is to be held 
responsible for that?!”49
A response from the academic world came in another analytical journal 
from Vladimir Sangi, a scholar of Nivkh origin. Sangi was among the first 
to pinpoint the value of the ethical principles, which regulated the relation 
of the indigenous peoples of the North to nature: “These principles appear 
to us as an […] unreachable ideal from the future, […] not the conquest 
and merciless exploitation, but the principle of consent and unity with 
nature.”50
According to the customary law of the indigenous peoples of West 
Siberia, one is not allowed to take any unnecessary excesses from the 
earth, but rather only resources needed for oneself and one’s children. 
Khanty, Mansi and Nenets barely store up. Two very contradicting models 
of resource use: The sustaining approach of the indigenous population 
and the Soviet exploitive approach have been the essence of the conflicting 
situation in the oil province. The Khanty and Mansi families are de jure 
entitled to compensation from the oil-extracting companies operating on 
their tribal lands. De facto, such compensations have only rarely been paid 
and often not to the full extent.51 However, based on the oversimplified 
but widely spread confrontation line ‘oilmen – indigenous peoples of the 
49 | Nikolai Nosonovich: Nizhnevartovsk Tyumenskoi oblasti. Pisma v redaktsiyu 
(Readers’ Letters), in: Voprosy Istorii 10 (1989), 178.
50 | Vladimir Sangi/Anna Dmitrieva: “Spasti narodnosti severa, sokhranit’ ikh 
kul’turu” (Save the Ethnic Groups of the North and Preserve Their Culture), in: Vo-
prosy Literatury 3 (1989), 5.
51 | N. I. Novikova: “‘Rodovyie ugodia’: Perspektivy Pravovogo Plzuralisma 
(Predstavlenia Predstavitelei Korennikh Narodov i Zakonodateley) (‘Tribal 
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North’ in the media, the non-indigenous inhabitants of West Siberia envy 
Khanty and Mansi for their alleged privileges: “There are people in our 
country, who manage to get rent from the deposits, which belong to the 
whole nation, but are situated on their land. […] To be able to work on these 
territories, oil companies have to pay the masters of the taiga in cash and 
in kind: with flour, butter, vodka and kitchenettes.”52
It was the researchers from the Institute of Geography of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences who among the first in the early 1990s spoke about 
a broader spectrum of problems, namely “the conflict between the natural 
environment, the oil industry and the population.”53 Such works were soon 
followed by articles further dispelling oil’s progressive role. 
An important element of the new oil discourse was the oil city with its 
poor social infrastructure. The city was never on top of the socialist agenda. 
Oil revenues were largely reinvested in increased production and the search 
for new fields as well as other heavy industries. Thus, West Siberian cities 
constructed for the oilmen, whose work was sustaining the whole country, 
looked like “skinny teenagers, whose heart is just not capable of pumping 
enough blood for all the organs of the weak body, bizarre cities – wherever 
one touches them, it hurts.”54 Poor living conditions caused by factors such 
as lack of running water, no central heating and unreachable health care 
were cloaked in the supposed romanticism and heroism of the socialist 
regime. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that oil production 
began to be portrayed as evil for the social and communal sector. 
Lands’: Potential for Legal Pluralism [Perspectives of the Indigenous Peoples and 
Law-makers]), in: Gosudarstvo i pravo 6 (2000), 105.
52 | “Za neft’ platiat mukoi’” (Paid with Flour for Oil), in: Argumenty i fakty, 
02.10.2002. 
53 | Among several works in Russian some were published in English and even 
abroad, as for example: Gregory Vilchek/Olga Bykova: “The Origin of Regional 
Ecological Problems within the Northern Tyumen Oblast, Russia”, in: Arctic and 
Alpine Research 24:2 (1992), 99-107.  
54 | A. I. Prishepa: “Gradostroenie v Surgute vo vtoroy polovine XX veka” (City-
Planning in Surgut in the Second Half of the 20th Century), in: Otechestvennaya 
Istoria 2 (2007), 96.
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In the mid-1990s, printed media and scientific literature opened 
a large-scale debate on the issue of associated gas flaring.55 Until now, 
this has been a major oil-related environmental problem in Russia as 
the Khanty Mansi Autonomous District (KMAO) is the world’s leader 
in the amount of the associated gas explosions. This makes this West 
Siberian district the brightest spot on the world’s map. Officially 20 billion 
cubic meter of associated gas is burned here every year, but Russian 
environmentalists estimate it being closer to 50 billion. Following this 
discursive theme and the 1994 oil spill in the city of Usinsk56, both media 
and scholarship pinpointed the lack of environmental awareness, typical 
for the oil sector ever since its foundation. This time, the discourse gained 
some apocalyptic rhetoric, which is well illustrated by a quote from a 
book published in 1995. Commemorating fathers of the West Siberian 
oil industry, it states: “We now again realize our connection to and 
dependence on nature and understand that a human being cannot survive 
without the biosphere.”57 As the prominent Russian mathematician and 
ecologist Nikolai Moiseyev once said: “The Cro-Magnon man managed to 
survive the ice age. But I am afraid, our civilization will not even be able 
to survive the real oil crisis that we are approaching.”58 Similar utterances 
were also to be found in the printed media, for instance, in the weekly 
Argumenty i Facty, which published an account of an enormous increase 
55 | Associated gas is natural gas found dissolved in oil at the high pressures 
existing in a reservoir, and it can be present as a gas cap above the oil. Tradition-
ally, this type of gas is released as a waste product of the oil extraction indus-
try and burnt off in flares. Associated gas flaring produces ca. 1% of total global 
emissions of greenhouse carbon dioxide. The annual global volume of natural 
gas currently flaring is equivalent to 30% of natural gas consumption by the EU, 
25% of U.S. consumption or 75% of Russian natural gas exports and results in 
the emission of 400 million tons of carbon dioxide. See À. Knizhnikov/N. Poussen-
kova: “Russian Associated Gas Utilization: Problems and Prospect”, WWF-Russia, Insti-
tute of World Economy and International Relations of RAN, Moscow, 2009, http://www.
wwf.ru/data/pub/oil/poputnygaz_eng.pdf, Accessed: 23.09.2011. 
56 | Usinsk’s on the ground spill of around 100,000 tons of oil is the largest in 
history, and although the town is not situated in the West Siberian oil province, 
its notorious oil spill shook the entire discourse on fossil fuels and environment. 
57 | Krol: Neftianaya epopeya, 327.
58 | Nikolai Moiseev qtd. in Krol: Neftianaya epopeya, 329.
VALENTINA ROXO268
in oncological diseases (over 90 percent), especially in lung cancer, in the 
Tyumen Oblast in the post-Soviet years. The article blames the authorities 
for allowing associated gas flaring and paying for the “black gold” with 
human lives.59 
2000S: PRIMACY OF ECONOMICS AND NEGLECTED 
ECOLOGICAL DISASTERS 
Considering the increased environmental awareness of the early post-
Soviet discourse, it is strange that one notorious case of environmental 
damage caused by oil extraction still has not gained domestic publicity. 
In June 2000, the World Bank declared the West Siberian Samotlor oil 
field “an ecological disaster zone.”60 This caused a lively debate on the 
environmental deterioration of Russia’s ‘Wild East’ in the Western media 
and to some extent in Russian scholarship.61 However, the discursive shift 
towards the oil-related environmental damage barely took place in the 
Russian media. Right up to the present day, the oil discourse has been 
dominated by economic matters rather than environmental ones. Thus, 
within Russia the tragedy of Samotlor is regarded either as an outcome 
of the absent economic rationale62 or as a failure of the system to resist 
the interests of the Soviet elites. Most analysts simply regret that the oil 
deposit was ruined as several million tons of oil was not extracted due to 
59 | Yuriy Zviagintsev: “Chernoye zoloto tsenoy zdorovia” (Paying with Health for 
the Black Gold), in: Argumenty i Facty, 15.08.1996, 3. 
60 | Qtd. in West Siberia Oil Industry: “Environmental and Social Profile”, Final 
Report by IWACO BV Consultants for Water and Environment, June 2001, 63. 
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/nederland-old/reports/west-siberia-oil-
industry-envi.pdf, Accessed: 11.04.2010.
61 | See e.g. Oliver Morgan: “Black Cloud over BP Oil Deal,” in: The Observer, 
19.10.2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/oct/19/oilandpetrol.russia, 
Accessed: 22.06.2011 and Stanislav Meshcheryakov: “Environmental Problems 
in the Fuel-Energetics Complex of Russia,” in: Chemistry and Technology of Fuels 
and Oils 36:2 (2000), 78.
62 | Viktor S. Smirnov: “Diskussii i Obsuzhdenia. Economicheskie Prichiny Kra-
kha Sotsialisma v SSSR” (Discussions and Debates. Economic Reasons for the 
Collapse of Socialism in the USSR), in: Rossiiskaia Istoriia 6 (2002), 106. 
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technological mistakes of the 1970s and 1980s. Until today, none of the 
investigated media sources have reported about the natural catastrophe 
caused by irrational exploitation. Not a single Russian source mentions 
the 6,500 hectares of heavily polluted soil or the people exposed to major 
health risks through contaminated drinking water and air. Only Western 
statistics document that in the last 5 years, 97 percent of the drinking water 
from the Vakh River has been contaminated with oil.63 
Obviously the current discourse is focused on the destructive effect of 
the oil dependence on the national economy. Although by the late 1990s, 
Russian oil mining companies completed structural reforms and increased 
efficiency, the state underwent another type of restructuring. It became 
more dependent on oil prices than ever before. Since 1997 there has been 
a clear correlation between oil prices and Russia’s economic growth.64 
This is especially dangerous because petroleum is a commodity whose 
position on the market is subject to steep fluctuation cycles. Such strong 
dependence of the national economy on oil revenues and the resulting 
underdevelopment of its other branches are symptoms of the so-called 
Dutch disease.65 The Russian oil curse, namely the ease and speed with 
which oil revenues are received, makes the country unable to use such 
wealth to boost its economy. Together with the high rate of oil-related crime 
63 | West Siberia Oil Industry: “Environmental and Social Profile”.
64 | Fiona Hill: Energy Empire. Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival. London: The For-
eign Policy Centre, 2004, 33. 
65 | ‘Dutch disease’, also called the ‘resource curse’ or the ‘curse of oil’, is the 
damaging effect on an economy as a result of the exploitation and export of 
natural resources. Rapidly acquired resource wealth tends to give rise to a fight 
over existing resources, which in turn leads to poor institutional quality and 
lower growth. The argument here is that the large rents that can be obtained 
from natural resources create incentives for governments and private agents to 
engage in rent-seeking behavior, voracity and corruption, thus hindering entre-
preneurial activity and other pro-growth activities. Recommended fur ther read-
ing: Nienke Oomes/Katerina Kalcheva: “Diagnosing Dutch Disease: Does Rus-
sia Have the Symptoms?”, International Monetary Fund, WP/07/102 (2007), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07102.pdf, Accessed: 08.09. 
2011.
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and the approaching “end of oil history”66, this pathological dependence 
poses a threat to Russia’s national economic security. Moreover, one 
of the complications of the Russian mutation of the Dutch disease has 
been a slowdown of institutional reforms.67 This has to do with the low 
demand for reforms on behalf of big business (mostly oil businesses) and 
insufficient reform offers from the state, since both parties are interested 
in maintaining the status quo, e.g. easy revenues from fossil fuels. In this 
respect, Russia resembles many emerging economies cursed by their 
wealth in natural resources. Governments that are not dependent on the 
wealth of the citizens just do not need to care about their own people and 
hope for the never-ending plenty of precious hydrocarbons.
The discovery of Siberian oil riches at the moment of dramatic 
economic decline of Brezhnev’s stagnation era has set the trend of 
keeping the national economy afloat with the help of oil-export revenues. 
This habit had its ideological grounds in the Marxist-Leninist concept 
of natural resources, which challenges the very existence and gravity of 
environmental issues. Despite the fact that the ‘green wave’ of the 1980s 
put environmental protection institutions in place, there has not been an 
environmental breakthrough in the oil debate. 
West Siberian oil has been used to create an illusion of saving the 
country from an unavoidable collapse in the last decades of the Soviet rule. 
The illusion of oil plenty, deeply ingrained into people’s minds through 
Soviet propaganda, lives on. Today, the exploitation of oil fields has become 
even more predatory than in the Soviet period and sustaining national 
economy by pumping more and more natural resources turned into an 
addiction. The traditional strategy of plundering West Siberia put the 
whole country on the ‘oil needle’. 
Although the discourse on oil-related environmental problems in 
Russia has grown over the past two decades, it has had little effect on the 
political action undertaken to make the industry cleaner and to effectively 
look for alternative energy sources. Despite the fact that science recognizes 
the environmental limits of oil extraction, politics, businesses and society 
66 | Yuriy Latov: “Vliyanie neftegazovogo komplexa na national’nuyu econom-
icheskuyu bezopasnost’ Rossii” (Influence of Oil and Gas of Russia’s National 
Economic Security), in: Terra Economicus 7:1 (2009), 101. 
67 | Sergey Guriyev/Konstantin Sonin: “Economica ‘resursnogo proklyatia’” 
(Economics of ‘The Resource Curse’), in: Voprosy economiki 4 (2008), 65.
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do not wish to respect these limits. However, a functioning system of 
environmental protection potentially can pose hurdles to the traditionally 
extensive mining. The recognition by the government of the vital importance 
of the oil wealth for the national economy has had two dramatic results: de-
ecologization of the state energy policy and of the energy mentality of the 
Russian people. And if the society remains indifferent to environmentally 
conscious energy policy, what are the chances that the state will become 
greener? As long as there are no structural improvements in the economy 
and no progress in the development of civil society in Russia, there will be 
no transition from a resource exploitive to a sustainable society. 
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Publics in the Pipeline 
On Bioenergy and its Imagined Publics in    
Norway and Sweden
Tomas Moe Skjølsvold
In 2009, I attended the Norwegian Bioenergy Days – a conference where 
the bioenergy industry gathered to discuss the state of their bioenergy 
fuels, technology and markets.1 Recurring themes at the conference were 
red numbers, difficult markets and bankruptcies. Many participants had a 
bleak outlook because they were unable to generate profits. One presenter 
asked: “Is something going to happen soon, or should we find another 
industry?”2 The discussions circled around flawed policy, but also around 
the relationship between bioenergy and competing technologies.3 The 
conference participants claimed that other renewable energy technologies 
like wind and solar power were seen as better alternatives to bioenergy. 
This, they claimed, was reflected in the media coverage on bioenergy and in 
the way politicians spoke of it. Most importantly, they pointed to a broader 
1 | The Norwegian bioenergy industry is quite small, but includes players working 
with many fuels and technologies like pellets, wood chips, biogas, biodiesel and 
ethanol. See Norsk Bioenergiforening: Bioenergi i Norge. Oslo: Nobio, 2010. 
2 | Geir Skjervak: “Kvar Blir det av det Store Pelletsløftet i Noreg?”, Conference 
paper, “Bioenergidagene 2009”, Rica Nidelven Hotell, 23.-24.11.2009.
3 | ‘Bioenergy’ refers to energy derived from biological sources. It is considered 
a renewable form of energy and often highlighted in policies, meant to increase 
the share of renewable energy technologies. See e.g. European Parliament: “Di-
rective 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources”, in: Offi-
cial Journal of the European Union, 05.06.2009.
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collective referred to as ‘the public’4 as either unaware of the possibilities 
offered by bioenergy or holding negative attitudes towards it.
From an industry perspective, bioenergy had an image problem. 
The industry’s concerns about public ignorance and negative attitudes 
paved the way for presentations about how they could engage the public 
to improve the perception of bioenergy. As an outsider observing from 
a science and technology studies perspective, I found this illuminating. 
The bioenergy industry’s efforts to improve the reputation of bioenergy 
are examples of what Bruno Latour and others refer to as translation; that 
is strategies to enlist and interest others to their technology.5 Thus, the 
conference participants had moved beyond the ideas postulated in the 
linear models of innovation and diffusion where the success or failure of 
technologies is largely seen as determined by the technology’s technical 
and economic properties.6 Rather, the participants proposed translation 
strategies that sought to attach bioenergy to positive symbolic universes, 
for example through presenting it as a futuristic, simple, climate friendly 
or economically sound competitor to other energy technologies.7 
4 | ‘The public’ as a concept has a long tradition in philosophy and political sci-
ence. See e.g. Jürgen Habermas: The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989. In my paper, I use the notion of ‘the 
public’ as it appears in the literature on ‘Public Understanding of Science and 
Technology’. Here, ‘the public’ is used pragmatically, to describe actors implicat-
ed by scientific or technological activity. For more, see the section entitled “From 
Publics to Imagined Publics” in this paper.
5 | Bruno Latour: Science in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1987, 132.
6 | The linear model of innovation’s origin is unclear. See Benoit Godin: “The Lin-
ear Model of Innovation. The Historical Construction of an Analytical Framework”, 
in: Science, Technology & Human Values 36:4 (2006), 639-67 for a discussion 
of how the model has shaped thinking on innovation and technology dif fusion 
over the last 50 years. 
7 | E. g. Anne Jordal: “Korleis Utvikle og Lansere Meir Konkurransedyktige Pellet-
skaminar?”, Conference paper, “Bioenergidagene 2009”, Rica Nidelven Hotell, 
23.-24.11.2009, discussed framing pellet ovens as ‘future heat’ or ‘automated 
stoves’ arguing that this would convince ‘the public’ about the environmental 
potential and convenience of pellet heaters. These symbolic frames would bring 
customers to pellets who would otherwise buy air-to-air heat pumps.
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Inspired by this, the point of departure for this paper is an interest 
in the development of such strategies. Specifically, I am interested in 
the rationale behind their formulation. In most presentations at the 
conference this rationale was anchored in beliefs about the nature of the 
collective referred to as ‘the public’ and beliefs about ‘public’ perception of 
bioenergy. In this paper, I examine the relationship between the bioenergy 
industry and this collective from the perspective of industry actors, policy 
and decision makers. Empirically, I will examine two questions:
1. How do the actors who work to improve the position of bioenergy 
perceive this collective? How do they imagine ‘the public’?
2. How do such imagined publics influence the formulation of strategies 
of public engagement?
I pursue these questions comparatively, looking at Norway and Sweden. 
The paper is based on fieldwork from these countries conducted in 2009-
2010, and on studies of newspapers from 2007-2009. 
The paper is structured as follows. I set out to outline the theoretical 
foundations of the concept ‘imagined publics’, before looking at earlier 
studies of imagined publics of renewable energy. I proceed to present the 
paper’s methodology before examining the context for this discussion: 
Norway and Sweden as energy regimes, focusing on bioenergy. Also, a 
brief analysis of how Norwegian and Swedish newspapers have covered 
bioenergy is presented. I then move on to the discussion on bioenergy and 
its imagined publics in Norway and Sweden. 
FROM PUBLICS TO IMAGINED PUBLICS
For the last 25-30 years a body of literature has been engaged with what 
has been labelled ‘public understanding of science and technology’ 
(PUS).8 This line of thought emerged in response to the influence of ‘the 
8 | Steve Miller: “Public Understanding of Science at the Crossroads”, in: Public 
Understanding of Science 10:1 (2001), 115-20 dates the star t of this intellectual 
tradition to a publication by the Royal Society in the UK entitled “The Public Un-
derstanding of Science” from 1985.
TOMAS MOE SKJØLSVOLD280
deficit model of public understanding’.9 Here, public opposition to and 
concerns about scientific and technological development is rooted in a lack 
of public knowledge or understanding of science and technology.10 Thus, 
technologies or science are not seen as problems, ‘the public’ is. A typical 
policy response to this understanding of public agency has been to employ 
top-down approaches to by-pass public concerns.11 
This has been criticized by the PUS literature, first by a call for attention 
to possible ‘public’ participation in science and technology12, a critique 
highlighting “opposition between technocracy and public participation.”13 
Now the idea of public participation has been refined to the point where 
‘participation’ is no longer necessarily a goal, but one of many forms of 
‘public engagement’ with science and technology.14 Recently, scholars have 
found ‘engagement’ with the public to be an industry and government 
norm, particularly for those working with controversial science or 
technology.15
9 | See Alan G. Gross: “The Role of Rhetoric in the Public Understanding of Sci-
ence”, in: Public Understanding of Science 3:1 (1994), 3-23 for a discussion on 
this model’s influence.
10 | Steve Rayner: “Democracy in the Age of Assessment: Reflections on the 
Roles of Expertise and Democracy in Public-Sector Decision Making”, in: Science 
and Public Policy 30:3 (2003), 163-70. 
11 | E.g. John Durant: “Participatory Technology Assessment and the Democrat-
ic Model of the Public Understanding of Science”, in: Science and Public Policy 
26:5 (1999), 313-19. 
12 | E.g. Edna F. Einsiedel/Erling Jelsøe/Thomas Breck: “Publics at the Technol-
ogy Table: The Consensus Conference in Denmark, Canada and Australia”, in: 
Public Understanding of Science 10:1 (2001), 83-98 or Heather Dietrich/Ren-
ato Schibeci: “Beyond Public Perceptions of Gene Technology: Community Par-
ticipation in Public Policy in Australia”, in: Public Understanding of Science 12:3 
(2003), 381-401. 
13 | Noortje Marres: “The Issues Deserve More Credit”, in: Social Studies of Sci-
ence 37:5 (2007), 766.
14 | Gene Rowe/Lynn J. Frewer: “A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms”, 
in: Science, Technology and Human Values 30:2 (2005), 251-90. 
15 | Related to renewable energy see Julie Barnett/Kate Burningham/Gordon 
Walker/Noel Cass: “Imagined Publics and Engagement around Renewable En-
ergy Technologies in the UK”, in: Public Understanding of Science, published 
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A related question deals with how industry and policy makers formulate 
strategies of public engagement – and further, about the rationale behind 
their formulation. These are the questions that primarily interest me 
in this paper. One way to address this is to look for subtle and indirect 
links between collectives like ‘the public’, the industry and policy makers. 
Inspired by what Allesandro Maranta and colleagues coined ‘imagined 
laypersons’16 in a discussion of how experts think non-experts relate to their 
activity, a recent strain of literature has studied such matters via the idea 
of ‘imagined publics’.17 Their premise is simple. These authors claim that 
‘the public’ does not only carry agency through action. Rather, ‘the public’ 
is also powerful as an idea. When industrialists and policy makers make 
decisions, they do so in light of an imagined public response.18 Imagined 
publics give life to “shared repertories and expectations amongst actors 
in technical-industrial networks”, expectations which are “anticipated and 
internalised into organisational practices and working practices.” 19 Thus, 
there is reason to believe that while studying the Norwegian and Swedish 
online before print on June 30, 2010, http://pus.sagepub.com/content/ear-
ly/2010/06/21/0963662510365663.abstract, Accessed: 15.12.2011. 
16 | Allesandro Maranta/Michael Guggenheim/Priska Gisler/Christian Pohl: 
“The Reality of Experts and the Imagined Lay Person”, in: Acta Sociologica 46:2 
(2003), 150-65.
17 | E.g. Brian Wynne: “Reflexing Complexity. Post-genomic Knowledge and 
Reductionist Returns in Public Science”, in: Theory, Culture and Society 22:5 
(2005), 67-94. 
18 | These ideas are not entirely new. In 1927, John Dewey wrote that political 
orders “impute a public only to support and substantiate the behaviour of offi-
cials” – thus, publics are imagined to legitimate and give substance to govern-
ment systems. Dewey cited in Rebecca Ellis/Claire Waterton: “Environmental Cit-
izenship in the Making: The Participation of Volunteer Naturalists in UK Biological 
Recording and Biodiversity Politics”, in: Science and Public Policy 31:2 (2004), 
103. 
19 | Gordon Walker/Noel Cass/Kate Burningham/Julie Barnett: “Renewable En-
ergy and Sociotechnical Change: Imagined Subjectivities of ‘the Public’ and Their 
Implications”, in: Environment and Planning 42:4 (2010), 943.
TOMAS MOE SKJØLSVOLD282
bioenergy industry, I will find links between their imagined publics and 
their actual practice of public engagement.20 
Studies of imagined publics are particularly pertinent if the science 
or technology is controversial. Earlier studies show that renewable energy 
projects generally21 and bioenergy projects particularly22 are prone to 
controversy; frequently surrounded by supporters, protesters and debate. 
This is probably why there already exist a number of studies dealing with 
the imagined publics of renewable energy technology. What can be learned 
from these studies? 
Most existing literature is concerned with the imagined publics of the 
renewable energy industry in the UK. Gordon Walker and Noel Cass argue 
that prior to the liberalisation of the UK energy utilities and infrastructure 
in 1989, ‘the public’ was imagined as “‘end-of-wire’ captive consumers.”23 
Following the liberalisation and the tailing variety in modes of energy 
production, the importance of ‘the public’ has increased and its roles have 
multiplied. The authors identify publics imagined as captive consumers, 
active consumers, service users, green investors, local beneficiaries, 
project protestors, project supporters, project participants, technology 
hosts and energy producers.24 This plurality is reflected elsewhere. Kate 
Burningham and colleagues found publics imagined as ‘users’ or as 
20 | Several studies dealing with ‘public perception’ of bioenergy exist. Typically, 
they use quantitative methods to measure ‘public attitudes’ towards bioenergy. 
E.g. Henrik Karlstrøm: Den Deregulerte Forbruker. Trondheim: Institutt for Tverr f-
aglige Kulturstudier, 2010 finds roughly 70 percent of Norwegians to be positive 
towards bioenergy. A focus on ‘imagined publics’ complements this approach, by 
showing how public imaginaries inform industrial behaviour. 
21 | Gordon Walker: “Renewable Energy and the Public”, in: Land Use Policy 12:1 
(1995), 49-59.
22 | Bishnu Raj Upreti/Dan van der Horst: “National Renewable Energy Policy 
and Local Opposition in the UK: The Failed Development of a Biomass Electricity 
Plant”, in: Biomass and Bioenergy 26:1 (2004), 61-69.
23 | Gordon Walker/Noel Cass: “Carbon Reduction, ‘the Public’ and Renewable 
Energy: Engaging With Socio-Technical Configurations”, in: Area 39:4 (2007), 
466.
24 | Walker: “Carbon Reduction, ‘the Public’ and Renewables”, 465.
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‘neighbours’.25 Julie Barnett and colleagues26 found publics imagined as 
ignorant or concerned about renewable energy developments and that the 
renewable energy industry imagined the public through the ‘deficit model 
of public understanding’.27 This public imaginary, the authors claim, led 
to the formulation of strategies of public engagement meant to educate 
the public, and to rectify public concerns. Similarly, Gordon Walker and 
colleagues28 found the renewable energy industry to imagine its publics as 
opposed to renewable energy based on the NIMBY (‘not in my back yard’) 
concept.29 Thus, the industry sees publics mostly as hostile obstacles to 
their development. To summarize past research on imagined publics of 
renewable energy, Dandy Norman’s words seem fitting: “The actors in the 
renewable energy industry have a strong tendency to define ‘the public’ 
as ‘concerned’”. Further, he notes that this has “strong impacts on the 
‘engagement’ activities” of the actors involved.30
Based on the studies from the UK cited above, it is likely that the study 
of the Norwegian and Swedish bioenergy players will reveal a plurality of 
imagined publics. One way to categorise this plurality is Mike Michael’s 
differentiation between ‘publics in particular’ (PiPs) and ‘publics in general’ 
(PiGs).31 While discussing publics in relation to science, his argument 
25 | Kate Burningham/Julie Barnett/Anna Carr/Roland Clif t/Walter Wehrmeyer: 
“Industrial Constructions of Publics and Public Knowledge: A Qualitative Investi-
gation of Practice in the UK Chemicals Industry”, in: Public Understanding of Sci-
ence 16:1 (2008), 23-43.
26 | Barnett: “Imagined Publics and Engagement in the UK”.
27 | Gross: “The Role of Rhetoric in the Public Understanding”.
28 | Walker: “Renewable Energy and Sociotechnical Change”.
29 | The NIMBY concept has been criticised as a theoretical model for explain-
ing negative attitudes towards renewable energy. However, empirical research 
suggests that NIMBYism is still understood by industrial players and policy mak-
ers as the main obstacle to renewable energy developments. See e.g. Patrick 
Devine-Wright: “Beyond NIMBYism: Towards an Integrated Framework for Un-
derstanding Public Perceptions of Wind Energy”, in: Wind Energy 8:2 (2005), 
125-39.
30 | Dandy Norman: Stakeholder Perceptions of Short-Rotation Forest for Ener-
gy. Farnham: Forrest Research, 2010, 11.
31 | Mike Michael: “Publics Performing Publics: Of PiGs, PiPs and Politics”, in: 
Public Understanding of Science 18:5 (2009), 617-31.
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is that PiGs are defined in relation to ‘science’ in general while PiPs are 
defined in relation to particular scientific enterprises. As an example, 
‘science’ has one public (PiG), while the human genome project has another 
(PiP). This differentiation is applicable also to bioenergy. ‘Bioenergy’ as a 
generic concept has one public (PiG), particular bioenergy enterprises such 
as a combined heat and power plant or a particular bioenergy company 
might have another (PiP). In Michael’s account, PiPs tend to form around 
particular issues, resulting in publics having strong interests. Therefore, 
they are often either project protesters or project supporters.32 It will be 
interesting to see if Norwegian and Swedish bioenergy actors differentiate 
between PiPs and PiGs, and whether or not they have moved beyond 
imagining the public through the deficit model of public understanding. 
ME THODOLOGY
The methodology mobilized here is two-fold. First, I set out to analyse 
how Norwegian and Swedish newspapers cover bioenergy. By studying 
437 Norwegian and 598 Swedish newspaper articles33, I shed light on how 
bioenergy is communicated in contemporary Norway and Sweden. This 
information is used to generate hypotheses about Norwegian and Swedish 
bioenergy actors and their imagined publics. 
The second source of data consists of interviews with 44 persons in 
Norway and Sweden34, six issues of the Norwegian professional journal 
32 | Walker: “Carbon Reduction, ‘the Public’ and Renewable Energy”. 
33 | Three Norwegian and Swedish newspapers were accessed. The Norwegian 
papers were Adresseavisen, Aftenposten and Verdens Gang; the Swedish were 
Östgöta Correspondenten, Svenska Dagbladet and Aftonbladet. The papers were 
accessed via the media database Retriever. 
34 | All interviews used as data for this paper was carried out by the author with 
the exception of three Norwegian interviews conducted together with Gard H. 
Hansen. The interviews were conducted in Norwegian and Swedish. All quotes 
in this paper, both from interviews and written sources have been translated to 
English by the author. The interviewees have been anonymized and are presented 
with pseudonyms. 
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Bioenergi35 and six issues of the Swedish equivalent journal36 (also named 
Bioenergi). The interviewees were players in the bioenergy industry, public 
employees and decision makers working with bioenergy as well as scientists 
working with bioenergy. The interviews were 40 minutes to two hours long 
and recorded and transcribed before they were coded and analysed. The 
analysis and coding were inspired by Grounded Theory.37 Here, pieces of 
data are compared with each other and with the emergence of similarities 
and differences, groups of categories are formed. These categories form 
the basis for the analysis of how the Norwegian and Swedish bioenergy 
actors imagine the publics of bioenergy.
THE NEED TO INTRODUCE BIOENERGY:  
NORWAY AND SWEDEN AS ENERGY REGIMES
Norway and Sweden are ideal contrasts since they represent different 
‘energy regimes’. In Norway, almost all electricity is hydropower.38 Much of 
this is used for space heating.39 In principle, this stationary energy base is 
‘green’, which could indicate that there is little need to introduce bioenergy. 
Two aspects complicate this. First, Norway is actually a net importer of 
electricity in a ‘normal’ year40, which means that the consumed electricity 
35 | Bioenergi: 3-6, 2009 and 1-3, 2010. Professional journal published by the 
Norwegian bioenergy association. 
36 | Bioenergi: 3-6, 2009 and 1-3, 2010. Professional journal published by the 
Swedish bioenergy association.
37 | Anshelm Strauss/Juliet M. Corbin: Basics of Qualitative Research: Ground-
ed Theory Procedures and Techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990.
38 | IEA Energy Statistics: “Electricity/Heat in Norway in 2008”, 2008, http://
iea.org/stats/electricitydata.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=NO, Accessed: 01.09.2011.
39 | Norway uses the largest share of electricity for space heating of all coun-
tries studied by the IEA. See Fridtjof Unander/Ingunn Ettestøl/Mike Ting/
Lee Schipper: “Residential Energy Use: An International Perspective on Long-
Term Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden”, in: Energy Policy 32:12 (2004), 
1395-1404.
40 | Marit Tyholt/Anne Grete Hestnes: “Heat Supply to Low-Energy Buildings in 
District Heating Areas: Analysis of CO
2
 Emissions and Electricity Supply Securi-
ty”, in: Energy and Buildings 40:2 (2008), 131-39.
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is not necessarily ‘green’. Second, there has been an increased focus on 
energy efficiency and energy quality. In this perspective, it is better to 
use electricity for purposes other than space heating.41 Thus, bioenergy 
has primarily been given political attention in Norway as a potential 
replacement for space heating based on hydroelectricity.42 Parliament 
representative Trond Martin Sæterhaug summarized this notion in 2009 
stating that “using electrical power for space heating is like bathing in 
champagne.”43 
Despite its ‘green’ and ‘efficient’ qualities, bioenergy is a marginal 
technology in Norway with an annual consumption of 14.5 TWh44 or around 
6 percent of all energy consumed.45 Even if the goal of doubling this by 
202046 is met, it will remain a niche, a modest addition to the Norwegian 
energy total. Instead, the major Norwegian energy-political effort over the 
last years has been geared towards developing carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) and the employment of this in gas power plants.47 
The Swedish situation is different with a historically more diverse 
energy production. Fossil fuels, hydroelectricity, and nuclear power have 
41 | Ivar S. Er tesvåg/Michael Mielnik: “Exergy Analysis of the Norwegian Soci-
ety”, in: Energy 25:10 (2000), 957 say: “The notion of energy quality follows from 
the second law of thermodynamics. Some forms of energy can be converted into 
any other form, whereas other forms cannot. Electricity can be converted into 
mechanical work or into heat. For practical purposes, hot-water thermal energy 
can most often only be used for heating. On the other hand, for space heating hot 
waste-water suffices, whereas an aluminium plant requires electrical energy.”
42 | Olje og Energidepartementet: Strategi for økt utbygging av bioenergi, Olje- 
og Energidepartementet, 2008, http://www.reg jeringen.no/upload/OED/Bio-
energistrategien2008w.pdf, Accessed: 04.07.2011.
43 | Håkon Arntsen/Sivert Rossing: “Fikk 15 Millioner til Strømsparing i Fylket”, 
in: Trønderavisa, 15.09.2009. 
44 | Olje og Energidepartementet: Strategi for økt utbygging av bioenergi, 7.
45 | This number includes the transport sector. See Statistisk Sentralbyrå: 
“Energi”. http://www.ssb.no/energi/, Accessed: 01.09.2011. 
46 | Olje og Energidepartementet: Strategi for økt utbygging av bioenergi, 12. 
47 | Andreas Tjernshaugen: “Fossil Interests and Environmental Institutions: 
The Politics of CO
2
 Capture and Storage” (Unpublished Ph.D diss. Universitetet 
i Oslo, 2009).
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all been important.48 Today, Sweden has one of the highest consumption 
rates of bioenergy in the world.49 Bioenergy started to receive attention 
in Sweden in the 1970s. It was first seen as a means to rid Sweden of its 
dependence on foreign fossil fuels and nuclear power, and later as a tool to 
mitigate climate changes.50 Bioenergy broke through to the mainstream of 
Swedish energy technologies in the early 1990s51, a decade characterised by 
a ‘greening’ of the Swedish welfare state. It has been at the core of Swedish 
energy policy since 199752, acting as a ‘politically harmonizing technology’ 
by bridging a gap that existed between advocates of nuclear power and 
renewable energy technologies.53 Today, bioenergy accounts for roughly 
one third of the total Swedish consumption. Its share is larger than fossil 
fuels, nuclear power and hydroelectricity.54 
Thus, the roles of bioenergy in Norway and Sweden are substantially 
different. In Norway, it is a niche technology, primarily introduced to 
replace electricity for space heating. In contrast, it is at the core of Swedish 
energy policy and is currently the largest energy-producing technology in 
this setting. How will these circumstances influence the imagined publics 
of bioenergy in Norway and Sweden? To generate hypotheses about this, 
I will now look briefly at how Norwegian and Swedish newspapers have 
covered bioenergy. 
48 | See e.g. Arne Kaijser/Marika Hedin: Nordic Energy Systems. Historical 
Perspectives and Current Issues. Canton, MA: Watson Publishing International, 
1995.
49 | Energimyndigheten: Energiförsörjingen i Sverige. Energimyndigheten, 2009.
50 | Jonas Anshelm: Att ersätta kärnkraften med bioenergi – om en omstridd idé 
i den offentliga energipolitiska debatten i Sverige 1979-2000. Linköping: Tema T, 
Linköpings Universitet, 2009; Ann-Sofie Kall: “Förnyelse med förhinder” (Unpub-
lished Ph.D diss. Linköpings Universitet, 2011).
51 | Kall: Förnyelse med förhinder, 143-99.
52 | E.g. Atle Midttun/Mari Hegg Gundersen/Anne Louise Koefoed: “Greening of 
Nordic Electricity Industry: Policy Convergence and Diversity”, in: Energy & Envi-
ronment 15:4 (2004), 633-56. 
53 | Kall: Förnyelse med förhinder, 172.
54 | Energimyndigheten: Energiförsörjingen i Sverige, 35. 
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BROADENING THE CONTE X T: NORWEGIAN AND SWEDISH 
MEDIA COVER AGE OF BIOENERGY
The reading of the analysed newspapers shows substantial differences 
between the coverage of bioenergy in Norway and Sweden. In summary, the 
Swedish newspapers are more supportive of bioenergy than the Norwegian. 
The Swedish newspapers support bioenergy through presenting it as 
‘green’ or ‘environmentally friendly’55, but also as competitive in other 
ways. Bioenergy is presented as a safe and comfortable technology56 
that has brought wealth and prosperity to local communities.57 It is 
frequently described in patriotic terms, as a ‘Swedish’ way of being green, 
an area where the rest of the world seeks Swedish aid.58 In summary, the 
technology is presented as good for the wallet, good for the climate, and 
good for Sweden. 
The Norwegian press is less supportive. It does not portray bioenergy 
negatively, but with ambiguity and ambivalence. Bioenergy is presented 
as ‘green’59, but this is not sufficient, because it is always compared with 
other energy technologies that are seen as technically and economically 
superior.60 In other words, the Norwegian story about bioenergy is a story 
55 | Svenska Dagbladet: Satsar Stenhårt på att Förse Polen med Miljövennlig 
Fjärrvarme, 29.07.2009 is a typical example highlighting the ‘green’ aspect of 
the technology.
56 | E.g. Svenska Dagbladet: Elda snyggt och säkert, 12.12.2009 notes how 
bioenergy heating solutions are better than other solutions at providing heat, but 
also in terms of aesthetics and safety.  
57 | E.g. Östgöta Correspondenten: Linköpingsföretag gör Milliardaffär, 
05.06.2010 discusses bioenergy primarily as a local-industrial stimulant and 
generator of wealth. 
58 | E.g. Östgöta Correspondenten: Sydkoreansk Stad vill Lära av Linköping, 
12.05.2010 shows how a South-Korean town wants to learn from a Swedish 
town, while Östgöta Correspondenten: Världsnaturfonden Lyfter Fram Linkö-
pingsföretag, 30.09.2010 highlights how the World Wildlife Fund praised a Swe-
dish bioenergy company. 
59 | E.g. Aftenposten: Lover mer enn Enoksen, 22.09.2007 portrays bioenergy 
as the ‘green coal of the future’.
60 | Adresseavisen: Spår Vannkraft-Boom i Norge, 25.09.2009 suggests that 
hydroelectricity and gas power-plants are the future while Adresseavisen: Søker 
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about a ‘green’ technology, but as energy technology it is seen as falling 
short based on technical and economic arguments.
Furthermore, bioenergy was described in the newspapers with a third 
set of arguments in both countries. The production of bioenergy was cast 
against the production of food, resulting in bioenergy being framed as a 
controversial symbol of the North’s dominance over the South.61
How does all of this influence the investigation of imagined 
publics of bioenergy in Norway and Sweden? First, earlier research has 
found publics imagined as ‘concerned’ about or opposed to renewable 
energy developments62, framed through the deficit model of public 
understanding.63 In the following, I expect to find such imagined publics 
in both Norway and Sweden. Second, the role of bioenergy differs in 
Norway and Sweden. As a marginal Norwegian technology, its expansion 
will be accompanied by the construction of facilities changing landscapes, 
creating noise and smell, increasing traffic and creating other controversial 
side-effects. The ambivalent Norwegian newspaper coverage might be 
a hint of such controversy. There is less of this in Sweden, since much 
infrastructure needed to distribute bioenergy is already in place. Thus, 
I expect publics explicitly imagined through mobilisation of the NIMBY 
concept in Norway while I believe there will be less of this in Sweden. 
Third, the patriotic coverage of bioenergy in Swedish newspapers and the 
position of bioenergy in Sweden suggest publics to be imagined more 
positively. 
om forlengelse, 22.12.2008 writes that compared to competing technologies 
bioenergy is ‘unsuitable’. 
61 | Verdens Gang: Matvaregiganter i Heftig Krangel, 10.08.2007, Aftenposten: 
Det Sier seg Selv at vi har et Problem, 11.09.2009, Aftonbladet, Etanolen Sköv-
lar Naturen, 28.07.2007 and Svenska Dagbladet, Världensbanken Pekar på Bio-
brensle, 07.07.2008 are all examples of coverage presenting bioenergy primarily 
as a competitor to food production. 
62 | Barnett: “Imagined Publics and Engagement”; Walker: “Carbon Reduction, 
‘the Public’ and Renewable Energy”; Walker: “Renewable Energy and Sociotech-
nical Change”; Norman: Stakeholder Perceptions.
63 | Gross: “The Role of Rhetoric in the Public Understanding”.
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IMAGINING THE PUBLICS OF BIOENERGY IN  
NORWAY AND SWEDEN
The interviewees in both countries had clear ideas about ‘the publics’ of 
bioenergy. Altogether five ideal typical domestic imagined publics were 
found; two Swedish and three Norwegian. Further, many Norwegian actors 
related their stories so explicitly to Sweden that they ended up imagining a 
Swedish public. As we shall see, the imagined publics frequently informed 
the bioenergy players’ strategies of public engagement. 
The Local Publics
In both countries, the most prominent imagined publics were ‘local’ publics. 
In Norway, local publics were imagined as ‘neighbours’ or ‘protesters’ 
of specific projects. Local publics were imagined as PiPs64 (publics in 
particular) with strong interests related to particular facilities, products or 
companies. As expected, these publics were regarded in light of the NIMBY 
concept and understood by the interviewees as selfishly concerned about 
how bioenergy developments would disturb local communities in terms 
of aesthetics and safety. This was related to issues like visual pollution, 
increased traffic, reduced air quality, foul smell, and so forth. One example 
was given by the manager of one of the largest Norwegian biogas facilities. 
He imagined the public in relation to the companies’ experiences with the 
construction of a biogas plant a few years back:
“Well, we were not allowed to build the plant where we wanted. It was a political 
decision. […] Basically the decision was based on fear. Fear of birds [and other 
vermin that the plant might attract, T. S.], smell, all kinds of stuff. The public was 
very much against us. There were demonstrations and we didn’t really get the 
message across. It’s not so easy when everyone is against you, and this is quite 
typical for our kind of operation.”65
While some imagined the publics based on earlier interaction with groups 
of opponents, other accounts were anchored in what appeared as an 
industrial mode of ‘common sense’ regarding how publics of bioenergy act. 
64 | Michael: “Publics Performing Publics: Of PiGs and PiPs”.
65 | Interview with manager Andre Jørgensen in his office, 30.09.2009. 
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For example, the head of a district heating company imagined the public as 
responding to their technology instinctively based on NIMBY logic: 
“I think it’s the same everywhere, at least for the technology we work with. Every 
time someone has a new project, there are these reactions, especially from the 
neighbours who begin with their protests as soon as they hear about it. It’s not 
simple, of course. The public suddenly doesn’t care so much about the climate 
and the environment when it comes to this.”66
The development of a bioenergy industry in Norway will affect local 
communities substantially through construction work. In many cases the 
result will be an altered landscape with new industrial facilities. As in the 
quotes above, the bioenergy industry imagines the publics as opposed to 
such development. This view often leads the industry to craft strategies of 
public engagement meant to limit the impacts of opposition. The manager 
of the district heating department of a large energy utility explained how 
engaging with the public was vital prior to announcing the construction of 
a new facility:
“Well, you can’t just go ahead and say that you have decided about the location 
of a plant. For us, we take preliminary rounds with dif ferent departments at 
the administrative level, and we have meetings with the boards of various 
cooperative housing associations nearby, very lively meetings. Then we inform 
the municipal opposition, and then the board of the neighbourhood. We do all 
this before officially saying what we have decided, because keeping a dialogue 
with the public is considered important. Although all this takes some time, it 
minimizes the risk of having the regulation application thrown back in our faces 
with an answer of finding an alternative location.”67 
The quote illustrates how ‘public engagement’ through communication at 
various levels is considered an industry norm. However, it is not done for 
the sake of the public. The goal is not public participation in the decision 
66 | Interview with manager Bernt Knutsen at district heating facility, 
20.10.2009.
67 | Interview with department manager Christian Haugen in his office, 
12.10.2009.
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making process, the engagement is meant to limit the impact of expected 
opposition. 
The local imagined publics in Sweden were different. These were not 
imagined as neighbours or protesters, but as passive consumers. As such, 
however, they were imagined as a group without a direct relationship to 
bioenergy. Instead, they were considered consumers of services, hooked 
up to an infrastructure where bioenergy was important. In other words, 
this public was imagined to buy heat, electricity, bus fares and cars, 
while bioenergy was imagined as ‘invisible’ to the public. The Swedish 
interviewees did not imagine publics via the NIMBY concept found in 
Norway or the UK.68 A manager at a large Swedish wood chips and pellet 
producer described the situation in this manner:
“The Swedish public, I guess, is largely positive towards bioenergy, or perhaps 
more precisely: it is ignorant about it. I mean, I don’t think most people are 
aware of how important it is, and that it heats their homes and actually provides 
the light in their light bulbs. And I think this is a good sign – as long as it works, 
people don’t care where the energy comes from.”69
Similar sentiments were expressed by a market trader for stationary 
biofuels:
“The average Swede […] does not care about bioenergy. He has a vague idea 
about it being something other than coal and fossil fuels, and the label ‘bio’ 
suggests that it is green. As long as it works, the Swede is quite happy.”70 
It is noteworthy that the interviewees did not see the imagined public’s 
ignorance as a problem; in fact some respondents interpreted it as a 
seal of approval. A senior employee at the transport office of Linköping 
Municipality highlighted this by showing that the ignorance and approval 
had not always been there. When bioenergy was introduced, it was 
associated with occasional problems, resulting in bioenergy becoming the 
scapegoat:
68 | E.g. Walker: “Renewable Energy and Sociotechnical Change”.
69 | Interview with manager Dan Eklund in his office, 07.04.2010.
70 | Interview in market trader Einar Carlström in his office, 20.04.2010.
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“People are not riding the bus because it is powered by biogas; they ride the 
bus because they need to go somewhere. And today, biogas works as well as 
any other fuel, and the air quality is much better now than when the buses used 
diesel. But in the beginning, there were some problems with the biogas buses. 
They did not work properly in the winter, and as you know it can be quite cold 
in Linköping during those months. And then some people certainly raised their 
voices against biogas.”71
This illustrates the difference between imagining publics of novel, 
potentially controversial technology and of a smoothly working 
infrastructure. This point might seem trivial, but it suggests that while the 
technology improves, the nature of the relationships between ‘publics’ and 
industry changes. The imagined public is altered from active complainers 
to ignorant and unaware consumers. This also seems to have had an 
influence on how the industry players reflect on the need for public 
engagement. One interviewee highlighted that the most important thing 
they could do was to “produce as good services as we possibly can so that 
they stay happy.”72 Another said it was important to “listen if the public 
reported any concerns.”73 In other words, public engagement appeared less 
important when the publics were not imagined as problems. 
In summary, bioenergy in Sweden has been described as invisible and 
the publics imagined as blissfully ignorant. For the majority of bioenergy 
players, this was unproblematic. As we will see, however, there was one 
deviation from this way of framing the relationship between bioenergy and 
its publics. Here too, bioenergy was seen as an invisible aspect of daily life, 
but this was considered a democratic deficiency problem. The argument 
was that the public needed to know and understand the energy technology 
if they were to make informed decisions, a concern that was first and 
foremost raised by the Swedish bioenergy association through the industry 
journal Bioenergi. One article stated:
71 | Interview with senior employee Frederica Jansson in her office, 24.04.2010.
72 | Interview with manager Gunnar Lögnes in his office, 13.04.2010.
73 | Interview with senior employee of company producing wood chips, Harald 
Ström at production site, 17.04.2010.
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“Ask your neighbour, your cousin or a large share of the Swedish public […] 
and most will completely have missed the remarkable development that has 
happened and that continues today.”74
A similar article highlighted that the public should “wake up and realise 
how important bioenergy is.”75 This image of deficiency on behalf of the 
public was accompanied by voices highlighting that the public needed to 
be engaged through information. An editorial stated:
“First and foremost we want the energy authorities to do a better job when 
they present statistics so that journalists and others can do a good job when 
informing the public [...] [I]f this is not done we have to fill that gap […] [I]n a 
democracy it is important that the public gets relevant or accurate information, 
or they cannot produce informed opinions.”76
Thus, where some saw the imagined publics’ ignorance as unproblematic; 
others saw it as a problematic call for public engagement, primarily through 
strategies of information. 
The Public as Customers
In both countries, I also discovered publics imagined as customers. These 
are examples of publics in particular, imagined in relation to specific 
bioenergy products. In Norway, such publics were understood via the deficit 
model of public understanding as ignorant and disinterested in relation to 
the products offered by the bioenergy industry. Here, the disinterest was 
seen as a problem for the industry since it was understood to result in non-
consumption. 
This articulation of the public was particularly prominent amongst 
respondents working with pellets. These actors imagined their public as 
people in the market for a new heating solution. The interviewees claimed 
that this group was uninformed about the possibilities of bioenergy and 
74 | Anders Haaker: “Är Bioenergi Något Nytt?”, in: Bioenergi 1 (2010), 9. 
75 | Jan Ridfeldt/Gun Blomquist Bergman: “Underskatta Inte Bioenergins Bety-
delse!”, in: Bioenergi 3 (2010), 44-45. 
76 | Gustav Melin: “Kylan, Värmen och Elen”, in: Bioenergi 1 (2010), 11. 
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therefore chose competing solutions. The manager of a leading pellets 
company framed the problem in the following way:
“We have tried everything to increase the sales, but it feels as dif ficult as 
cracking the DaVinci code. The problem for us is that people don’t know about 
pellet heaters. The sales persons have to spend a lot of time explaining how 
they work, and the consumers take a long time to decide. For us, branding and 
information towards the public are prioritised tasks.”77 
Similar sentiments were presented by a senior representative of a 
company that shortly before I interviewed them had decided to abandon 
the private market in favour of the municipal heating market. Public 
ignorance and lack of knowledge were highlighted as integral to the 
decision:
“Selling to municipalities and public agencies is one thing. They are 
professionals. They have engineers that make decisions and personnel such 
as janitors that can be trained. Individuals and normal households do not have 
this, so they generally tend to choose other solutions such as heat pumps – often 
because of misunderstandings.”78
Several respondents related the perceived knowledge deficit to aspects 
like lack of trust, familiarity or experience with the technology. Thus, they 
engaged the public to increase its knowledge of the technology. This was 
done through standard information and advertisement campaigns, but also 
through more direct engagement. In one case, a company tried to establish 
a new network of pellet users by providing the public with technology free 
of charge: 
“We are trying to get the information directly to the customers. And we think that 
if they know someone who uses a pellet heater and is happy with it they might 
consider it themselves. So what we did was to produce flyers that we gave to 
every household in the region where we highlighted the benefits of pellets and 
promised that we would install pellet heaters and allow people to use them – free 
77 | Interview with manager Ingrid Johnsen over the telephone, 22.07.2009.
78 | Interview with senior representative Jan Andresen in company sales hall, 
19.05.2009.
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of charge – for a period of time. If they were not happy, we would also collect the 
heater, free of charge.”79
When Swedish respondents imagined the public as customers, they did so 
differently. Their imagined public was quite local in character, probably due 
to the situation in the area where the interviews were conducted. The public 
as customers were not the imagined publics of ‘bioenergy’, but rather the 
imagined public of a cluster of companies and research institutions that 
worked with biogas.
This public was imagined as supportive of bioenergy both by politicians 
and companies with a regional profile. They clearly imagined the publics 
outside the deficit model of public understanding as a proud group of 
customers with a preference for ‘green’ products. The head of one large 
regional biogas company explained:
“The public is very interested in what we do, and I actually think they are 
somewhat proud of this company. This is one of the few things that we here at 
this lit tle place are best at in the world, and I have the feeling they appreciate 
that.”80
The public was imagined as a resource, a source of opportunity and 
potential. A representative of the environmental office in Linköping 
municipality elaborated:
“Bioenergy is popular, absolutely. Take biogas as an example. More and more 
customers are buying biogas cars, more and more people are thinking about it. 
There is a great public acceptance of the technology, and I will also claim – a 
pride in it.”81
Many actors highlighted an appreciation for the public support, and that 
their engagement with the public was aimed at maintaining the positive 
relationship. A senior employee at the traffic department of Linköping 
municipality gave an example:
79 | Interview with manager Kristine Vold over the telephone, 03.08.2009.
80 | Interview with manager Lars Knutson in his office, 20.04.2010. 
81 | Interview with environmental office representative Monica Fall in municipal 
office, 15.04.2010.
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“A few times a year we have these events that we call ‘open municipality’. 
Basically, what happens is that the dif ferent offices of the municipality set up 
stands at town square, and then people can come chat with us about whatever 
they want. And this has been important, for instance in relation to the biogas 
projects, to avoid any confusion. I mean, there have been instances when 
someone has been concerned, but through these events there is a direct line of 
sor ts, and most of the times we are able to cool down the worries.”82
In other words, the respondents still deemed public engagement 
through conveying positive images of bioenergy important, despite the 
unproblematic relationship with the public, and maintained that this was 
best done through two-way communication. 
THE STR ANGE NORWEGIAN PIG AND ITS SWEDISH COUSIN
So far, the publics have been imagined as publics in particular in relation 
to specific bioenergy projects or specific bioenergy products. In Norway, I 
also discovered an imagined public in general (PiG), primarily imagined 
by ‘experts’ – scientists, employees of public agencies, and others more 
indirectly related to the bioenergy industry. They imagined ‘the public’ as 
less tangible and locatable than ‘neighbours’, ‘protesters’ or ‘customers’. 
Instead, they imagined an abstract ‘Norwegian public’ that was opposed 
to bioenergy because it was incompatible with the idea of ‘pure nature’, an 
idea believed to be cherished by the Norwegian public. An employee of a 
public agency working with bioenergy in Sør-Trøndelag explained how this 
mentality differed between Sweden and Norway: 
“There is a dif ference in mentality between Sweden and Norway. I mean, hacking 
away on the forests with the goal of extracting as much as possible biomass would 
be politically very dif ficult here. Take this thing with stumps. People wouldn’t 
accept the kinds of large scale interventions into nature that we would need to 
extract them at any reasonable scale here in Norway. That would be extremely 
controversial.”83
82 | Interview with senior employee Nils Åkerfeldt in traffic office, 13.04.2010.
83 | Interview with employee Ola Nordmann in his office, 30.09.2009.
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The imagined publics’ reaction to bioenergy was a question of bioenergy vs. 
nature; a battle lost by bioenergy. As in the quote above, many interviewees 
contrasted the Swedish public to the Norwegian. The Swedish public was 
seen as an ‘ideal public’, readily accepting issues seen as problematic in 
Norway. Thus, the respondents not only imagined a Norwegian PiG, but 
also a Swedish PiG, more positive towards bioenergy than reported by the 
Swedes. Another example of the public imagined this way was presented 
by a Swedish professor working at a Norwegian university: 
“It is a sort of strange thing this bioenergy here in Norway. In many ways it has 
become something negative, something bad. Take the environmental movement, 
for example. You can almost say that in Sweden, they are pro bioenergy, 
whereas they are basically against it here in Norway. And if you go to an industry 
conference here in Norway and look at the average age of the participants, you 
will not exactly see a young crowd. And this says something about the position of 
bioenergy with the general public, I think.”84 
IMAGINED PUBLICS – RE AL EFFECTS
In the last paragraphs, I have studied how bioenergy in Norway and Sweden 
have imagined their respective ‘publics’. This exercise has illustrated that 
technology developments are not value-free processes of diffusion, but that 
the adoption of energy technologies occurs in a complex setting where 
the agency of multiple actors influences the outcome. ‘The public’ in its 
various guises can be a player who can protest, participate and support. The 
notion of ‘imagined publics’ illustrates that ‘the public’ may appear in these 
processes more indirectly. The public does not actually have to protest a 
development in order to influence the process, if those trying to implement 
the technology believe protests to be likely.
In Norway and Sweden, the publics were imagined differently. The 
Swedish publics were imagined either as ignorant consumers or supportive 
customers. In Norway, they were imagined as concerned about or opposed 
to bioenergy based on NIMBY logic, as ignorant non-customers or 
opponents to bioenergy because it interfered with the idea of ‘pure nature’. 
These ways of imagining the publics resulted in different strategies of 
84 | Interview with Professor Pär Vargas over the telephone, 07.10.2009.
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public engagement. Some Swedish players saw public ignorance as a 
democratic problem and concluded it would be their task to enlighten 
the public. The Swedes who imagined the public as supporters wanted 
to preserve the situation and considered the best way to be open two-way 
dialogue. In Norway, the industry pre-emptively responded to expected 
NIMBY responses through meetings with perceived stakeholders, mainly 
to limit the consequences of protests. The ignorant non-consumers were 
engaged through information campaigns as well as more active attempts to 
bring them on board as trustworthy users of the technology. 
The ways that the publics of bioenergy are imagined in Norway and 
Sweden also tells us something about the role of bioenergy in Norwegian 
and Swedish culture. In particular, the notion of bioenergy as invisible 
to the Swedish publics even though it is the major energy technology in 
the country stands out as a contrast to the Norwegian situation where 
bioenergy, a marginal technology, appears controversial. It is likely that this 
can be attributed to the historical circumstances by which bioenergy was 
introduced in Sweden, that is through familiar infrastructure for district 
heating and combined heat and power.
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Patterns of Energy Transitions 
The Long-Term Role of Energy in the Economic   
Growth of Europe
Silvana Bartoletto
Debates and analyses on the role of energy consumption in economic 
growth and its environmental impact are of central interest today. Most 
studies, however, rely on post-1960 data and they usually focus on a single 
country or region, with a limited perspective on the past. In this article, 
the topic of energy will be analyzed from the viewpoint of economics, 
with a long-term historical perspective, over a period of almost 150 years. 
Several Western European countries will be considered (England, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden). 
In the transition from the old to a modern economy, energy is of 
central importance. In recent studies, energy has been recognized as a 
main determinant of the divergence of Europe from the rest of the world 
in the 19th century and as the main cause of its success.1 Despite the central 
importance of energy, historians dealt for a long time only sporadically with 
energy problems. John Nef was the first historian who analyzed energy as 
the main pillar of the industrial revolution.2 After the energy crisis of the 
1970s, much empirical research took place on energy, within the context of 
1 | Kenneth Pomeranz: The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the Making of 
the Modern World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, 37-
47; Paolo Malanima: Pre-Modern European Economy. One Thousand Years (10th-
19th Centuries). Leiden: Brill, 2009, 49-94.
2 | John Nef: The Rise of the British Coal Industry. London: Routledge & Sons, 
1932 and John Nef: La Naissance de la Civilisation Industrielle et le Monde 
Contemporain. Paris: Colin, 1954.
SILVANA BARTOLETTO306
both economic and environmental history. In 1988, Tony Wrigley analyzed 
the historical transition from organic to mineral resources in the course 
of industrialization of the British economy, stressing the importance 
of energy in the industrial revolution.3 Vaclav Smil dealt with energy 
transitions in a long historical perspective.4 Joachim Radkau analyzed the 
connections between forest history and technological developments from 
the 16th to the 19th century and the energy transition in the wider context of 
environmental history.5 
The aim of this article is to examine the role of energy in long-term 
economic growth. The analysis relies on new data that so far have been 
mostly used in analyses of long-term trends in energy consumption.6 In 
the first part, I will explain the main changes which have taken place in 
the energy system over the past two centuries, and in particular the energy 
transition from traditional to modern energy sources. In the second 
3 | Edward Anthony Wrigley: Continuity, Chance and Change: The Character of 
the Industrial Revolution in England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988.
4 | Vaclav Smil: Energy in World History. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
5 | Joachim Radkau: Nature and Power. A Global History of the Environment. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. On these aspects see also Rolf 
P. Sieferle: The Subterranean Forest. Energy Systems and the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Cambridge: White Horse Press, 2001; Clive Ponting: Storia Verde del Mon-
do. Torino: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1991. 
6 | Long-term trends in energy consumption have been quantified by the Energy, 
Growth and Pollution Network which was set up in 2003 to link together histori-
ans working on the history of energy use and its consequences for the economy 
and environment in Europe from ca. 1500 to the present. The first stage of the 
group’s work has consisted of developing a common methodology for quantifying 
energy inputs into the economy and publishing sets of data as the basis for fur-
ther research, including the first detailed and reliable quantification of consump-
tion of ‘traditional’ energy carriers in the pre-industrial and modern era for a 
wide range of countries. This provides a reliable quantitative basis for investiga-
tion of the role of energy in economic growth, especially the impact and cause of 
transition between ‘energy carriers’. Other areas of study include the relationship 
between energy consumption and income levels (energy intensity) in the long-
term, CO
2
 emissions and energy use. For fur ther details see www.histecon.magd.
cam.ac.uk/ees/energy_and_growth.html.
PATTERNS OF ENERGY TRANSITIONS 307
part, I will reconstruct the current structure of energy consumption. 
The next section will explore the relation between energy, economy and 
technological change. Energy intensity, i.e. the ratio of energy to output, 
and its reciprocal, i.e. energy productivity, will be reconstructed and I will 
try to show the relative importance both of rising consumption and of 
changes in the productivity of energy in growth of per capita output. In 
the final part, I will discuss the constraints of the current energy system. 
The paper’s long-term outlook may serve to clarify contemporary trends 
and provide perspectives on the impact of policy decisions on the energy 
problem. 
THE ENERGY TR ANSITION
Over the past two centuries there has been a massive and continuing 
increase in the consumption of fossil fuels: first coal and then oil and 
natural gas. Large-scale use of fossil fuels has led to greatly increased 
energy consumption. Since 1800, energy consumption in Western Europe 
has grown about six fold, in per capita terms (Fig. 1) and 26 fold in total 
terms. 
At the end of the 18th century, the main sources of energy were food, 
firewood and fodder for working animals. A relatively small contribution 
came from two other carriers: falling water, utilized by watermills, and 
wind, exploited by sailboats and mills. Modern growth, from about 1820 
to the present, has marked a sharp rise both in the energy sources and in 
the efficiency of their utilization. This change can be defined as an ‘energy 
transition’. The transition to modern growth is explained as a discontinuity 
founded on the increase in productive capacity, due to the introduction 
of new energy carriers (fossil fuels) and engines able to transform energy 
into mechanical work. Although other deep changes occurred in the use of 
energy before the modern era7, this transition is considered a watershed 
between past and present.
7 | For instance the use of fire, which represented the most fundamental con-
quest in the history of energy.
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Figure 1: Per Capita Energy Consumption in Europe, 1820-2003 (Gigajoules)
The profound and rapid changes, which took place especially in the 
second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, accelerated the 
process of transition to the new energy system. The strong population 
growth, worsening climate conditions and the decline of per capita 
amount of traditional energy sources are the main causes. Especially in 
the first half of the 19th century, there was a marked acceleration in the 
rate of population growth. In just 50 years, from 1800 to 1850, Europe’s 
population expanded from 189 to 288 million.8 The balance between the 
established renewable energy sources on the one hand and the growing 
population on the other was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain 
within the prevailing energy system. Wood, the main energy source until 
the eve of the Industrial Revolution, became increasingly scarce. The 
energy crisis played an important role for the urbanization process. To 
feed the growing urban population, the surrounding countryside needed 
to produce an adequate exchange and agricultural surplus.9 However, the 
8 | Malanima: Pre-Modern European Economy, 49-94.
9 | With the widespread use of coal instead of wood, cities began to change and grow 
rapidly, especially since the beginning of the 19th century. For the case of London see 
Robert C. Allen: The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; for the case of Naples and other Ital-
ian cities see Silvana Bartoletto: “Dalla Legna al Carbon Fossile. I Consumi di 
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whole system reached a critical point when population growth exceeded 
that of agricultural production. 
Deforestation for claiming more arable land had already sharply reduced 
the availability of wood, but it was the acceleration of a series of industrial 
and commercial activities which brought about a real energy crisis. The 
food, glass and soap industries consumed enormous quantities of wood, 
but the highest demand came from shipbuilding and iron production. To 
understand the magnitude of the energy crisis, it must be kept in mind 
that wood was the dominant industrial resource as it was used as a fuel and 
as raw material for instruments, machines, tools and equipment, but also 
for many end products. It had the same importance as fossil fuels today.10 
Jeremy Rifkin introduced the concept of ‘watershed entropy’ to explain the 
transition from one energy system to another: It was the scarcity of wood 
that determined its replacement by coal. However, it was not simply the 
substitution of one energy source with another, but it resulted in a radical 
change in the way of life.11
There are, however, quite a few dissenting opinions on the subject 
of ‘energy crises’. Joachim Radkau for instance, has criticized the thesis 
that the Industrial Revolution should be seen as a consequence of the 
catastrophic shortage of wood resources that necessitated the transition 
to coal, first in England and then in other parts of Europe.12 Robert Allen 
has recently maintained that there was no energy crisis in the 18th century.13 
Instead, coal was abundant and cheap in Britain and wages were high in 
Combustibile a Napoli nel Corso dell’Ottocento”, in: Mélanges de l’Ecole Françai-
se de Rome 116 (2004), 705-21; Silvana Bartoletto: “L’Energia delle Città. Per-
corsi di Ricerca, Muovendo dal Caso di Napoli”, in: Gabriella Corona/Simone Neri 
Serneri, eds. Storia e Ambiente. Città, Risorse e Territori nell’Italia Contempora-
nea. Roma: Carocci, 2007, 218-33; Silvana Bartoletto: “Energy Consumption in 
Naples between the 19th and the 20th Centuries”, in: Working Papers Department 
of Economic Studies, University of Naples Parthenope 3, 2009.
10 | Lewis Mumford: Tecnica e Cultura. Milano: il Saggiatore, 1961. Original: 
Technics and Civilization. New York: Brace & Company, 1934.
11 | Jeremy Rifkin: Entropia. Milano: Baldini & Castoldi, 2000.
12 | Radkau: Nature and Power, 195.
13 | Robert C. Allen: “Was There a Timber Crisis in Early Modern Europe?”, in: Si-
monetta Cavaciocchi, ed. Economia e Energia secc. XIII-XVIII, Istituto Internazio-
nale di Storia Economica. Firenze: Le Monnier, 2003, 469-82.
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comparison to other countries in Europe and Asia. Thus, it was profitable 
for Britain to replace workers by machines, and that is why the use of 
coal and steam engines increased rapidly.14  Paolo Malanima, by contrast, 
emphasized the role of energy crises in the energy transition.15 He argued 
that “Allen’s conclusion is only correct if we look at pre-modern energy 
sources in a partial way; that is if we consider firewood and fuels as the 
only sources of energy, excluding others. However, considering energy in a 
wider perspective, including, that is, food for humans and animals, we can 
not but disagree with Allen’s view.”16 
The analysis of the times and ways of the passage from an energy system 
based on traditional energy sources to another based on fossil fuels reveals 
considerable differences between countries. The energy transition occurred 
very rapidly in northern Europe, particularly in England and Wales, where 
in the mid-19th century fossil fuels represented about 91 percent of total 
consumption while the percentage of traditional energy sources dropped 
to only 9 percent (Tab. 1). In the Netherlands in 1850, traditional energy 
sources represented the largest part of total consumption, but fossil fuels 
had already gained an important position with 41 percent of the total. The 
profile of energy balance that emerges from comparative data for Sweden, 
Italy and Spain is very different. In these three countries in 1850, the role of 
fossil fuels was very marginal. In Southern Europe at the beginning of the 
20th century, the traditional sources of energy accounted for 70-80 percent 
of the energy consumed.17 
14 | Allen: The British Industrial Revolution; Joseph Zeira: “Workers, Machines 
and Economic Growth”, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:4 (1998), 
1091-117.
15 | Paolo Malanima: “Energy Crisis and Growth 1650-1850: The European De-
viation in a Comparative Perspective,” in: Journal of Global History 1 (2006), 
101-21.
16 | Paolo Malanima: “The Path Towards the Modern Economy. The Role of Ener-
gy”, in: Bruno Chiarini, Paolo Malanima, eds. From Malthus’ Stagnation to Sus-
tained Growth, Rivista di Politica economica  (aprile-giugno 2010/2011), 89.
17 | Silvana Bartoletto/Mar M. Rubio: “Energy Transition and CO
2
 Emissions 
in Southern Europe: Italy and Spain (1861-2000)”, in: Global Environment 2 
(2008), 46-81.
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Muscle 7 25 38 41 50
Firewood 0 73 11 51 46
Wind, water 2 <1 10 1 2
Fossil fuels 91 2 41 7 2
In Italy and Spain in particular, only on the eve of World War II was the 
contribution of traditional energy sources reduced to less than half of total 
consumption. In Italy, the scarcity of fossil fuels resulted in fuel costs 3 to 
5 times higher than in competing Western European economies. In order 
to get a clearer view of these differences we can also consider production 
quantities. In 1910, the United Kingdom produced about 270,000 tons 
of coal per year, Germany 150,000, and Italy only 3,000.18 The scarcity of 
energy resources has seriously affected the process of industrialization 
in Italy, which has followed a different path compared to countries like 
England where the industrial revolution came about much earlier. In fact, 
Italy has been specializing in industries with a high intensity of labor, which 
has been abundantly available, and a low intensity of energy, which has 
been scarce. This confirms the thesis that the adoption of energy intensive 
technologies (e.g. the steam engine) was not beneficial everywhere, but 
depended crucially on the price of production factors.19 
ENERGY CONSUMP TION
Currently, energy consumption in Europe is about 1,759 Million Tons 
of Oil Equivalent (Mtoe) and fossil fuels represent 80 percent of total 
consumption. Oil is the main energy source, with a percentage of about 
33 percent, followed by natural gas (24.6 percent) and coal (18.8 percent). 
In comparison, the role of renewable energy remains very marginal, 
18 | Carlo Bardini: Senza Carbone nell’Età del Vapore. Gli Inizi dell’Industrializ-
zazione Italiana. Milano: B. Mondadori, 1998.
19 | Zeira: “Workers, Machines and Economic Growth”, 1091-117.
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representing only 8 percent of total consumption (Fig. 2). If we examine 
the evolution of the structure of fossil fuel consumption in a long-
term perspective, it is possible to identify three main phases: the first, 
culminating in the early 1950s, which saw coal in first place in order of 
importance of fossil fuels; a second phase, during which the consumption 
of oil exceeds that of coal; a third phase, following the energy crises of the 
1970s, which saw the emergence of natural gas as an energy source and 
the growth of nuclear power, while the use of oil remains predominant, not 
only in Europe but also worldwide. 
Figure 2: Energy Consumption in Europe in 2007 by Energy 
Sources (percentages)
Note: Renewables include hydro (1.51 percent), geothermal 
(0.32), solar/wind/other (0.61), renewable and waste (5.7).
In the years following the oil crises, one of the main objectives of European 
energy policy and more generally of industrialized countries has been to 
shift the supply and demand of energy to the non-oil sources, since they 
were considered politically more secure. Achieving this goal would entail, 
on the industrial level, the expansion of nuclear power and increased use 
of coal in thermoelectric generation besides the intensification of the uses 
of natural gas not only in industry but especially in residential heating and 
cooking.
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Final energy consumption in Europe is about 1,224 Mtoe, corresponding 
to 15 percent of the world’s final energy consumption.20 Over time, energy 
consumption in various sectors has changed (Fig. 3).  
Figure 3: Final Energy Consumption in Europe in 2007, by Sectors 
(percentages)
Note: Data refers to EU 27.
The agricultural sector has lost ground to the industry, transport and service 
sectors, the latter being more intensive in energy use and making almost 
exclusive use of modern energy sources. The transport sector represents 
about 27 percent of total final consumption, while industry’s share 
amounts to 25 percent. The tertiary sector, which includes the residential, 
commercial and public sectors, represents 34 percent of the total. Energy 
consumption in the industrial sector has decreased since 1973, not only 
percentage-wise, but also in absolute terms.
20 | Total final energy consumption is the sum of consumption by the dif ferent 
end-use sectors: industry, transport, residential, commercial and public servic-
es, agriculture, forestry, fishing. Non energy-use covers those fuels that are used 
as raw materials in the dif ferent sectors and are not consumed as a fuel or trans-
formed into another fuel.
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Typically, over the course of economic development, the output mix 
changes. In the earlier phases of development, there is a shift away from 
agriculture towards heavy industry, and in the later stages there is a shift 
from the more resource-intensive extractive and heavy industrial sectors 
toward services and lighter manufacturing. Different industries have 
different energy intensities. This typically results in an increase in energy 
used per unit of output in the earlier stages of economic development and 
a reduction in energy used per unit output in later stages. 
ENERGY INTENSIT Y 
To analyze the relation between energy and economic growth it is 
important to consider two indicators, energy intensity and its reciprocal, 
energy productivity.
Energy intensity is the ratio of consumed energy to the gross domestic 
product (GDP) and expresses the energy required to produce one monetary 
unit of income. In particular, primary energy intensity is calculated as the 
ratio of gross domestic energy consumption to GDP, while final energy 
intensity is obtained by dividing the final consumption of energy by GDP.
As a first approximation, a decline over time in energy intensity 
beyond a certain level of income could be interpreted in terms of increased 
efficiency of economic systems. What does increase or decrease the ratio 
of energy intensity is the change in energy consumption (numerator) 
compared to GDP denominator. If the numerator (energy) increases less 
than the denominator (GDP), then the energy intensity decreases. The 
indicator shows to what extent there is a decoupling between gross energy 
consumption and economic growth, but not the reasons for the trend. It is, 
in fact, an indicator that enables us to grasp the complexity of the energy-
economy link. To consider it as a measure of the efficiency of an economic 
system may lead to erroneous conclusions. The change in energy intensity 
of a given country over time reflects the different nature of the relationship 
between the growth of energy consumption and the underlying level of 
economic development. The energy intensity curve shows a trend that 
varies depending on the state of economic growth. In particular, if the 
calculation of energy consumption only includes modern energy, the curve 
grows rapidly during the industrialization phase and reaches its peak at 
the stage of industrial maturity; afterwards, the energy intensity tends to 
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decrease with increasing income, therefore the corresponding curve also 
decreases thanks to the growth of the services with high added value.
According to an interpretation widespread among economists, energy 
consumption does not increase in proportion to GDP. The relationship 
between energy and GDP (energy intensity) shows a pattern which 
resembles an inverted U-shaped curve or a curve that grows in the early 
stages of industrialization and subsequently declines during the post-
industrial period. This theory was supported in an influential article of 
Jose Goldenberg and Amulya Reddy, published in the Scientific American 
in 1990.21 This study, however, did not take into account traditional energy 
sources that were consumed before the introduction of fossil fuels. More 
recent studies, conducted with reference to countries such as Italy, Spain, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, have shown that in the longer term, energy 
intensity tends to decrease and the respective curve does not show an 
inverted U-shape if the calculation also includes traditional energies (Fig. 
4).22
Figure 4: Energy Intensity in Europe, 1800-2000 (Megajoules/1990 $ ppp) 
21 | Jose Goldenberg/Amulya Reddy: “Energy for the Developing World”, in: Sci-
entific American 263:3 (1990), 111-18.
22 | Ben Gales/Astrid Kander/Paolo Malanima/Mar M. Rubio: “North versus 
South. Energy Transition and Energy Intensity in Europe over 200 Years”, in: Euro-
pean Review of Economic History 11 (2007), 219-51.
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For England and Wales, the estimated trends diverge widely prior to 1850, 
depending on which estimates for GDP have been chosen. Energy intensity 
rose steadily peaking in 1883. After 1883, with a few exceptions, energy 
intensity showed a steadily declining level until the 1990s, with particularly 
rapid drops in periods when the traditional manufacturing industry was 
struggling: the early 1930s and 1973-88.23
There is no consensus on the causes of the downward trend in energy 
intensity. For Italy, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands, more recent 
studies have shown that the growth of services in economic structure 
determines only about 15 percent of the total reduction in energy intensity. 
Technological change has played a more important role in this decline 
than services’ growth. Thanks to mainly technological progress, further 
economic growth with decreasing energy intensity becomes possible. 
Not only technical changes but also many other variables have affected 
progress in energy intensity trends, e.g. structural changes, energy prices 
and the quality of energy. Since technical and structural changes occur 
simultaneously in the economy, it is hard to determine which of the two 
variables is responsible for changes in energy intensity. The use of new 
energy sources stimulated and, at the same time, came about as a result 
of the exploitation of new technologies which in turn, had an impact on 
productivity, the prices of commodities and their consumption. 
Production can be boosted either by means of a quantitative increase 
of production factors or by increasing overall productivity. Investment 
and capital increases are one of the most important growth factors in 
industrialized countries. However, as far as energy intensity is concerned, 
the quality of production factors is far more important than their quantity. 
In the industrial sector, for example, microelectronics has facilitated 
automation and coordination of production systems, and this has affected 
both labor demand and energy consumption. Microelectronics has also had 
a decisive impact on other sectors of the economy.24 Automobiles, TV-sets, 
23 | Paul Warde: Energy Consumption in England and Wales. Naples: Consiglio 
Nazionale delle Ricerche, Istituto di Studi sulle Società del Mediterraneo, 2007.
24 | I refer especially to the semiconductor, which is considered the most spec-
tacular macroinvention of the 20th century (Joel Mokyr: The Gifts of Athena. Prin-
ceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, 112). For a deeper analysis of the 
role of technological and scientific knowledge in the economic development dur-
ing the past two centuries, see also Mokyr’s The Lever of Riches: Technological 
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radios, and household appliances all rely on electronic circuitry, and this 
affects energy consumption. Going back in time, in the industrial sector, 
assembly-line production was important for specialization and economies 
of scale, and electricity played a decisive role in raising productivity in 
assembly lines since they employed electric motors. 
Energy prices have a crucial impact on the development of energy 
intensity. When prices rise, energy intensity tends to decrease for a more 
efficient use of energy thanks either to increasingly efficient energy 
utilization or to a structural shift. In fact, the reduction in energy intensity 
means energy savings per unit of output and it is caused, first of all, by 
the desire to save money in the production process in order to maintain 
or increase profits, as demonstrated by past experiences. During the 1950s 
and 60s, when energy was plentiful and cheap, energy intensity was high. 
Following the oil crises of the 1970s and the large increase in oil prices, 
total world energy intensity has decreased. From 0.32 (toe/thousand 2000 
U.S. $ ppp) in 197125, the intensity dropped to 0.20 in 2007 (Fig. 5).
 
Figure 5: Energy Intensity Trends in Europe (1971-2008)
Creativity and Economic Progress. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990 and 
Leggere la Rivoluzione Industriale. Bologna: il Mulino, 1997. 
25 | Energy consumption is expressed in tons oil equivalent (toe), while GDP is 
expressed in 2000 $ at purchasing power parity (ppp).
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As for European countries, there are very stark differences between those 
that are members of OECD and those that are not. Non-OECD countries 
have much higher energy intensity, although over the last forty years, the 
decline was much sharper than that of other European countries.
However, the energy intensity indicator alone is not sufficient to 
understand the complexity of the link between energy, economy and 
environment. In particular, from an environmental point of view, 
everything depends on the amount of energy consumed and the mix of 
fuels used. Even if two countries have the same energy intensity or show 
the same trends during a certain time period, there may be significant 
environmental differences between them. In other words, even without 
a significant reduction in energy intensity, the environmental impact of 
energy consumption can be reduced, for example as a result of a change in 
fuel mix. Emblematic are the cases of China and the United States which, 
despite the reduction in their energy intensities, remain the two biggest 
polluters of the earth.
ENERGY PRODUCTIVIT Y
There is no direct link between the energy converted in the production 
of goods and their economic value. Very small amounts of energy 
conversion can create large value and vice versa. The size of energy flow is 
not necessarily correlated with the value we give to a particular economic 
output. At the same time, there is a difference between the thermodynamic 
efficiency of the physical conversion of energy from one form to another 
and the economic efficiency in turning energy into value. Energy carriers, 
whether primary or secondary, are converted into energy services, which 
are heat, motion and light. In line with the second law of thermodynamics, 
all these conversions of energy from one form to another entail losses. 
Thermodynamic efficiency ( ) can be expressed through the ratio (and 
then multiplied by 100)
where Eu is useful energy (or energy services) and Ei is the input of energy 
in the form of a primary or secondary source. 
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The measure of economic and not only thermodynamic efficiency is 
called energy productivity
where Y is output in monetary terms and Ei is the raw input of energy (and 
not energy services) into the economic flow. As far as we know, increases 
in thermodynamic efficiency imply increases in energy productivity. For 
example, the transition from biological engines to mechanical engines, 
which is the main recent change in the energy system, implied both a rise in 
energy yield or efficiency and energy productivity. However, while the first 
formula deals with the mere technical structure of an engine or a series of 
engines, the second is more comprehensive and includes, at the same time, 
both technical and organizational and institutional changes. Productivity 
of energy is not only influenced by the technical capacity of conversion, but 
also by other variables, such as the specialization of economy in particular 
sectors and sub-sectors. If parts of the economy that are more energy-
efficient than others grow faster and provide a greater share of national 
income, the energy productivity of the economy will increase even though 
technical knowledge has not changed. Many variables can influence 
energy productivity such as climate and the structure of the economy. In a 
northern country, specialized in heavy industry, energy productivity can be 
much lower than in a southern region specialized in light industry. 
Also, the level of gross output and changes in the institutions that 
rule the economy, society and the performance of economic variables all 
influence energy productivity.
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Table 2: Energy Productivity, Energy Consumption and Population in 12 Wes-
tern European Countries (1820-2001)
Energy productivity Energy consumption Population
(GDP/GJ) (PJ) (million)
1820 52.71 2,707 115
1850 56.48 4,222 144
1870 52.57 6,450 162
1890 48.24 10,259 187
1913 47.72 17,617 228
1921 53.27 13,832 222
1931 58.27 16,467 237
1941 69.80 17,941 248
1951 67.67 20,107 258
1961 84.75 25,794 276
1971 83.29 40,107 298
1981 99.60 43,133 306
1991 117.76 45,503 314
2001 127.04 51,242 325
Note: This table includes 12 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom.
From the analysis of energy productivity in Europe (Tab. 2), it may be noted 
that the introduction of modern energy carriers and machines implied a 
rise in energy productivity only from the end of the 19th century onwards.26 
Replacing the work of humans (or draught animals) by that of machines 
can bring about either an increase or a reduction in energy productivity, 
26 | For data on energy productivity in Western European countries see Silvana 
Bartoletto: “Energy and Economic Growth in Europe. The Last Two Centuries”, in: 
Bruno Chiarini/Paolo Malanima, eds.: From Malthus’ Stagnation to Sustained 
Growth, Rivista di Politica economica (aprile-giugno 2010/2011), 57-75; Angus 
Maddison: The World Economy. Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD, 2002.
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depending on the efficiency of machines versus muscle power. In the early 
19th century, machines were less energy-efficient than human beings and 
animals; only gradually did the machines’ energy-efficiency surpass that of 
living beings. As long as machines remained less efficient, the increase of 
the machine-work ratio resulted in a reduction in energy productivity. And 
conversely, ever since machines became more efficient than living beings, 
every increase in the ratio of machine work to human or animal muscle 
power has determined an increase in overall energy productivity.
In the case of Western Europe, energy productivity fell from 52.71 (GDP/
GJ) in 1820 to 47.72 (GDP/GJ) in 1913 (Tab. 2). During this period, the GDP 
increase depended totally on the growth of energy consumption. From the 
First World War to the Second World War, there was an important increase 
in energy productivity. Improvements in the efficiency of the techniques 
of energy exploitation played a very important role. Otherwise, in the 
1950s and 60s, economic growth was sustained not only by an increase in 
energy productivity, but also by a strong increase of energy consumption. 
Oil was the main energy source and since it was abundant and cheap, no 
particular attention was paid to energy saving methods. After the 1970s oil 
crises, the productivity of energy played a more important role than energy 
consumption. 
In order to better understand the relative importance of the input 
of energy and the efficiency of its exploitation, we can carry out a 
decomposition analysis of per capita GDP. Per capita GDP (Y/P) is, in 
fact, the product of energy consumption per capita (E/P) multiplied by the 
productivity of energy (Y/E):
If we assume:
y as the rate of growth of Y/P;
e as the rate of growth of E/P; and
π as the rate of growth of Y/E;
we can specify the relative importance of e and π in the growth of y, during 
the period concerned; that is the years from 1820-30 until 2000. Thus:
y=e+ π
SILVANA BARTOLETTO322
Table 3: Rates of Growth of Per Capita GDP (y), Per Capita Energy Consump-
tion (e) and Productivity of Energy (π) 1820-2000 in Western Europe
y e π
1820-1850 0.42 0.32 0.10
1850-1870 0.50 0.65 -0.16
1870-1890 0.51 0.70 -0.19
1890-1913 0.63 0.65 -0.02
1913-1921 -0.58 -1.18 0.60
1921-1931 0.86 0.47 0.39
1931-1941 0.96 0.18 0.78
1941-1951 0.19 0.32 -0.13
1951-1961 1.76 0.78 0.98
1961-1971 1.51 1.59 -0.08
1971-1981 0.98 0.20 0.78
1981-1991 0.84 0.11 0.73
1991-2001 0.70 0.37 0.33
From 1820 until the First World War, a remarkable decline took place in 
energy productivity, especially during the period 1850-1890 (Tab. 3). The 
input of energy contributed more than the productivity of energy to the 
growth of GDP. From 1913, both the contribution of rising consumption 
and its more efficient use determined a growth in GDP, with some 
differences. The rate of growth of energy productivity was much higher 
than the rate of growth of per capita energy consumption during the 
periods 1913-1921, 1931-1941 and 1971-1991, reaching a maximum during the 
decade 1951-1961. During the 1960s, energy productivity slowly diminished 
because energy, especially oil, was both abundant and cheap and energy 
use was less efficient. After the severe oil crises of the 1970s, the higher 
price of energy encouraged more efficient exploitation and a decline of 
energy consumption in the industrial sector. Compared to other continents, 
Europe today has the highest energy productivity and the lowest energy 
intensity. Because of the high dependence on fossil fuels, the reserves of 
which are finite, and the high price of energy, Europe’s energy policies are 
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aimed at increasing the ratio of renewable energy and improving energy 
efficiency.
THE CONSTR AINTS OF THE CURRENT ENERGY SYSTEM
Currently, world total primary energy consumption is 12,267 Mtoe and it 
has doubled since the beginning of the 1970s.27 The increase has been 
determined by several causes. Not only population growth, but also the 
increase of final energy consumption played a very important role. In 1973, 
about 60 percent of total final energy consumption was concentrated in 
OECD countries. During the following years, this percentage declined and 
in 2008 final energy consumption in OECD countries was 43.8 percent. In 
contrast, in China and Asia, total final energy consumption has doubled. It 
also increased significantly in the former Soviet Union and in the Middle 
East. From 1973 to 2008, the percentage of oil consumption on total final 
energy consumption in the world declined from 48.1 to 41.6 percent. Coal 
is employed mainly in industry (78.5 percent), oil is consumed mostly for 
transport (61.4), while gas is used mainly in the tertiary sectors but also 
plays an important role in industry (35.1).
The world energy balance is changing due to the enormous growth in 
the energy consumption of China and India, whose role in international 
trade of fossil fuels continues to increase. The strong economic growth of 
these two countries in recent years has resulted in a significant increase 
in their demand for energy, which is increasingly met through imports. 
The energy resources of China, especially coal, are substantial, but not 
enough to completely satisfy its growing needs. In the first half of 2007, 
China became a net importer of coal.28 In India, coal remains the main 
fuel. It is expected that over the next 20 years India will even triple its 
coal consumption.29 The growing worldwide demand for energy has led 
27 | International Energy Agency (IEA): Key World Energy Statistics 2010. Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2010. Data on total world energy consumption refers to 2008.
28 | On the Chinese energy transition pattern see also Vaclav Smil: Energy Tran-
sitions – History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010, 
95-99.
29 | International Energy Agency (IEA): World Energy Outlook 2007. Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2007, 3. 
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to considerable concern about the security of energy supplies because of 
growing competition between countries for supplies and the increasing 
dependence of the consuming countries on few producing countries, which 
are often politically unstable. The concentration of oil and gas reserves in 
a small group of countries, particularly in Russia and the countries of the 
Middle East members of OPEC, determines their market dominance. The 
greater the increase in the demand for oil and gas in these regions, the 
greater the likelihood of rising prices. In Europe, the problem of secure 
energy supplies has become an issue as a result of increasing energy 
dependence.30 Since 1990, the energy dependence of Europe has grown 
from 45 to 55 percent (Fig. 7).
Figure 6: Energy Dependency in Europe, 1990-2007 (Mtoe)
From the mid 18th century until the first half of the 20th century, coal was 
the main energy source on which Europe built its industrial power, largely 
under conditions of energy autonomy. With the outset of the age of oil 
and later of natural gas, imports of energy sources have become inevitable 
and are steadily growing. Only after the energy crises of the 1970s did the 
30 | Energy dependency is calculated as net imports (imports-exports) divided 
by total energy consumption. 
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problem of energy dependence and security of energy supply in Europe 
capture the attention of the economic policy debate.
Italy is certainly one of the countries with the highest levels of energy 
dependency, as about 90 percent of its energy demand is met by fossil fuel 
imports, notably through oil and natural gas. Following the oil crises of the 
1970s, natural gas consumption has greatly increased in Italy, currently 
representing 39 percent of total demand. However, oil remains the main 
source of energy, because it represents 42 percent of total demand.31 In 
Italy, energy policies have failed to reduce the degree of dependence. 
The diversification of the energy sources supply has been only marginal, 
replacing imported oil with imported natural gas. Not only Italy, but also 
other European countries have invested in natural gas. In fact, the greater 
part of new thermoelectric capacity installed in Europe over the past ten 
years is fuelled by gas, which currently provides about a quarter of Europe’s 
electricity production, compared to 7 percent in the early 1980s.32 However, 
having focused so strongly on natural gas, for the European Union this has 
meant a greater dependence on imports.
After the oil crises, several European countries have invested heavily in 
nuclear power. In France, for example, nuclear power is the main energy 
source, with a share of 43 percent of total demand. In Sweden, nuclear 
power represents 33 percent of total consumption.
The recent disaster at the Fukushima nuclear plant has reignited the 
debate on the use of nuclear power, leading some countries to abandon it 
permanently. In Germany, where nuclear power currently accounts for 22 
percent of the electricity needs of the country, the government has decided 
to shut down all reactors by 2020, following strong protests against the 
use of atomic energy. In Italy in 2008, the Berlusconi government had 
announced it would resume its nuclear program through the construction 
of four third-generation nuclear power plants, with the aim of covering at 
least 10 percent of Italy’s energy demand. But, after the Fukushima disaster, 
following the referendum in June of 2011, Italy has once again abandoned 
the project to produce electricity by splitting the atom. Risks associated 
with the process of nuclear power generation are very serious, as amply 
demonstrated by the disasters of Fukushima (2011) and Chernobyl in the 
31 | International Energy Agency (IEA): Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 
2009 edition. Paris: OECD/IEA, 2009. 
32 | Alberto Clô: Il Rebus Energetico. Bologna: il Mulino, 2008, 45-82.
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Ukraine (1986). Another serious problem is how to deal with radioactive 
waste from nuclear power plants. The approximately 440 existing nuclear 
reactors in 31 countries produce thousands of tons of waste annually.33 In 
addition, there is the risk that certain countries that have nuclear technology 
may use it to develop nuclear weapons.
Thus, in seeking a more secure and reliable energy system, increased 
deployment of renewable energy sources is essential. The heated political 
and economic debate on unsustainable present-day energy consumption 
encourages the development of a more secure and sustainable energy 
consumption model. Great hopes are placed especially on wind, hydro-
electric, and solar energy. The capital intensity of renewable energy is 
greater than that of fossil fuels and therefore the investment required to 
create additional generating capacity from renewable sources is very high. 
Thus, energy policies should focus on the goal of increasing the importance 
of the combination of different renewable energy sources, as approved 
in the package “Climate Action and Renewable Energy”, adopted by the 
European Council on April 6, 2009. Here, member states have agreed to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 20 percent below 1990 levels by 
2020 and to increase energy efficiency by 20 percent, reaching a quota of 
20 percent renewable energy for end use by 2020. Of course, the answers 
to the problem vary from country to country. Oil is the main source of 
energy in the world and will remain so for a long time, even under the most 
optimistic assumptions about growth rates and diffusion of alternative 
technologies. A quantitatively significant transition from fossil fuels to 
new renewable sources cannot be seen only in the long term perspective. A 
market penetration of renewables will require strong public support for a 
rapid development of technologies to reduce costs of producing and using 
renewable energy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In recent years, the emphasis on energy within the transition from the 
old to the modern economy has received new attention. During the last 
two centuries, the energy system has changed, shifting from renewables to 
non-renewable energy sources. Currently, fossil fuels represent 80 percent 
33 | Clô: Il Rebus Energetico, 97-109.
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of total consumption in Europe and in the world. Following large-scale use 
of fossil fuels, energy consumption grew exceptionally strongly, especially 
after the Second World War.
The transition from traditional renewable energy sources to fossil fuels 
was a slow process because the two sources have coexisted for a long time. 
We could say that the present energy balance represents the result of a 
long and slow evolution of the energy system and of technologies used 
to transform energy into work. In Europe, the use of coal during the 17th 
century and much of the 18th century remained modest and devoid of real 
importance in the economy. An exception is northern England and the 
Netherlands, whose economic success, especially since the 17th century, 
was largely dependent on the exploitation of new energy sources. Until the 
early decades of the 20th century, much of Western Europe still depended 
significantly on traditional energy sources. Working animals continued to 
play an important role in agriculture and transport. Wood was still widely 
used for heating and cooking. Not only that, but in vast regions, wood, 
water and wind represented the major sources of energy in industry even 
in the late 19th century. The advantages of energy-intensive manufacturing 
and transport technologies are immediately visible in the trend of energy 
productivity (Y/E), which is the reciprocal of energy intensity formula 
(E/Y). Analyzing the trend of energy productivity in Europe, we can 
identify four periods during which the energy-growth relationship has 
presented different characteristics. A first phase, which covered the 
time span from 1820 to the end of the 19th century, is characterized by a 
reduction of energy productivity. A second phase lasted from the beginning 
of the 20th century until the Second World War. In this period, the 
improvements in the efficiency of techniques of energy utilization played 
a more important role for economic growth than the amount of energy 
used. In a third phase, from post-World War II until the energy crises of 
the 1970s, the output growth was sustained mainly by the increase in the 
availability of energy sources and not by increases in the thermodynamic 
efficiency of techniques used. During the fourth phase following the oil 
crises, improvements in the efficiency of energy exploitation played and 
continue to play an important role in economic growth. Despite growing 
awareness of European dependency on finite fossil energy sources and the 
growth of CO2 emissions, the consumption of renewable energy sources 
remains marginal. If in the past century, the transition to fossil fuels was 
an important condition to overcome the limits to growth, today we risk 
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a new ‘trap’ without a new transition path towards a new energy system 
where renewable energy will play an important role.
UNITS OF ME ASURE
Kilocalorie (Kcal): 4,1868 Joule
Joule (J) or kilojoule: 0,239 kcal
Gigajoule (Gj): 1 million of kilojoule
Petajoule (Pj): 1 million of gigajoule
Tons oil equivalent (toe): 10 million of kcal
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